

By Mr. OLMSTED: Petition of numerous voters of Steelton, Pa., urging the passage of Senate bill 1890, the per diem pension bill—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, petition of General E. O. C. Ord Circle, No. 20, Ladies of the Grand Army of the Republic, of Harrisburg, Pa., favoring a bill providing pensions to certain officers and men in the Army and Navy of the United States when 50 years of age and over, and increasing widows' pensions to \$12 per month—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. RICHARDSON of Alabama: Petition of R. W. Shaw, of Cherokee County, Ala., for reference of war claim to the Court of Claims—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. RUSSELL: Petition of the National Association of Retail Druggists, urging the immediate reduction of the internal-revenue tax on alcohol to 70 cents a gallon—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SHOWALTER: Petitions of 1,800 citizens of Newcastle, 300 citizens of Euclid and West Liberty, and numerous churches in Lawrence County, Pa., for an amendment to the Constitution preventing polygamous marriages—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SKILES: Papers to accompany House bill granting a pension to May E. Bunn, widow of Maj. George B. Bunn, deceased—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, petition of A. W. James and others, of Morrow County, Ohio, for the passage of a service pension bill—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SULZER: Resolutions of Musicians' Mutual Benefit Association No. 41, of New York City, in favor of the proposed increase of pay of letter carriers—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

Also, petition of Daniel E. Ryan and other citizens of New York City, for the repeal of the tariff on beef, veal, mutton, and pork—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. TRIMBLE: Petitions of numerous citizens of Fayette County, Ky., and vicinity, in favor of House bills 178 and 179, for the repeal of the tax on distilled spirits—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

## SENATE.

WEDNESDAY, May 14, 1902.

Prayer by the Chaplain, Rev. W. H. MILBURN, D. D.

The Secretary proceeded to read the Journal of yesterday's proceedings, when, on request of Mr. ELKINS, and by unanimous consent, the further reading was dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Journal, without objection, will stand approved.

### PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS.

Mr. SCOTT presented a petition of New River Division, No. 140, Order of Railway Conductors, of Hinton, W. Va., praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases; which was ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. FOSTER of Washington presented a petition of the Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, of Seattle, Wash., praying for the enactment of legislation authorizing the granting of pensions to certain officers and enlisted men of the Life-Saving Service of the United States, etc.; which was referred to the Committee on Pensions.

He also presented petitions of Lodge No. 403, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Tacoma; of Mount Tacoma Division, No. 249, Order of Railway Conductors, of Tacoma, and of Puget Sound Lodge, No. 196, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Seattle, all in the State of Washington, praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. PLATT of New York presented a petition of the Merchants' Exchange of Buffalo, N. Y., praying for the enactment of legislation to reorganize the consular service; which was ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented a petition of Local Division No. 167, Order of Railway Conductors, of Oswego, N. Y., praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which was ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented a petition of the Iron Trades Council of San

Francisco, Cal., praying for the enactment of legislation authorizing the construction of war vessels in the navy-yards of the country; which was referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Mr. HARRIS presented the petition of C. Hoffman & Son, of Enterprise, Kans., and a petition of the Kelley Milling Company, of Kansas City, Mo., praying for the adoption of certain reciprocity treaties; which were referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. WETMORE presented a petition of Local Division No. 370, Order of Railway Conductors, of Providence, R. I., praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which was ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented a petition of J. C. Nichols Post, No. 19, Department of Rhode Island, Grand Army of the Republic, of Rockland, R. I., praying for the enactment of legislation providing pensions to certain officers and men in the Army and Navy of the United States when 50 years of age and over and increasing the pensions of widows of soldiers to \$12 per month; which was referred to the Committee on Pensions.

He also presented a memorial of Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Local Union No. 114, American Federation of Labor, of Providence, R. I., remonstrating against the adoption of certain amendments to the copyright law; which was referred to the Committee on Patents.

Mr. WELLINGTON presented a petition of Patapsco Lodge, No. 432, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, of Baltimore, Md., praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which was ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. MITCHELL presented a petition of the Central Labor Council of Astoria, Oreg., praying for the enactment of legislation providing an educational test for immigrants to this country; which was referred to the Committee on Immigration.

Mr. FAIRBANKS presented the petition of G. B. Baird, of Shelbyville, Ind., and the petition of D. W. Edwards, of Indianapolis, Ind., praying for the enactment of legislation providing for the improvement of the post exchanges; which were referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

He also presented the petition of Charles F. Holler, of South Bend, Ind., and the petition of J. C. Martin, of New York City, N. Y., praying for the enactment of legislation to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors in immigrant stations; which were referred to the Committee on Immigration.

He also presented a petition of the Sterling Remedy Company, of Kramer, Ind., praying for the adoption of an amendment to section 4 of the act of June 13, 1898, making appropriation for the postal service, relative to second, third, and fourth class mail matter; which was referred to the Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads.

He also presented petitions of Dr. Moses H. Waters and sundry other physicians, of James P. Stunkard and sundry other attorneys, of Barker & Walsh and sundry other liquor dealers, of E. H. Bindley & Co. and sundry other wholesale druggists, and of C. W. West & Co. and sundry other retail druggists, all of Terre Haute, in the State of Indiana, praying for the adoption of an amendment to the internal-revenue law relative to the tax on distilled spirits; which were referred to the Committee on Finance.

Mr. PLATT of Connecticut presented a petition of Still River Lodge, No. 493, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, of Danbury, Conn., praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which was ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented a petition of Grand Division, Sons of Temperance, of Connecticut, praying for an increase of the allowance for rations to the soldiers in the Army; which was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

He also presented a petition of sundry citizens of Bridgeport, Fairfield, and Stratford, all in the State of Connecticut, praying for the appointment of a commission to inquire into the condition of the colored people of the country; which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor.

Mr. CULLOM presented a petition of Lincoln Division No. 206, Order of Railway Conductors, of Springfield, Ill., and a petition of Local Division No. 386, Order of Railway Conductors, of East St. Louis, Ill., praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy"

and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. SPOONER presented a resolution adopted at a meeting of the New Holstein Turnverein, of Wisconsin, expressing sympathy with the people of the South American Republic and the Orange Free State; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

He also presented petitions of the Common Council of Racine, and of the Common Council of Kenosha, in the State of Wisconsin, praying for the enactment of legislation authorizing the granting of pensions to those employed in the life-saving service of the country; which were referred to the Committee on Pensions.

He also presented petitions of D. J. Chase Lodge, No. 259, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, of Ashland, and of Superior Division, No. 288, Order of Railway Conductors, of West Superior, in the State of Wisconsin, praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. NELSON presented the affidavit of Ole Larson, of Meeker County, Minn., in support of the bill (S. 570) for the relief of Ole Larson; which was referred to the Committee on Claims.

He also presented a petition of Machinists' Local Union No. 91, American Federation of Labor, of Minneapolis, Minn., praying for the enactment of legislation providing an educational test for immigrants to this country; which was referred to the Committee on Immigration.

He also presented petitions of Grand Army Posts Nos. 28, 144, 141, 62, 159, 102, 90, and 58, of Glencoe, New Auburn, Osakis, Attica, Rockford, Wadena, Crookston, and Rush City, all of the Department of Minnesota, Grand Army of the Republic, in the State of Minnesota, praying for the enactment of legislation providing pensions to certain officers and men in the Army and Navy of the United States when 50 years of age and over, and increasing the pensions of widows of soldiers to \$12 per month; which were referred to the Committee on Pensions.

He also presented petitions of Lodge No. 569, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Duluth; of Lodge No. 122, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of St. Paul; of Local Division No. 40, Order of Railway Conductors, of St. Paul; of Lodge No. 36, Order of Railway Conductors, of Two Harbors; of Lodge No. 519, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, of Duluth; of Lodge No. 525, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Minneapolis; of Local Division No. 99, Order of Railway Conductors, of Montevideo; of Local Division No. 333, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of St. Paul; of Local Division No. 117, Order of Railway Conductors; of Local Division No. 102, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Austin; of Local Division No. 150, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of St. Paul; of Local Division No. 420, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and of Lodge No. 65, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, of Waseca, all in the State of Minnesota, praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. PENROSE presented petitions of 32 citizens of Philadelphia, and of 24 citizens of Whitestown, in the State of Pennsylvania, and of 6 citizens of the State of Indiana, praying for the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution to prohibit polygamy; which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

He also presented petitions of Lieutenant William Allison Post, No. 196, Department of Pennsylvania, Grand Army of the Republic, of Duncannon; of Lieutenant Ezra S. Griffin Post, No. 139, Department of Pennsylvania, Grand Army of the Republic, of Scranton; of Albert Jones Post, No. 383, Department of Pennsylvania, Grand Army of the Republic, of Bangor, and of Encampment No. 105, Department of Pennsylvania, Grand Army of the Republic, of Wellsboro, all in the State of Pennsylvania, praying for the enactment of legislation providing pensions for certain officers and men in the Army and Navy of the United States when 50 years of age and over, and to increase the pensions of widows of soldiers to \$12 per month; which were referred to the Committee on Pensions.

He also presented a petition of Carpenters' Local Union No. 501, American Federation of Labor, of East Stroudsburg, Pa., and a petition of Woman's Labor Union No. 26, American Federation of Labor, of Bradford, Pa., praying for the enactment of legislation to exclude Chinese laborers from the United States and their insular possessions; which were ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented petitions of the Germania Turnverein, of

Philadelphia; of the German-American Alliance, of Philadelphia, and of the Philadelphia Turngemeinde, of Philadelphia, all in the State of Pennsylvania, praying for the adoption of a resolution expressing sympathy with the people of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State; which were referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

He also presented petitions of Essex Lodge, No. 72, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Newark; of Hope Lodge, No. 202, of Netcong; of Shrewsbury Lodge, No. 353, of Long Branch; of Pallisade Lodge, No. 592, of Jersey City; of Hudson Lodge, No. 146, of Jersey City; of Neptune Division, No. 169, Order of Railway Conductors, of Jersey City; of Central Division, No. 157, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Jersey City; of Jersey City Division, No. 53, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Jersey City; of Hoboken Lodge, No. 508, of Hoboken; of Order of Railway Conductors, Morris Division, No. 291, of Hoboken; of Central Lodge, No. 872, of Elizabeth; of Jersey Central Division, No. 307, of Elizabeth; of Division No. 170, of Camden; of Defender Division, No. 312, of Weehawken; of Lodge No. 299, of Passaic; of Lodge No. 491, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Union Hill; of John Franks Lodge, No. 329, of Phillipsburg; of Division No. 373, of Trenton; of Trenton Lodge, No. 38, of Trenton; of Lodge No. 239, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Trenton; of Unity Division, No. 235, of Union; of Greenwood Lake Lodge, of Orange; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Paterson; of Delevan Division, No. 37, of Phillipsburg; of Protection Lodge, No. 2, of Phillipsburg; of Newark Lodge, No. 219, of Newark, all of the State of New Jersey; of Northern Pacific System Division, No. 54, Order of Railroad Telegraphers, of Butte; of Order of Railway Conductors, of Great Falls; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Great Falls; of Kalispell Division, No. 414, Order of Railway Conductors, of Kalispell; of Lodge No. 293, of Missoula; of E. W. Hayes' Division, No. 397, of Beatrice, all of the State of Montana; of Glerietta Lodge, No. 11, of East Las Vegas; of Montezuma Division, No. 70, of East Las Vegas; of Raton Pass Lodge, of Raton; of Lodge No. 608, of Roswell, all of the Territory of New Mexico; of Lodge No. 341, of Roseburg; of Division No. 50, Order of Railway Trainmen, of Portland, all of the State of Oregon; of Railroad Conductors' Division, No. 72, of Fargo; of Great Northern Division, No. 178, of Grand Forks, all of the State of North Dakota; of Order of Railway Conductors, Wolverine Division, No. 182, of Jackson; of Hermalite Lodge, No. 612, of Ishpeming; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen No. 133, of Irving; of Valley City Lodge, No. 1820, of Valley City; of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Division No. 286, of Grand Rapids; of Order of Railway Conductors, Gladstone Division, No. 340; of Order of Railway Conductors, Division No. 6, of Battle Creek; of Detroit Division, No. 1, of Detroit; of Milo Eastman Division, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, No. 482, of East Tawas; of Division No. 266, of Gladstone; of Lodge No. 10, of Marquette; of Central City Lodge, No. 121, of Jackson; of Chief Pontiac Lodge, No. 436, of Pontiac; of St. Clair Lodge, No. 241, of Port Huron; of Mackinaw Division, No. 338, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of West Bay City, all of the State of Michigan; of Flour City Division, No. 494, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Minneapolis; of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Division No. 443, of Melrose; of Division No. 549, of Wilmar; of Lodge No. 194, of Staples; of St. James Lodge, No. 384, of St. James; of Division No. 349, of St. Paul; of Oriental Division, No. 369, of St. Paul; of St. Paul Division, No. 40, of St. Paul; of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers of Two Harbors; of M. Clancy Division, No. 260, of Two Harbors; of Waseca Division, No. 90, Order of Railway Conductors, of Waseca; of Brainerd Division, No. 197, of Staples; of Hill Top Lodge, No. 529, of Proctorknott; of Mesaba Division, No. 405, of Mesaba; of Division No. 99, of Montevideo; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Minneapolis; of Division No. 117, of Minneapolis; of Division No. 357, of Minneapolis; of Minnehaha Division, of Minneapolis, all of the State of Minnesota; of Ingraham Division, No. 303, of Chadron; of Black Hill Lodge, No. 190, of Chadron; of Order of Railway Conductors, Blue Valley Division, No. 343, of Fairbury; of L. S. Cook Division, No. 389, of Fremont; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen of Fremont; of J. D. Mason Lodge, No. 134, of Grand Island; of Claude Champion Division, No. 227, Order Railway Conductors, of Lincoln; of C. W. Bronson Lodge, No. 487, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of McCook; of Platte River Lodge, No. 29, of North Platte; of Omaha Division, No. 126, Order of Railway Conductors, of Omaha; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen of Omaha; of Order of Railroad Telegraphers, Division No. 6, of Omaha; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen of South Omaha; of John McCuniff Division, No. 246, Order of Railway Conductors, of Wymore; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Blue Valley Lodge, No. 493, of Wymore; of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Division No. 158, of Wadsworth; of Camden Division, No. 22, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Wadsworth, all of the State of Nebraska;



of St. Louis Division, No. 3, Order of Railway Conductors, of St. Louis; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Future Great Lodge, No. 45, of St. Louis; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen Pacific Lodge, No. 64, of St. Louis; of Division No. 358, Order of Railway Conductors, of Thayer; of Order of Railway Conductors, Division No. 42, of Trenton; of Southwestern Lodge, No. 50, of Trenton; of New Franklin Division, No. 230, of New Franklin; of Two Rivers Division, No. 151, of Monett; of Grand River Division, No. 393, of Chillicothe; of Sheridan Division, No. 238, of Chillicothe; of Hazel Nelson Lodge, No. 205, of De Soto; of Hannibal Division, No. 39, of Hannibal; of Lodge No. 46, of Hannibal; of Kaw Valley Division, No. 55, of Kansas City; of T. S. Berler Lodge, of Brookfield; of Division No. 48, of St. Louis; of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Division No. 497, of St. Louis; of St. Joseph Division, No. 141, of St. Joseph; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of St. Joseph; of Division No. 327, of St. Louis; of Division No. 107, of St. Joseph; of Stanberry Lodge, No. 562, of Stanberry; of Lodge No. 5, of Slater; of Order of Railway Conductors, of Slater; of Prairie Queen Lodge, No. 18, of Sedalia; of Division No. 178, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Sedalia; of Queen City Division, No. 60, of Sedalia; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen No. 542, of New Franklin, all in the State of Missouri; of Division No. 54, of Port Jervis; of Neversink Division, No. 52, of Port Jervis; of West Shore Lodge, of Ravena; of Division No. 35, of Rochester; of Ira Van Buren Lodge, No. 300, of Potterdam Junction; of Syracuse Division, No. 169, of Syracuse; of Utica Division, No. 14, of Utica; of Division No. 46, of Albany; of Division No. 37, of Albany; of Trojan Lodge, No. 90, of Albany; of Division No. 311, of Binghamton; of Parlor City Lodge, No. 36, of Binghamton; of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Division No. 419, of Brooklyn; of Division No. 15, of Buffalo; of Pan-American Division, No. 544, of Buffalo; of L. S. Coffin Lodge, of Mechanicsville; of Division No. 105, of New York; of New York City Division, No. 54, of New York; of New York Lodge, No. 163, of New York; of Empire City Lodge, No. 197, of New York; of Lodge No. 598, of New York; of Order of Railroad Conductors, of Mechanicsville; of Long Island Division, No. 391, of Long Island City; of Lodge No. 517, of Long Island City; of Division No. 244, of Corning; of Lodge No. 417, of East Buffalo; of Division No. 43, of East Syracuse; of Sherman Lodge, No. 43, of East Syracuse; of Lodge No. 22, of Elmira; of Northern Central Lodge, No. 413, of Elmira; of Storm King Lodge, of Fishkill Landing; of Colonial Lodge, No. 468, of Kingston; of Chemango Lodge, No. 252, of Norwich; of Division No. 58, of Oneonta; of Hopkins Lodge, No. 1, of Oneonta; of Smith M. Weed Lodge, No. 540, of Plattsburg, all of the State of New York; of Ohio City Lodge, No. 237, of Cleveland; of Devereux Division, No. 167, of Cleveland; of J. M. Ferris Lodge, No. 132, of Cleveland; of Cincinnati Lodge, No. 148, of Cincinnati; of Division No. 107, of Cincinnati; of Delta Division, No. 480, of Cincinnati; of Division No. 95, of Cincinnati; of H. A. Kennedy Lodge, No. 395, of Canton; of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Division No. 522, of Chicago Junction; of Deer Lick Division, No. 292, of Chicago Junction; of Lodge No. 380, of Cambridge; of Lake Shore Lodge, of Ashtabula; of Bellevue Division, No. 134, of Bellevue; of C. R. Kline Lodge, No. 224, of Nelsonville; of Division No. 208, of Springfield; of Division No. 4, of Toledo; of Division No. 28, of Toledo; of Jeppa Lodge, No. 397, of Toledo; of Lady of the Lake Lodge, of Toledo; of Lodge No. 260, of Cleveland; of Little Miami Division, No. 34, of Columbus; of Sciota Valley Division, No. 172, of Coes; of Columbus Division; of Hollingsworth Division, No. 100, of Columbus; of Lodge No. 175, of Columbus; of Lodge No. 259, of Conneaut; of Miami Valley Division, No. 320, of Dayton; of Miami Lodge, No. 273, of Dayton; of Dennison Division, No. 278, of Dennison; of Lucas Lodge, No. 618, of East Toledo; of Buckeye Lodge, No. 35, of Galeon; of Brady Lodge, of Kent; of Division No. 299, of Lima; of Lodge No. 504, of Marietta; of Marion Division, No. 360, of Masillon, all of the State of Ohio; of Division No. 104, of Columbia; of Columbia Lodge, No. 117, of Columbia; of Conemaugh Division, No. 406, of Conemaugh; of Division No. 386, of Conemaugh; of Division No. 310, of Derry Station; of Forest Home Division, No. 159, of Derry Station; of Lodge No. 593, of Dubois; of George B. Smith Division, No. 403, of Dunmore; of Onoko Division, No. 257, of East Mauch Chunk; of Easton Division, No. 259, of Easton; of Mountain City Division, No. 172, of Altoona; of United Lodge No. 174, Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, of Altoona; of Fellowship Lodge, No. 405, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Albion; of Keystone Division, No. 293, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Allegheny; of Division No. 272, of Ashley; of Order of Railroad Conductors, Division No. 217, of Bennett; of F. R. McFeather Lodge, No. 534, of Brad-dock; of Division No. 254, of Bradford; of Engineers of Division No. 280, of Bradford; of Morris City Lodge, No. 610, of Bridgeport; of Butler Lodge, No. 251, of Butler; of George W. West Division, No. 468, of Carbondale; of Division No. 166, of Carbon-

dale; of Pennsylvania Division, No. 156, of Carbondale; of E. E. Hendrick Lodge, No. 294, of Carbondale; of Chartiers Valley Lodge, No. 571, of Carnegie; of Clearfield Lodge, No. 261, of Clearfield; of Easton Division, No. 147, of Easton; of Erie Division, No. 64, of Erie; of Erie Lodge, No. 199, of Erie; of Division No. 459, of Harrisburg; of White Block Lodge, No. 127, of Harrisburg; of Harrisburg Lodge, No. 383, of Harrisburg; of Broadtop Division, No. 158, of Huntingdon; of Juniata Lodge, No. 498, of Huntingdon; of Lodge No. 344, of Jersey Shore; of Anthracite Lodge, No. 543, of Kingston; of R. H. Coleman Division, No. 414, of Lebanon; of Mauch Chunk Division, of Mauch Chunk; of McKeesport Lodge, No. 578, of McKeesport; of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Lodge No. 321, of McKees Rocks; of Division No. 43, of Meadville, all of the State of Pennsylvania, praying for the enactment of legislation providing an educational test for immigrants to this country; which were referred to the Committee on Immigration.

Mr. FRYE presented a petition of the Merchants' Exchange of Buffalo, N. Y., and a petition of the Maritime Association of the Port of New York, praying for the reorganization of the consular service; which were ordered to lie on the table.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES.

Mr. LODGE. I am directed by the Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 11728) to classify the rural free-delivery service and fix the compensation to employees thereof, to report it adversely, and to ask that the bill be postponed indefinitely, as the provisions contained in it are embodied in the post-office appropriation bill, which has passed both Houses of Congress.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be postponed indefinitely.

Mr. GAMBLE, from the Committee on Indian Depredations, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them severally without amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (H. R. 8108) for the relief of John Hornick;

A bill (S. 586) for the relief of Frank C. Darling; and

A bill (S. 587) for the relief of A. M. Darling, administrator.

Mr. PLATT of New York, from the Committee on Printing, reported an amendment proposing to appropriate \$50,000 for the purchase by and on behalf of the United States of the right to use in and through the several departments of the Government of the United States the Daniel improvements in the art of map production and general engraving, etc., intended to be proposed to the general deficiency appropriation bill, and moved that it be printed, and, with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Appropriations; which was agreed to.

Mr. DEBOE, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them severally without amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (H. R. 750) granting a pension to Martin Essex;

A bill (H. R. 9226) granting a pension to Elizabeth I. Ogden; and

A bill (H. R. 13503) granting an increase of pension to Charles Haltenhof.

Mr. McCUMBER, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 8921) granting an increase of pension to Jesse C. Rhodaback, reported it without amendment, and submitted a report thereon.

He also, from the same committee, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them each with an amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (S. 4064) granting a pension to Betsy Gumm; and

A bill (S. 5141) granting an increase of pension to Charles Barrett.

Mr. GALLINGER, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them severally without amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (H. R. 3829) granting a pension to Mary Ann Merrow;

A bill (H. R. 13266) granting an increase of pension to Elbert N. Remson;

A bill (H. R. 1715) granting an increase of pension to Henry P. Hudson, formerly Henry P. Dow;

A bill (H. R. 1695) granting an increase of pension to Christopher C. Perry;

A bill (H. R. 2563) granting an increase of pension to Robert R. Strong;

A bill (H. R. 12562) granting an increase of pension to William H. Temple;

A bill (H. R. 14099) granting a pension to Samantha B. Van Brocklin; and

A bill (H. R. 13807) granting a pension to Jeremiah Horan.

Mr. GALLINGER, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 6330) granting an increase of pension to William D. Tanner, reported it with an amendment, and submitted a report thereon.

Mr. TALIAFERRO, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom were referred the following bills, reported them severally without amendment, and submitted reports thereon:

A bill (H. R. 4204) granting a pension to Hester A. Furr; and  
A bill (H. R. 13350) granting a pension to Presley P. Medlin.

Mr. SCOTT, from the Committee on Pensions, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 10201) granting an increase of pension to Otis R. Freeman, reported it without amendment, and submitted a report thereon.

Mr. PENROSE, from the Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads, to whom was referred the bill (S. 4791) authorizing the Postmaster-General to provide for the transportation of the mails by pneumatic tubes or other similar devices, reported adversely thereon, and the bill was postponed indefinitely.

Mr. SPOONER. I am directed by the Committee on Public Health and National Quarantine, to whom was referred the bill (S. 2162) to increase the efficiency and change the name of the United States Marine-Hospital Service, to report it with an amendment, in the nature of a substitute, and to submit a report thereon.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be placed on the Calendar.

Mr. SPOONER, from the Committee on Public Health and National Quarantine, to whom were referred the following bills, reported adversely thereon; and the bills were postponed indefinitely:

A bill (S. 2417) relating to quarantine and the public health;

A bill (S. 4583) to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the Marine-Hospital Service, and for other purposes; and

A bill (S. 4895) to establish a commission of public health and fix the salaries of the commissioned officers of the Marine-Hospital Service.

#### REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE MINT.

Mr. PLATT of New York, from the Committee on Printing, to whom was referred the following concurrent resolution of the House of Representatives, reported it without amendment; and it was considered by unanimous consent, and agreed to:

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring).* That there be printed 6,000 additional copies of the report of the Director of the Mint on the production of the precious metals for the calendar year 1900, bound in cloth and wrapped; 2,000 copies for the use of the House of Representatives, 1,000 for the use of the Senate, and 3,000 copies for the use of the Director of the Mint.

*Resolved.* That there be also printed 8,000 additional copies of the report of the Director of the Mint covering the operations of the mints and assay offices of the United States for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1901, to be bound in cloth and wrapped; 3,000 copies for the use of the House of Representatives, 2,000 for the use of the Senate, and 3,000 for the use of the Director of the Mint.

#### CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS OF FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT.

Mr. BACON. I am instructed by the Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (S. 5383) providing that the circuit court of appeals of the fifth judicial circuit of the United States shall hold at least one term of said court annually in the city of Atlanta, in the State of Georgia, on the first Monday in September in each year, to report it favorably with certain amendments, and to ask for the present consideration of the same.

The Secretary read the bill; and by unanimous consent the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to its consideration.

The first amendment of the Committee on the Judiciary was, in section 1, page 1, line 6, to strike out "September" and insert "October;" so as to make the section read:

That the circuit court of appeals of the fifth judicial circuit of the United States is hereby authorized and required to hold one term of said court annually in the city of Atlanta, in the State of Georgia, on the first Monday in October in each year.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, in section 2, page 1, line 11, after the word "Georgia," to strike out the words "and in the southern judicial district of Florida;" so as to read:

That all appeals, writs of error, and other appellate proceedings which may, after date of this act, be taken or prosecuted from the circuit or district courts of the United States in the State of Georgia to the court of appeals of the fifth judicial circuit shall be heard and disposed of by the said court of appeals at the terms of the court held in Atlanta in pursuance of this act.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was reported to the Senate as amended, and the amendments were concurred in.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

The title was amended so as to read: "A bill providing that the circuit court of appeals of the fifth judicial circuit of the United States shall hold at least one term of said court annually in the city of Atlanta, in the State of Georgia, on the first Monday in October in each year."

#### BILLS INTRODUCED.

Mr. MASON introduced a bill (S. 5809) granting pensions to honorably discharged officers and enlisted men in the military

and naval service of the United States during the civil war; which was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Pensions.

He also introduced a bill (S. 5810) for the relief of Thomas H. Cross; which was read twice by its title, and, with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Claims.

Mr. MITCHELL introduced the following bills; which were severally read twice by their titles, and, with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Pensions:

A bill (S. 5811) granting an increase of pension to Lewis H. Phelps;

A bill (S. 5812) granting a pension to Wallace Fairbank;

A bill (S. 5813) granting a pension to Cornelia Kelsay; and

A bill (S. 5814) granting a pension to Preston W. Burford.

Mr. TURNER introduced a bill (S. 5815) to establish a Branch Soldiers' Home at Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai County, Idaho; which was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

He also introduced the following bills; which were severally read twice by their titles, and referred to the Committee on Pensions:

A bill (S. 5816) granting a pension to Etta A. Whitehouse;

A bill (S. 5817) granting a pension to Fidelia A. Boyd; and

A bill (S. 5818) granting a pension to Margaret M. Kollock.

Mr. McLAURIN of South Carolina introduced a bill (S. 5819) for the relief of the estate of Christopher W. Dudley, deceased; which was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Claims.

Mr. DANIEL introduced the following bills; which were severally read twice by their titles, and referred to the Committee on Claims:

A bill (S. 5820) for the relief of Preston Lodge, No. 47, of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons, of Jonesville, Lee County, Va. (with accompanying papers);

A bill (S. 5821) for the relief of the estate of John B. Ege, deceased;

A bill (S. 5822) for the relief of the estate of Isaac Burnett, deceased; and

A bill (S. 5823) for the relief of Sallie R. Walton.

Mr. DANIEL (by request) introduced a bill (S. 5824) for the relief of G. W. Browder; which was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Claims.

Mr. FOSTER of Washington introduced a bill (S. 5825) to remove the charge of desertion against George A. Ingersoll; which was read twice by its title, and, with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Mr. FORAKER introduced the following bills; which were severally read twice by their titles, and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs:

A bill (S. 5826) for the erection of a memorial building or monument at Fort Recovery, Ohio; and

A bill (S. 5827) to remove the charge of desertion from the military record of Silas J. Munsell.

Mr. FORAKER introduced the following bills; which were severally read twice by their titles, and, with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Pensions:

A bill (S. 5828) granting a pension to Clara I. Ashbury;

A bill (S. 5829) granting an increase of pension to John Berns;

A bill (S. 5830) granting an increase of pension to Andrew Jackson;

A bill (S. 5831) granting an increase of pension to John M. Bromagem;

A bill (S. 5832) granting an increase of pension to Martin Goldsbery;

A bill (S. 5833) granting an increase of pension to Eugene Orr, alias Charles Southard; and

A bill (S. 5834) granting an increase of pension to Isaac Wise.

Mr. COCKRELL introduced a bill (S. 5835) granting an increase of pension to Joel C. Shepherd; which was read twice by its title.

Mr. COCKRELL. To accompany the bill, I present the petition of Joel C. Shepherd for an increase of pension, together with the affidavits of Dr. G. W. Givens and John F. Weaver and Melvin Ellis. I move that the bill and accompanying papers be referred to the Committee on Pensions.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. PLATT of Connecticut introduced a bill (S. 5836) granting an increase of pension to Jessie Nesbit Smith; which was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Pensions.

Mr. PENROSE introduced the following bills, which were severally read twice by their titles, and referred to the Committee on Pensions:

A bill (S. 5837) granting an increase of pension to Henry Pennington;

A bill (S. 5838) granting a pension to Ellwood I. Beatty;

A bill (S. 5839) granting a pension to Frederick Agastoff;



A bill (S. 5840) granting an increase of pension to Phoebe Buch;  
A bill (S. 5841) granting an increase of pension to John A. Barcus;

A bill (S. 5842) granting an increase of pension to George Fusesman (with accompanying papers);

A bill (S. 5843) granting a pension to F. Max Gress (with accompanying papers); and

A bill (S. 5844) granting an increase of pension to Griffis Bachman (with accompanying papers).

Mr. NELSON introduced a bill (S. 5845) granting an increase of pension to Ira Boyington; which was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Pensions.

#### AMENDMENTS TO BILLS.

Mr. BLACKBURN (by request) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 2341) to authorize the readjustment of the accounts of Army officers in certain cases, and for other purposes; which was referred to the Committee on Claims, and ordered to be printed.

He also submitted an amendment providing that hereafter whenever any judgment is rendered by the Court of Claims or by the circuit or district courts of the United States upon any items of claim, which, if paid on demand, would have been payable out of any appropriation, the balance of which has not been exhausted or turned into the surplus, the said judgment shall be paid from said appropriation upon certificate of nonappeal by the Attorney-General; otherwise said judgment shall be certified to Congress, as in other cases, intended to be proposed by him to the general deficiency appropriation bill; which was referred to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

Mr. PENROSE and Mr. PETTUS submitted amendments intended to be proposed by them to the bill (H. R. 14018) to increase the limit of cost of certain public buildings, to authorize the purchase of sites for public buildings, to authorize the erection and completion of public buildings, and for other purposes; which were referred to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, and ordered to be printed.

#### POSTAL CLAIMS IN OREGON.

Mr. MITCHELL. I submit a resolution and ask that it be read, and, with the attached schedule, be printed and referred to the Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads.

The resolution was read, and, with the accompanying schedule, referred to the Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads, and ordered to be printed, as follows:

*Resolved by the Senate.* That the Postmaster-General be, and hereby is, directed to report to the Senate the amount of salary required to be paid to each of the postmasters in the State of Oregon named on the memorandum schedule hereto attached, or to their heirs, for service as postmasters in each biennial term specified on such memorandum schedule in order to make effective sections 473, 474, and 475 of the postal regulations of 1866, and the act of June 12, 1866, section 8, and the act of March 3, 1883, as construed by Postmaster-General Gresham in an order dated June 9, 1883, addressed to Hon. Frank Hatton, First Assistant Postmaster-General, in a declaration as to the intent, meaning, and requirement of said statutes furnished for publication to the press through Chief Clerk Walker on February 16, 1884, and printed as Exhibit A, Senate Executive Document No. 146, Forty-ninth Congress, first session.

#### POSTAL CLAIMS IN PENNSYLVANIA.

Mr. PENROSE. I submit a resolution and ask that it be read and, with the accompanying schedule, be printed and referred to the Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads.

The resolution was read, and, with the accompanying schedule, referred to the Committee on Post-Offices and Post-Roads, and ordered to be printed, as follows:

*Resolved by the Senate.* That the Postmaster-General be, and hereby is, directed to report to the Senate the amount of salary required to be paid to each of the postmasters in the State of Pennsylvania named on the memorandum schedule hereto attached, or to their heirs, for service as postmasters in each biennial term specified on such memorandum schedule in order to make effective sections 473, 474, and 475 of the postal regulations of 1866, and the act of June 12, 1866, section 8, and the act of March 3, 1883, as construed by Postmaster-General Gresham in an order dated June 9, 1883, addressed to Hon. Frank Hatton, First Assistant Postmaster-General, in a declaration as to the intent, meaning, and requirement of said statutes furnished for publication to the press through Chief Clerk Walker on February 16, 1884, and printed as Exhibit A, Senate Executive Document No. 146, Forty-ninth Congress, first session.

#### PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL.

A message from the President of the United States, by Mr. B. F. BARNES, one of his secretaries, announced that the President had on the 13th instant approved and signed the act (S. 5736) for the relief of citizens of the French West Indies.

#### OMNIBUS CLAIMS BILL.

Mr. WARREN. I ask that the report from the House on the omnibus claims bill be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair lays before the Senate the action of the House of Representatives, which will be read.

The Secretary read as follows:

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, May 13, 1903.

*Resolved.* That the House insists upon its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 8887) for the allowance of certain claims for stores and supplies reported by the Court of Claims under the provisions of the act approved March 3, 1883, and commonly known as the Bowman Act, asks a further conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

*Ordered.* That Mr. MAHON, Mr. GIBSON, and Mr. SIMS be the managers of the conference on the part of the House with the following instructions: That the conferees be instructed not to agree to what is known as the Selfridge board findings in the Senate amendments.

Mr. HALE. Mr. President, near the close of the session yesterday I had this matter laid over. I desired to examine the proceedings of the House as they would be shown in the RECORD this morning, because of the rather novel message sent by the House to the Senate, in which it proposed a conference, appointed conferees, and accompanied the message, making it a part of the message, with an instruction to the House conferees not to agree to certain propositions known as the award of the Selfridge board, which had been incorporated in the bill by the Senate.

I have looked carefully into the proceedings of the House, reading all that was said there, and I do not further object to the motion of the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. WARREN] to agree to the conference asked by the House and to appoint the conferees. I have no doubt that the House had the technical right to instruct its conferees. I have no doubt on reading the proceedings that the House was morally constrained to instruct the conferees.

Mr. SPOONER. I should like to ask the Senator why?

Mr. HALE. I was going to state why. It was stated, if I may refer to the debate, that in the consideration of the omnibus claims bill the so-called Selfridge claims were a subject of controversy and debate in the House, and a separate vote was taken upon them, and the House threw them out, thereby taking its position, as a coordinate body, against these claims, and thereby, as was stated, and as is reasonable, practically instructing the conferees to act in accordance with the action of the House.

Sensors know that that is an invariable rule and practice in the Senate. In the course of proceedings upon any bill—upon an appropriation bill—if there is a controversy and the members of the Appropriation Committee are outvoted by the Senate and a proposition against them is carried and put upon a bill or struck out from the House bill, although the conferees have been defeated, and although the inclination and judgment of the conferees are in a certain direction, we always consider that those are subjects we are practically instructed upon, to insist as long as possible.

The only remedy the House had was to instruct. It would not have got that remedy but for a fact to which I call the attention of my friend from Wyoming; and I hope he will see to it hereafter in these important bills that no new matter is inserted in conference. A report was made in the House, and the point of order was taken, that there were three absolutely new items in the bill that had never been considered either by the House or the Senate, and upon that point of order the Presiding Officer ruled against the report. Therefore the House had the opportunity to instruct its conferees upon the so-called Selfridge part of the report. Otherwise, a report being submitted that comprehended all the other items that were not contested, the House would not quite likely be able to carry out its will upon the Selfridge matters, because of the force that would be arrayed for accepting the report on account of the other items that were in it.

Upon the technical matter of there being new items in the bill, the whole thing, by the ruling of the Chair, was thrown open to another conference, and then but two methods could be pursued—either to instruct its conferees or to appoint a new conference who would not give up the right of the House upon a matter in which it had taken ground; which, as Senators know, neither body likes to do. To dispossess and turn out the old conferees and appoint new ones is a thing rarely done, and instead of taking that course the House resorted to its only remedy—to instruct its conferees.

I find, on an examination, with the assistance of the clerks, into the records of the Senate, that question has been raised more than once, and it has been decided that the Senate may instruct its conferees upon particular matters, leaving only open, to what may be called "free conference subjects," matter upon which the Senate does not take that ground.

So I have no further objection to make to the motion of the Senator from Wyoming upon that point. The House, I should presume inadvertently, incorporated with its message its instructions to its own conferees. That undoubtedly should not be done. It is not customary, I think; but it was an inadvertence, and I presume the other body will take notice of it and will not fall into this error again. I do not think it is important enough now to make a report to send it back in order that the House may correct it. I think it is proper to call the attention of the Senate,

and in this way it will come to the knowledge of the House, that we do not deem it a proper thing where instructions are given to the House conferees to make it a part of the message of the House which asks for a free conference; but, as I have said, I do not ask, and I do not think it would be advisable, to raise the question with the other body by sending back the report from the House to be so corrected.

Therefore, if the Senator from Wyoming and his associates, in whom we have great confidence, are willing to try it again upon another conference, with the instructions in their face, I see nothing else for us to do. It should be borne in mind—

Mr. BACON. Will the Senator permit me to ask him a question. I am not familiar with the details of the conference. Has there been a conference, or has there been more than one conference?

Mr. HALE. I do not know whether there has been more than one.

Mr. WARREN. One.

Mr. BACON. There has been one and this is the second?

Mr. HALE. This is the second, I understand.

Mr. WARREN. Yes.

Mr. HALE. The House took the action because it was the only thing it could do. Of course, it will always be borne in mind by conferees that it is the moving body which attempts to change existing conditions that naturally yields. If the House sends over to us, as it does, propositions upon appropriation bills changing the law and the practice, and the Senate says, "We can not agree to that; it is a new proposition; the burden is upon you, and the Senate can not agree," the body moving yields. When the Senate puts on an amendment embodying some new proposition, some change of law, and the House declares affirmatively that it can not agree to it, the harder side of the conference is that of the body which moves and seeks to change existing conditions.

Mr. SPOONER. Will the Senator from Maine allow me to ask him a question?

Mr. HALE. Certainly.

Mr. SPOONER. I ask the Senator for information, and I am sure to get it from the Senator.

Mr. HALE. I hope so.

Mr. SPOONER. Does the Senator remember an instance of this kind before, where the House of Representatives has sent us a message asking for a further conference accompanied by a notification that it had instructed its conferees not to agree to certain items in the bill?

Mr. HALE. No; I have said that therein the House made a mistake. They had a right to instruct, but should not have incorporated it in the message sent to the Senate. But that being a technical matter, undoubtedly an inadvertence, I do not think it is worth the while to raise a controversy with the House on that point. I do not believe it will ever do it again. I hope the conferees will take up the matter again.

Mr. HOAR. I should like to ask the Senator from Maine what it is that the existing motion in the Senate proposes to do with this item?

Mr. HALE. I suppose it proposes to do like every motion where a conference is agreed to. It submits it to a new conference.

Mr. HOAR. I should like to make a remark, but I will wait until the Senator gets through, or I will do it now, as he thinks best.

Mr. HALE. If it is right on the point, the Senator can do it now.

Mr. HOAR. As I understand, when there is a motion in one body to adhere, instead of a mere motion to insist, a motion for a free conference is no longer open in the other body. The other body must either adhere, too, and the measure fails, or they must recede and concur with the other branch, and end the controversy in that way. That is the only thing, if I recollect the parliamentary practice, that is in order. At any rate, it is the only thing that is customary.

Now, when the House sends us word that it has appointed conferees and ordered them only to consent to one thing in regard to the particular matter in dispute, which is that the Senate shall give up, it is not inviting us to a free conference any longer on that proposition. It is in substance an order to its conferees to adhere. It seems to me that there is not any proposal, as far as that item is concerned, for a free conference before the Senate. We should either now recede or drop the bill, which, of course, I suppose, is not proposed by anyone.

Suppose this were the only item open in the bill. The House says, "We ask you for a free conference on that measure and we have ordered our conferees not to agree under any circumstances to what you have proposed." A free conference is had in order that they may hear our reasons for what we have done and consider them and see whether we are not right.

It is a good while from the end of the session, and I think this

is rather important that we proceed pretty carefully in this matter of conferences with the House; on one hand being careful not to have topics for disagreement or conflict come up if we can help it, but on the other not to yield our just rights and get into a practice which, at the end of a session when we have not much time, is going to take away our own independence and equality.

I think, therefore, the Senator from Wyoming ought to test the sense of the Senate whether we will now retire on that item, and if what the Senator from Maine says be true, and it is undoubtedly true, that where there is such a conflict the body that proposes to do something new must withdraw, we will withdraw with a great deal more dignity now than we can do after another conference. It seems to me that it is an abandonment of our dignity and our equality as one of the coordinate legislative bodies of this Government to go into a conference which is free on one side and where we are padlocked.

Mr. HALE. Now, Mr. President—

Mr. BACON. Will the Senator from Maine permit me to read the parliamentary rule on the subject to which the Senator from Massachusetts has alluded?

Mr. HALE. Certainly.

Mr. BACON. I rose for the purpose of suggesting the same thought which has been very much more clearly stated than I could have done by the Senator from Massachusetts, and I will content myself now with simply reading from Jefferson's Manual the rule which has been cited by the Senator from Massachusetts. On page 135 of our Manual, which contains Jefferson's Manual, I find the language which I shall read. After a discussion of the regular order, in which amendments are offered by one House and submitted to the other, etc., it proceeds to say:

The term of insisting may be repeated as often as they choose to keep the question open, but the first adherence by either renders it necessary for the other to recede or adhere also, when the matter is usually suffered to fall.

In the conclusion of the same paragraph there is the following language:

Either House, however, is free to pass over the term of insisting and to adhere in the first instance, but it is not respectful to the other. In the ordinary parliamentary course there are two free conferences, at least, before an adherence.

As stated by the Senator from Massachusetts, the instruction of the House to its conferees is practically an adherence, and whether we stand upon the rule of courtesy or not, as to the practice of insistences which may be made before adherence is announced, it does seem to me that when the House has announced that it adheres the Senator from Massachusetts is eminently correct. There is nothing for us to do. There is no reason why we should confer with those who say beforehand they will not agree with us, and who announce that their conferees are not permitted to agree with us for the purpose which we confer. It seems to me there is but one of two things to do, as has been correctly stated by the Senator from Massachusetts—either to recede or to refuse to go further with the matter unless the House will withdraw its adherence.

Mr. HALE. Mr. President, all that, of course, the Senate has in mind. It is only a practical question. The House might have voted to adhere, but it did not vote to adhere. That, of course, leaves but one thing for us to do. The House did what has been done more than once in both House and Senate—instead of adhering and making a deadlock, it asked for a new conference, which will bring the matter into another conference if we agree to it, and then instructed—and that is the only opportunity it had in getting at its view of this bill—its conferees not to agree to certain provisions. Of course, we may make the point, and it is a good one, that they ought not to have sent the message which they have sent in connection with their action, but, as I have said, I do not think, as we have called attention to it, that it will ever happen again.

I suppose, however, what will happen is that the Senator in charge of the bill, in whom we have confidence, as we have in the other conferees, will ask for a new conference; that we shall then have a new conference appointed, and we will go into it. Then the conferees will have the opportunity either of receding from this proposition—as it is a proposition that the Senate put on, we moving affirmatively—and thereby end the whole matter and pass the bill, which has some very important things upon it, in which a great many Senators and their constituents are interested, or the conferees will come back to the Senate and ask the Senate to recede; and, as the Senator has indicated that is his desire, I think that is the easiest way out of it.

I do not say that the House was right in sending that message over here with its declaration that it wanted a new conference; but I do not think, to repeat, that that is of importance enough for us to raise an issue and send a special message to the House.

I think this thing will never happen again. I never have known it to happen before, and I have the RECORD here which shows that the Senate has instructed its conferees, after debate and



discussion, more than once upon certain matters in a bill, and sent it over to the House, instead of adhering; because, as I have said, adhering at once brings the locking of horns, and one side or the other has got to back down or the whole bill fails. I suppose the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. WARREN] had that in view and desires the opportunity of again meeting the House conferees, and either agreeing to strike out this provision, as it is new matter put in by the Senate, or coming back and moving here to recede, and let the Senate settle it. I do not feel, of course, that I should make that motion, for I do not want to take the matter out of the hands of the Senator from Wyoming; and, to repeat, to sum up again all these points I recognize as forcible, and if we choose to insist upon them and send such a message back to the House, that can be done, but I do not think it is worth while.

Mr. BACON. Will the Senator please let me ask him a question before he takes his seat?

Mr. HALE. Yes.

Mr. BACON. An agreement to the report of this committee of conference under a notice from the House that it will not recede can only be made upon the express basis of an intention to recede, and that our conferees shall so act. That being the case, why should we go through that formality? Why should not the Senator in charge of the bill move that the Senate recede? If the purpose is to recede, what is the use of appointing another conference committee to go through that formality?

Mr. HALE. It does not follow, of course, that the House may not still recede, although I do not think it will.

Mr. BACON. It can not under the instructions given to its committee of conference.

Mr. HALE. No, I do not think it will; but the conferees have a right to report it to the House for a new result. I do not think it will recede. But the Senator in charge of the bill, instead of making the motion now—I have no objection to his making the motion now—but instead of making that motion now, as he prefers to move to agree to the further conference asked for by the House in order to get the bill back to the conferees, I yield to him in that regard.

Mr. BACON. I understand the point made by the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. HOAR] is not one with reference to any desire to retain this provision in the bill, but to preserve the orderly procedure of the Senate. I understand the point made by the Senator to be that it is not consistent with orderly proceedings in the Senate that we should agree to a conference in the face of an avowal by the other House that it will not recede.

Mr. HOAR. As I understand it, the House sends, substantially, this message: "We want you to have a free conference with us, but we will not discuss the question with you." That is the whole of it.

Mr. ALLISON. Mr. President, I do not think there is any serious difficulty respecting this motion of the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. WARREN]. As I understand his motion, it is that we insist not only upon this amendment, which is in dispute—

Mr. HALE. That is part of the motion.

Mr. ALLISON. That is part of the motion—that we insist upon this amendment and all other amendments. As I understand the bill, it consists of a great many items, and the committee of conference at the first meeting agreed to all of these items. The House rejected that conference report; I do not know precisely upon what grounds, but upon various grounds, I presume; perhaps a point of order among other things.

Now, then, this bill is wholly open as to every item in it; and every item that was inserted by the Senate is to be again in conference. The House, after appointing the conferees on the part of the House, instructed them that here was an amendment that they wanted an opportunity to vote on separately. That is the practical question. In appropriation bills it is the common practice of the two Houses, where there is a sharp division between them, to disagree as to certain items and to agree as to all other items. I have had some experience in that regard, as have other Senators. At times here we have disagreed three or four times before we came to a final agreement.

Mr. TILLMAN. Yes; four or five times.

Mr. ALLISON. Four or five times. I have the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. TILLMAN] in my eye, and he will remember that that occurred here a year ago.

Mr. PLATT of Connecticut. On the naval appropriation bill?

Mr. ALLISON. I believe it was on the naval appropriation bill.

Mr. TILLMAN. No; it was on the sundry civil bill as to the item relating to the Charleston Exposition. I recollect very clearly what happened to me that night, or rather what happened to the Charleston Exposition. I was afraid there might be the same thing here on this item.

Mr. ALLISON. I think probably the main object of the House was to bring the bill back again into the House, so as to give the

House an opportunity to express its opinion as it had once before done upon this particular amendment of the Senate.

As has been so well stated by the Senator from Maine [Mr. HALE], the House of Representatives may have made a mistake in communicating their action to us in the way they have done; but, as I understand it, the main object of the conferees, especially where there are various items in the bill—some of them meritorious, some of them not so meritorious, and some of them where the Senate can finally yield and some of them where the House can finally yield—is by several conferences to get the two Houses together, so that one House or the other will yield items rather than lose all the items in a bill.

So, although there is probably some little irregularity in this proceeding, as the Senator from Maine says, it will never recur. I think if we want to pass this bill, it will be a wise thing for us to agree to the conference asked for by the House. It is not necessary that we should also instruct our conferees that they shall not agree to the bill unless the amendment in dispute is incorporated in it. We can do that if we desire to do so, but I think it is enough for us to say that we insist. We do not go to the extent of insisting upon all the amendments in the bill, including this amendment. The result of the next conference will be, I have no doubt—I do not know, of course, but I suppose—that our conferees will insist upon this particular amendment.

I do not know whether or not they ought to do so; but I suppose it has been put on the bill after careful consideration by the Senate. If they insist upon this amendment in conference, the result will be probably a partial agreement—that is, all the other items will be agreed to, and this particular item will be hung up in the air, as many such items are hung up during the process of passing bills of this character, containing a great number of details. When that is done, our conferees will come back to the Senate, and it will be a question for debate whether we shall still further insist upon this amendment, or whether we shall recede from it; and what happens here will happen in the other House.

Mr. HALE. If the Senator will allow me, that will happen in the body where the conference report is first submitted, and undoubtedly the motion will be made to recede.

Mr. ALLISON. Very well. That motion in regard to the conference report will first be submitted in this Chamber. It may be that the Senator having charge of this bill will not make that motion, but he can make another motion. He can move that upon this particular amendment we still further insist, and then in the next report that goes back to the House it will be for them either to move to recede or move to insist. Then the item will be between the two Houses for further adjustment. So, Mr. President, I quite agree with the suggestion of insisting upon our amendments, agreeing to a further conference, and again try our chances with the other body.

Mr. WARREN. Mr. President, last evening I was engaged in urgent committee business, and also this morning, and I therefore have not had an opportunity to read in full the proceedings of the House of Representatives yesterday in regard to the omnibus claims bill, but from what I have learned from members of the House, from the remarks of the Senator from Maine [Mr. HALE], and the hasty glance I have now been able to give to the RECORD for a few moments, the first complaint lodged against this bill in the House was a point of order that the conference report contained items that had not been passed upon by the House or the Senate before the bill was sent to conference. That charge, unless some explanation is given of it, seems a very severe one. So I think that it is only just to the conferees to state precisely what those items are, and precisely how they came into the report.

A large portion of the omnibus claims bill is made up of findings of facts by the Court of Claims under the so-called Bowman and Tucker claims acts. Another large portion consists of French spoliation claims, which are also Court of Claims findings. The bill that came to us from the House of Representatives had upon it Bowman claims only. The House War Claims Committee report on them was made up of the findings of the Court of Claims set out in full. We added as the Senate amendments the later findings of the court of the same kind, and also certain miscellaneous claims, and the entire matter went into conference.

The Senate conferees did not insert or ask to insert a single new item or to raise the amount of a single item contained in the bill. They were opposed to the insertion of new matter in a conference report as a matter of course. In the meantime, however, at the other end of the Capitol, the House took charge of the bill for a while before it was sent to the conference committee, went into Committee of the Whole on it, and voted almost unanimously to add another one of the Bowman or Tucker court findings, and then proceeded as if to add others. Finally, a motion was made to disagree to the so-called Selfridge board claims, and that motion was carried by a vote of 75 to 73. The committee then rose and reported to the House. Then a motion was made to send the bill to conference.

So, Mr. President, the conferees were in this position when they came to the conference. The House had expressed itself upon inserting another certain claim that had not been covered before either by House or Senate, and the House had also voted in favor of cutting out the Selfridge board claims, but the Speaker of the House had ruled that neither one of those acts stood good, as a matter of fact, because the motion to send to conference carried with it all the subject-matter to the conference.

The conferees on the part of the House asked that we insert the item to which the House had expressed itself as being favorable in Committee of the Whole. They also asked that two other items, court findings, one of about \$1,200 and one of about \$800, which had already received the indorsement of the House Claims Committee and were supposed at the time the measure passed to be in the bill, should be added, and precedents were quoted for putting them in the bill in conference. I notice that in the House yesterday precedents offered by the House conferees were read on that particular point, so that a general complaint against inserting new matter can scarcely be lodged against the conferees.

Mr. HALE. If the Senator will allow me, I have read the report very carefully, for I wanted to know all that had taken place. It is not, I think, our Senate conferees who put new matter in the report, against the contention so often raised here that no new matter shall be put into such a report which has not been considered by either House; but it came here in the provision inserted by the other body.

Mr. WARREN. Entirely so.

Mr. HALE. And not from our representatives here.

Mr. WARREN. Mr. President, I do not want to further occupy the time of the Senate, except to say that the reason I made the motion to insist upon all the Senate amendments and to ask for a further conference and the appointment of conferees was because, whatever the House may do in the future, their action has been, to say the least, a little complicated and confusing upon this subject in the past, and I therefore want the whole matter open to conference. The House asked us to accept, alongside the instructions to cut out the Selfridge board claims, its instruction to insert a certain claim, and yet the same interest making that motion to insert made the complaint yesterday which cut out that identical claim on a point of order, for the purpose, seemingly, of defeating the whole bill.

There was a proposition made in conference that the Selfridge board claims be reduced a certain percentage, as had been done in conference upon similar claims and on a similar bill two years ago. I am not certain but that a proposition of that kind may be submitted as meeting the views of the House. Therefore I have thought it better that the Senate should now at this time insist upon its amendments, ask for a further conference, and go into conference as if this instruction message had not come from the House.

As one of the conferees I want to act in entire harmony with the views of the Senate. I am ready to receive any instructions now or later on, but it seems to me that the better policy at this time would be to go into a "full and free" conference, ignoring entirely the proposition which came over from the House as an instruction appendix to its request for conference.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Wyoming [Mr. WARREN] moves that the Senate still further insist on its amendments disagreed to by the House of Representatives and ask for a further conference with the House.

The motion was agreed to.

By unanimous consent, the President pro tempore was authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate; and Mr. WARREN, Mr. TELLER, and Mr. MASON were appointed.

#### FORTIFICATIONS APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. President, in accordance with notice heretofore given, I now move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the bill (H. R. 13359) making appropriations for fortifications and other works of defense, for the armament thereof, for the procurement of heavy ordnance for trial and service, and for other purposes.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Appropriations with amendments.

Mr. PERKINS. I ask that the formal reading of the bill may be dispensed with, and that the bill be read for amendment.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from California asks unanimous consent that the formal reading of the bill be dispensed with, that it be read for amendment, and that the committee amendments first receive consideration. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The Secretary will read the bill.

The Secretary proceeded to read the bill.

The first amendment reported by the Committee on Approp-

riations was, under the subhead "Fortifications and other works of defense," on page 1, line 9, to increase the appropriation for installation of range and position finders from \$325,000 to \$500,000.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 2, line 2, to increase the appropriation for purchase and installation of search lights for the defenses of our most important harbors from \$150,000 to \$300,000.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 2, after line 7, to insert:

For the purchase of land on Cushing's Island, Portland Harbor, Maine, being parcels of land 6 and 7 as described in Senate Document No. 278, Fifty-sixth Congress, first session, to be used to erect additional batteries and for buildings for the troops, \$225,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary: *Provided*, That no part of this sum shall be expended until a valid title to all the land and property described shall have been acquired by the United States.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 2, line 20, to increase the appropriation for the protection, preservation, and repair of fortifications for which there may be no special appropriation available from \$150,000 to \$300,000.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 3, line 4, to increase the appropriation for construction of sea walls and embankments, from \$100,000 to \$150,000.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 3, after line 4, to strike out:

For the purchase of submarine mines and necessary appliances to operate them for closing the channels leading to our principal seaports, needful casemates, cable galleries, and so forth, to render it possible to operate submarine mines, and continuing torpedo experiments, \$50,000.

And in lieu thereof to insert:

For the construction of mining casemates, cable galleries, torpedo storehouses, cable tanks, and other structures necessary for the operation, preservation, and care of submarine mines and their accessories, \$93,000, to be expended by the Engineer Department.

For the purchase of submarine mines and necessary appliances to operate them for closing the channels leading to our principal seaports and continuing torpedo experiments, \$17,000, to be expended by the Artillery Corps.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, under the subhead "Armament of fortifications," on page 5, line 16, to increase the appropriation for oil-tempered and annealed steel for coast-defense guns of 8-inch, 10-inch, and 12-inch caliber, from \$46,500 to \$165,000.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 6, line 1, to increase the appropriation for purchase, manufacture, alteration, and issue of carriages for mounting seacoast guns of 8, 10, and 12 inch calibers, including any new tools or machinery necessary for their manufacture at arsenals, from \$250,000 to \$406,000.

Mr. PROCTOR. Let that amendment be passed over, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment will be passed over for the present.

The reading of the bill was resumed. The next amendment of the Committee on Appropriations was, on page 7, line 7, to increase the appropriation for range finders, including instruments for fire control and azimuth instruments for coast defense, etc., from \$100,000 to \$170,000.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 7, after line 13, to insert:

For mountain guns, with their carriages, packing outfits, accessories, and ammunition, \$82,000.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 7, line 18, before the word "breech-loading," to strike out "five-inch;" so as to make the clause read:

For breech-loading rifles, siege, \$7,500.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 7, line 20, before the word "breech-loading," to strike out "five-inch;" so as to make the clause read:

For carriages for breech-loading rifles, siege, including implements, equipments, platforms, and ammunition wagons, \$14,400.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 7, line 23, before the word "breech-loading," to strike out "seven-inch;" so as to make the clause read:

For breech-loading howitzers, siege, \$8,200.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 8, line 1, before the word "breech-loading," to strike out "seven-inch;" so as to make the clause read:

For carriages for breech-loading howitzers, siege, including implements, equipments, platforms, and ammunition wagons, \$14,000.

The amendment was agreed to.



The next amendment was, on page 8, after line 12, to insert:

For remaining payments to be made under contract with the Bethlehem Iron Company dated June 8, 1898, as amended by supplemental contract of June 22, 1901, \$35,000, or as much thereof as may be necessary. This payment shall be made to the Bethlehem Steel Company as successor to the Bethlehem Iron Company.

Mr. PENROSE. Mr. President, I desire to offer as a substitute for the committee amendment an amendment which I ask to have read. I will ask the Senator from California [Mr. PERKINS] to accept the amendment tentatively and provisionally, subject to the approval of the War Department, which, I understand, has been given to the amendment. Its purpose is the same, but it is somewhat broader in scope.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Pennsylvania offers an amendment to the committee amendment, which will be read.

The SECRETARY. Strike out the committee amendment and insert the following:

All contracts of the Bethlehem Iron Company, of South Bethlehem, Pa., heretofore made between it and the United States shall be completed by its successor, the Bethlehem Steel Company, or its successor, which has acquired or may acquire all of its assets and has assumed or may assume all of its liabilities under the said contracts, and the said Bethlehem Steel Company, or its lawful successor, upon giving security in proper form and amount conditioned upon the performance by it of the said contracts according to the true intent and meaning thereof, shall be substituted therein for the said Bethlehem Iron Company, and be entitled to exercise all rights thereunder which the said Bethlehem Iron Company had or would have had if it had continued in existence.

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. President, the amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania somewhat enlarges the recommendation made by the Secretary of War, which was presented to your committee. However, there seems to be no objection to it on its face. I will, therefore, with the permission of the committee, accept it provisionally; that is, that a letter of recommendation shall be secured from the Secretary of War substituting this for his former recommendation.

Mr. PENROSE. I understand this amendment has the indorsement of Major McNally. It was only given to me this morning, so that I have not had an opportunity to get the formal recommendation of the Secretary of War or of the Chief of Ordnance. Of course, that will be had or I will not press the amendment.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The amendment as amended was agreed to.

The next amendment of the Committee on Appropriations was, on page 8, after line 19, to insert:

The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to accept the proposition of the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Company contained in its letter of August 9, 1901, addressed to the president of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification, for settlement of its contract dated November 5, 1894, to furnish the Department with a 10-inch disappearing gun carriage.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, under the subhead "Proving Ground, Sandy Hook, N. J.," on page 9, line 12, to increase the appropriation for current expenses and maintenance of the ordnance proving ground, Sandy Hook, N. J., from \$37,000 to \$43,926.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 9, line 18, after the word "draftsmen," to insert "and such other service as the Secretary of War may deem necessary;" so as to make the clause read:

For the necessary expenses of officers while temporarily employed on ordnance duties at the proving ground and absent from their proper stations, at the rate of \$2.50 per diem while so employed, and the compensation of draftsmen and such other service as the Secretary of War may deem necessary while employed in the Army Ordnance Bureau on ordnance construction, \$18,700.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 10, after line 19, to insert:

#### SEA WALL AT SANDY HOOK, NEW JERSEY.

For construction of a riprap or stone wall and causeway for the protection of the eastern beach of the United States lands at Sandy Hook, New Jersey, and the Government railroad thereon, \$75,000.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, at the top of page 11, to insert:

#### FRANKFORD ARSENAL, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

For establishment of a power plant for the artillery ammunition factory, and the removal thereto of engines and boilers on hand, \$58,000.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, on page 11, after line 4, to insert:

For box-making and packing shop for small-arms cartridge factory, \$28,000.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, under the subhead "Watertown Arsenal, Watertown, Mass.," on page 11, after line 12, to insert:

For additional battery of two boilers, including extension of the boiler room, and necessary connections, \$4,600.

The amendment was agreed to.

The next amendment was, under the subhead "Board of Ord-

nance and Fortification," on page 13, after line 10, to strike out the remainder of the bill in the following words:

To enable the Government to secure the use of the high explosive "Thorite," the Secretary of War is hereby authorized and directed to purchase the entire and exclusive right for the United States to manufacture and use the high explosive "Thorite." *Provided*, That all formulae, data, and facts related to said process and necessary to the successful manufacture of said "Thorite" shall be placed in the possession of the Secretary of War before payment for the same shall be made.

The sum of \$50,000 for the said purpose is directed to be taken from the appropriation of \$100,000 made by the act of Congress "Making appropriations for fortifications and other works of defense," approved March 1, 1901, for the purpose of securing the high explosive "Thorite" and the "Isam High Explosive Shell."

The amendment was agreed to.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment on page 6 was passed over.

Mr. PERKINS. The Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROCTOR] asked to have that temporarily go over. The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. PLATT] desires to offer an amendment.

Mr. PLATT of Connecticut. I offer an amendment which I think might come in either on page 2, after line 20, or at the end of the bill. I am not particular as to where it comes in.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment proposed by the Senator from Connecticut will be stated.

The SECRETARY. On page 2, after line 20, insert the following:

There is hereby granted to the State of Connecticut the right to occupy, improve, and control, for the purposes of a public park for the use and benefit of citizens of the United States and for no other purposes whatever, the tract of land owned by the United States which is situated on the east shore of New London Harbor, in said State of Connecticut, known as the Fort Griswold tract, and partly occupied by an abandoned fort and earthwork of that name, said tract being bounded northerly by the Fort Griswold monument reservation and by the land of various private parties, easterly and southerly by the land of various private parties, and westerly by New London Harbor and by the land of various private parties. The provisions of this grant are that the State of Connecticut shall have and exercise power to make and enforce police regulations concerning said tract and shall protect it from injury and defacement; that before beginning any use or improvement of said tract the State of Connecticut shall present to the Secretary of War detailed plans of any improvement and shall have received his approval thereof; that the United States reserves to itself the fee in said tract and the right to resume possession and occupy any portion thereof whenever, in the judgment of the President, the exigency arises that should require the use and appropriation of the same for the public defense or otherwise, without any claim for compensation to the State of Connecticut for improvements which may have been made thereon or damages on account thereof.

Mr. PLATT of Connecticut. Mr. President, I gave notice of this amendment. I ought to have appeared before the subcommittee to explain it, but I was away. I think there is no objection to it. I will ask to have read the memorandum of the Chief of Engineers in connection with it.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Secretary will read as requested.

The Secretary read as follows:

OFFICE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY,  
April 17, 1902.

Respectfully returned to the Secretary of War.

The suggested amendment to the fortification bill provides all necessary safeguards for the interests of the United States in Fort Griswold so far as engineer features are concerned. No objection is made on the part of the Chief of Engineers to its incorporation in the bill.

A blue print which shows the Fort Griswold tract is sent herewith. From this it will be seen that the fort tract is bounded westerly by land of various private parties and New London Harbor and not by New London Harbor and a public highway, as stated in the draft of suggested amendment.

G. L. GILLESPIE,  
Brigadier-General, Chief of Engineers, United States Army.

Mr. PLATT of Connecticut. The boundary has been corrected in the present amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. PROCTOR. I offer the following amendment, to be inserted at the end of line 2, page 6:

*Provided*, That no part of the appropriation made by this act shall be used for constructing or procuring disappearing carriages, emplacements, or magazines therefor.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Vermont offers the amendment which the Secretary will read.

The SECRETARY. At the end of line 2, page 6, insert the following proviso:

*Provided*, That no part of the appropriation made by this act shall be used for constructing or procuring disappearing carriages, emplacements, or magazines therefor.

Mr. PROCTOR. Mr. President, I regret very much that I was not able to go before the committee on this measure, but other engagements prevented it, and the information that I had asked for by a resolution was not furnished in time; in fact, the principal response only came in last night, and I have had no opportunity to examine it. But I felt that I should be remiss in my duty if I did not express, on the passage of this bill, my views about the disappearing carriage.

The history of it in brief is this: In 1896 letters patent were granted to Colonel Buffington and Captain Crozier (he was then) for a disappearing carriage. General Crozier, in a communication sent to the Military Committee by the Secretary of War,

stated that no royalty had been paid by this Government, which is true, but they had disposed of the patents in foreign governments to the Bethlehem Iron Company, which is now the Bethlehem Steel Company—they are the same corporation, only the name has been changed—for a stated sum paid down and for a royalty reserved on all that was sold in foreign countries. The amount of this sum paid down was not stated, and I do not know that it makes any difference. Rumor has put it at a high sum, but one of his friends has told me that it was \$10,000, equally divided between Colonels Crozier and Buffington.

Colonel Crozier stated before the House Committee on Appropriations that something over a year ago inquiries were sent out as to the views of artillery officers in regard to these carriages. To these inquiries 91 replies were received, and of the 91 officers replying 84 expressed opinions and 7 asked to be excused from expressing an opinion.

Of the 84 who expressed opinions, 60 were in favor of the use of the disappearing carriage which had been provided for the sites on which it was originally intended to use it—namely, medium and low sites; and of these 60, 16 were in favor of the exclusive use of the disappearing carriages on all sites. Sixty-three out of the 84 would have been a three-quarter majority, and those who were in favor were 60 out of 84.

Those replies are printed in Senate Document No. 336, which any Senator can obtain, and I should be very glad if they would do so. And there is also another document brought in this morning, No. 355. Those documents will give all that information.

I have read every one of those letters very carefully and have made many notes upon them. The best I could make out is that a very large majority even of the 60—two-thirds of them—are not in favor of the carriage. Considering the matter from the standpoint on which we must consider it—that is, granting that what they say is true—is it a wise and safe investment of money to make more of these carriages? I think Senators will be convinced that the evidence is overwhelming that, looking at these letters from our standpoint of the case, from the duty that is before us, a large majority of the replies are opposed to the use of the carriage. Many of them are very strong against its use under any consideration.

In Document 336 the Secretary of War sends some preliminary articles. I do not need to read them. It is an expression from a report made in 1891. There was another one made in 1894, before this carriage was patented, and there is a report from Secretary of War Lamont in 1894. It is fair to say that when the great improvements in heavy ordnance were made by high-explosive powder and lengthening of the gun it seemed to be the theory to construct a carriage that after the discharge would disappear and would be entirely out of the way, and all the men serving it would be protected; and there was a good deal of work done in all countries of the world in that direction.

This patent was gotten out here. General Buffington was, as you know, Chief of Ordnance. The Ordnance Department had almost absolute control of this matter of expenditures. The Board of Ordnance and Fortification, which was established in 1888 with a view to make an independent board which should consider matters of this kind, has been stripped of all its power. It practically amounts to nothing now. The original act contemplated that all the expenditures should be made on the recommendation of that board. It was proposed originally in the Senate here as an amendment to the fortifications bill.

I think the Senator from Colorado [Mr. TELLER] will remember about it. I find, in looking up the records, he had considerable to say about it. The purpose of it was to give to outside inventors a better opportunity to have an impartial board of high character to pass upon these things instead of having them in the close corporation, as I am inclined to call it, of the Ordnance Bureau.

Among the other preliminary papers is a report from that board, the Board of Ordnance and Fortification, made in 1900. They report against the use of this carriage in the first place for rapid-fire guns, and then say:

After giving the question of nondisappearing and disappearing carriages for 8, 10, 12, and 16 inch high-power guns for coast fortifications and the opinions of artillery officers careful consideration, it is the judgment of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification that it would be unwise and injudicious to locate any more guns on disappearing carriages than those now under process of construction on high or medium sites and no more should be placed (than those now under process of construction) on low sites until the proportion of those to be placed in such fortifications shall have been limited to one-third of the total number to be so located.

The vote on this resolution was in favor of it. General Miles, Colonel Rodgers, one of the finest officers of artillery, and General Henderson, well known to members of the Senate, a long time a member of the House, the civilian member of the board, voted for it. The two who were opposed to it were General Wilson and General Buffington, one of the patentees.

The questions asked of these artillery officers are found on page 6, of Document No. 336.

Mr. HARRIS. Will the Senator permit me to interrupt him?

Mr. PROCTOR. Certainly.

Mr. HARRIS. If it will not interrupt the Senator from Vermont, would it not be well to give the reports which have been made on this subject by other Boards of Ordnance and Fortification than the one he has referred to?

Mr. WARREN. Upon which General Buffington did not serve.

Mr. HARRIS. The preceding board. I think there were several reports at different times, and I think it is just as well to have them.

Mr. PROCTOR. Those that are printed in this document?

Mr. HARRIS. They are printed in Senate Document No. 336.

Mr. PROCTOR. Please refer to them. I have referred to some board reports.

Mr. WARREN. They immediately precede what you have read.

Mr. PROCTOR. Oh, yes; I thought I explained that sufficiently. In 1894 there was a favorable report, and there was a report in 1897.

Mr. WARREN. There was a report in 1891.

Mr. PROCTOR. I sufficiently explained those other reports. At that time it was the desire of everybody to get such a carriage if possible.

Mr. HARRIS. If we are to discuss the question of the gun carriage and its desirability, it seems to me all of the matter on pages 3, 4, and 5 of Senate Document No. 336 would be very desirable.

Mr. PROCTOR. I would be very glad indeed to have it read. I do not wish to read it myself. I cheerfully admit there are several reports. If that is not sufficient, let them be read.

Mr. HARRIS. A reference to it will be sufficient.

Mr. PROCTOR. The answers to the inquiries follow. The questions asked were, "What opportunities have you had to judge?" "Which do you deem preferable for modern high-power guns, barbette carriages or disappearing carriages, either on high, medium, or low sites?" "Your opinion of disappearing carriages, and whether they are satisfactory or unsatisfactory; if unsatisfactory, state the reasons, etc."

All those questions are found at the top of page 6.

The answers are quite lengthy, and I ask to have printed an abstract or a synopsis made by an artillery officer, the recorder, I think he is, or was, of the Board of Ordnance. It was asked for by the Secretary of War and made for him. That is Document 355.

I have not been able to compare the abstract fully. I presume it is a fair one. I have had printed the page of Document No. 336 where the full letter is given, and Senators can look at the abstract and compare it with the letter if they choose to do so. I have had them printed in this order.

On page 94 of Document No. 336 is given a summary from a digest of opinions of these officers. The first class, those claimed to favor disappearing carriages for heavy guns on all sites are 15 officers; those claimed to favor disappearing and nondisappearing carriages, depending on height of site, are 49 officers. Then follows a list of 8 who are in favor of nondisappearing carriages without shields on all sites; a list of 10 in favor of nondisappearing carriages with shields on all sites; then two other lists, the final one, 6, giving no definite expression of opinion.

This synopsis is printed in just the order they are named there. The first fifteen are those who are claimed to be, without qualification, in favor of the disappearing carriage. I will ask the Secretary to read that list, and, if he will, to read it slowly, and give the name of the officer and page on the summary where his letter can be found in full.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Vermont want the entire document read that he has sent to the Secretary's desk?

Mr. PROCTOR. Yes.

Mr. WARREN. Will the Senator yield a moment?

Mr. PROCTOR. Certainly.

Mr. WARREN. I think it will be only fair, when we are to have a list of answers, to first have the questions read, so that the Senators who hear these answers may know what was propounded to the witness.

Mr. PROCTOR. I read the substance of the questions.

Mr. WARREN. The Senator did not read them completely.

Mr. PROCTOR. I read the substance of every one of them.

Mr. WARREN. If the Senator does not object, I will ask to have them read.

Mr. PROCTOR. Certainly.

Mr. WARREN. I ask that the first page, commencing 1, 2, a, b, c, and 3, 4, and 5, be read.

Mr. COCKRELL. Let the whole of it be read.



The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Will the Senator from Wyoming read the document, or will he send it to the Secretary's desk to be read?

Mr. WARREN. I will send it to the Secretary, as he is to read all the others.

Mr. PROCTOR. I will state that the questions are to be found on the top of page 6.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Secretary will read as requested.

The Secretary read as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, May 2, 1902.

SIR: In response to the following resolution of the Senate, dated April 24, 1902—

"Resolved, That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, directed to send to the Senate copies of all official reports from artillery officers in regard to the Buffington-Crozier disappearing gun carriage, made either to the War Department or to the Board of Ordnance and Fortification."

I have the honor to advise you that on July 19, 1900, letters were addressed by the Board of Ordnance and Fortification to officers of artillery who had been in charge of batteries of modern high-power guns within the past two years, requesting replies to the following questions:

"(1) Please state what opportunities you have had for judging as to the value, effectiveness, and utility of disappearing and nondisappearing gun carriages.

"(2) Which do you deem preferable for modern high-power guns in barbette batteries, either on high, medium, or low sites:

"(a) Disappearing carriages such as are now in use;

"(b) A nondisappearing carriage such as is now in use;

"(c) A nondisappearing carriage with a strong shield for the protection of the gunners;

"Assuming all to be provided with proper loading facilities?

"(3) In your judgment are the disappearing carriages now mounted in modern batteries satisfactory or unsatisfactory?

"(4) If unsatisfactory, please state in as concise a manner as practicable to what extent you deem them objectionable, and what changes or improvements can you suggest?

"(5) Any suggestions as to the proportion in which these different types of carriages should be used, or any other suggestions you may desire to make in this connection, will be considered by the board."

Replies to these questions were received from 91 officers.

Copies of all these replies are annexed hereto.

A digest of the opinions contained in the replies prepared for the Secretary of War by Gen. John M. Wilson, then Chief of Engineers, is also annexed, together with a summary prepared from that digest, whereby it appears that of the 91 artillery officers answering the questions, 64 were in favor of disappearing carriages, 15 being in favor of them for all sites, 49 being in favor of them for low sites and of nondisappearing carriages for high sites, while 21 were opposed to disappearing carriages on any site, and 6 gave no definite expression of opinion.

The only official reports in regard to the Buffington-Crozier disappearing gun carriage made to the War Department, as distinct from the Board of Ordnance and Fortification, are a report by First Lieut. (now Capt.) H. E. Cloke, Third Artillery, commanding defenses at the mouth of the Columbia, dated December 15, 1900, and a report by Maj. Charles E. L. B. Davis, Corps of Engineers, dated December 19, 1900. Both of these reports relate to firing tests of the disappearing gun carriage made on the Pacific coast in the fall of 1900, and both of them are annexed hereto.

Under paragraph 415 of Army Regulations the commanding officers of all artillery stations are required to forward to the War Department a report of each shot fired in practice, instruction, and active service.

I do not understand that it was the intent of the resolution to call forth these reports, but as portions of them have a manifest bearing upon the subject I inclose a digest of the statements contained in these reports for the second half of the year 1900 and the whole of the year 1901, relating to the action of disappearing gun carriages. The reports themselves are very detailed and voluminous. Complete copies will be prepared and furnished if the Senate should so desire.

The remarks as to the action of gun and carriage quoted in the ninth column of the digest exhibit a general record of efficiency, such failures to act perfectly, as are recorded in about one-fourth of the cases, being but slight and easily corrected, and of the character which it is the purpose of practice to correct.

There are also on file in the Department copies of voluntary letters stating the personal experience of the writers in the use of the Buffington-Crozier disappearing gun carriages, as follows:

By Maj. Arthur Murray, Corps of Artillery, dated December 26, 1899; by Maj. W. P. Davall, Corps of Artillery, dated July 15, 1900; by Maj. Sedgwick Pratt, Corps of Artillery, dated January 11, 1901.

These letters having the substantial character, although not the technical form, of reports, I also annex hereto.

I also annex, as furnishing useful information upon the subject of the resolution, extracts from the reports of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification, showing the action of that body on the subject of disappearing gun carriages from the date of its organization to the present time, and an extract from the annual report of Secretary Lamont in 1894 upon the same subject.

Very respectfully,

ELIHU ROOT,  
Secretary of War.

The PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,  
United States Senate.

Mr. PROCTOR. Now let the synopsis be read.  
The Secretary read as follows:

[Senate Document No. 355, Fifty-seventh Congress, first session.]

DISAPPEARING GUN CARRIAGES—SYNOPSIS OF REPORTS FROM ARTILLERY OFFICERS ON SUBJECT OF DISAPPEARING GUN CARRIAGES PRINTED IN SENATE DOCUMENT NO. 336, FIFTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION.

May 13, 1902.—Ordered to be printed.

The following is a synopsis of the reports of the 15 officers named in the summary on page 94 of Senate Document No. 336 as favoring disappearing carriages for heavy guns for all sites:

Captain Best (p. 72): Can not say as to carriage in general; thinks present carriage gives better protection than barbette, particularly so on low sites; thinks present carriage satisfactory, but defenses not effective because of insufficient artillery; can not see why such carriages can not be kept in order; present difficulty lies with the animate artillery; has not been associated with the armament for past two years and has consequently lost touch

to a considerable extent; knows of no reason to think unfavorably of present carriage.

Captain Chase (p. 77): Inclines toward disappearing carriages for guns of 10 and 12 inch caliber; opinion not formed as to barbette carriages with and without shield; when present carriage is properly installed, it is easy and simple to operate; demands constant care; from experience, thinks they fulfill the requirements of seacoast sites.

Captain Cronkhite (p. 78): In favor of for all sites, but not for rapid-fire guns; present carriage satisfactory if used under conditions upon which their construction is based.

Lieutenant Ferguson (p. 89): Favors for all sites; regards present carriage satisfactory and as efficient as barbette carriage; has served during the past two and one-half years in light battery, and consequently opinion not maturely formed.

Capt. H. L. Harris (p. 50): Favors latest model for all sites; no suggestions to offer; present carriage satisfactory; experience very limited.

Lieutenant Hains (p. 47): Prefers disappearing carriage, particularly for low and medium heights, because it affords greater protection for the gun and detachment; qualifies this opinion in special cases; experience too limited to form competent judgment as to whether present carriage is satisfactory or not; thinks they are.

Lieutenant Hero (p. 53): In favor of for all guns of 8, 10, and 12 inch caliber. Captain Hoyle (p. 56): In favor of for all sites; present carriage entirely satisfactory; work beautifully, and are a happy solution of a difficult problem. Suggests an actual firing test to determine service value.

Lieutenant Johnston (p. 42): In favor of for all sites for all except rapid-fire guns; late models of present carriage satisfactory, and with proper care ought to do good service, but thinks they can be improved upon in simplicity of construction, in reduction of cost, in making them suitable for use either as disappearing or nondisappearing carriages; objects to sliding surfaces and the present method of taking up recoil.

Colonel Kinzie (p. 43): In favor of for all sites; present carriage of later model seems to be satisfactory; no suggestions and no recommendations.

Lieutenant McNair (p. 18): In favor of the disappearing carriage for all sites; considers the latest model of disappearing carriage to be very satisfactory; believes that no radical changes are needed in the disappearing carriage as now made for the 12-inch rifle; objects to shields; describes advantages of disappearing carriage over barbette.

Colonel Myrick (p. 22): In favor of for all sites; present carriage satisfactory or, when not, believes it can be made so by a perfect acquaintance on the part of the men engaged in handling it.

Captain Pratt (p. 16): In favor of for all sites; considers present carriage of later models satisfactory, with exception of traverse chains and retraction gears; criticizes the loading crane.

Captain Weaver (p. 30): States that if mechanical defects can be removed so as to make the carriage certain, he would favor disappearing; favors disappearing for large calibers; points out many defects constantly developing. Recommends that board of civilian mechanical experts be formed to report on carriage.

Lieutenant Winston (p. 40): Theory of disappearing carriage is correct, in his opinion, and protection afforded is sufficient to warrant its manufacture in preference to simpler barbette; qualifies this opinion by referring to delicate machinery; states that if it fulfills conditions laid down, disappearing carriage is best for 8, 10, and 12 inch guns.

Mr. PROCTOR. These are the 15 men who are quoted as unqualifiedly in favor of the disappearing carriage. I wish to call attention to the fact that four of them said that they have had practically no experience. The first one, Captain Best, "has not been associated with the armament for the past two years, and has consequently lost touch with it to a considerable extent;" Lieutenant Ferguson says his "opinion not maturely formed;" Captain Harris says, "experience very limited;" Lieutenant Hains says, "experience too limited to form competent judgment as to whether present carriage is satisfactory or not;" and five qualify their indorsement to such an extent as would hardly justify action upon an appropriation.

Captain Hoyle "suggests an actual firing test to determine service value," which has never been given, so far as I can learn.

Mr. COCKRELL. Does the Senator mean that there never has been a firing test with full charge?

Mr. PROCTOR. I beg the Senator's pardon; I will come later on to a table showing just what has been done.

Captain Weaver "recommends that board of civilian mechanical experts be formed to report on carriage," which I think is a very wise recommendation.

Let the Secretary proceed with the reading. The next 49 are quoted as favorable, depending somewhat on the site. Perhaps I might say that the engineers classify the sites in this way from their table, which I examined. Up to 40 feet is a low site. They make a division, 40 to 60, and 60 to 80, which are both perhaps called medium, the first a low medium and the next a high medium. Above 80 is a high site.

The Secretary read as follows:

The following 49 are named as favoring disappearing and nondisappearing carriages, depending on height of site:

Captain Adams (p. 92): Opposed to for sites above 75 feet; in favor of below this height. Present carriage not entirely satisfactory; presumes defects will be remedied; states that chains frequently break at drill, due to defective design; believes this can be remedied; adjustment of counterweight causes trouble; requires constant care and precaution to keep adjusted. Gives his experience at Morro Castle during Spanish war. States Navy did no damage to coast defenses above elevation of 70 feet.

Captain Alexander (p. 68): Opposed to carriage; present carriage not completely satisfactory; too liable to get out of order; requires constant care; too complicated; retraction gear with ropes and chain constantly giving trouble; loading devices slow and unwieldy. As carriage has not been subjected to test of war would try both types and mount half the guns on low sites on disappearing carriages.

Lieutenant Arnold (p. 69): Opposed to on high and medium sites; favors on low sites; carriage only partially satisfactory; recoil mechanism and counterweight defective; cylinders give trouble; carriages can not be tested before firing; too slow; great difficulty experienced in keeping bearing surfaces clean; suggests that such carriages be used only in case others can not be.

Captain Bailey (p. 70): Opposed to generally; a few could be used on very low sites defending a very narrow channel; for calibers of 8 inches and over, carriages used on low sites and in certain special cases on medium sites. Present carriage will be satisfactory when improvements are made. Recommends no more such carriages for rapid-fire guns.

Captain Bartlett (p. 71): Opposed to on high and medium sites; would use one half on low sites; present carriage unsatisfactory to some degree; not simple in construction; gets out of order easily; adjustments too fine; slow fire.

Captain Blunt (p. 73): Opposed to on high; in favor of on medium and low, but modifies his favorable opinion by certain conditions; considers latest type of carriage satisfactory; carriages are changing continually; suggests certain improvements in mechanism; points out defects; cylinders give trouble; so do counterweights; older models of carriages defective; retraction chains break often; laying devices not satisfactory; gun sights not placed properly. Further use will bring out advantages and disadvantages of these types.

Major Burbank (p. 74): Opposed to on high and medium sites; in favor of on low sites; opinion based on theoretical grounds; present carriage complicated; requires a skilled personnel, which at present we do not have; has only had experience with present type and does not feel qualified to discuss relative proportions.

Lieutenant Campbell (p. 75): Opposed to for high sites; in favor of for medium and low; present carriage very satisfactory; present liability of injury to mechanism can be remedied; suggests certain improvements; smokeless powder should be used.

Lieutenant Chamberlain (p. 76): Opposed to on high sites; in favor of on low sites; no fixed rule as to medium sites; present carriage satisfactory; suggests various improvements and points out defects; power should be used for manipulation; no suggestions as to proportions of types of different carriages.

Captain Conklin (p. 78): On general principles opposed to on high and medium sites and in favor of for low sites; says present carriages fairly satisfactory; experience limited; not sufficient data to base an opinion upon; would only favor disappearing carriages on low sites, provided it stands the test of firing under severest conditions; otherwise would favor the barbette; reports on the whole against the carriage, even for low sites.

Capt. R. R. Davis (p. 80): Opposed to on high and medium sites; in favor of on low; carriage satisfactory except as to minor details and loading facilities; suggests application of power; recommends practical trial to determine relative value under service conditions to settle questions.

Major Day (p. 83): Opposed to on all sites, but favors use of small; proportion to be determined in each case by board of officers, majority of whom should be artillerymen. Thinks present carriage unsatisfactory; mechanism too delicate; too liable to get out of order; objections serious; favors a mixed mount for heavy artillery, proportion to be determined in each case separately, as above indicated.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which is the bill (S. 2295) temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes.

Mr. PERKINS. I ask that the unfinished business be temporarily laid aside for the purpose of considering the pending bill.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from California asks unanimous consent that the unfinished business be temporarily laid aside and that the Senate be permitted to continue the consideration of the fortifications appropriation bill. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The Secretary will resume the reading.

The Secretary read as follows:

Lieutenant Gatchell (p. 90): Opposed to on high and medium sites; in favor of on certain special low sites, but even for low sites would prefer Gruson turrets; present carriage not wholly satisfactory; points out many minor defects in the mechanism; suggests no improvement.

Lieutenant Gatley (p. 91): Thinks question can not be consistently answered as stated, as all depends on the site; for sites under 200 feet suggests the present disappearing carriage until a better one is devised; so far as his personal experience and observation goes, present carriage eminently satisfactory. Believes that the effectiveness of the carriages depends altogether upon the men in charge of them. Believes that the ordnance officer should be a man of experience and mechanical ingenuity.

Captain Hamilton (p. 94): Opposed to on high and medium sites; in favor of for low sites; present carriages not entirely satisfactory; states many objections to details of mechanism. Suggests as a solution of the question that such carriages be used only for sites under 70 feet.

Captain Harlow (p. 48): Opposed to for all sites; present carriage unsatisfactory; gives in detail objections, but thinks that for very low sites and for short ranges a proportion of disappearing carriages may be used, proportion not to exceed one-half, usually less.

Lieut. F. E. Harris (p. 49): Opposed to for high and medium sites; for low sites favors the use of either type; present carriage not satisfactory; were constantly out of order and no amount of care seemed able to prevent the difficulties encountered. Makes no suggestions.

Colonel Hasbrouck (p. 50): Opposed to for medium and high sites; in favor of for low sites; considers present carriage satisfactory for its type, but prefers the barbette carriage where it can be used without too much exposure to the enemy's fire; has seen both carriages tested by firing, during which defects developed with the disappearing but not with the nondisappearing; proportion should be determined by the site.

Lieutenant Hayden (p. 52): In favor of for low and medium; opposed to for high sites; qualifies opinion as to medium sites; present carriage satisfactory in almost every respect when given proper care and attention; defects of earlier models have been corrected.

Captain Hills (p. 53): Opposed to for high and medium sites; in favor of for low; no suggestions or recommendations.

Lieutenant Hubbard (p. 57): Opposed to for high and medium sites; in favor of for low sites in special situations, and especially where the element of surprise enters; the later models of the present carriage appear to be satisfactory; present proportion of these carriages entirely too great; 30 or, at most, 40 per cent would appear to be high enough.

Lieutenant Kephart (p. 55): Objects to on all sites; present carriage unsatisfactory; gives in detail advantages and disadvantages of the two types; would suggest certain improvements in the artillery service of the guns.

Captain Lomia (p. 44): In favor of for low sites; opposed to for high sites; present carriage unsatisfactory; objection to carriage its liability to get out of order, thus rendering gun useless; qualifies opinion as to low sites, and would use nondisappearing carriages with shield for protection of gun detachment on such sites.

Captain Lundeen (p. 89): Opposed to for high and medium sites; no opinion

as to low sites; does not think present carriage entirely satisfactory, and gives an illustration from his own experience, describing faults in detail.

Captain Marsh (p. 15): In favor of for all except very high sites for guns of 10-inch caliber and upward; has never seen the nondisappearing carriage, either with or without shield, and only four of the disappearing carriages, and has never seen these tested in service; consequently not qualified to answer the question submitted.

Lieutenant Martin (p. 20): Opposed to for high and medium sites; in favor of for low and medium sites, unless a more simple carriage can be constructed; present carriages of late model satisfactory, but thinks they may not be the best attainable; seem to be most satisfactory part of our system of coast defenses; well-trained men required to handle them; none but artillery officers should be allowed to mount and dismount these guns.

Captain McClellan (p. 17): In favor of for low sites; opposed to for high sites, and would use both on medium sites; regards the present carriage as satisfactory; believes that the faults found can be cured and presumes they will be; criticizes various details of the mechanism; proportion of types must depend upon exposure to enemy's fire.

Captain Newcomb (p. 23): Opposed to for high and medium sites; in favor of for medium sites provided a simpler type can be devised; carriage fairly satisfactory; considers the carriage as a whole experimental.

Captain Patterson (p. 24): Has had but little experience; prefers a barbette carriage with shield; does not consider present carriage satisfactory, but believes they can be made to work better; has no suggestions as to proportions, but thinks majority of disappearing carriages in low sites; suggests improvement in service of magazines.

Lieutenant Pence (p. 24): Opposed to for high and medium sites; favors a small proportion for low sites in certain special cases; does not consider the carriage as now mounted satisfactory; gives reasons.

Colonel Randolph (p. 87): Difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion as to value of these carriages in actual warfare; his preference is decidedly in favor of barbette carriage with shield, which makes a better target; suggests it may be well to have a certain proportion of disappearing carriages on low sites; has little or nothing on which to base an opinion.

Captain Ridgway (p. 66): Opposed to for all sites; considers present carriage unsatisfactory; his experience fails to approve them as reliable machines and their efficiency depends upon too many adjustments; if a satisfactory solution of the problem of a reliable disappearing carriage is found, a number could be advantageously applied to sites up to about 60 feet.

Colonel Rodgers (p. 86): Opposed to for high and medium sites, and also for low sites, unless a perfectly stable foundation can be constructed on such sites; considers present carriage unsatisfactory and gives in detail his reasons. On low sites would not mount more than 50 per cent of 8, 10, and 12 inch guns on disappearing carriages.

Captain Rogers (p. 6): Not had sufficient experience and not prepared to give an expert opinion. If guns are mounted on disappearing carriages they should at least be supplemented by others mounted on barbette with shield.

Captain Rumbough (p. 10): Opposed to on high and medium sites; considers them satisfactory for low sites; has not used carriage sufficiently to learn its defects.

Captain Skerrett (p. 11): Opposed to on high and medium sites; favors on low sites only; considers present carriage very satisfactory as a type of its class; objection is to type for general use, and suggests improvements.

Lieutenant Snow (p. 12): Opposed to for high and medium sites; in favor of for low sites; considers present carriage on whole satisfactory; requires more intelligent and better trained class of soldiers; danger that something will be deranged during actual fire that would require the services of more skilled men than are now found in the artillery; thinks the present carriage has no equal of its type, but that a sufficient proportion of them has already been mounted and that hereafter the standard carriage should be barbette.

Captain Stone (p. 14): Opposed to for high and medium sites; in favor of for low sites; prefers that the number of disappearing carriages be limited to such as may be calculated for final resistance at close range in case others become disabled.

Maj. R. P. Strong (p. 9): Opposed to on high and medium sites; on low sites would use both; present carriage not entirely satisfactory; gun can not always be depended upon to run into battery; recommends that on low sites half the guns be disappearing and half barbette.

Capt. F. S. Strong (p. 15): In favor of on sites below 40 or 50 feet; for high and medium sites, opposed to; considers the present carriage more liable to get out of adjustment than the barbette, and does not consider them entirely satisfactory; suggests no improvements or changes; says that the disappearing carriage is practically used only for a few shots during actual firing season; officers and men do not become familiar with it.

Lieutenant Todd (p. 59): Opposed to for high and medium sites; favors for low sites; considers latest models best obtainable, but use for all sites can not be too strongly condemned; mechanism complicated; loading facilities crude and slow.

Captain Townsley (p. 60): In favor of for low and medium sites except for rapid-fire guns; opposed to for high sites; advantage of carriage is in protection; does not consider them entirely satisfactory, but considers defects are of mechanical details and not inherent; cylinders defective; platform not rigid; thinks difficulties due to lack of sufficient firing practice.

Captain Treat (p. 9): Opposed to for all sites, but suggests that a few disappearing carriages would be of advantage on certain sites; not satisfactory as only one to use, but is satisfactory of its type.

Captain Van Deusen (p. 94): Prefers a large proportion of barbette carriages with shields; considers present carriage satisfactory of their class, but does not think so much dependence should be placed on them; carriage is complicated; constant care needed; easily put out of order; thinks system of protection has had effect on efficiency of gun. Does not think proportion of disappearing should be greater than one-third.

Captain Van Ness (p. 25): Mistake to rely entirely on disappearing carriages; experience with partially instructed volunteer artillery sufficient to indicate need of carriage of simple construction; prefers barbette, but disappearing carriage will be best for certain sites; his objection is solely to amount of mechanism.

Captain Walker (p. 81): So far as his experience goes is disposed to favor present carriage, but on account of cost favors barbette with shield for protection of gunners on high sites; considers carriage quite satisfactory; as a machine, complicated and liable to get out of order.

Captain Whistler (p. 23): Considers present carriage complicated; large number of sliding parts, and must necessarily become, in time, very inaccurate, and more so than barbette; considers it fundamental that disappearing carriage should not be used when barbette can be; use of disappearing carriage as service type for all sites contrary to common sense; loading facilities not satisfactory; present carriage meets all requirements of fire so far as gun is concerned, but is too complicated. Thinks Howell carriage better than Crozier-Buffington.

Captain White (p. 30): No practical experience with barbette carriage and has not formed definite opinion as to merits of two; both should be used in varying proportions on medium and low sites; opposed to them for high sites; present carriage not entirely satisfactory; gun fails to run fully into firing position at times and at others goes in with too much shock; does not think



it advisable to manufacture any more disappearing carriages until fair proportion of nondisappearing have been obtained and their relative merits tried.

Captain Wisser (p. 41): Opposed to for high sites; favors one-fifth for medium sites and one-third for low sites; considers the carriage satisfactory; only grave objection to it is lack of proper loading facilities.

The following 10 officers are named as favoring nondisappearing carriages with shields for all sites:

Captain Anderson (p. 68): Opposed to for all sites; present carriage unsatisfactory; not accurate; aiming defective; does not permit rapid firing; states his opinion that one-half the carriages now mounted will be giving trouble half an hour after action begins; easily disabled; spring return barrette carriage suggested instead.

Lieutenant Barrette (p. 70): Opposed to on all sites; carriage unsatisfactory under present conditions; objectionable so long as artillery force is insufficient, badly organized, and meanly paid; mechanism beautiful but delicate; skilled personnel needed to keep in order.

Captain Califf (p. 75): Opposed to for all guns and on all sites; present carriage appears to behave well under the conditions of drill and exercise; objects to it because of the ease and ever-imminent possibility of its being disabled under actual conditions of war.

Captain Hoskins (p. 55): Opposed to for all sites; present carriage unsatisfactory; gives objections in detail; recommends many minor changes in mechanism.

Lieutenant Hunter (p. 65): Opposed to for all sites except that it may be preferable to mount the 8-inch rifle on disappearing carriages on low sites; says loading facilities of barrette carriage not satisfactory; present carriage not satisfactory except for the 8-inch rifle; those for the 12-inch rifle are most unsatisfactory; states that since last November there has been two weeks when all the disappearing carriages could have been used; at the present time the three 10-inch carriages are out of order, and have been since June; points out defects; constantly out of order; hard to clean, and less accurate than barrette; states that within two years it will be necessary to dismount each of the 12-inch B. L. rifles at Fort Mott; gives reasons; makes no recommendations; suggests more attention in keeping clean.

Major Lancaster (p. 43): Opposed to for all sites; present carriage satisfactory, but objectionable on account of being rendered unserviceable by small breakages.

Lieutenant Landon (p. 84): Opposed to for all sites. A very long report, in which the question of protection is considered, and the general care and attention needed to keep the present carriage in order is entered into in detail.

Captain Leary (p. 46): Opposed to for all sites; present carriage satisfactory so far as his experience goes; have worked well as machines, but practice with them unsatisfactory; gun should be considered from the standpoint of fire efficiency. A long report, with many quotations from various authors on the subject, principally with reference to the ineffectiveness of fire from shipboard on land fortifications; goes into question of relative cost of two types.

Captain Ruckman (p. 39): Impossible to brief this report. It is most comprehensive, covering 14 typewritten pages, and giving elaborate tables and other data in support of his conclusions. Captain Ruckman is strongly opposed to the use of a disappearing carriage for any gun on any site.

Lieutenant Spinks (p. 12): Opposed to for all sites; considers present carriage unsatisfactory; too many adjustments; the means of checking recoil defective; too many sliding parts; in his opinion, the present type of carriage should be used in small numbers compared with number of nondisappearing.

The following eight are named as favoring nondisappearing carriages without shields for all sites:

Lieutenant Applewhite (p. 67): Opposed to for all sites; present carriage very unsatisfactory; clearances not sufficient; liable to get out of order; retraction gear breaks; mechanism too delicate; requires too much time to operate; considers defects so serious that it would be impossible to overcome them; suggests that no more such carriages be used.

Captain Danes (p. 79): Report written on board transport for China; no data at hand, but refers to professional paper written by him on Seacoast Gun Mounts and Emplacements, in which he gives his reasons for being opposed to disappearing carriages and in favor of barrette. Opposed to carriage for all sites.

Captain Homer (p. 54): Opposed to for all sites; present carriage satisfactory of its kind; no objections; no suggestions.

Major Morris (p. 21): Opposed to for all sites; present carriages unsatisfactory; type is too complicated and machinery too delicate, and hence is rarely in perfect order; fails to work unless many conditions of adjustment are fulfilled; describes defects in detail.

Captain Schenck (p. 10): Opposed to on all sites; considers present carriage decidedly unsatisfactory and wholly unnecessary, in view of its excessive cost.

Captain Stewart (p. 13): Opposed to for all sites; considers present carriage unsatisfactory, being too complicated, requiring skilled mechanics, which we do not get in the artillery except in very limited numbers; noted defects in detail; recommends that as many disappearing carriages have been installed, owing to cost of replacing them they be continued in service, but that new mounts be barrette.

Captain Vogdes (p. 26): Not much in favor of disappearing carriages except for very close ranges; at long ranges nondisappearing carriages preferable; does not approve of shields on account of moral effect. Has had no opportunity to observe barrette carriages. Now serving in Porto Rico.

Colonel Woodruff (p. 42): Little or no experience with modern high-power guns; has not seen nondisappearing gun except at Watertown Arsenal; prefers barrette mount; disappearing carriages at Fort Warren work satisfactorily under the supervision of Major Crozier. Makes no suggestions.

The following three officers are named as favoring nondisappearing carriages with strong shields on high sites, turrets for low sites:

Captain Brown (p. 62): Opposed to on all sites; favors turret for low sites. Present carriages unsatisfactory; not familiar with barrette carriage; present carriage slow and unhandy; liable to get out of order; piston heads on older models too small; counterweights give trouble; so do crane and drum. Carriage is badly designed in every way. "We need a carriage we can drill with, not one so badly designed that we use it only six times a week, practically." Severely criticizes all essential details of construction.

Colonel Haskin (p. 51): Opposed to for all sites; on low sites would use turret; present carriage satisfactory if we must have disappearing carriages at all; faults of construction which have developed have been for most part remedied; has serious misgivings as to whether these carriages will perform satisfactorily in excitement and hurry of actual fight; lack of care has serious results; defective platforms not easily repaired; has seen several such platforms; suggests the use of disappearing carriages on all low sites and the nondisappearing on all high sites since we have carriages of both types; the proportion of carriages to be determined by site.

Captain Walke (p. 26): Opposed to on all sites; prefers turret system on low sites; present carriage difficult to keep in thorough working order even

in time of peace; retraction gear unwieldy; not adapted to subcaliber practice; carriage generally unsatisfactory.

The following six officers are named as giving no definite expression of opinion:

Lieutenant Berry (p. 71): At present opposed to carriage; prejudice might disappear after service with them; requests to be excused from answering.

Lieutenant Blake (p. 7): Opposed to on high and medium sites; for low sites opinion not formed; not had sufficient experience to form intelligent opinion.

Lieutenant Coe (p. 77): Has had no opportunity of judging; no opinion formed.

Captain Hubbell (p. 58): Has never served at a post provided with barrette battery and does not feel competent to express opinion. Present carriage satisfactory so far as he has observed; they fail occasionally when tripped; suggests that lever be provided to start the carriage in battery.

Lieutenant Lassiter (p. 43): Has had no experience with new coast fortifications, and consequently not in position to pass judgment.

Colonel McCrea (p. 17): Not having had any experience with the nondisappearing carriages, is not prepared to compare them; present carriage not entirely satisfactory; points out numerous defects; suggests that no more disappearing carriages be made until those we now have have been more thoroughly tested.

Mr. PROCTOR. Mr. President, I call attention to the very last sentence of Colonel McCrea's letter. He is one of those officers quoted as having "no opinion" on this subject, and yet he suggests very forcibly "that no more disappearing carriages be made until those we now have have been more thoroughly tested." Senators who have followed the reading of the report will notice how many of these officers have stated the liability of these carriages to get out of order.

Captain Anderson, a very bright officer, states in "his opinion that one-half the carriages now mounted will be giving trouble half an hour after action begins." Several other officers speak of it as it actually is—experimental—and that a large enough proportion has already been constructed.

It is difficult to get at the total expense that we have incurred upon these disappearing carriages. I think there has been over \$5,000,000 directly appropriated, and that does not cover the amount expended in experimental work. Of course, these inventors being in the Ordnance Department, all the experimental work has, I have no doubt, been done at the expense of the Government.

Besides this, of the appropriation of \$50,000,000 at the beginning of the Cuban war, about thirteen millions went to coast defenses. How much of that went direct to carriages I have no means of ascertaining, but taking a fair proportion, I think it is safe to say—in fact, I am sure it is—that it must be very near \$10,000,000 that have been directly expended upon these carriages. Besides that, the emplacements and the magazines cost very much more than do those for barrette carriages.

Furthermore, Mr. President, suppose these carriages should prove to be unsatisfactory. They have never yet been thoroughly tested, in my opinion, and that is the opinion expressed by several of these officers. They have never been put to the test they would be subjected to in time of actual war. Suppose they fail, as I am very confident they will in the end, their cost will be entirely lost.

You can not mount on a disappearing carriage a gun any longer than that for which it is made, and our guns already in the Army are shorter than the naval guns, and have less initial velocity. The tendency has been to make guns longer and longer, so that the slow-burning powders would have time to fully expand and give their force to the projectile before leaving the muzzle of the gun. On the disappearing carriage no longer gun than that for which it was intended can possibly be mounted. You can not possibly lengthen the gun without losing all our expenditure for the carriages and the emplacements, while on the barrette carriage there is no trouble in mounting a longer gun whenever desirable to do so.

I give from General Crozier's report, from abstract of reports of seacoast target practice, submitted to the subcommittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, a transcript of the shots fired, with the weight of charge, kind of powder, weight of shot, and number of rounds, and a summary of the same, which shows that of a total of 209 shots of the 8-inch guns only 6 were with the service charge and service shot, and of the 251 rounds from a 10-inch gun only 4 were with full charge and shot, and of the 29 rounds from the 12-inch gun 8 were of full charge and shot; and out of the total of 489 shots only 18 were with full service charges and full service shot, and only 2 were with smokeless powder.

General Crozier says:

Reading right down the column it reads something like this: "No failure reported." "No failure reported." "No failure reported;" and so on and so on.

Mr. President, I want to call attention to the Digest of Target Practice with seacoast guns. It is part of the report received from the War Department, and I have made a summary of it. The report is printed, and anybody who so desires can make a summary of it.

The summary is as follows:

*Digest of target practice with seacoast guns.*

Gun.	Weight of charge.	Kind of powder.	Weight of shot.	Number of rounds.
	<i>Pounds.</i>		<i>Pounds.</i>	
8-inch	44	Brown cocoa	144 to 150	87
	58½ to 59	do	144 to 148	70
	58½	do	164	10
	100	do	300	30
	110	do	300	6
	135	do	300	6
10-inch	80 to 85	do	253 to 263	92
	80 to 85	do	275	60
	80 to 85	do	300	5
	205 to 210	do	575	71
	215 to 217	do	575	10
	230	do	575	6
12-inch	240	do	575	3
	280	do	575	4
	350 to 352	do	1,000	20
	460	do	1,000	1
	490	do	1,000	6
	244	Smokeless	1,000	2

\* Service charges: Brown cocoa powder, 135 pounds; smokeless powder, 70 pounds; projectile, 300 pounds.

<sup>b</sup> Weight of service projectile.

<sup>c</sup> Weight of service charge of powder.

<sup>d</sup> Service charges: Brown cocoa powder, 280 pounds; smokeless powder, 140 pounds; projectile, 575 pounds.

<sup>e</sup> Service charges: Brown cocoa powder, 490 pounds; smokeless powder, 240 pounds; projectile, 1,000 pounds.

SUMMARY.

Gun.	Light-weight charge and light-weight shot.	Light-weight charge and full-weight shot.	Service charge and service shot.	Total.
8-inch	167	36	6	209
10-inch	157	90	4	251
12-inch		21	8	29
Total	324	147	18	489

That is the character of the test this gun has been subjected to—mere pop-gun charges.

Mr. President, I would like to compare that with the table showing the yearly allowance of money for target practice by the Navy, all of which, I am informed, has been expended for the 10, 12, and 13 inch guns:

	Rounds per gun.
For 10, 12, and 13 inch guns	12
For 8-inch	18
For 4, 5, and 6 inch	24
For 3-inch	36
With full service charges of smokeless powder and full-weight shot.	

In the digest of target practice by the Army, which I read, there were only two rounds, and those for 12-inch guns fired with smokeless powder. The others were with brown cocoa.

In regard to the sites, the report of the Chief of Engineers gives 302 guns that have been mounted, 254 of them on the disappearing carriage and only 48 on the nondisappearing carriage. Taking the percentage, I believe it is 84 per cent of the disappearing carriage, as I have figured it. I think one report from the Bureau of Ordnance states it at 87 per cent; but as I have figured it it is about the same. So there is no question that from 84 to 90 per cent have been mounted on disappearing carriages.

The Chief of Engineers in his report states that improved projects of defense call for a total of 478 heavy guns, of which 27 are to be mounted in turrets, 59 on nondisappearing carriages, and 397 on disappearing carriages, the latter being 83 per cent of the total number. The turret mounting has been abandoned, and these, I understand, are to be mounted on disappearing carriages, which makes the proportion of disappearing carriages 87 per cent instead of 83 per cent.

I am informed also that the Engineer Department proposes to mount guns on disappearing carriages for the defense of the Philippines and Porto Rico, and also the 16-inch experimental gun now under construction is to be mounted on a disappearing carriage. The expense of that will be hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Now, as to the height of the sites, 74 are reported by the Engineer Department as mounted on sites over 80 feet high. I called at the War Department this morning, the report not being ready, and took a list from a copy of a report they have sent here, but which was not received in time, showing the sites. In the list I have taken there are only 72, but that is near enough for all practical purposes. These heights run from 80 feet to 338 feet. These are the elevations. I will ask to have the list inserted in my remarks.

The list referred to is as follows:

6-inch on nondisappearing carriage	8
6-inch on disappearing carriage	31
8, 10, and 12 inch on nondisappearing carriage	48
On disappearing carriage	254

Height of sites for 72 guns.—1 at 122 feet, 2 at 338, 2 at 85, 2 at 233, 1 at 88, 3 at 90, 1 at 118, 1 at 235, 2 at 104, 1 at 145, 1 at 178, 1 at 184, 1 at 192, 2 at 197, 1 at 177, 1 at 203, 1 at 209, 3 at 85, 3 at 170, 1 at 80, 1 at 80.44, 5 at 80.03, 2 at 93, 2 at 105, 2 at 107, 5 at 144, 1 at 82, 2 at 136, 2 at 153, 2 at 170, 2 at 129, 2 at 122, 2 at 110, 3 at 94, 1 at 97, 4 at 105, 3 at 88.

Average height of site for these 72 guns, 131 feet.

Mr. MALLORY. Are those the elevations?

Mr. PROCTOR. Those are the elevations above the sea. These guns are all mounted at the seacoast.

Senators will notice that the condemnation of these high disappearing carriages on these high sites was almost universal in the reports of the artillery officers. It will be noticed from the reports of the officers that very little attention has been given to the barbette carriage. It is well known that our barbette carriage is very inferior to that used abroad; its advantages are largely counteracted by being so much higher.

The carriages used in foreign countries are quite low, and therefore largely protected by being low. The patents of the present disappearing carriage were sold to the Bethlehem Steel Company in 1896, six years ago. They have not sold one abroad. One experimental carriage is being made in Sweden, but they took out no patent there. They only took out patents in the leading countries, in England, France, and Germany, and those patents are in the name of the Bethlehem Steel Company.

I have just received this morning The Journal of the Military Service Institution for May, 1902. There is an article here from Captain Ruckman, a very able one. I will only read some brief extracts from it. The article is so long that I will not read it in full. Captain Ruckman speaks of the mechanical construction; he says that it costs much more, and he gives a table showing the difference in cost. The balance in favor of the barbette is \$19,000 on a mount for a 12-inch gun; \$7,000 for a 10-inch gun, and \$2,300 on the 8-inch gun. This is his language:

1. *Mechanical construction.*—It is generally conceded that, for a given gun, a disappearing will cost more than a nondisappearing carriage. This applies to all classes of disappearing carriages. In the recent controversy this assumption has not been denied and all authorities within the knowledge of the writer accept it as a fact.

The Buffington-Crozier carriage undoubtedly costs more than the simple barbette mounts for same caliber now used in this country, but the difference in cost is not so great as would at first appear. The price of these carriages has varied from time to time and in different places. What is desired here is not so much the actual as the relative cost, since in the comparison it will be to the relative value that all results must finally reduce. With this object in mind the following data have been collected and arranged in tabular form to facilitate comparison:

Cost of Buffington-Crozier and barbette carriages for 6, 8, 10, and 12 inch guns.

	6-inch.		8-inch.		10-inch.		12-inch.	
	Disap-pear-ing.	Bar-bette.	Disap-pear-ing.	Bar-bette.	Disap-pear-ing.	Bar-bette.	Disap-pear-ing.	Bar-bette.
Maximum	\$7,400	\$6,800	\$12,820	\$10,900	\$19,000	\$11,000	\$42,000	\$19,000
Minimum	6,450	6,800	9,500	7,500	15,500	11,000	32,000	14,220
Mean	6,875	6,800	11,160	9,200	17,650	11,000	37,000	16,610
Mean from all sources	7,000	6,800	11,000	8,700	18,000	11,000	36,000	17,000
Balance in favor of barbette mount		200		2,300		7,000		19,000

Taking cost of carriage, emplacement, and gun, caliber for caliber, we have the following aggregates per gun in position for the two classes of carriage:

DISAPPEARING GUNS.

	6-inch.	8-inch.	10-inch.	12-inch.
Disappearing carriage	\$7,000	\$11,000	\$18,000	\$36,000
Emplacement	27,000	45,000	47,000	54,000
Gun	6,000	12,000	25,000	41,000
Total per gun	40,000	68,000	90,000	131,000

BARBETTE GUNS.

Caliber of gun.	6-inch.	8-inch.	10-inch.	12-inch.
Barbette carriage	\$6,800	\$8,700	\$11,000	\$17,000
Emplacement for same	10,000	27,500	31,000	50,000
Gun	6,000	12,000	25,000	41,000
Total	22,800	48,200	67,000	108,000
Total for gun on disappearing mount	40,000	68,000	90,000	131,000
Balance in favor of barbette mount	17,200	19,200	23,000	23,000



The above figures show that for every 100 guns of each caliber mounted on disappearing carriages 171 of the 6-inch, 142 of the 8-inch, 134 of the 10-inch, and 121 of the 12-inch could be mounted on simple barbette carriages. The average balance in favor of the barbette mount is about \$20,600, which would probably install a rapid-firing 6-inch gun with shield on pedestal mount, giving a muzzle velocity of 3,000 feet and capable of being fired eight times per minute.

Therefore, by mounting the heavier guns on the simple barbette mount, for each one so mounted another of the kind just described could be mounted for the additional money now being expended on disappearing mounts. This would provide the defense with the same number of guns and give it in addition an equal number of the 6-inch rapid-firing guns, whose presence in future defense of harbors will be essential to success. This phase of the problem demands reflection.

The number of large parts making up the disappearing carriage is approximately 340 and the small pieces, including bolts, about 1,400, while for the other carriage these numbers are about 131 and 650, respectively. The weight of the disappearing carriage is about 93,000 pounds and for the barbette carriage about 55,000 pounds.

Friction varies from hour to hour with the amount of lubrication, dust, and sand blowing about, and frequently a carriage left in working order at night will not go into battery in the morning without a readjustment of the counterweight.

The service disappearing carriage is particularly affected by the sand blast existing along the coast. The sliding parts become clogged, and, owing to the difficulty of getting at the surfaces, the sand can be removed only with great labor, perhaps to be blown in again the same day. A readjustment of the counterweight becomes necessary or a change in the oil in the cylinders. Both of these operations are tentative, and differ for drill and practice and for full and reduced charges. In short, with every new set of conditions a new and original problem arises for solution, and one feels compelled to stop and consider what would be the result of being compelled during battle to adjust counterweights, rig retraction gears, or change the amount of oil in the cylinders, necessitated, perhaps, by a change of ammunition.

Touching the subject of care of the carriage, the amount required for the disappearing carriage may be taken at not less than ten times that for other carriages, and the writer is not aware of any barbette carriage that ever failed to run "in battery" although neglected for months at a time.

The 6, 8, 10, and 12 inch disappearing carriages mount their guns, on an average, about 10 feet higher than the more simple barbette or pedestal mount. Assuming that 10 feet is a reasonable superior limit for height of a barbette gun above sea level, a comparison of values for the same target and gun at 10 and 20 feet above the sea will give a good idea of the relative hitting efficiency of the two classes of guns. This comparison reveals an enormous loss in hits due to the higher mounting of the gun on disappearing carriage. The efficacy of fire of the gun on low mount increases as the hostile ship approaches, while that of the gun on the high mount diminishes more and more as the range shortens, resulting in a great reduction in offensive power at the critical moment when most urgently needed.

It should be borne in mind that of the inventors of this carriage one of them has been Chief of Ordnance for several years and the second has now been appointed, and it is perfectly natural that they should exploit their own inventions—and they have had an opportunity to do so at immense expense to the Government.

I wish to call attention to the character of the replies which these artillery officers made to the War Department to be seen by the Chief of Ordnance, a mere staff officer of the Secretary of War. Under such circumstances it was but natural that the officers should be somewhat diplomatic in their answers and a little careful. My attention was attracted to that by seeing a personal letter a day or two since from an officer whose report is here. His report was against the carriage, but moderately so; not more opposed than many others. In his letter he says, what I believe to be true, that "it is a stupendous blunder."

I think, Mr. President, the weight of evidence of these reports is very strongly in favor of the following points:

First. The disappearing carriage, its emplacement, and magazine are much more costly to build and maintain.

Second. It is easily disabled by sand, dirt, or any substance falling on sliding surfaces or thrown on by bursting shell, and requires constant care of higher class mechanics than the service furnishes to keep in order.

Third. If the same time, money, and attention had been given to the improvement of the barbette carriage that has been given to the disappearing carriage, we should have had many more guns mounted for the same money and our defenses would have been in far better condition for immediate service.

Fourth, and strongest. That if disappearing guns are used at all they should only be used on low or medium sites, and the number of guns mounted on barbette carriages should be in much greater proportion. In fact, many guns have been and are being mounted on sites so high that they are almost universally condemned by these reports.

I have given the height of 72 sites averaging 131 feet.

It seems to me, Mr. President, it is conclusively established that it would be unwise—in fact, the height of folly—to expend any more money for these carriages until we can have tests made by a disinterested board of officers and mechanical experts, as is recommended by several of these letters, with full service charges and under all the conditions that would exist in war.

Mr. COCKRELL. That is the very question I asked a while

ago, in the beginning, whether there had been any such tests as that made with full charges.

Mr. PROCTOR. I read during the Senator's absence a summary of one of the reports that had been submitted, but too late for me to examine it thoroughly. In the digest of target practice with seacoast guns there have been 489 shots fired, 324 of them with light-weight charge and light-weight shot, 147 with light-weight charge and full-weight shot, and only 18 out of 489 with service charge and service shot.

I also gave in that connection, while the Senator was absent, the difference in the target practice of the Navy. Their allowance, which I am informed has all been expended, is for 10, 12, and 13 inch guns, 12 rounds per gun; for 8-inch guns, 18 rounds per gun; for 4, 5, and 6 inch guns, 24 rounds per gun; for 3-inch guns, 36 rounds per gun, with full-service charges of smokeless powder and full-weight shot. In the Army tests there were but 2 rounds, and that for 12-inch guns only—2 rounds of smokeless powder. The rest were with brown powder.

Mr. MALLORY. Before the Senator takes his seat, I should like to make an inquiry for information. Can the Senator state whether any of the great powers of Europe use disappearing gun carriages on their fortifications?

Mr. PROCTOR. To the best of my information it has never been used in Germany. The turret system is used there. In France it has never been used to any extent; the barbette system prevails. In England an attempt was made to use it some. It was used, I think, in four unimportant forts, but it has been discontinued.

Mr. HARRIS. That was a different carriage from this, a different patent. If the Senator will allow me to suggest, the English experiment was entirely on what is known as the hydraulic lift carriage, not on the disappearing type, as used in our service.

Mr. WARREN. Not upon the counterpoise. The system was not the counterpoise.

Mr. PROCTOR. Mr. President, this Bethlehem Steel Company, a pretty energetic business company, has owned the foreign patents, subject to a royalty to be paid to Generals Buffington and Crozier, for about six years, and it is admitted they have not sold one. Sweden is building on her own account an experimental carriage. It is a fair presumption that if foreign countries are seeking this carriage in the last six years they would have bought some.

Mr. MALLORY. I should like to ask the Senator another question, if he will permit me. If the disappearing gun carriage is not practicable for medium or great elevations and it would have to be abandoned at such sites, would that necessitate an additional expenditure on the fortifications to change their character from what they are now, adapted to the purposes of barbette guns?

Mr. PROCTOR. It would.

Mr. MALLORY. That would involve, then, considerable additional expense?

Mr. PROCTOR. Very large. The carriage would be entirely lost, and the emplacement, as I understand it. The carriage certainly would.

Mr. MALLORY. Then it would practically amount to largely rebuilding some of the fortifications that we have constructed at great expense in recent years?

Mr. PROCTOR. It would necessitate rebuilding the armament.

Mr. MALLORY. I am speaking also of the fortification itself, aside from the armament.

Mr. PROCTOR. Yes; it would involve a change in that and in magazines. Magazines for the disappearing carriages are located very low. I have sent in an inquiry in regard to the condition of magazines, and I was informed unofficially that that ought to be considered confidential, so as not to give foreign countries the information.

Mr. PLATT of Connecticut. May I ask right there, is this an American invention? Is it in use in other countries or simply in the United States?

Mr. PROCTOR. Simply in the United States. Only one experimental carriage is being built in Sweden. Although this steel company has had the foreign patents for six years, no foreign power has adopted this carriage yet.

Mr. MALLORY. There is another point, Mr. President, to which I would like to call the Senator's attention, and that is with reference to the report of target practice here. In hurriedly running over it—I have not been able to give the matter attention—I find that in a great majority of instances the experiment has not been unsatisfactory. As the Senator has said, the report in many instances is "no failure reported," which is rather peculiar language. The Senator, in his comment on this, called attention to the fact that the charges used were much less than the service charge. I observe in one of the comments, in the case of Capt.

J. A. Lundeen, reported on page 104, as to an experiment at Rodman, Mass., he says:

Owing to small charge, gun did not recoil sufficiently to catch in ratchets, and had to be hauled back by hand.

There was a defect, apparently a failure, but it was not due, I infer from this report, to any defect in the carriage itself, but was really due to the fact that there was not a service charge used—that the charge was not sufficient to drive the gun back.

Mr. COCKRELL. What is the benefit of such charges?

Mr. MALLORY. I do not know that there is any, but it is not fair to a carriage to put that down as a failure, because it was not used under such conditions as those under which it would be used in the event of real service.

Mr. PROCTOR. Mr. President, in that case they probably got the charge a little bit too small. This is a beautiful piece of mechanism, and with just the right charge, very moderate, much less than the service charge, it will play back and forth very well, but it has never had the trial with the service charge and war conditions to demonstrate its usefulness.

Mr. WARREN. Will the Senator permit me to interrupt him? The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Vermont yield to the Senator from Wyoming?

Mr. PROCTOR. Certainly.

Mr. WARREN. I want to ask the Senator from Vermont if he wishes to make the unqualified statement that Sweden is not using a disappearing carriage, very much the same as ours, and that it only has one experimental disappearing gun carriage?

Mr. PROCTOR. I think it has appeared in some way before the Committee on Military Affairs that they were constructing one experimental carriage. I have no positive knowledge in regard to it.

Mr. WARREN. May I state at this moment some information I have?

Mr. PROCTOR. Certainly.

Mr. WARREN. Of course there is information in the War Department which it is hardly fair for it to send to the Senate. I am informed they are using in Sweden a good many of the disappearing carriages called the Bofors, which is really much the same carriage as the Buffington-Crozier. You will recall that the Bethlehem people did not take out patents in that country; therefore Sweden has a right to make the carriages.

Mr. PLATT of Connecticut. What country is that?

Mr. PROCTOR. Sweden.

Mr. WARREN. Sweden. I have, in looking over the papers, found the following quotation, which I will submit:

Referring to previous correspondence on the subject of disappearing-gun carriages I have the honor to say that I have to-day received official information from the minister of war in Sweden.

"That high-power guns with disappearing carriages are mounted in the fortifications of Sweden, and give satisfaction. Three of the largest have been placed in position during the present year and work admirably. These guns are made at the Swedish manufactory at Bofors and patented by this manufactory."

In reply to instructions, I have been officially notified by the Swedish Government as follows:

Modern guns now mounted, 24-centimeter guns are the largest; of these 60 per cent are mounted on disappearing carriages, Bofors pattern, 40 per cent in armored casemates.

Disappearing gun carriages were somewhat out of favor here in Sweden until recently when the new Bofors carriages were set up. But they have worked so successfully that officers who had formerly opposed them are their warmest advocates—for heavy guns. The artillery officers of the garrison where they have just been mounted say that they can be fired as rapidly as the other styles of carriages, and can be handled by a single man without any effort.

The 24-cm. rifles, which are the largest guns in use, are, as far as practicable, to be mounted on disappearing carriages. The old guns were mounted on old carriages of English manufacture, which were very unsatisfactory. The new carriage, known as the Bofors-Buffington, is a modification of the American carriage.

The price of gun and carriage is about \$90,000 or \$70,000.

For coast defense the Swedes do not mount guns of any higher caliber than 15 cm. on barbette carriages.

Mr. PROCTOR. Mr. President. Sweden is not a country of much military importance. Does the Senator claim that England, France, and Germany are making and mounting these guns on these carriages?

Mr. WARREN. No; I do not. But England has disappearing carriages and has them in use.

There are a great many in use in Italy. So far as Germany is concerned, as the Senator says, they are using a different style of gun, a very large type in revolving armored cupolas or turrets, that costs, the complete establishment, three or four and sometimes six hundred thousand dollars to install, as against our cost of installation of a smaller gun—a Buffington-Crozier carriage gun—amounting to less, perhaps, than \$100,000. They have the guns in place, and therefore are not taking them out to substitute the other. They have not the right there to use the Buffing-

ton-Crozier patent, of course, without paying the royalty or making arrangements with the Bethlehem people.

Mr. PROCTOR. What does the Senator think about the use of them in England?

Mr. WARREN. My information regarding England generally is that she is about as much behind in adopting this later style of gun carriage as she is in keeping up with the march of American industrial progress. I think she is slightly behind.

Mr. WELLINGTON. Or her army?

Mr. WARREN. Yes; or her army.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will allow me, I think there is no question but that England has expended an enormous amount of time and money in attempting to perfect a disappearing carriage of altogether a different model. She has been working on a disappearing carriage which is lifted up or down by a hydraulic or pneumatic pressure, and I believe she has not made a success of that form of disappearing carriage. But nations naturally seek to have some peculiar armament of their own. They do not necessarily or generally follow the steps of other nations.

Mr. PROCTOR. Mr. President, I thought I had the title page of a very recent publication here with me. I have it somewhere, but I do not see it at this moment. It is by a major of the Royal Engineers, who is an official of the great English Woolwich Arsenal. That publication is by Murray & Sons. I will ask the Senator from Massachusetts if that is not a London house?

Mr. LODGE. Yes.

Mr. PROCTOR. It is published by Murray & Sons, and was dated, on the title page, March 2, 1892. It has been sent to Dutton & Co., of New York, to have it published in this country. I have a few sheets here. I have somewhere the title page, but I have given it substantially. I have a few sheets of the copy sent from England for Dutton & Co. to examine it in regard to its publication. The chapter on "Carriages" is very brief. It is headed "Barbette, the only modern type of mounting." It says:

The barbette system is practically the only system now used in the mounting of guns for coast defense. \* \* \* Even on low sites the advantages of the disappearing mounting are neutralized by the slow rate of fire possible. The barbette principle is now universally employed by us.

In a note the author speaks of a few guns that can not be worked by hand and some mounted in turrets now, but he does not allude to the disappearing carriage.

Mr. PERKINS obtained the floor.

Mr. WARREN. Will my colleague on the committee yield to me for a moment?

Mr. PERKINS. Certainly.

Mr. WARREN. In reply, further, to the inquiry of the Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROCTOR] as to England, I have here a quotation from Gen. Andrew Clark, inspector-general of fortifications for England, in which he says, speaking of the whole matter of the necessity for disappearing guns:

The disappearing principle will undoubtedly remain in some form, since it must always be an exceedingly effective mode of protection on account of extreme invisibility. A disappearing gun in a well-placed pit, provided with a turtle back, splinterproof shield, is probably far better protected than in a turret. Moreover, a gun so mounted possesses the great advantage that future advances in the offensive power of ironclads are little likely to diminish the value of its protection.

Mr. PROCTOR. What is the date?

Mr. WARREN. This is 1884.

The disappearing principle will undoubtedly remain in some form, since it must always be an exceedingly effective mode of protection on account of extreme invisibility.

Now, in 1890 Col. Sir George Clarke, R. E., says:

Of all methods of mounting yet proposed the disappearing principle offers the greatest advantages, and provided that the mechanical difficulties can be overcome this method will receive wide adoption. The gun, laid under cover by a position finder, will be vulnerable only for a few seconds before each round. Its exact position can only be identified during the brief period of visibility. There appears to be no satisfactory mode of attacking it.

This was some years later, in 1890. The other was in 1884.

Also, in speaking of the English hydropneumatic carriage, he says:

For the purpose of coast defense this form of mounting is ideal in conception. Provided that the hydropneumatic arrangement is in good working order, there is practically no hope of silencing guns thus mounted by the fire of ships. Their position can be rendered absolutely indistinguishable from the surroundings if a little care has been disposed upon the works. They need be exposed only for a brief period before the moment of firing.

It will be observed he is speaking of their own gun, which has not the counterpoise weights and easy action of the Buffington-Crozier.

He says further:

The disappearing principle is ideal in conception, and, provided that skilled supervision is available, these mountings ought to be easily kept in serviceable condition. \* \* \* The advantages this method of mounting offers—complete invisibility until the moment of firing, and practical immunity from all danger to the gun's crew—can scarcely be overestimated. Against disappearing guns the armament of a ship is powerless.

Mr. PROCTOR. Mr. President, I understood that perfectly well. That first report was made eighteen years ago and the next



one twelve years ago. As I stated, at that period, early in the invention of high-explosive powders and long guns, attention all over the world was directed to some disappearing gun. It was thought necessary to go back to the early principle that we had followed in Indian fighting, to fire and then get behind a tree and load again. But modern experience has demonstrated that that is poor policy; that the side wins that throws the most iron and throws it fastest and throws it with the best aim. That was demonstrated plainly at Manila and Santiago, and it has been demonstrated everywhere. The disappearing principle has never been subjected to the test of war, and whenever it is it will be found to be a lamentable failure.

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. President, it is with some temerity that I venture, on behalf of the committee, to oppose the amendment proposed by my friend from Vermont [Mr. PROCTOR]. I realize the fact that he himself is a distinguished soldier; that he has been Secretary of War; that he is the ranking member and acting chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, and therefore in anything he may have to say he speaks ex cathedra; he speaks by reason of his position, from his knowledge of affairs. And yet it is barely possible, Mr. President, that some of us, who know more about nautical affairs and the ships of war that would assail these forts, may have some thoughts that we may advance that will be a benefit to this discussion.

That alone gives me courage on the part of the committee to venture the assertion that when a ship of war anchored off the Golden Gate, at the port of San Francisco, sees a target 3 or 4 miles away that she can fire at again and again with her 12-inch guns 14 times in ten minutes, which has been done, sending a projectile that weighs 1,000 pounds, and the target does not disappear, it gives them a decided advantage over firing at a blank space where disappearing guns on a carriage go down where they can not be seen.

But I am not giving my testimony alone, Mr. President. During the five or six years that I have been upon the subcommittee on the fortifications appropriation bill it has been my privilege to listen to gentlemen who have won their spurs, as my friend from Vermont has done, and their epaulets, in front of the battle, who have appeared before that committee and have given their testimony relative to fortifications and ordnance, to guns and lines of defenses which they believe are the most modern improvements of the day.

On March 3, 1885, an act was approved, and President Cleveland appointed a Board of Ordnance and Fortification, known as the Endicott board. It consisted of Hon. William C. Whitney, then Secretary of the Navy; Gen. Stephen V. Benét, Chief of Engineers; Gen. John Newton, United States Engineers; Col. H. L. Abbot, captain, Corps of Engineers; Capt. Charles S. Smith, of the Ordnance Bureau; Commander W. T. Sampson, United States Navy; Commander Casper S. Goodrich, United States Navy; Joseph Morgan, jr., of Pennsylvania, and Erastus Corning, of New York, civilians. This, as I have stated, was known as the Endicott board. They were appointed by the President for the purpose of devising a plan of fortifications at different ports in the United States, commencing on the coast of Maine and continuing to the coast of Texas, and from San Diego, in California, to Puget Sound, in the State of Washington.

Since that time the Board of Ordnance and Fortification has been perpetuated and continued. Under the act of September 22, 1888, the Board of Ordnance and Fortification was organized, composed of the Commanding General of the United States Army as president, a United States engineer officer, a United States artillery officer, and a United States ordnance officer. February 24, 1891, a civilian was added to the members of that board. So it has been continued from year to year, and under their direction the plan of the Endicott board has been continued. They have carried out in a general way the plan which was then devised and promulgated and approved by the Secretary of War.

Congress has annually appropriated about \$100,000 for their experimenting with guns and carriages and ammunition. They have made certain allotments when they have been satisfied that the inventor had merit; and so they have gone on, not a close corporation, but gentlemen who stand in their professional lines at the very top of the list, gentlemen who have the respect and confidence of all who know them. During the time I have had the honor of being a member of this committee of the Senate I think they have allotted about half a million dollars for experimental tests in guns and powder and ammunition and shells, which has been expended in perfecting the invention of those who brought it to their attention.

So I think, Mr. President, the charge of the Senator from Vermont is hardly just to these eminent men when he says it has been a close corporation, so to speak, and that only those who have had influence with them or belonged to the Army would have the consideration that they ought to have had. I am sure such was not the case when he was Secretary of War for every

act of that Board of Ordnance was approved by him and there was no criticism whatever during his administration. It is only fair to assume that his successors have followed in the wise footsteps that he had left for them and the wise precepts and example which they had to follow. I think that all who have inventions that possess merit have had an opportunity of having them tested at the expense of the Government.

Mr. President, my friend has referred to the extravagant difference between the cost of the barbette emplacement and of the disappearing carriage. I anticipated that such a charge would be made, and I therefore communicated with the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance asking him to kindly write me showing the cost of a fixed 8, 10, and 12 inch gun, its emplacement in a barbette, and its cost upon a disappearing carriage. I will ask the Secretary, with your permission, to read this letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Secretary will read as requested.

The Secretary read as follows:

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,  
UNITED STATES ARMY,  
Washington, May 9, 1902.

Hon. GEORGE C. PERKINS, *United States Senate.*

MY DEAR SENATOR: In further reply to your letter of yesterday I can now furnish the following information:

The cost of the 6-inch gun and its carriage is as follows:

On simple barbette carriage:	
Average cost of 6-inch rifle.....	\$7,686.00
Estimated cost of simple barbette carriage.....	7,500.00
Total for the gun and carriage.....	15,186.00

On disappearing carriage:	
Average cost of 6-inch rifle.....	7,686.00
Average cost of 6-inch disappearing carriage.....	6,616.66
Total cost of gun and carriage.....	14,302.66

The greater cost of a simple barbette carriage for this caliber of gun is due to the protective shield which is required for the mechanism of the gun and the cannons. It is difficult to give a statement of the cost of emplacements for the two methods of mounting these guns, as very few of the emplacements have been constructed, and there are really no typical designs therefor on hand. There is no reason why the two classes of emplacements, if constructed with a view of affording the same degree of protection and the same degree of convenience of operation of the guns, should differ in cost.

The cost of emplacing 8-inch rifles by the two methods is as follows:

On simple barbette carriage:	
Average cost of 8-inch rifle.....	\$11,484.94
Cost of simple barbette carriage, with shield.....	18,208.00
Total cost of gun and carriage.....	29,692.94
Estimated cost of emplacement.....	45,000.00
Total cost of gun, carriage, and emplacement.....	74,692.94

On disappearing carriage:	
Average cost of 8-inch rifle.....	\$11,484.94
Average cost of 8-inch disappearing carriage.....	10,651.52
Total cost of gun and carriage.....	22,136.46
Estimated cost of emplacement.....	50,000.00
Total cost of gun, carriage, and emplacement.....	72,136.46

In this case the greater cost of the simple barbette carriage results partly from the cost of the necessary shield, as with the 6-inch carriage, and partly from the increased cost of the only 8-inch barbette carriages which have been built, viz, those which were constructed at the beginning of the work of reconstruction of the coast defenses, due to the lack of experience at that time in building machines of this size.

The cost of emplacing the 10-inch guns has been as follows:

On simple barbette carriage:	
Average cost of 10-inch rifle.....	\$22,632.77
Cost of simple barbette carriage with shield.....	20,319.93
Total cost of gun and carriage.....	42,952.70
Cost of emplacement.....	55,000.00
Total cost of gun, carriage, and emplacement.....	97,952.70

On disappearing carriage:	
Average cost of 10-inch rifle.....	22,632.77
Average cost of 10-inch disappearing carriage, model of 1896....	15,935.22
Total cost of gun and carriage.....	38,567.99
Cost of emplacement.....	60,000.00
Total cost of gun, carriage, and emplacement.....	98,567.99

The cost of emplacing 12-inch rifles by the two methods is as follows:

On simple barbette carriage:	
Average cost of 12-inch rifle.....	\$36,425.51
Cost of simple barbette carriage, with shield.....	25,210.98
Total cost of gun and carriage.....	61,636.49
Cost of emplacement.....	65,000.00
Total cost of gun, carriage, and emplacement.....	126,636.49

In disappearing carriage:	
Average cost of 12-inch rifle.....	36,425.51
Average cost of 12-inch disappearing carriage.....	32,628.46
Total cost of gun and carriage.....	69,053.97
Cost of emplacement.....	70,000.00
Total cost of gun, carriage, and emplacement.....	139,053.97

In this last case the total cost with the disappearing method is \$12,414.48 in excess of that with the barbette. Five thousand dollars of this amount is

due to the difference in estimated cost of the emplacements; but it may be said that this \$5,000 is more or less accidental, as there is no essential reason why the emplacement for the disappearing gun should cost any more than that for the barbette. As a matter of fact, the disappearing emplacements have cost more, and this is what has undoubtedly guided the Chief of Engineers, from whose estimates the above figures for the emplacements have been taken, in fixing the cost of the two kinds.

The parapet required for the disappearing gun is no higher than that required for the barbette, as the height results from other considerations than the character of the carriage upon which the gun is mounted, and if the degree of protection and the other features are given equal consideration in the two classes it is believed that the difference of cost would disappear. It is known that at some places where all the conditions have been the same, because of the two classes of emplacements being constructed in the same locality, the disappearing emplacement has cost no more than that for the barbette gun.

The cost of the Abbott gun lift at Sandy Hook, including the two guns, with their carriages and the emplacement, was \$625,000.

There are now mounted upon our seacoast or provided for 58 6-inch, 8-inch, 10-inch, and 12-inch guns upon simple barbette carriages and 275 upon disappearing carriages. Most of these are already installed.

In regard to the experimental character of the disappearing carriage, I can only say that it is now eight years since those of the service type were tried and adopted, and that for several years past they have been in use in our fortifications. Opinions from 91 artillery officers in regard to them were obtained by the Board of Ordnance and Fortification in the latter part of the year 1900, which have been published in Senate Document No. 336 of the present session of Congress. It is believed that, owing to the greater experience since had with them, expressions obtained from artillery officers would now be more favorable to the carriage than those which were then given, but 75 per cent of the letters above referred to indicated their authors to be in favor of disappearing carriages for the kind of sites for which they were originally intended, viz, low sites and sites of medium height. For a further discussion, with evidence, of the merits of the service carriage, I would refer you to the memorandum inclosed with my letter of yesterday, which also refers to the action of England, France, and Germany with regard to the type.

Hoping that this information may be of service to you and that you will not hesitate to call for anything further on the subject which you may desire, I am, Senator,

Very respectfully,

WILLIAM CROZIER.

Mr. PETTUS. Will the Senator from California allow me to ask him a question?

Mr. PERKINS. Certainly.

Mr. PETTUS. The Senator spoke in the highest terms of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification. Does the Senator want us to understand that they approve of these disappearing gun carriages?

Mr. PERKINS. I certainly do. Your committee most certainly so understand it.

Mr. PETTUS. I understand it exactly the other way.

Mr. PERKINS. They could not be ordered without their sanction and without the approval of the Secretary of War.

Mr. PETTUS. I was speaking merely of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification and their opinion.

Mr. PERKINS. Your committee certainly understand that the disappearing carriage has been manufactured by their approval and recommendation. I will give the Senator, with his permission, in a few minutes, a slight history of the disappearing carriage. The present Board of Ordnance and Fortification consists of the president, who is Lieutenant-General Miles; General Gillespie, chief of engineers; Colonel Rodgers, of the artillery; General Randolph, chief of artillery; Major Shaler, of the Ordnance Department; Major Pratt, of the artillery, and Mr. Henderson, the civilian member. These are the seven members of the board. Captain Taylor is the recorder, and, of course, is not a member of the board.

Your committee understand, I will say in answer to my friend from Alabama, that none of these plans of fortifications are carried out without the approval of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification and their action is approved by the Secretary of War. The figures which I have given in comparison with the cost of the barbette emplacement for the guns and the disappearing carriage is in marked contrast to that of the Abbot lift at Sandy Hook. There are two 12-inch guns mounted upon the Abbot lift at Sandy Hook for which the Government paid \$625,000. It is a complicated piece of machinery. There are two engines, with the necessary boilers, and it is a work of many hours to get the steam up and to get the lifts in operation. The point of economy your committee in considering this question have had before them during the past five years or more. They have taken that into consideration as well as other questions bearing upon the subject-matter.

When, in 1888, Congress broke the ice and—after twenty-five years of neglect—decided upon the reconstruction of the coast defenses, the Ordnance Department sent abroad an officer to—among other duties—seek a serviceable type of the disappearing carriage, which had been decided to be necessary. A few more or less unsatisfactory experimental mounts were found, but the only carriage which had been actually installed for any service was the Elswick hydro-pneumatic, which was in use in England, in Italy, and in some British colonies and less advanced countries. This type was at once rejected as being too complicated, as well as otherwise unsatisfactory, and the attempt to provide a carriage from abroad was abandoned.

I wish to say that in giving the history of this disappearing

carriage I have compiled the testimony from interviews with members of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification, with artillery officers, with members of the Bureau of Ordnance, and others, and, therefore, I believe this compilation of the history of the disappearing carriage which I am now giving is correct beyond a question.

Four types of domestic production were considered—the King, the pneumatic, the Gordon, and the Buffington-Crozier. The first mentioned did not get beyond the stage of discussion, and after full consideration was abandoned as being unsuited to long, high-powered guns, although it had been tried with promise for the guns of an earlier period. The pneumatic carriage was the production of a private corporation, the Pneumatic Gun Carriage and Power Company. A representative of the type was built for a 10-inch gun and tested at Government expense, the total cost being \$70,792.

This was an experimental test paid for by the Government to an inventor who claimed that he had discovered a new plan whereby these guns might be more expeditiously handled than they had been heretofore.

The Gordon carriage for a 10-inch gun was next tried, after a long time consumed also in getting it to work. At its official test ten rounds were fired in a few minutes under an hour, hand power only being required. The cost to the United States was \$62,632. The installation and test of both of these types was attended with numerous vexatious delays caused by breakages and other failures.

During this period of effort Captain Crozier was in charge of the subject of the supply of gun carriages in the office of the Chief of Ordnance. He was of opinion that it was very doubtful whether any of the designs under consideration would result in the satisfactory carriage which was demanded of the Department. In looking over the various projects he was satisfied that a design proposed twenty years previously by Colonel Buffington, of the Ordnance Department, embodied a sound principle, and he caused suggestions to be sent to Colonel Buffington requesting him to modify and act upon the suggestion.

This Colonel Buffington declined to do, and Captain Crozier then went on with his own plans and ideas.

The first design was of a carriage for an 8-inch gun, which was submitted by the Ordnance Department to the Board of Ordnance and Fortification. It met with such favor on the part of this board that the Ordnance Department was requested to submit a design for a 10-inch carriage, in order that the test of the one for the gun of larger caliber might suffice for both. Captain Crozier then made the design for the 10-inch carriage, and the Department returned it, giving its reasons for having originally submitted the 8-inch design; these being in general those which would naturally suggest themselves in the view of commencing with the smaller, more easily constructed and less expensive machine.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SIMON in the chair). Does the Senator from California yield to the Senator from North Dakota?

Mr. PERKINS. Certainly.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. I wish to suggest to the Senator in charge of this bill that day before yesterday we secured a unanimous-consent agreement to vote on a most important measure immediately after the close of the routine business to-morrow morning. It is extremely important that that measure should be debated, and we are in a situation where if we vote to-morrow morning, and, of course, we must vote, because unanimous consent has been given, we shall not have an opportunity to debate the bill. I ask the Senator if he will not kindly allow this bill to go over, because it appears evident that it is going to give rise to extended debate, and we shall then have no opportunity to debate the union station bill.

Mr. PERKINS. The rest of the history of this carriage I am willing to place in the RECORD without wearying the Senate by reading it.

The Board of Ordnance and Fortification decided to build from both designs and allotted the money for the construction of the two experimental carriages.

The 8-inch carriage was completed first, in the year 1893. It was installed and brought to the State for final test without accident or unforeseen delay of any kind, and at its final trial ten rounds were fired in twelve minutes and twenty-one seconds. The cost of the carriage and its test was \$30,829.

After the test of the Gordon carriage, and before that of the Buffington-Crozier, a contract was made by the Board of Ordnance and Fortification for a second Gordon carriage for 10-inch gun, with certain stipulations in regard to its operation. Based upon the experience then had, the standard rate of fire was taken as 10 rounds per hour, and a premium of \$2,000 was provided for every round over that number, accompanied by a penalty of \$1,000 for every round by which the rate should fall short. Delays and failures characterized the installation and preliminary work of



this carriage also, but at its final test 33 rounds were fired in an hour and a premium earned of \$44,000. The total price of the construction, installation, tests, premium, and alteration was \$118,165.

Finally there was tested the 10-inch Buffington-Crozier carriage, from which, after the same satisfactory installation as the 8-inch, there were fired 10 rounds in fourteen minutes and forty-two seconds, a rate four times that previously taken as a standard. The cost of the carriage and its test was \$54,315.

In regard to these two carriages the Board of Ordnance officers which tested them reported as follows:

It is considered by the board that the test of this carriage has demonstrated that it possesses in a marked degree the properties which should pertain to a disappearing carriage for high-power guns.

It is simple in construction, so that its parts and their purposes are easily understood.

Loading and maneuvering are effected by operations which are accomplished by hand with ease, certainty, and great rapidity, and these operations simulate very closely those required with the barbette carriages already adopted by the Department.

No valves or pumps of any kind are required, a feature regarded by the board as very desirable, as it insures certainty that the carriage will at all times be in proper working order and ready for action.

The fact that the entire test of the carriage, involving the firing of 47 rounds, was conducted without the breaking of a part or the bending of a bolt indicates great care and skill on the part of the designer in proportioning its parts and adjusting them to the work which they were intended to perform.

And, speaking of the test of the 10-inch carriage:

The advantages of this system of disappearing carriage are fully set forth in the report of the board on the 8-inch carriage, before referred to. These advantages are confirmed and emphasized by the trial of a carriage adapted for a gun of much greater caliber and power, and it is the opinion of the board that the exhaustive test to which this system has now been subjected demonstrates that on account of the simplicity of its construction, involving no valves, pumps, or other complicated appliances, and the fact that by methods easily understood by the average artillery soldier the operations of loading and maneuvering are effected with remarkable ease, certainty, and rapidity, it is worthy of adoption for use in the service on all sites except those where an all-round traverse is absolutely necessary.

After the trial of the three types of carriage mentioned above, a board composed of one officer of engineers, one ordnance officer, and one artillery officer was, at the request of the Chief of Ordnance, convened by the Secretary of War to report "which of the various types of disappearing carriages for seacoast fortifications that had been on trial by the Ordnance Department during the last four years is best adapted for the service of the United States." The board reported as follows:

After a full consideration, the board is of the opinion that the Buffington-Crozier type of depressing gun carriage is, of the three types represented, best adapted for service in our seacoast defenses. It appears to have sufficient strength and durability, gives the required amount of protection cover, is easily operated and manipulated by hand; admits of traversing, elevating, and depressing the gun sufficient to give as great a field of fire as is required in most positions, and can be built and erected at a comparatively low cost.

The following quotations are made from the reports of the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications, viz, from the report from October 31, 1893, to October 31, 1894 (Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield, president; Col. Henry L. Abbott, Corps of Engineers; Col. Henry W. Closson, Fourth United States Artillery; Maj. Frank H. Phipps, Ordnance Department, United States Army, and Mr. Byron M. Cutcheon, members):

The 8-inch carriage of this type had been received at the proving ground prior to the last annual report, and was being assembled and mounted on that date.

Since then it has passed a most satisfactory test at the hands of the Ordnance Board, exceeding for rapidity and smoothness of operation the most sanguine expectations of this board. This is an absolutely new type of disappearing carriage, the result of the combined inventions of Colonel Buffington, United States Ordnance Department, and Captain Crozier, Ordnance Department. It is a strictly American invention. Although of an entirely novel type, never before subjected to trial, it passed successfully through its test without so much as the breakage of a bolt or any accident whatever. Only slight alterations in the recoil mechanism were required. The board regards this as a remarkable record. This is a front-pintle carriage and traverses through 180 degrees.

The board recommends that liberal appropriations be made, so that the expenditures for guns of this caliber and emplacements therefor, already made, may be speedily utilized.

Ten-inch Crozier-Buffington disappearing carriage: This carriage, which was in process of fabrication at the date of last report, has been completed, assembled on its platform at Sandy Hook, and fully tested and accepted during the year.

The carriage does not materially differ, except in proportions, from the 8-inch carriage. Only slight modifications were required, especially in the hydraulic cylinders for checking recoil, in order to make it work satisfactorily. Like the 8-inch carriage of this type, the test has been completed without accident and to the entire satisfaction of the board.

The Secretary of War, in his annual report for the year 1894, writes as follows:

The establishment of type disappearing gun carriages for 8-inch and 10-inch guns, invented by officers of the Ordnance Corps, and believed to be unequaled for rapidity and simplicity of action by any carriage elsewhere in use, is a notable achievement of this year. This problem solved, the armament of our harbors may now be prosecuted as rapidly as means are available.

At the date of the last annual report of the Department a selection of a type carriage for 8 and 10 inch guns was expected within a few months. Since then the 8-inch Buffington-Crozier disappearing carriage has been tried

with results, as stated by the Board of Ordnance, exceeding for rapidity and smoothness of operation the most sanguine expectations of this board. The carriage is the combined invention of Colonel Buffington and Captain Crozier, of the Ordnance Department, and reflects credit on the inventive skill of American officers.

It is a satisfactory solution of one of the most difficult problems which has confronted military science. I concur in the recommendation that liberal appropriations be made for the manufacture of these carriages for service, so that expenditures for guns of this caliber and emplacements prepared for them may be speedily utilized.

The annual message of the President to Congress of December 7, 1896, makes the following reference:

During the same year, immediately preceding the message referred to, the first modern gun carriage had been completed and 11 more were in process of construction. All but one were of the nondisappearing type. These, however, were not such as to secure necessary cover for the artillery gunners against the intense fire of modern machine, rapid-fire, and high-power guns.

The inventive genius of ordnance and civilian experts has been taxed in designing carriages that would obviate this fault, resulting, it is believed, in the solution of this difficult problem.

The construction of a disappearing carriage for a gun of as great weight and power as the 12-inch had previously been considered a problem too difficult for solution, and the method had been inaugurated of mounting these guns upon hydraulic elevators, to be raised and lowered by steam power for firing over an ordinary parapet and for loading behind its shelter. Two guns were thus mounted at Sandy Hook. But after the successful trials and adoption of the 8-inch and 10-inch carriages, a 12-inch Buffington-Crozier carriage was built, tested, and adopted, replacing the gun-lift mounting for this caliber of gun. In regard to this carriage, the Board of Ordnance and Fortification (Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, president; Col. Royal T. Frank, First United States Artillery; Col. Peter C. Hains, Corps of Engineers, United States Army; Maj. Frank H. Phipps, Ordnance Department, United States Army, and Mr. Joseph H. Outhwaite, members) in its report for 1897, stated as follows:

The test of this carriage is nearly completed, and it has proved an unequalled success. The development of this carriage is considered by the board as a decided advance, as it enables the Government to mount its heaviest guns under cover without resorting to such expensive devices as the gun-lift battery and armored turrets, which were considered the only solution of the problem a few years ago.

And again, in its report for 1898:

This carriage was completed at the Watertown Arsenal May 6, 1897. It has since passed a very satisfactory test at the proving ground and has been issued to the service.

Although the system of mounting in gun-lift batteries is much less expensive than the use of turrets, it is still more than twice as costly as the method by the use of disappearing carriages, and as by actual trial the rate of fire with the latter system is five times as great as that with the gun lifts, it is seen that with this system more than ten times the efficiency is obtained than with the gun-lift system.

The price of the three type Buffington-Crozier carriages should be deducted from the cost of the experiments with them, as these carriages are all now in service at fortifications, which none of the carriages of the other types tried are, although considerable sums were afterwards spent upon some of them in the effort to fit them for use. Efforts have been made since the adoption of the Buffington-Crozier carriage to replace it by other types, proposed by parties interested in efforts to supply, for the large profits which would result, these extensively used machines. Two 10-inch carriages have been tested with this object, at a cost, respectively, of \$41,620 (second pneumatic) and \$55,605.10 (Howell), the experiments being made as a result of special legislation by Congress. The first-mentioned carriage was not accepted, and a measure is pending in Congress for the relief of the parties concerned from their bond for its successful performance and the retention by the Government of the final payment, which has not yet been made.

Congress has also authorized the expenditure of \$180,000 for the construction of the Emery carriage for 12-inch gun; of this amount \$126,000 has been expended, but the carriage is not yet completed, although its construction was authorized as long ago as the year 1893. Notwithstanding these vigorous efforts, all costly to the Government, of private industry to supersede the type, in the natural effort, and one finding sympathy to substitute something upon which somebody should make a profit for a largely used machine for which the Government pays only manufacturer's earnings, the Buffington-Crozier carriage still retains its supremacy. In time, of course, it will be outbuilt, and it will then be possible to utilize the disappearing principle to still greater advantage.

This history shows the manner in which the subject was regarded at the time when the attention of all concerned with it was most earnestly engaged. It precludes all idea of surprise or lack of cognizant deliberation, and enforces the necessity for at least equal care to precede the admission that such skillfully and laboriously sought conclusions were, after all, in error.

Mr. President, there seems to be no other side to this question, unless we propose to place ourselves in the position of experts, when the Government has educated at West Point and at the

Naval Academy and elsewhere people who are competent to pass upon the question. If this Board of Ordnance and Fortification deem it proper, expedient, and advisable and in the interest of the Government to have these disappearing carriages, we ought to acquiesce in their decision, and I am willing to submit the question to the Senate on this proposition and to vote immediately.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. I think there are other Senators, doubtless, who desire to discuss this matter at length, and under those circumstances we shall be shut out entirely, unless the Senator will kindly yield that we may take up the union-station bill.

Mr. PERKINS. I will certainly agree to vote if we can pass the bill now. This is an appropriation bill of great importance.

Mr. PROCTOR. I do not wish to take more than a minute or two whenever the Senator has concluded.

Mr. PERKINS. I am willing to submit it to a vote; but there are one or two other propositions. My friend read an essay from an Army officer, and he gave it as an authority and wished to have it printed in the RECORD. He forgot to state that the Journal of the Military Service Institution, which is a work of great literary ability and authority upon military affairs, offered a prize to a number of essayists for the best written paper upon disappearing carriages, either for or against it.

Those essays were sent in under anonymous names. As a matter of fact, the paper read by the Senator from Vermont did not win the first prize of a golden medal. It was won by Lieut. E. R. Stuart, who read a paper in favor of disappearing carriages. He is an eminent engineer officer. The second best paper was by Capt. W. R. Hamilton, of the Artillery Corps. It is only fair that those two essays should go into the RECORD to neutralize the essay submitted by the Senator from Vermont. They are both strongly in favor of the disappearing carriage, and they give authorities. I ask that they may be printed in the RECORD with the article offered by my friend from Vermont. He neglected to state that Lieutenant Stuart received the golden prize. Let those two essays also be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from California? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The papers referred to are as follows:

[Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, March, 1902.]

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1901—ARE DISAPPEARING GUNS ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFICIENT DEFENSE OF OUR SEAPORTS?

[By First Lieut. Edwin R. Stuart, U. S. A., Corps of Engineers.]

#### PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION.

The fact that the sea-coast defenses of all nations comprise guns of all calibers up to a maximum of 12 inches or greater is of itself sufficient evidence of the necessity for the different calibers in an effective defense. The rapidity of fire varies inversely with the caliber, but the decrease is not severely felt until a caliber is reached where it becomes necessary to use mechanical appliances for handling the ammunition. This is the case in calibers beyond the 6-inch, and marks the true division line between the rapid-fire and the heavy gun.

In the smaller calibers the rapidity of fire is so great that any attempt to apply the disappearing principle between shots would so diminish the rate of fire as to greatly reduce the effectiveness of the gun. Furthermore, the number of men necessarily exposed in serving the gun is very small, and they may be sheltered from splinters, machine-gun, and other small projectiles by shields. On account of the fact that the weight of the heavy gun is near the limit that may be maneuvered by hand, a shield furnishing protection to the gun detachment can not be satisfactorily used in this case.

A rapid-fire gun may be provided with some form of eclipsing mount, permitting it to disappear as a target when it can not be effectively used as a weapon. During such period it is wholly protected from all except accidental injury. The device by which this temporary disappearance is accomplished in the balanced pillar mount is so simple as to offer no objection to its use. In the elevated position of the gun it differs in no wise from the ordinary pedestal mounting. This form of mount therefore offers no objection from a mechanical standpoint and will protect from injury until needed such guns of the smaller calibers as can not for any reason take an effective part in the combat. Its advantages can not therefore be contested.

In those calibers requiring mechanical appliances for handling the ammunition, the interval between shots and the consequent exposure of a large gun detachment becomes so great that it is worth while to consider those mounts which will withdraw the gun between shots and allow loading under cover.

The various types of mount that have been used may be classified as casemate, turret, barbettes, and disappearing. Of these the casemate and turret mounts are so enormously expensive as to be eliminated from consideration in a defensive system so extensive as that of our sea-coasts must necessarily be, except for those special cases of restricted sites where an adequate defense can be provided in no other way, and their adoption is forced regardless of the cost.

For the 8-inch, 10-inch, and 12-inch calibers, the only types of mount available for general use are the barbettes and disappearing carriages, and these alone will be considered in this discussion, since one or the other must be used in present defensive constructions and until something more satisfactory than either shall have been developed.

#### COMPARISON OF TYPES.

Both types of mount are possibly susceptible of improvement, but the present forms of the barbettes and disappearing carriages will be considered in the comparison, which to be complete must involve the following points: Accuracy of fire, rapidity of fire, simplicity of mechanism, protection to gun and detachment, the moral and material advantages of concealment, cost.

In making the comparison it is necessary to assume that the guns are the same and that the system of ammunition delivery is capable of delivering ammunition as fast as needed.

#### ACCURACY OF FIRE.

The range and position finding systems necessary for firing at moving targets will be the same for both types of mount, and the difficulty experienced with each will be the same. The element of accuracy may be compared on the basis of a fixed target at a known range.

The barbettes gun may be given any elevation and azimuth, and its errors will be due to causes beyond control in any gun; it is therefore as accurate as it lies within human power to make any weapon.

The disappearing gun, if laid indirectly, may be given any computed azimuth, but errors in azimuth will not be self-detecting, and errors in computation will result in a miss. If a sight be rigidly attached to the carriage at such elevation that the target will be visible, its azimuth laying will be as accurate as that of the barbettes gun. This method has been adopted, but involves a slight sacrifice of concealment of gun position. The elevating mechanism may be set to give the piece an elevation corresponding to a given range. The gun will have this elevation when in a certain final position only, since the elevation is continually changing during the upward motion of the gun. This change is slow as the gun approaches the final position, and any variation possible in practice would be small. On account of the greater number of joints in the disappearing carriage errors due to looseness of these joints would be greater than in the barbettes gun. The disappearing gun has advantages which act directly to counteract this slight disadvantage in point of accuracy, as will be shown later.

#### RAPIDITY OF FIRE.

Assuming the ammunition delivered were needed upon the loading platform, the mechanical operations of loading are the same, except that the shot for the barbettes gun has to be hoisted by hand a distance corresponding to the total vertical motion of the disappearing gun, and the loading done on a small platform, while the disappearing gun comes down after its discharge, and the operation of loading is conveniently performed.

In a rapidity test of the disappearing gun, 10 shots were fired from an 8-inch gun in twelve minutes and twenty-one seconds, and in fourteen minutes and forty-two seconds from the 10-inch gun. No similar data for the barbettes gun has been found, but the report of the Chief of Ordnance for 1900 states that careful tests for rapidity of fire for 10-inch and 12-inch guns show that the rate of fire for the disappearing gun is about double that for the barbettes gun, due to the causes previously given.

#### SIMPLICITY OF MECHANISM.

Excepting the balanced pair comprising the gun levers, gun and counterpoise, every part of the disappearing carriage is duplicated or represented in the barbettes gun by a device designed to accomplish the same end. The complexity of mechanism alleged as one of the grave defects inherent in the disappearing carriage is largely one of appearance, and dissolves upon a rigid comparison of the two types of mount.

Each has its base ring, upon which rests a carriage provided with suitable turning gear. Upon this carriage rests upon five rollers in each type a chassis, whose motion is controlled by hydraulic recoil cylinders, with throttling bars, equalizing pipes and the attendant evils fully developed in both. Each has a retracting gear, and an elevating gear, mechanically satisfactory and suited to its purpose in each. On the chassis is mounted the gun in the barbettes carriage, and in the disappearing carriage the gun levers, carrying at its extremities the gun and counterweight. No gun lever has ever broken in service; no carriage has failed through the presence of the counterweight, or given any trouble from this source except through carelessness, or mechanical defects corrected in the later types of the disappearing carriage.

Accidents to other parts of the carriage are equally liable to happen to both types. In practice three disappearing carriages have been disabled for service through the bursting of equalizing pipes, but the pressure in the cylinders and equalizing pipes of the barbettes carriage is very much greater than in the disappearing carriage, and an equal amount of experience with the barbettes carriage would show a greater number of failures from this cause. Considerable annoyance has been caused and a number of guns disabled for drill purposes by the breaking of retraction chains, but this was not a serious difficulty, and has been obviated in later carriages by the substitution of wire rope for the retraction of the gun. Each carriage, as all other machines, requires daily attention to keep it in perfect order.

Even if the disappearing carriage be more complex than the barbettes carriage, the increase in this respect is far less than in the other details of artillery defense.

No artilleryman advocates the return to a system of defense which would render unnecessary searchlights, electric-light plants, a complicated system of range and position finding, an elaborate system of communication, and a more or less complicated system of ammunition delivery.

Moreover, through the initiative of the artillery, there has been recently transferred to it an adjunct of the defense—the submarine mines, with a large amount of delicate apparatus, a large amount of material which to be effective must be in perfect condition, difficult to install in service and still more difficult to maintain in serviceable condition, requiring technical knowledge and manual skill in marked degree, and involving many situations where errors, mistakes, or the slightest carelessness means disaster.

It is true that the most effective defense requires the submarine mines to be installed and controlled by the artillery commander. The responsibility for this defensive adjunct has been assumed without complaint as to its complexity for the sake of a better defense. If the artillery can not care for the heavy armament on disappearing carriages, a most valuable item of the defense of our seaports has been rendered useless by having been transferred to a branch of the service incapable of installing and maintaining it, for it may be stated without hesitation that men not capable of the degree of instruction necessary to handle successfully the disappearing gun can not be depended upon to install an effective submarine-mine defense. The willing assumption of this defense is evidence of the belief of the artillery in their ability to handle the less complicated disappearing guns.

#### PROTECTION TO GUN AND DETACHMENT.

The degree of protection required can only be determined by considering the experiences of the past, coupled with experiments made under conditions which are not sufficiently near those of war as to be a true guide. The latter serve only to indicate what may be expected under present conditions of combat where forces are about equally matched.

The bombardment of Alexandria, San Juan, Santiago, the batteries in Manila Bay, and other earlier instances may be cited to show that no material damage can be inflicted upon fortifications or their armament by the guns of a fleet. The degree of protection afforded to guns in barbettes mounts appear to meet the requirements of protection to material, even when opposed to modern guns. The same is not true of the gun detachments. Cases may be cited, as at Alexandria, where troops of poor morale have abandoned uninjured guns under the fire of vessels. The inference is irresistible that even troops of good morale will be severely shaken by the fire to which they will be exposed in future attacks on seacoast fortifications, and the service of the gun in rapidity and accuracy will be materially affected by the losses which the bombardments of San Juan and Santiago show that the cannoners of barbettes batteries will suffer.



Interesting in this connection are certain observations of L. Alvarado, a Spanish officer, who participated in the defense of San Juan against the bombardment of May 12, 1898. These are published in a translation in the Journal of the United States Artillery for March and April, 1900. The extracts are as follows:

"Third. Barbette batteries need at least 14 to 16 meters elevation. Low barbette batteries, unless in very especial positions, can not be fought if they are attacked with resolution by vessels which use the fire from their tops.

"Sixth. Many officers are absolutely necessary in seacoast batteries. \* \* \* They are needed to preserve by their example the coolness and discipline of the men who have to stand firm under a fire from which they can shelter themselves by running only a few meters."

It seems useless to cite experimental firing when examples from actual war are available, but the French experimental firing at l'île de Levant, in 1896, and the English experimental firing at Inchkeith, about 1885, while showing greater results than were actually obtained later under war conditions, pointed clearly to what might be anticipated and was later realized, and justify citing the experimental firing at a dummy representing the action of a disappearing gun at Portland, in 1885, to show that machine-gun fire can not harm the detachment serving such a gun, while poor practice by the heavy guns showed the demoralizing effect of the want of a definite target.

This firing comprised 6,910 rounds of 1-inch and rifle caliber, 29 rounds from 6-pounders, fired at an average range of about 825 yards, and 15 shell and 13 shrapnel from 10-inch guns at a range of about 2,500 yards. No damage to gun or detachment resulted from this firing. The weather conditions were not favorable, but the officers of the vessel engaged reported that the results would probably have been the same, even under more favorable conditions. Peace practice being more accurate than can be hoped for in war, it is evident that the fire of a fleet can not injure a disappearing gun battery.

#### THE MORAL AND MATERIAL ADVANTAGES OF CONCEALMENT.

The barbette gun can be rendered inconspicuous by neutral colors, but the advocacy of such measures is an admission of the immense advantage of the total concealment afforded by the disappearing mount. By the use of the latter the enemy has no visual means of determining the strength or location of the defenses. No definite target is presented except during a few seconds insufficient for aiming, and not much greater than the time of flight of the projectiles aimed at it.

Any gun out of ammunition or not actually engaged may be wholly removed from danger of damage by accidental shots by being withdrawn behind its parapet, and any gun slightly injured may be withdrawn and repaired. The disappearing gun has also the advantage of concealing from the attack the nature and extent of any injury to the armament, while any damage to the attacking fleet is at once known to the garrison of the fortifications. The greater circumspection required in the attack of fortifications whose strength and condition remain unknown will result in delay, which will directly favor the fortifications by reason of the greater expenditure of ammunition possible to the latter.

#### COST.

The approximate cost of the emplacement, gun, and mount for the different calibers is—

8-inch:	
Barbette .....	\$55,670
Disappearing .....	72,000
10-inch:	
Barbette .....	74,300
Disappearing .....	99,300
12-inch:	
Barbette .....	118,800
Disappearing .....	141,000

It has been previously shown that the rate of fire of the disappearing gun is about double that of the barbette gun. While information from different sources does not give the same cost for the different types of emplacements, the ratio of cost is about the same, and may be assumed as 3:4 in favor of the barbette gun. The actual cost of installation for a given intensity of fire is therefore in the proportion of 2:3 in favor of the disappearing gun. To deliver the same volume of fire from barbette guns would require double the number of gun detachments. Since a certain intensity of fire is the consideration governing any project for defense, the relative cost of obtaining this intensity of fire by the use of the different types of mount is of interest, and would be as follows:

Four 8-inch barbette guns can be mounted for about \$222,400. These guns (assuming double the time quoted in the rapidity test of the disappearing gun) could fire 4 shots every two minutes and twenty-eight seconds, or 96 shots per hour for the 4 guns. Three 8-inch disappearing guns can be mounted for \$216,000. These guns can fire 3 shots every one minute and four seconds, or 135 shots per hour for the 3 guns.

The ability to fire 96 shots per hour from 8-inch guns, rating interest at 3 per cent, represents an annual outlay of \$6,600 and requires 4 gun detachments of about 10 men each. The annual cost of each gun detachment is about \$3,000, counting the pay and rations of each soldier at an average of \$25 per month. The total annual expenditure representing the ability to fire 96 shots per hour is therefore \$18,600. The annual cost per shot per hour from 8-inch barbette guns is therefore approximately \$194.

On the same basis, three disappearing guns, representing the ability to fire 135 shots per hour, involve an outlay of \$15,480, or approximately \$115 per shot per hour for the disappearing guns. The annual cost of maintaining an effective defense using barbette guns will therefore be nearly 1.7 times as great as for an equally effective defense using the disappearing guns.

This relative annual cost will vary with the absolute numerical strength of the garrisons maintained, but will always be decidedly in favor of the disappearing gun.

#### SUMMARY.

For rapid-fire guns, the ability to disappear when not needed is obtained by means so simple as to offer no objection to the use of a type of carriage which gives the ability to do so.

For heavy guns, the disappearing carriage secures at less cost per annum all the advantages of concealment and protection to gun and the detachment serving it, by the use of a mechanism apparently complex and liable to get out of order, and involving a slight sacrifice of theoretical accuracy. The complexity of mechanism exists largely in appearance, since a rigid comparison of the barbette and disappearing carriages shows all the dangerous elements of complexity to be equally existent in both, and the hydraulic pressure in the cylinders and equalizing pipes greater in the barbette than in the disappearing carriage. The most serious accidents that have happened to the disappearing carriages so far have been due to the bursting of the equalizing pipes, an accident more liable to happen to the barbette carriage than to the disappearing.

The sacrifice in theoretical accuracy in the disappearing carriage is more

than compensated by the protection afforded to the gun detachment, which will allow the service of the gun to proceed without the demoralization incident to the losses which experience shows must be suffered by the detachments serving barbette guns.

For a smaller first cost, and a smaller annual expenditure, the disappearing gun will protect our seaports in time of war as efficiently as the barbette gun, and return to their homes at its close many men whose lives would be sacrificed if exposed in the open emplacements of barbette guns. An effective defense must be provided, but that can be accomplished by the use of disappearing guns, and the Government owes it to its defenders that their lives shall not be needlessly sacrificed.

The installation of guns on disappearing carriages in the past has been based upon sound principles, and the best defense of our seacoast requires that it shall be continued.

#### CRUSTACEAN.

#### ARE DISAPPEARING GUNS ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFICIENT DEFENSE OF OUR SEAPORTS?

[By Capt. William R. Hamilton, U. S. A., Artillery Corps.]

The defense of the coast is sought by means of the offensive action of ships of war, primarily; by the defensive action of guns in fortifications on the land, secondarily; or by a combination of the two. In our country we must perform use both means, and the subject of coast defense should therefore be divided into two parts, viz:

1. Mobile defense, or that of war ships.
2. Stationary defense, or that of fortifications.

Under the first head belong all classes of war ships operated by sailors, and designed to carry offensive action wherever necessary. Under this head are included not only battle ships, cruisers, torpedo boats, but transports for troops and munitions of war also. From their very nature they must act on the offensive to be successful; i. e., they can not be tied down to single ports or harbors.

Under the second head belong the fortifications located on the coast, their guns, submarine mines, and all accessories designed to defend against attack of harbors, channels, or other valuable or strategic place on the dividing line between the sea and shore. Necessarily from their nature, they are tied down to the locality in which they are located, and their sphere of action is limited to the effective range of their guns.

Both these classes are absolutely necessary in our country, and neither possesses any relative importance above the other. To maintain and extend our commerce and trade, to punish insulters in foreign seas, to cause our flag to be respected on distant shores, a navy is necessary. But battle ships require dockyards and arsenals and storehouses, and commerce and trade builds up large and important cities on the coast, and to offer harbors of refuge for ships, protect and defend dockyards, arsenals, and cities, fortifications are just as necessary. In an article on "The war on the sea and its lessons," Captain Mahan says:

"It is proper here to say, for the remark is pertinent and most important, that coast defenses and naval force are not interchangeable things; neither are they opponents, one of the other, but complementary. The one is stationary, the other mobile; and however perfect in itself either may be, the other is necessary to its completeness. In different nations the relative consequences of the two may vary. In Great Britain, whose people are fed from the outside world, the need for a fleet vastly exceeds that for coast defenses. With us, able to live off ourselves, there is more approach to parity. Men may even differ as to which is the more important; but such difference in this question, which is purely military, is not according to knowledge.

"In equal amounts mobile offensive power is always and under all conditions more effective to the ends of war than stationary defensive power. Why, then, provide the latter? Because mobile force, whatever shape it takes, ships or men, is limited narrowly as to the weight it can bear; whereas stationary force generally being tied to the earth is restricted generally in the same direction only by the ability of the designer to cope with the conditions. Given a firm foundation, which practically can always be had, and there is no limit to the amount of the armor, mere defensive outfit, be it wood, stone, bricks, or iron, that you can erect upon it; neither is there any limit to the weight of guns—the offensive element—that the earth can bear, only they will be motionless guns.

"The power of a steam navy to move is practically unfettered; its ability to carry weight, whether guns or armor, is comparatively very small. Fortifications, on the contrary, have almost unbounded power to bear weight, whereas their power to move is nil; which again amounts to saying that, being chained, they can put forth offensive power only at arm's length, as it were.

"Thus stated, it is seen that these two elements of sea warfare are in the strictest sense complementary, one possessing what the other has not, and that the difference is fundamental, essential, unchangeable, not accidental or temporary. Given local conditions which can be found, greater power, defensive and offensive, can be established in permanent works than can be brought to the spot in fleets. When, therefore, circumstances permit ships to be squarely pitted against fortifications—not merely to pass swiftly by them—it is only because the builders of the shore works have not for some reason, possibly quite adequate, given them the power to repel attack which they might have had. It will not be asserted that there are no exceptions to this, as to most general rules, but as a broad statement it is almost universally true."

"Thus deficient coast protection reacts unfavorably upon the war fleet, which in all its movements should be free from any responsibility for the mere safety of the ports it quits."

In short, if war fleets can leave the home ports knowing that they are effectively protected by the shore defenses they can act in turn effectively, well knowing that which is left behind is well protected, and that in case of mishap either by battle or elements they have a safe refuge to which to flee for refitting and arming again for renewed battle.

From the very nature of the subject of this essay there is no need of any discussion of the mobile coast defence, except so far as to consider what may be brought against guns ashore. We will therefore conclude this part of the subject by remarking that the ideal defense of a coast is a vast naval fleet, so superior in strength, numbers, skill, and armament against any combination of fleets that might be brought against us that it would not only cover all our harbors, channels, etc., with a sufficient number of vessels to adequately protect them, but leave a still further number to act offensively in any part of the world.

And such a fleet would be so costly, both in initiating and maintenance, that it would soon bankrupt the nation, and therefore would not be tolerated even in thought. The defense of our coasts rests in the fortifications, the guns therein, and the mines of adjacent waters. All discussion in this essay refers entirely to the fortifications erected on the coast line of the United States, and assuming this condition, we pass on to the query: What is seacoast defense? And, following closely in its train, will naturally come the following queries: Where are such defenses placed, and what condition govern their location, and strength, and character? Upon the character of

the special defense determined depends the nature and strength of the armament, and when we have proceeded thus far we are then ready to discuss understandingly the guns and mounts required for thorough efficiency for the desired work.

By coast defense is understood all means of war used to protect the maritime frontiers of our country, with the special duty of guarding all approaches to rivers and harbors and other channels whose possession would be of value to an enemy and a loss to us. This defense comprises fortifications with emplacements for both large and small guns and all means of obstructing channels and of working guns and mines both by night and day. Its special object is to prevent attack directly by war ships or attack by bombardment, and while a proper prudence will dictate also means to prevent attack by landing parties and by land, yet the actual landing of a body of troops of sufficient size to do any considerable damage is so remote a contingency, is fraught with so much danger to the attackers, and attended with so many difficulties that we may dispense with it in this discussion. Hence all attack will be considered as coming from the sea.

#### WHERE ARE SEACOAST DEFENSES PLACED?

The United States has a maritime frontier of about 5,000 miles on the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Pacific. This does not include Alaska, the Great Lakes, or our new possessions in either the West Indies or the East. The coast of the Gulf States and those bordering the Atlantic as far north as New York presents few harbors of sufficient depth to admit heavy war vessels. It is a low-lying, sandy coast, with the majority of its cities and towns somewhat removed from the coast proper, but from New York northward the character changes to one of bold and high eminences, with many good harbors and channels sufficiently deep to admit the heaviest battle ships to the very wharves of the many populous cities on its shore. On the Pacific the line is even bolder, and guarded almost to its edge by mountains. Here few harbors are found, but they are deep and commodious. Quoting from General Abbot on this subject, we find that—

"Upon the whole extent of the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts there are about 30 ports which demand local protection for their cities, now exposed to occupation and destruction, and of these about a dozen are so important as centers of commercial wealth that the entire country has much at stake in their security. Nine out of this number are also important as containing naval stations and depots of supply, without which our new ships of war would be unable to keep the sea or perform any service in war; for it must not be forgotten that naval bases are as indispensable in these days of steam as are bases of supplies for armies in the field. In fact, this statement hardly puts the matter strongly enough, for our new ships of war would be exposed to capture and use against us, if they should attempt to operate on their natural element, the ocean, without ports of refuge in which to find security when overmatched.

"Besides these 30 ports now urgently demanding protection there are about 70 others whose local importance would justify inexpensive earthworks." \* \* \* "In fine, our true policy for coast defense is to fortify the chief ports along our coasts, so as not only to protect the chief cities and arsenals against insult but also to provide safe refuges for our coastwise marine and safe naval bases with coaling stations, depots of supply, and places of refuge for our ships of war when threatened by superior forces on the ocean, whence they may issue to act offensively as circumstances permit."

Works of coast defense are therefore required to—

(1) Prevent passage of war fleets through narrow channels that would enable them to successfully attack cities and important places.

(2) Prevent the bombardment of cities and important works from beyond our outside.

(3) Prevent the occupation of harbors or the passage of channels, which without having cities or important works located on them, may nevertheless lead to landlocked bays, sounds, or rivers. Wherever any of the foregoing conditions exist there should be placed coast-defense works, which with their armaments will vary according to surrounding local conditions.

What conditions govern the location, strength, and character of coast-defense works?

The location of works must depend upon the vicinity of the city, arsenal, harbor, or other place it is built to defend, upon the nature of the terrain or ground, upon the width, depth, and form of channel, harbor, or other waters from which an enemy may issue, and upon local conditions of climate, storms, soil, etc.

In choosing the location for coast works we are obliged to consider the commercial and political development of the port it is to defend, which may or may not become a strategic point, necessitating the building of a stronghold, though not well adapted to defense. Commercial development has caused many cities to spread out beyond the original boundaries desired for them, and in fact in some instances military development has brought about this very end, so that close to the fort or battery is a part of the town or city. This did not matter a half century ago, when means of attack were limited to ranges that could be easily calculated by the eye, but in these days of accurate long-range guns we often find, almost upon the coast, great and important commercial works built for trade and commerce, but unsuited for defense.

Still such defense can not be dispensed with, and to keep a fleet from bombarding such a location makes another difficulty in building a proper defense work. Thus the vicinity or proximity of the city, arsenal, or port has a very important bearing on the location of the defense works. If the waters of the channel to be covered by the works is a narrow, tortuous one, or shallow, or filled with shoals or rocks, it may also be easily understood that only lighter vessels would attempt to force such a passage, and they being in general armed with lighter guns, it follows that the location of the works would have to be considered with reference to such fire as an enemy could bring upon the works. Again, the entrance of the channel may be lofty and bold, so that a few guns placed upon the summits would entirely bar the passage of vessels; or, it may be low or even covered with water, as a shoal, etc., all of which will have an important bearing on the proper and best location of the defense works.

Fortunately with us there are few important cities outside of those on the Great Lakes that are built directly upon the shore, and our engineers have been able to find in all places, so far, advanced sites for locations of all necessary defenses.

The character of coast defenses must depend generally upon the nature of attack to be expected (Abbot), and specifically upon local conditions. If danger is anticipated of attack by land, or of an immense army debarking on land, then works must be constructed as to withstand not only attack from the sea, but from the land also. This latter condition necessitates provision for sustaining prolonged sieges and bombardments. Such a condition we do not, as before remarked, consider possible in this country. Hence, as we may anticipate attack by sea only, our coast works are built accordingly.

In order that the greatest amount of fire may be concentrated on any one unit of an opposing fleet, and at the same time the enemy be compelled to scatter his fire, our works must be built in a number of detached batteries, widely spaced, and as far as possible concealed. Such batteries will rarely have more than four guns of heavy caliber or less than two. They must be properly flanked and such disposition made of rapid-fire guns as will not only

insure their use as flanking guns, but also for the more important rôle of covering mine fields and the closer water approaches. Local conditions will determine not only the specific character, but also the strength of the works or batteries. All authorities on this subject lay down the general principle that coast-defense works are built for (1) preventing passage of war fleets, (2) preventing bombardment of cities, arsenals, etc., (3) preventing occupation of channels, land-locked bays, wide-mouthed harbors, etc. The two methods of coast science adapted for this prevention are the use of high-power guns and the obstruction of channels by mines or other obstacles.

It is in the proper selection of sites for his guns that the engineer finds his greatest difficulties and has his greatest opportunities of displaying his professional abilities. The general topography of a location will exert a governing influence on the character of the work to be erected, and, inasmuch as the armament in turn depends upon the nature of the work as well as other conditions to be discussed later, it is opportune here to discuss more in detail the influence of site upon the nature of works and their armaments.

It may be remarked, first, that in selecting a site the engineer has the great advantage, not possessed by the enemy, of indicating his own battlefield and building on it accordingly. On this point we again quote General Abbot:

"A land fortress chosen in advance may usually be passed, and the battle be forced beyond reach of its guns. On the approaches to a land-locked water route nature provides only a few channels where ships can move, and that particular site for defense can be chosen by the engineer where they will operate under the maximum disadvantages, and yet where they must certainly pass to effect their object. This is the answer to the common fallacy urged by advocates of floating batteries, that land guns are chained monsters, while guns afloat may be shifted to meet the enemy wherever he appears. This argument fails doubly. He should be compelled to fight where we have every possible advantage, and the guns should be sure to be in position when wanted.

"Mobility implies the possibility that they may be drawn away by the skilled maneuvers of the enemy and the channel be left uncovered at the critical moment. Moreover, a land armament is not exposed to ramming or torpedo attack, while a coast-defense fleet is as likely to suffer in this manner as the enemy himself. \* \* \* To forbid to an enemy the occupation of a harbor useful for his purposes is a simple operation. It only requires few modern mortars in a battery suitably designed to facilitate accuracy of fire and well protected against the operations of a landing party. Should we become possessed of foreign coaling stations, this plan, with appropriate local modifications, would probably meet all needs."

(It is more than seven years ago that General Abbot wrote his article, and since then his prophecies have been strangely verified. The full and complete experiments at Pretle, Me., last fall, have demonstrated thoroughly the value and reliability of mortars, while the number of coaling stations now possessed by the United States is beginning to circle the earth.) "The increased range of modern ordnance has rendered possible a somewhat new application of land batteries to the defense of the coast. There are certain entrances to large inland waters, like Long Island Sound and Puget Sound, which are too wide to be properly closed with land defenses alone, especially as the depth and strength of the current forbid the effective use of submarine mines. Here there will be great advantage in reinforcing land fortifications with armored coast-defense vessels and torpedo boats."

The elevation or site of a coast-defense work determines in all cases to a certain extent, and in many to a very great extent, the nature of the arm to be used, its caliber and kind of mount. Hence it is necessary to study it carefully. In a most interesting and authoritative article on the "Elevation of Sites for Batteries," Maj. J. G. D. Knight, Engineer Corps, deduces as a result of many examples the conclusion that it is not probable that a naval attack on land batteries will be entered upon at distances exceeding 5,000 yards. The article in question was written six years ago, and later developments occurring during the Spanish-American war make it conclusively certain that attacks on land batteries can not be opened at ranges exceeding 3,000 yards with any degree of effectiveness, except in the one case where a fleet may lay at anchor and attempt from a long range to bombard the work.

This, however, is the one case that shore authorities consider as least fraught with danger or harm. In other words, the danger to be feared by such bombardment on a city, dockyard, or harbor densely occupied, at ranges exceeding 5,000 yards, is nil, and an enemy would not be justified in expending the large amount of ammunition necessary to consummate it, except in the one case where he was really executing a diversion or attempting to keep the shore batteries so occupied as to lead them from his real objects of attack. Major Knight presents two tables which are quoted herein, giving the angles of fall of projectiles of 8-inch and 10-inch United States Army guns and the 40-centimeter Krupp gun, all rifled breech-loaders, as computed from the tables of curves of the engineer board. The second table gives the heights at different ranges, giving corresponding reductions of the angles of fall of arriving projectiles, with the corresponding increase of protection (vertical) of loading detachments at 45 feet in rear of the crest of the parapet, and on a level of the loading platforms:

TABLE I.

Range.	8-inch guns.	10-inch guns.	40-centimeter guns.
1,000 yards.....	0.7	0.8	0.6
2,000 yards.....	1.5	1.8	1.6
3,000 yards.....	2.6	3.0	2.5
4,000 yards.....	3.9	4.4	3.7
5,000 yards.....	5.7	6.1	4.9
Initial velocity per second.....	2,160	1,960	2,035

TABLE II.

Angle of fall diminished in degrees.	Ranges, in yards.			
	1,000.	2,000.	3,000.	4,000.
Theoretical increase of protection (vertical), in inches, 45 feet from crest.				
1.....	9	52	105	157
2.....	19	105	210	314
3.....	28	157	314	472
4.....	38	210	420	629
5.....	47	262	525	787

\* Elevation above ship's guns.



From the foregoing tables, remembering that effective ranges are not beyond 5,000 yards, it follows that guns mounted on the Buffington-Crozier carriages, after recoil, the gun not being fired with an angle of depression, lies wholly below a plane which passing through the interior crest is depressed 7 degrees. This plane passes 5 feet 11 inches above the front edge of the loading platform and 4 feet 3 inches above the rear edge of loading platform. Now, according to the table the greatest angle of fall for projectiles for a range of 5,000 yards is given by Table I as 6.1 degree. It follows, therefore, that since the rear of the gun when drawn from battery, that is, when in its loading position, is less than 5 feet above the platform, that neither gun nor carriages will be struck by projectiles passing above the interior crests.

This is good for all ranges of 5,000 yards or less, and even where the crest of the land battery is on the same level of the attacking naval battery. Since the chances of projectiles striking just above or grazing the interior crest are almost nil, it follows that the protection afforded men serving the guns is ample. They are almost entirely covered. So also will the same be apparent with guns mounted on the gun-lift disappearing principle. But where guns are mounted on barbette—that is, on nondisappearing carriages—both guns and carriages and necessarily also the loading detachments, being above the level of the interior crests, are exposed as plainly to the enemy's fire as if on sandy beach without any parapets in front of them.

Although the danger from fire is little in the cases just cited, still, there being some, we next inquire by the second table what effect the elevation of the site will have on the fire. Major Knight calls this "the searching effect of projectiles and the elevation of site that will neutralize this effect." As we increase the elevation of a site the angle of depression for its guns must also increase until finally, when with the 8-inch gun, the angle of depression is 5°, the platform of the gun is relatively 11 inches higher to the interior crest than when the gun is fired without depression, while with the 10-inch gun it is 12.5 inches.

Of course, when vessels are 2,000 yards or more distant, no moderate increase of elevation will give corresponding increase in protection. Hence, by Table II, a vessel 1,000 yards away firing at a battery that is 262 feet high above sea-level, since the protection at 5° depression is but 35 inches and 30 inches, respectively, for 8-inch and 10-inch guns at 45 feet in rear of crest, this protection being the net increase, it is seen that there is but little chance of hitting any of the detachment, even on extreme rear edge of platform. But if the range be double or more then the crest elevation should also be increased in like ratio, so as not to obtain more than 36 inches increase. This is evident since each increase in elevation of interior crest requires the loading platform also to be raised so much nearer the level of the crest that the required angles of depression may be obtained.

Were this not so, there would be between the walls of the battery and the nearest spot the projectiles of its guns would strike the water a dead space, much out of proportion to the increase of elevation. A projectile, by Table II, having an angle of fall of 1° and clearing the interior crest will, at a distance of 45 feet from crest, pass 9 inches below the level of the crest when fired at a range of 1,000 yards. For ranges of 2,000 yards the angle of fall will be 2°, and projectiles will pass 19 inches below the crest, and to neutralize this fall the elevation of the site must be 210 feet. When a projectile is fired from 5,000 yards and has an angle of fall of 5° it will pass 47 inches below the crest, and to neutralize this the site must be over 1,000 feet high. But while by raising the site we have gained a great protection to guns and detachment, we have also gained in the searching power of the guns. A 10-inch rifle whose interior crest is 300 feet high will have a dead zone of 1,000 yards radius, but if we raise the same gun to 210 feet elevation, then the dead zone becomes 730 yards radius.

Major Knight asserts that a gun mounted on either of the three disappearing plans—the gun-lift, Buffington-Crozier, and Gordon carriages—will not be directly hit when under direct fire of guns at ranges not exceeding 5,000 yards, and therefore that the additional protection is slight and really unnecessary for guns so mounted, and is practically nothing for nondisappearing barbette guns. Also, that increase of site increases dead zones, and therefore that moderate elevations are best. Furthermore, the loading platforms of barbette guns on nondisappearing carriages being on practically the same level as the interior crests, no elevation of site affords commensurate shelter to gun, mount, or detachment. There is one advantage gained by elevation of site for disappearing guns, which he distinctly mentions, and that is expressed by him as follows:

"With nothing but the parapet continuously in the enemy's view, with guns appearing only for brief periods, he must be at a loss how to direct (the enemy) his fire if he can not see the openings into which the gun disappears. Therefore, with the view of depriving an enemy of a definite target for his guns, the battery may well be constructed at sufficient elevation to hide the openings of its emplacements from view from the tops of an enemy's vessel. For this purpose, and for this only, it may be well to give crests of batteries an elevation of about 100 feet above the water."

But are there not disadvantages of low sites, which would make necessary the higher elevation? It is claimed that a low site enables the ships to dispense with high angles of fire, for which their decks and gun mounts are not fitted, and it is further said that a low mount on shore does not enable the shore gun to throw a fire on the deck of a ship which as well known is her most vulnerable point. Again it is claimed that a low site gives to the naval attack a distinct advantage, placing its guns on an equality with the shore guns as to energy of impact. For the first objection it may be said that for the same ranges the angles of fall of ship guns is increased but very slightly over those of the shore guns.

Against the second point, it is well known that ships have been unable to give angles of elevation of over 14° or 15° to their guns, while for the third, an example taken from Ingalls's Handbook of Exterior Ballistics may fully answer. Thus a 714-pound shot fired from a ship at a range of 3,000 yards, at an elevation of 1,270 feet, while another fired from the battery at the 1,270-foot elevation, with same weight projectile, the striking velocities would be 1,474 and 1,517 feet, respectively, while the respective striking energies would be 10,754 and 11,380 foot-tons, or the vessel would have but 638 tons handicap. In other words, the shore gun has gained but 3 per cent of energy by reason of elevation, and since a blow of 11,000 foot-tons would not damage at that distance the steel deck of a ship, it is hardly probable that an addition of 400 foot-tons would enable it to do so. Major Knight sums up his splendid article as follows:

"Assuming that vessels will not attack shore batteries at greater ranges than 5,000 yards, barbette guns mounted according to the United States disappearing methods need no additional protection derived from increasing the elevation of battery sites within reasonable limits. Even moderate elevations of batteries, which are armed with guns limited to depressions of 5°, entail dead zones of magnitude not to be overlooked where these zones include areas of deep water. Disappearing guns gain but little additional protection by such increase in the battery elevation, and nondisappearing guns gain practically no additional protection."

Notwithstanding these excellent arguments, the writer of this essay, being an artilleryman, is not prepared to coincide with the conclusions. The fact is admitted that site gives additional invisibility to the guns on shore, for every foot of elevation is a most distinct and valuable advantage when applied to the disappearing guns. But in addition it must be said that every

foot of height gained renders the gun more accurate, by reason of the target being virtually larger, while at the same time deck attack is easier and more certain. Beyond this, where elevations for batteries are low, those for the depression range finders of the respective batteries must also be low, and therefore the errors from this source must increase. Ranging of guns is not possible by any system of depression range finding where the vertical base is under 50 feet, and accuracy can not be depended on absolutely till the height is at least 90 feet.

So far, no horizontal range finder has been adopted that will satisfy all artillery conditions so thoroughly as the depression instruments. High sites for fire commanders, and battery commanders' stations are almost a necessity, since ships can be sighted at greater ranges, and preparations for fighting them made accordingly. Thus, at a height of 600 feet in clear weather, the water line of a vessel is visible, with a good glass, a distance of 20 miles, and smoke coming from the same vessel is visible 10 miles farther. If the vessel is coming on at a 14-knot speed, this will allow two hours to prepare for it. Modern guns have much flatter trajectories than our old muzzle-loaders, yet in the heyday of their existence those on Porter's fleets could not damage the guns of the Confederate batteries at Fort Hudson and Vicksburg, although the elevation of these latter was about 100 feet. The flatter trajectory the less the angle of fall, and hence modern guns at short ranges can not attain the rear of parapets of moderate height, while the higher the site the greater must the range of the ship be to do any damage to the works or detachments back of the shore batteries.

The high site is not so easily rushed by shore or landing parties. That the target becomes greater the higher we ascend is readily seen, since the beam of a ship is always greater than its freeboard, and while we lose but little of the latter, we gain much of the former. But that elevation affects the errors of aiming or firing is not so plain. If we suppose a gun fired at any given range at a target on the same level with it, and presume the shot to pass 50 yards beyond the target, it is evident that, raising the gun 50 feet and firing under exactly the same conditions as before, the shot must strike so much nearer the target, since with the same charge of powder and the same conditions, the range of the shot is exactly the same. Now, since the most important thing about seacoast firing is to obtain accurate ranges, and since range finders and instruments used in communicating ranges may give out at a critical moment, it can not be doubted that the elevation of a site when high will give to the shore greater advantages than when low. In conclusion, we may sum up that a high site is always to be chosen, provided the area of fire covered by its batteries is not restricted thereby.

In placing guns in a battery chosen there are two main objectives to bear in mind. The first is that guns are placed there to prevent vessels from passing by—in other words, to fire at vessels in motion.

The second one is that they are placed there to prevent bombardments—that is, to fire at vessels at anchor.

In the first case, vessels may run by without firing or they may pass in keeping up a systematic attack on the fort. In the second case, vessels may anchor at close range in the hope of crushing or silencing the forts by a systematic attack and heavy fire or they may anchor at long range and bombard while other ships attempt to pass by, thus hoping to draw the fire of the batteries on shore; or, at any range, they may attempt to crush the shore batteries by a heavy fire.

Bearing these two objectives in mind, we readily understand, then, that guns are distributed according to their class and caliber as follows:

First. At those points where navigation is most difficult for any enemy, the most effective fire must be brought to bear.

Second. To render the position of a ship untenable, we must cover with an effective fire, all waters in which she could lie and do any damage either to the shore batteries, to shipping in the harbor, to dockyards, cities, etc. In some cases one condition must yield to the other, and then the first must be supreme, but in the majority of cases, the two may be combined. These are tactical questions that do not come within the scope of this essay. The guns having been generally determined upon, then follows the question of their mounts, and as this is really the subject-matter of this essay, all that has been written so far, being necessary to lead up to it in an understanding manner, we must first lay down the different systems of mounting guns.

The various classes of mounts for heavy guns may be classed under three heads, viz:

1. Where complete protection is afforded both gun and its carriage and detachment, except for the brief moment the gun is exposed while firing, and limited only by the size of port through which it is withdrawn.

2. Protection to carriage and detachment at all times against direct fire and to gun, except for brief moment of firing. This method exposes gun and detachment to vertical fire.

3. Varying protection against direct fire by shields, etc. No overhead cover.

Maj. G. S. Clarke, R. E., gives as separate groups of the three classes thus named the following subdivisions:

#### CLASS I.

1. Shielded casemates. 2. Curved-front shielded casemates. 3. Continuous iron front. 4. Gruson battery. 5. Nonrecoil gun. 6. Turret. 7. Compound armor cupola. 8. Gruson turret.

#### CLASS II.

1. Open battery with shields. 2. Open battery with earth embrasures. 3. Barbettes. 4. Light cupolas. 5. Breech hoods with barbette guns. 6. Barbette with turntable and horizontal splinter roof shield; loading performed at elevation, the breech being depressed through an opening in the shield.

#### CLASS III.

1. Moncrieff counterweight carriages. 2. Hydropneumatic carriage. 3. Counterbalance disappearing carriage. 4. Floating platform. 5. Balance pillar.

The names given the foregoing classes of mounts very generally explain their manner of action. In the United States our old forts very generally follow in their casemate protection the groups 1 and 2 of Class I. Turrets have been suggested for certain of our fortifications, and this part of the subject will again be touched upon. The special advantages claimed for this class of gun mounting are complete protection to mounting and detachment against the heaviest projectiles, limited only by thickness of shield adopted, strength of masonry, and size of fort; also, complete protection against high-angle fire, and except at the embrasure in front, against machine-gun fire and shrapnel; generally requires the occurrence of several hits in a small area to produce much result; closest approximation to armor clads; with the turrets and cupolas, the curvature is generally unfavorable to projectiles, and makes small target.

The general disadvantages of the class are to keep within bounds of moderate cost, entails the crowding of guns, which is always undesirable. For casemates, generally, the target often is large and exposure increased by massive overhead protection. Liable to cumulative danger at long range, and is most effectively attacked by the same projectiles which the ship requires to engage armor clads. Field of view is restricted by small size of port, and a single shell entering is sure to disable carriage. Elevation and depression is limited. With turrets, a single segment broken, an entire turret



is hopelessly disabled. Moreover, they are excessively costly. A great deal of complicated machinery is necessary in the turrets, while within space is cramped.

Under Class II come the varying subdivisions of barbette, which may be found in the United States in all the old styles of water batteries, and the upper tiers of batteries in the masonry forts.

The advantages derived from this class are, first, the great economy over other methods; all-around fire and, where hoods or shields are used, protection against machine guns and small caliber rapid-fire gun-fire; simplicity in mounting, making manipulation of carriage easier; capable of any elevation, and depression limited only by slope of parapet. The disadvantages of this class are that the gun is at all times more or less exposed; no overhead covering, and detachment and carriage exposed. In the turntable barbette as great and intricate machinery is required as in the turrets. Guns and carriages increase the target offered to the enemy.

The Class III comprises the various forms of disappearing gun carriages. The advantages claimed are protection to gun, carriage, and detachment, except to the former at the moment of firing. Can be rendered by smokeless powder practically invisible, and when degree of protection and range of fire is considered, they are economical mounts. All loading, elevating, and traversing done is always under cover, and is particularly well suited to guns on low sites; allowing great field of fire and angle of elevation and depression, limited only by slope of parapet. The disadvantages stated are, first, the constant and special care required in maintenance in good and serviceable condition, danger from overhead fire, complicated machinery, and danger of being disabled by splinters, and even dust, sand, etc.

A study of the foregoing systems will result in bringing down the various classes to the three simple ones of, first, casemate mounts; second, open barbette mounts; third, disappearing barbette mounts. Taken in this order, they are all in use to-day in the United States, and while the various subdivisions of turrets, cupolas, etc., are suggested, they have not had so far any test of experience or use. As against wrought iron or steel plates, we can calculate with accuracy the result of shots of given weights and velocities, and our experience in the civil war has given us greater knowledge of the effect of shot on earthen parapets, perhaps, than is the case with other nations.

But beyond all question the results of the wars of the past decade, the revolutions in Brazil, the Japanese-Chinese war, the Spanish-American war, and the Chinese war, have most conclusively proved that seacoast guns mounted behind any kind of parapets are practically safe from the fire of naval guns. The magnificent fleets of the American Navy in overpowering numbers at Juan, at Santiago, and other Cuban ports directed well-aimed fire at old earthen and masonry embankments, constructed a century ago, and succeeded only in silencing for the time being the fire of the old Spanish guns, few in number and poorly served. On the cessation of the American fire the Spanish artillery invariably resumed action with their guns, they and their detachments having been unhurt, the only damage done the guns and mounts being exposed barbette.

To understand the requirements of carriages for heavy guns it is necessary to study each particular kind or class of mounts in the order given. Taking up the first class of mounts—the casemate—under this head we may include, also, the turret and armored casemate, proposed for use in the United States. The revolving-turret system is proposed for use on sea-level sites, and for guns of the heaviest calibers. They will be used where the field of fire is very extended. Of necessity the carriages are low and resemble, in many respects, naval gun mounts. Owing to the great cost of turret, armor, and machinery, the interior size of the turrets are restricted, and while not so much so as in the case of turrets on ships, yet the land gun, being generally heavier and larger, makes the amount of inside space as little.

The Collingwood turret, used in England, mounts two heavy guns, which are in barbette. The carriages are hydropneumatic ones, and rest on a steel deck or floor, which revolves as a turntable. The walls of the turret are fixed, and inclined to the horizon, and this gives greater chance for obliquity of impact of projectiles. Overhead protection is sought for by means of a steel deck, through which is an opening for raising and lowering the guns. This leaves the gun and mount practically without any overhead protection, and the advantages of the system on a low site would be thus rendered nil, when taken in connection with the cost. The Gruson turret system proposed for low sites, like that of Romer Shoals in New York Harbor, has the distinct advantage of complete protection, limited only by thickness of armor. But in addition to its great cost it is extremely doubtful if the great mass of steel and machinery can be made to revolve and work without trouble. All machinery gives more or less trouble, and it is generally at the critical moment that it fails.

The charges of powder and weight of projectiles are so tremendous in modern guns that the effect of recoil can hardly be imagined, and smooth working of machinery that is always underneath, and therefore more subject to the effects of recoil than in any other direction, can not be absolutely calculated beforehand. The special advantage of this turret mounting, so far as the gun and carriage are concerned, is that it is traversed independently of the gun carriage and furnishes an all-around fire. When area of site is restricted by it, we can place in the smaller space the maximum offensive power.

For all casemate carriages there must be two motions, one vertical and the other horizontal. General Abbot states that in the armored casemates the field of fire is restricted to 15° in the first and to 60° in the second. This is the case with the old-style carriages we use in our casemates to-day. In an armored casemate, by using a carriage similar to that used in turrets, the elevation can be increased; but in that case more or less trouble would ensue as a result of increasing the horizontal field of fire. The various varieties of casemate carriages have many advantages, which, however, may be summed up in the one of affording complete cover to carriage and detachment.

In the second class the open-barbette mounts are included, all methods of mounting where the gun, carriage, and detachment are exposed, wholly or nearly so, both to overhead and direct fire. The great merit of this class is their economy of cost, ease of working, and simplicity of construction. Necessarily they can not be used on low sites, but reach their maximum working points on higher sites, where their elevation makes it difficult for hostile shots to reach them. Breech-loading guns have increased the chances of cover afforded to gunners in barbette mountings, since cannoners are not needed at the muzzle but at the rear of the gun, and although they are more liable to being reached by curved fire there, yet they are also more covered by the gun itself.

But guns mounted in this way are always exposed, and therefore are targets for an enemy's fire. On low sites there is no doubt but the powerful fire of rapid-fire guns of a fleet would smother that of the shore batteries, and thus render, for the time being, the latter useless.

The third class, the disappearing system, comprises with us the two forms of the gun-lift carriage and the Buffington-Crozier carriage. The balance-pillar mount, the Driggs-Schroeder mount, etc., of rapid guns partake more of the open-barbette system, since in action they are loaded and fired in an exposed position. By the disappearing method—which our Artillery Drill most directly calls a class of the barbette system—the parapet affording protection is necessarily fixed and immovable in position. With the gun-lift the gun and carriage and platform on which they stand are moved upward by hydraulic

power to the firing position, and sink again by the same power to the loading position under cover of the walls.

In the Buffington-Crozier class the platform remains fixed, as also the greater part of the carriage, and always under cover. When loaded and laid, the gun is elevated above the parapet and it and part of the carriage are exposed for the small instant of time necessary to fire the gun. Its recoil throws it back to the loading position under cover. The whole of the personnel remaining under cover at all times, and as explained herein some pages back, they are protected ever against curved fire and practically unexposed. Against overhead fire, there is no protection beyond that afforded by the elevation of the crest. The gun-lift has, under recent action of the Ordnance and Fortification Board, been practically condemned, so that the only system of disappearing carriages used in the United States service is the Buffington-Crozier carriage.

A mature consideration of the foregoing pages must convince us that all systems of mounts for heavy guns must come under one of the two heads, of disappearing or open barbette. In order to apply the carriage to the site best adapted to it—that is, to place the carriage best adapted to any site—an analytical discussion of the various forms of gun carriages used in these systems is necessary.

What requirements should carriages for heavy guns fulfill?

First. A firm and reliable platform from which to fire the gun.

Second. Arrangements by which the gun can be easily loaded, traversed, elevated or depressed, and fired.

Third. Cover or protection to gun, carriage, and detachment in proper amounts compatible with efficient service of the gun.

Fourth. Carriages must be simple in construction, easy to manipulate, and strong to sustain the heavy shock of firing, and weather of all sorts; of as light weight as is consistent with strength and movability.

Fifth. They must be economical in first cost and in maintenance.

Sixth. They must be arranged so that the same parts of carriages of the same caliber can be interchangeable and be adjusted to all positions and sites.

Obviously, the first condition is the most essential, and without its fulfillment the entire gun and mount is rendered useless, since in firing guns if the projectile can not be started on its path accurately we simply wantonly waste powder and metal. Carriages mounted in barbette are made sometimes to revolve about a point, called a pintle, at the front and under the chassis. They are then called front-pintle carriages, and necessarily their area of fire is limited. Again, the pintle is under the center of the chassis, and they are then called center-pintle carriages and may then have an all-around fire.

When the pintle is front, errors in the level of the traversing circle may be more easily corrected than when the pintle is in the center. Errors in laying guns may be often counteracted by errors in carriage. But inasmuch as it is presumed that carriages are accurately made and mounted, errors in laying should not occur. Since it is the play at different points between the rails and guides pintle and carriage—that is, those points around which rotation, and flexure of supports between points widely separated—takes place, it can be understood that in barbette carriages, which are either of the front or center pintle pattern, there is more chance of error in the foregoing respects than in the case of the Buffington-Crozier, which revolves on its 24 live rollers, and which can be accurately laid and absolutely level.

Lieut. C. G. Gallup, in a masterly article on artillery carriages, says on this point: "We have our guns, carriages, projectiles, and powders, and our limit in accuracy is their limit. As soon as any new thing is suggested in connection with powder, projectiles, or guns some one or some nation experiments with it to determine its value, and if it will increase the accuracy or power of the gun it is adopted. But it looks as if all our attention was being concentrated on these, to the neglect of the mounts; yet to-day accuracy of fire depends more on the mount than on the guns—i. e., the error of the gun is less than the error of the carriage due to faulty design or workmanship. Why when mounts are made for heavy guns do they always throw them together haphazard, loose in every joint, and uncertain in their action? The breechblock of a gun is made a perfect fit, and what part of the gun carriage has a greater strain? Can we not have a carriage with points and connections so made that they would not look as if made either with insufficient tools or skill, or both?"

When we have such a carriage our accuracy of fire will depend principally on guns, powder, and projectiles, and not, as at present, on the carriage. All carriages for heavy guns consist of a top carriage and a bottom one, or chassis. The former is movable, the latter is fixed—so far as recoil is concerned. Many of our mounts have a high top carriage running on a high chassis. This gives occasion to a couple, about which gun and carriage tend to revolve, and adds to the jump. The navy top carriage has very little height above the gun slide, and the latter being close to its platform the tendency to jump is greatly decreased. The jump of a gun being an uncertain element, every effort should be made to get rid of it, and any mount which causes a gun to recoil in a direction parallel to its own axis reduces to the minimum the overturning couple.

In these days of rapid-fire guns, rapidity of fire, even with heavy guns, is a desideratum. A gun in barbette can be loaded quicker than a disappearing one, but it can not be elevated or depressed, traversed or fired in any less time. As compared with a casemate gun, it may be loaded as quick, but the latter requires a longer time to train. There is a happy medium which must be aimed at between rapidity and deliberation of fire; for if too rapid, then accuracy suffers; but in case of emergency it is necessary to load quickly and have the gun trained and ready to fire at just the instant we wish. Any carriage by which sliding friction is the method used, in part or whole, to check recoil, must be abandoned. The ideal carriage in this respect is the one with few joints, and in which the loading and firing and laying can be done in any position.

On account of great weight, modern gun carriages must be supplied with proper machinery for working carriage and gun with celerity. Of necessity this power should be some other than hand power. It may be steam or electricity or other suitable agent. The same power can be utilized in hoisting ammunition, loading gun, traversing and elevating it, and even running it to a firing position. To reduce recoil to the narrowest limit, without exercising strain on parts of the carriage, there must be a constant pressure maintained in the cylinders, and where friction is depended on as an assistant this can not be the case. The most difficult problem connected with modern ordnance is in the recoil. With barbette guns of an open mount we consider generally only the dissipation of the tremendous energy generated by recoil. But in the Buffington-Crozier gun we go further by utilizing and storing up a part of this energy to raise the gun to the firing position.

The necessity of cover to gun and gunners is greater to-day than ever before. It is claimed that cover makes cowards of men when they are obliged to fight in the open. It is passing strange that human nature, being the same the world over—this applies only to soldiers and not to sailors—it has never been claimed that heavy armor made a sailor less brave than wooden walls. But it is sure that the results of modern wars prove that to work guns effectively gunners must remain with their guns, and where batteries are exposed to the tremendous smothering fire of modern warships at short range they must be protected to a great extent to be of any use at all. Protection is needed in proportion to the extent of danger, and it is of but little use quoting experiences of war in this regard, since a little study of every



harbor will easily determine to what extent the danger may exist as against the sites of various batteries.

Since the manipulation of heavy weights, made necessary to sustain the tremendous shock of recoil, requires us to use to a greater or less degree machinery and power other than that of hand, it is extremely necessary that we should seek for simplicity of construction. The material of which carriages are made must be steel in some form in order to reduce weight to a minimum. So, also, since the number, estimated by our ordnance and engineer experts, of guns required to arm all the fortification planned, runs into the thousands, economy in both first cost and maintenance is an important desideratum. The class of men enlisted as soldiers do not possess that degree of mechanical intelligence and knowledge, as to insure the best working of the machinery of gun mounts, which, in their simple form, taxes the greatest minds to thoroughly comprehend. For the same reason the same parts of gun carriages of the same size should be interchangeable, and carriages generally should be adapted to all or any site.

Let us apply the foregoing requirements to the various systems of mounts, and by a comparison of the considerations connected therewith deduce conclusions that will enable us to decide as to the absolutely necessary essentials the proper carriage must possess.

Guns mounted in open barbette have many types of carriages, but all have a top carriage and a chassis. Owing to the fact that the chassis is always fixed, except in traverse, the top carriage being movable, the chassis can be constructed of long, unbraced pieces, which will carry the strain of recoil in the direction of their length. The carriage is, therefore, simpler and more compact. It can be loaded from the breech, and the stored-up energy of recoil can be used to send it—"in battery"—into the firing position.

But it can not be loaded more quickly than either the casemate, turret, or disappearing form of carriage, for the time necessary in the latter to throw the gun into the firing position is offset by the time necessary in the former to run the gun and top carriage "in battery." The volume of fire from this mount is therefore no greater than from others. Is its fire more accurate? Surely not, since owing to the couple engendered by either front or center pintle and the moving of the top carriage on rails is more likely to injure the perfect leveling and accurate laying than is the case of the disappearing gun, mounted on its 24 roller points of support. It is argued, however, that there is a loss of rapidity of fire and of accuracy with the latter carriage, owing to the play at points which can not be eliminated entirely and to the springing of long, unsupported pieces; that the slightest difference of level of base ring, and consequently of the roller path, or even the slightest ellipticity of the base ring, causes the rollers to jam or move hard and unevenly, etc.

When Stephenson built the first locomotive the rails were of wood and it was predicted that the uneven motion would destroy the steam carriages and culminate in accidents, but as time went on rails were changed from wood to iron and these in turn gave way to steel, and to-day railroads have beds so even and smooth, rails jointed together so closely, and withal so strongly made that loads over 100 times as heavy run at tremendous speed without accidents, with no jar or unevenness, and with scarcely a tremor. If the engineer makes his platform properly and the base ring is properly made at the foundry it can be accurately laid and leveled.

Two years ago the majority of our heavy guns were constantly giving trouble in their traversing and laying. To-day such guns are the exceptions and the majority of them, even the 12-inch gun with its great load of carriage and counterweight, amounting to over 250 tons, can be easily started and traversed with one hand. Two hundred years ago watches were larger than many clocks of to-day, yet so great has the advance been in mechanical construction that to-day an accurate timepiece can be made that is no larger than a silver dime. So, also, is the machinery of a disappearing gun made better, tighter fitting, more accurately with every carriage that is turned out. Every ordnance and artillery officer is acquainted with the fact that the present Chief of Ordnance has spent his time for years past perfecting the gun mounts which bear his name.

When the proprietor of a factory having a valuable engine or motor in it starts it up, he does not go out and pick up the first man on the street to run it, but he pays a good salary and hires a competent engineer. In the Army Uncle Sam can not expect that men enlisted everywhere will understand all the complicated mechanism of his various guns and carriages at once, but there is no reason for not believing that where intelligence and care are exercised not only are guns properly mounted, but they are properly kept and properly used, and therefore, due to their tremendous power and accuracy, they are most economical at the critical moments.

The barbette mount does not require the care that the disappearing mount does. The latter requires the care and skill in maintenance and handling. So does the monster 120-ton locomotive that hauls the train from New York to Buffalo and Philadelphia at 70 miles per hour. Given such care, the disappearing carriage will not get out of order, and the longer they are cared for the easier does their manipulation become and the better acquainted with them become their care takers. And when required to respond, how magnificently do they do it. Laid and trained and loaded beneath cover, at will they silently rise in the air, accurately point their huge mouths in the proper direction for an instant, and then vomiting forth their deadly contents at the enemy, at distances that appal naval men, they sink back quietly beneath their cover, leaving no trace whatever of their whereabouts.

Turrets and casemates are fully as costly as the disappearing mounts; in fact, the first is more so. They are capable of being fired with as great rapidity as either the open barbette or disappearing mount. But casemates limit the field of fire to a dangerous extent, while the disappearing gun has an all-around fire. The former offers an ideal target to the enemy, and by repeated blows becomes vulnerable. The latter is inconspicuous and presents nothing to fire at. Turrets, while not so conspicuous, are far more complicated in their machinery, and a single shot, while not injuring the gun, may jam it if it be a front pintle gun. The open barbette mount has an advantage of costing less than the disappearing, but this difference in both parapet and carriage does not amount to 6 per cent less in favor of the barbette.

As against its greater cost the disappearing gun has 20 per cent greater accuracy. Its platform is more stable, and while its parts are more numerous, they are like the parts of a steam engine, capable of greater power. The usual form of barbette mounts dissipates the energy of recoil, but the disappearing mount takes it up, stores it, and uses it to throw the gun up to the firing position. The barbette gun mount is lighter, but as all mounts of large guns are heavy and require machinery to manipulate, this consideration bears no weight, except in the one matter of cost. The barbette mounts can not be used on certain sites, as, for instance, those on low levels, while, as pointed out in Major Knight's article, the disappearing gun can. The disappearing-gun mount can be used on all sites, although it has its maximum advantages at certain elevations of about 100 feet.

But it is the one requirement of cover or protection that the adherents of the disappearing gun must place their greatest reliance on, and insist that in that particular alone its advantages are so superlative that without others it will outweigh the other systems. It is said that Napoleon scorned fortifications and relied on the courage of his soldiers as being the best protection. That was all right a century ago, but had the great general lived

in these modern times of accurate firing of shrapnel, of steel shells filled with high explosives, he would have changed his mind. Because there has never been a really first-class combat between forts and ships in modern times, and because in the halfway combats that have been held the forts have more than held their own is no argument for doing away with protection to gun and detachment.

We hope that there never will be such a combat, and we believe there never will be, but it will be because the forts and guns are properly constructed with cover for men and weapons. To make the gun efficient men must be protected, and the importance of proper cover can not be overestimated. The protection should only be compatible with the efficient handling of the gun. The barbette mount does not afford this; the disappearing mount does. A modern battle ship possesses an average of 8 rapid-fire guns to 1 heavy one. Land fortifications with us so far do not possess 1½ rapid-fire to 1 heavy gun.

To place six rapid-fire guns ashore to every heavy gun would give an immense superiority to the land over naval guns, since in considering the relative accuracy of the two, the former distances the latter by two and three to one. As a matter of fact, it is contrary to every principle of reasoning to presume that any naval attack can silence coast defenses if proper care has been displayed in their location, design, construction, and armament. It is computed that the land gun overmatches the naval gun by two and three to one. The results of the few actual combats between naval and land guns—at Alexandria, at Rio de Janeiro, at Wei-Hai-Wei, at San Juan, at Santiago—all prove the immense superiority of land fire to naval fire.

Major Clarke in his Fortifications says: "The vessels of a fleet greatly out-matched the coast defenses in number of guns, in many cases, 100 to 1, and consequently to the same extent in the number of projectiles, weight of metal per gun being practically equal. The ranges were absurdly short, compared with those at which fighting must be done in the future, varying from 50 to seldom over 600 or 700 yards." This was a century ago or more he had reference to, and while ranges were increased to the average of about 2,000 yards at Alexandria, the power and accuracy and volume of fire poured from the naval guns had increased in a much greater proportion. To-day a naval vessel coming to within 2,000 yards of a fort seeks to overwhelm the latter with its volume of fire from rapid-fire guns.

To pour out such a volume of fire from 30 to 40 guns for five minutes only, on the front or crest of a single battery, means a complete smothering of any attempt by the latter to show either gun, mount, or detachment. When rapid-fire guns are mounted in the proportion of 4 to 6 to every heavy gun, then the shore batteries can in turn smother and overwhelm the fire of the ships. To prevent ships from passing up channels submarine mines are placed where they can be advantageously used; but, even so, they must be defended by rapid-fire guns. Since, therefore, ships will come within close fighting ranges of 2,000 to 3,000 yards and attempt to overwhelm by their fire that of the defenses, it is here that the heavy guns can be most advantageously used.

Without cover they are helpless, but with cover to load and train, they rise at the touch of the lever, are fired at a practically point-blank range, their projectiles going straight through the armor of the ship, and then sink back again invisible to all, but the detachment completely protected. On level sites like the southern entrance to New York Harbor, and in fact the majority of harbors of the Atlantic coast, the gun mounted on the disappearing carriage is essential to efficient protection. If an ordinary barbette mounted gun ashore is worth two guns afloat, then a disappearing gun is worth four, since its protection practically increases its efficiency 100 per cent. Referring to the disappearing gun, Colonel Clarke, the noted British engineer, says: "Of all methods of mounting yet proposed, the disappearing principle offers the greatest advantages. \* \* \* The gun, laid under cover by a position-finder, will be vulnerable only for a few seconds before each round. Its exact position can only be identified during the brief period of visibility. There appears to be no satisfactory mode of attacking it."

To sum up, then, we find the main objections to the disappearing gun to be, viz:

First. Its cost. But, as stated, this is only 6 per cent more than the barbette mount, and less than the turret, and about the same as the casemate.

Second. Trouble in mounting and unreliability when wanted. As for this, if our artillery officers will take the same trouble, from colonels down to second lieutenants, to study and know their weapons as battery mechanics, they will find that the guns can be properly mounted, and wherever this is done, it can be properly cared for, and when the same degree of care and intelligence is bestowed on it as on their pocket watches it will respond the same and never be found wanting. Officers must be ready to put on canvas overalls and go down in the gun-pits and climb around the machinery and personally know the reason and use of every bit of mechanism. When this is the case there will no longer be complaints about its getting out of order, its unreliability, etc.

Third. By reason of the detachment being always under cover it is feared by many that a sense of dependence on cover will be engendered, which at certain times might make cowards of the artillery soldier.

Calm reflection on this argument will show what utter nonsense it is. Americans are naturally brave to temerity, and to remain under cover when all the excitement of action is passing outside requires a degree of personal restriction that is far braver than the physical rush and action of yelling and cheering in a mêlée. It is not necessary to linger on this point. We have good guns and good mounts and the best cover. Let us work and train our men to handle them to the best of our ability, and trust to the truth and patriotism, honesty and bravery of American manhood, and the nation may rest assured that the attack of the combined navies of the world will not break through the cordon of our coast fortifications armed with our disappearing guns.

For our uses the disappearing guns are essential even on the high bluffs of the Pacific. But on the low sandy wastes of the Gulf and South Atlantic States they are absolutely indispensable for efficient protection, while in the wide-mouthed channels of Long Island Sound, Chesapeake Bay, and Puget Sound, where the waters are too deep and wide to place any dependence on submarine mines and navies may congregate in force against any battery, it is only the Buffington-Crozier system that will give us victory. In conclusion, we may remark that though little use of disappearing systems has been made in Europe in the past to-day Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Spain, Italy, Russia, and Holland are making use of them and arming their coast defenses with guns on disappearing carriages.

A gun behind a parapet that can not be penetrated, mounted on a reliable and firm platform, with mechanism that will insure its perfect running in and out of battery, when fired with heavy charges and when used for drill and practice—that is at all times invisible, except for the brief time that it vomits its deadly, blinding, crashing load directly at the enemy—that is the best kind of a defense possible to have. In our system of disappearing carriages, properly handled, we have all the essentials called for. That the gun carriage can be made to respond at any time or all times to what may be demanded of it, in peace and the rough action of target practice, with heavy charges, has been proved by more than one artillery officer. Like a steam engine, constant and daily use makes the machinery more efficient until its usefulness is impaired by time alone.

Mr. WARREN. I wish to ask if the article which the Senator from Vermont has had printed in the RECORD was not written by an engineer officer, Mr. Ruckman, who was the most violently opposed to the disappearing carriage of any one of the ninety-one upon whom calls were made for answers?

Mr. PERKINS. Without answering that I am willing to have the two essays speak for themselves against the one which has been presented by the Senator from Vermont.

I wish to say parenthetically that the Senator from Vermont and all of us have the same common object in view. We want to do that which is for the best interest of the Government. He wants a fort and guns on it, so that a ship of war can not storm it and take it. We both have the same object in view. The only difference is how we may arrive at it. Therefore this discussion has a good effect. It brings out the defects on both sides. No one is perfect. When the Senator from Vermont was Secretary of War he was always striving to improve our fortifications. Our submarine fortifications to-day are better than any other in the world. I agree with the Senator that in a high elevation, perhaps, the barbette gun is the best, but on a low level, in the line of a marsh, a breech-loading gun that disappears, that the men can lower, has great advantages over any other implement of war.

Mr. PROCTOR. You have some of them in California mounted over 300 feet.

Mr. PERKINS. That is on a barbette, my dear friend. It is on a barbette at Lime Point.

Mr. PROCTOR. I beg the Senator's pardon. He will see from the reports that they are not.

Mr. PERKINS. I have been to one of them, and it is on a barbette. There may be some disappearing carriages there, but that which I have seen with my own eyes I know to be there. I know we have guns mounted upon barbette carriages at the entrance to the Golden Gate in San Francisco Harbor.

Mr. President, if we can have a vote at this time upon this question—

Mr. TELLER. We can not.

Mr. PERKINS. I am perfectly willing to yield to the Senator from North Dakota, who wishes to have a new depot built for the capital city of the nation. I want to fortify the Potomac and Newport News and the other parts of the country, so that the Capitol can not be destroyed, as it was once destroyed by the British.

Mr. PROCTOR. Mr. President, it can not be that the Senator from California wished to be understood that all expenditures for these disappearing carriages were approved by the Board of Ordnance and Fortification. He will see on the fifth page of Document 336, sent us by the Secretary of War, that the majority of that board disapproved of it and recommended that no more be made than those now under construction for high and medium sites, not on low sites, until the proportion of those to be placed in such fortifications would have been limited to one-third of the total number. The Board of Ordnance and Fortification has been opposed to these disappearing carriages, but its recommendations have no weight and force. All the appropriations are put under the control of the Ordnance Corps. The board has been recently reconstructed by removing Colonel Story and Colonel Rodgers, two officers who were strongly opposed to these carriages, and putting on officers who favored them. That has very recently been done. It has been done within a few days or a few weeks at most, and Major Pratt has been put on the board.

Now, Mr. President, one word more. My point about this is that we are staking everything, so far as our coast defense is concerned, five-sixths of our armament being mounted on these carriages which, it is plain to see from the reports, are an experiment. If they fail, as some officers express here their views that they will within half an hour after serious firing—and they never have been tested under conditions that would exist in battle—our coast defense, in which we have spent, I believe, some \$60,000,000 already, is practically lost.

Mr. PERKINS. I wish to state to my friend from Vermont that General Crozier said that the present board consists of Lieutenant-General Miles, Commanding General of the Army; General Gillespie, Chief of Engineers, United States Army; Colonel Rodgers, of the artillery; General Randolph, Chief of Artillery; Major Shaler, of the Ordnance Department, and Major Pratt, of the artillery, and General Henderson, civilian member. That was stated to us last week by General Crozier.

Mr. PROCTOR. It may be that I was wrong in stating that Colonel Rodgers had been removed. I think the board has been reconstituted so that it will favor the continuance of the exploiting of this invention made by the present Chief of Ordnance. Colonel Story has been removed and Major Pratt has been put in his place.

Mr. WARREN. I wish to ask a question before the Senator sits down. He says the board has been reconstructed in favor of

the Buffington-Crozier carriage. I understand the change recently made was to take General Crozier off the board.

Mr. PROCTOR. General Crozier was taken off the board. The attention of the Secretary of War had been called long ago to the statute forbidding an officer who was interested in an invention to be on that board, and after General Crozier's nomination came in here and it was known that was a point being considered he was relieved from the board and Major Shaler, of the Ordnance Corps, was put in his place. That is independent of the removal of Colonel Story and the placing of Major Pratt on the board. That makes a change in favor of the disappearing carriage.

Mr. WARREN. I simply want to call the attention of the Senator to the fact that that change could hardly be attributed to those who favored the present carriage, because the men taken off were men not opposed to it, and the men put on certainly were not those more favorable to it than those taken off.

Mr. PROCTOR. Mr. President, Colonel Story was very strongly opposed to it, and was well known so to be. He was a member of the board at that time, but he has no letter in this list, because those letters were answers to requests sent to officers then in command of posts where these carriages had been placed. He was taken off in a very short time, within a few weeks at the outside, and Captain Pratt, who wrote perhaps the strongest letter in favor of the disappearing carriages, was put on the board in place of Colonel Story.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. With the permission of the Senator in charge of that bill, I will ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be informally laid aside, and that the union-station bill may be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from North Dakota asks unanimous consent that the unfinished business be again informally laid aside, and that what is known as the union-station bill be now considered by the Senate. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

#### UNION RAILROAD STATION.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 4825) to provide for a union railroad station in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The pending question is on the amendment of the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. HANSBROUGH].

Mr. CLARK of Montana. Mr. President, the question now pending before the Senate in regard to the union depot and terminal facilities for the Baltimore and Ohio and Pennsylvania and other railroads is one of such importance, involving the expenditure of a large amount of money, that it should be, in my opinion, considered from the standpoint of the utmost fairness to the railroad companies, to the District of Columbia, and to the Government, and as well should the rights of individual citizens be properly considered.

This bill was introduced some weeks ago and referred to the committee of which I have the honor to be a member. It was, at a meeting of that committee at which I was not present and of which I had no knowledge, referred to a subcommittee.

When reported back to the committee there were some questions relating to the building of a tunnel through the Capitol grounds which first attracted my attention, and to which I raised objection. There were some engineers of the railroad company and of the District of Columbia who appeared before the committee and were interrogated as to the character of the ground through which this tunnel was to be built. It was developed that not a single boring had ever been made in the hill to determine the nature of the ground underlying the Library building; none of the engineers knew anything about its formation. But in view of the fact that there have been a number of disasters in the subways which are now being built in New York City, and have occurred in the building of a railway through Baltimore, at Philadelphia, and at Toledo, Ohio, and in view of the fact that there might be a possibility that this proposed tunnel might seriously damage this great structure, the Library building, which is the pride of this nation, and which has not, except perhaps when we consider the great cathedrals and buildings of that character, a parallel or an equal on the face of this globe, the matter was discussed; these engineers were examined, and it was determined that the tunnel should be removed a farther distance away from the Library building, which, upon examination, I believe will obviate the questions so far as the building proper is concerned; but whether or not it will, so far as the so-called approaches are concerned, which consist of heavy masonry, I am not able to determine.

There was another objection raised in the amendment proposed by the Senator from Colorado [Mr. PATTERSON] with regard to an alleged and probable monopoly that might be maintained by these roads which are concerned with their terminals in this city;



but, as I understand, the people connected with these railroad corporations have agreed to an amendment of a similar character, which is satisfactory to the Senator from Colorado.

The matter then stands before us comprehending a series of improvements involving a large amount of money. It is proposed to pay to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, in order to have them move their terminals from the Mall, the sum of \$1,500,000. That is to be paid by the Government. For my part, I should be glad to see the terminals removed from that ground, in order that the proposed beautification of the city of Washington, which I believe will eventually be adopted, may be properly carried out. The remainder of the expenditures are to be divided between the Government and the District of Columbia.

Now let us see what this comprehends. A report has been submitted here, which is, I believe, by the Commissioners of the District, in which it is stated that \$1,500,000 is to be paid to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company in consideration of improvements and changes that are to be made. I believe that this amount, as well as the \$1,500,000 to be paid to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, are comprised in existing legislation before these two railroads became united in their interests.

The next item is \$500,000 for grading and paving. The next is \$500,000 to purchase the land. The next is \$600,000 to pay any damages that may accrue to any parties interested in that locality. Then there is another item of \$170,000 for something connected with South Washington, which I do not clearly understand. The amount of money that is mentioned here—\$500,000—for the purchase of land comprises some territory which belongs to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, which the Government and the District of Columbia are to purchase and pay for.

There is no information presented, so far as I know, which explains what amount of land is to be purchased or what price shall be paid therefor. A portion of this land is to be appropriated for the use of a plaza to be made in front of the great building that is to be erected. The depot building is to stand north of the Capitol, some distance from the present terminus of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and facing directly in a southerly direction upon Massachusetts avenue, and east of New Jersey avenue. The façade of this building is, I believe, to be something over 700 feet in length. The proposed plaza will have a length of about 1,000 feet and a width of about 500 feet.

In connection with the purchase of such land from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as may be needed for the purposes of this plaza, there are some streets and alleys to be opened on the existing possessions of the railroad company, which are likewise to be paid for.

As I stated, this proposed depot is to be located in a great depression north of the Capitol. Why it becomes necessary to adopt this ground, which seems to me to be unfavorable in its location, I do not understand; but I suppose it is in accordance with the views of the civil engineers who have the matter in charge. This fact, however, stares us in the face: It will require a filling of a large area of ground to the depth, in some places, I believe, of 36 feet. This depth, of course, will diminish as we go away from the depot; but it will extend to the circle at the connection of Massachusetts avenue with New Jersey avenue on the west, so that you may get some idea as to the extent of the filling required.

The railroad company does not itself propose to do this. It proposes to haul the earth necessary for the filling from the country and to deliver it on the ground; but it will be distributed at the expense of the Government and the District of Columbia, joining equally, I believe, in the expenditure.

As to the amount of filling that will be required, the number of cubic feet, and the cost of the same, no estimate has been filed or placed before this committee, of which I am aware, and I have inquired for it. There are no estimates showing the amount of ground that we are to purchase or the cost of the same. The plaza and the streets and alleys are all to be filled with earth.

Now comes the question of damages, for which it is proposed to set aside the sum of \$600,000. There is no report on the bill, of which I am aware, that sets out clearly the amount of land involved or an estimate of the value of the property, or a description of the same by maps, or any estimate whatever as to the probable cost that these damages may involve before we get through with them.

Mr. President, I doubt very much if a half dozen members of this committee have ever seen this ground. I have looked over it, and I find that it embraces a considerable area of ground affecting a number of blocks, upon which are built structures which are now inhabited. There is one building, to which my attention has been called, for which the owner gets a rental of about \$10,000 per annum. If you will contemplate the proposition carefully in your minds, you will readily see that when these streets and alleys are filled up to a depth of from 10 to 36 feet all the property surrounded by these fills will be a long way below the surface of the streets. Indeed, I can not understand how this

filling is to be properly, carefully, and effectually done without damage and without covering these submerged lots, as I may call them, unless retaining walls are put in, particularly where the filling is from 30 to 36 feet.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Montana yield to the Senator from New Hampshire?

Mr. CLARK of Montana. Certainly.

Mr. GALLINGER. I will say to the Senator that the Engineer Commissioner of the District, Colonel Biddle, who is a man of great skill in his profession, differs from the opinions held by the engineers of the railroad companies; and the suggestion that was made that this very deep filling was a necessity was in deference to the views of the Engineer Commissioner of the District. I have been informed by the chairman of the Committee on the District of Columbia that since that time Colonel Biddle has admitted that the proposed fill was altogether greater than was necessary, and that it will be reduced at least one-half. I have that information from the chairman of the committee, and that is the only authority I can give.

Mr. CLARK of Montana. Even then, Mr. President, it would be simply a diminution of the cost of filling; but so far as the property owners are concerned it seems to me it would be just as serious for them.

It is proposed that in the estimate of the damages to the property owners of that locality the question of the appreciation of values when the improvements are made shall be considered. I do not think it is conceded by any one understanding the proposition that this work can be finished under four or five years. Shall the property owner be required to wait until the alleged appreciation of values shall be determined before he is entitled to redress? In the meantime what is he to do? How will he get access to his property? If he has tenants, they will leave him. There is no way, in my opinion, that you can get at this matter fairly and honorably to those property holders in that locality except by a condemnation of their property and the purchase of it by the Government and the District of Columbia, if they are to assume these burdens.

Many of these people are poor. They are not themselves able to fill up the grounds, and we do not propose to do it for them. If they were able to have earth brought in there and have the ground graded up to the level of the street, it would be necessary to pull down their structures, because it would be necessary to have new foundations on which to build new structures, thus practically destroying their property. I believe, Mr. President, that this would be a practical confiscation of the rights of the property holders in that locality unless the theory which I have suggested should be carried out in our treatment of them.

Nothing has been submitted to the Committee on the District of Columbia to give them any definite information as to the amount of damages that might be claimed in order to settle these difficulties. The committee put the amount at \$600,000, but they admit in their report that it is almost impossible to arrive at a conclusion, and that is correct.

This is not a business-like proposition. I do not wish to stand in the way of improvement; but no business man with any sagacity or training, unless he cared to run the risk of bankruptcy proceedings, would undertake to go into an enterprise of this kind unless he had all the data to enable him to count the cost thereof.

Mr. President, in the discussion of this matter in the committee the question of revenue was suggested, and it was stated that the amount of revenue to be derived under the proposed personal-tax law would be about \$1,500,000 per annum; that this expense might be spread over a term of years, and that the District, so far as its part is concerned, would be able to take care of it. But is this true?

The question of damages, the question of filling, the question of purchasing this land, will render it necessary that all the expenses to which the District of Columbia may be subjected will probably have to be incurred in the first twelve or eighteen months, but the personal-tax bill has not yet passed the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, and we do not know when it will, if at all. It may turn out, as I believe will be found to be true, that the costs for damages that will accrue from the injury to the property holders of that locality may amount to twice as much as has been contemplated. It is all guesswork. There has been no studied effort to arrive at just and accurate conclusions. I do not believe in rushing into a proposition of this kind until we not only count the cost but until we ascertain our ability to meet the cost.

Mr. President, it has been contended that this is the inauguration of a great system of beautification of the capital of the nation. I would not for one hour stand in the way of that contemplated improvement. The question as to who shall pay the expense thereof will be determined, and I believe justly it should

fall on the Government of the United States, and not on the District of Columbia. I believe the time will come, and that it is not far distant, when the plans that have been laid before you for improving the Mall and erecting the Government buildings that will be constructed on both sides of the great avenue, to extend past the Washington Monument, to the proposed Lincoln Memorial, and to the proposed Memorial Bridge, will be put into execution. Mr. President, when that day does come, and when we find the great thoroughfare open in the region described, one may behold a scene of beauty and grandeur in the way of architectural effects that can not be surpassed anywhere in the world; and I trust when that is accomplished that some spot may be set apart and devoted to a memorial to that great architect, L'Enfant, who conceived and designed the magnificent plan upon which this city is being constructed.

Mr. President, I am not an obstructionist. I do not wish to delay anything in the way of improvement. I am willing that the railways shall have fair consideration, and I desire, if it can be accomplished in a reasonable way and the railways are made to sustain the proper portion of the burden, that these improvements may be carried out; but with the lack of data, with the vague understanding we have of this proposition, I am in favor of recommending the bill in order that we may have accurate data and correct estimates.

I therefore move that this bill be recommitted to the Committee on the District of Columbia, in order that proper data and information may be laid before us, so that we may all vote intelligently upon the question.

Mr. CLAY. Mr. President, I shall occupy but ten or fifteen minutes of the time of the Senate. I had hoped that an investigation would lead me to cast my vote in favor of the passage of this bill. I have implicit faith in the integrity and the business ability of the chairman of the Committee on the District of Columbia [Mr. McMILLAN]. I have the honor of serving with him on the Committee on Commerce, and I know that he is a careful, painstaking Senator. I have implicit faith in the business ability and integrity of the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. GALLINGER], who champions this bill. But, Mr. President, investigation has led me to say that I ought not and can not conscientiously support this measure.

I believe that every Senator, before this bill is voted on, ought to examine with care the streets that these roads expect to occupy when the change is made. I took the liberty yesterday evening of going over these grounds. I am unwilling, Mr. President, to cast my vote in favor of a bill that provides that a tunnel 4,000 feet in length, 28 feet in width, and 50 feet below the surface of the ground shall be cut or dug in front of the Library.

I believe, Mr. President, that a careful investigation will show that when these railroads shall change their present sites and occupy principally First street, to which I now refer, you will find upon investigation that at least 75 dwellings will be absolutely destroyed at the lower end of this tunnel near where this union depot is to be located; and I do not question that these dwellings will cost the Government and the District of Columbia two or three millions of dollars. Mr. President, I took the liberty of counting these dwellings where this 30-foot fill is to be located, and I find there are either 74 or 75 that will be absolutely destroyed, and by reason of these cuts and fills more than 60 other dwellings will be injured from 50 to 60 per cent.

Mr. President, I believe that the damages that will accrue to property owners by reason of this change will be equal to three or four millions of dollars. I believe before we make a change of this kind data and information should be furnished to the Senate showing the number of buildings that will be injured, the number that will be destroyed, and the possible cost to the Government of the United States and the District of Columbia.

Another thing, Mr. President. There has been no attempt to bore and ascertain what kind of ground and soil is to be found where the Library is located. Before an attempt is made to put a tunnel there, by all means we ought to endeavor to show what kind of ground it is and whether any danger will accrue to the Library building, that cost seven or eight millions of dollars.

Again, an examination of this bill will show another fact. Congress grants to these railroads—and I have nothing to say against the railroads; I have nothing but the kindest feelings toward them, but I am speaking from a business standpoint and in regard to what we ought to do to protect the Government and the District of Columbia. When this bill passes it will give to these two railroads the right to occupy these streets for all time to come; and in the event they cease to occupy them, in my opinion, under the provisions of this bill, these roads could sell these streets to any other purchaser.

My idea of a city granting franchises to a railroad is simply this: They should not be granted for any other purposes except railroad and depot purposes; and when a corporation ceases to exercise these rights and privileges they should always come back

to the grantor. Mr. President, again—I want to be extremely brief—I have been told that this bill was not considered more than thirty minutes in the District Committee. Here is a bill involving seven or eight millions of dollars. This bill ought to have been maturely considered; and not only that, but we ought to have been furnished with a map pointing out the streets that these roads are to occupy, giving to Senators all of the information necessary to guide them in this important legislation.

Just another word. Something has been said, and very well said, in regard to an act that we passed in 1901. I understand that Congress passed an act in 1901 giving a million and a half dollars to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to assist in changing its present depot location and in building another depot. My friend the senior Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. GALLINGER] says we have already given \$1,500,000 to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and he says that this simply continues that appropriation, consequently that by reason of the passage of this act we do nothing more than to continue the present legislation.

I said to the Senator the other day that my recollection was that the act of 1901, which gave \$1,500,000 to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, specially provided that that road, when it vacated its present tracks and vacated certain streets and property that it owned at present, should convey by deed to the District of Columbia and the Government of the United States this property, in order to in part pay for the \$1,500,000 we gave them. My friend, the Senator from New Hampshire, said he thought I was mistaken. I thought I was correct and I took the liberty of hunting up the act. I find, Mr. President, on page 5 of this act, the following:

From and after the expiration of five years from the date of the passage of this act all rights of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company to maintain and operate the present tracks of its Washington Branch Railroad within the limits of the city of Washington, and the present tracks of its Metropolitan Branch Railroad south of the northern line of New York avenue, also extending from the north line of New York avenue to the north line of Q street, and west of the east line of Third street to said north line of New York avenue, shall cease and determine; and the said railroad company shall thereupon, within such reasonable time as the Commissioners of the District of Columbia shall prescribe, remove all such tracks and structures connected therewith from the streets, avenues, public reservations, or other property of the United States on all the lines to be abandoned as aforesaid.

Said Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company shall also immediately execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia a deed, in due form of law, granting, conveying, assigning, and transferring to the United States of America all the estates, right, title, and interest that it, the said Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, has in, to, or out of the lands included within the limits of the roadway or right of way of the Washington Branch Railroad of said company from the west line of Second street to Winthrop Heights Station and of the Metropolitan Branch for the continuation of Third street from Q street south to New York avenue, of an even width as north of Q street, subject, however, as to so much of said lands as lie north of Florida avenue and outside of the limits of the city of Washington, to the continued maintenance and use of the present tracks of said railroad company thereon, for the purpose of reaching its yard and roundhouse at Trinidad, until its new yard in or near Eckington and its roundhouse, authorized by this act, shall be ready for use, but not exceeding six years from the date of the passage of this act; said company, however, to have the right to remove its tracks and structures from the lands so granted within sixty days after the expiration of its right to maintain and use its tracks thereon.

In consideration of the surrender by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, under the requirements of this act, of its rights under the several acts of Congress heretofore passed, and under its several contracts with the municipal authorities of the city of Washington authorized by said acts of Congress, and in consideration of the large expenditures required for the construction of the new terminals, viaduct, and connecting railroads, as required by this act, to avoid all grade crossings of streets and avenues within the city of Washington, and, further, in consideration of the grant and conveyance to the United States of the lands included within the limits of the roadway and right of way of the Washington Branch Railroad, which can be used for a street or avenue for the public benefit, the sum of \$1,500,000, to be paid to said railroad company toward the cost of the construction of said elevated terminals, viaduct, and structures within the city of Washington, shall be, and is hereby, appropriated, one-half to be paid out of any money in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated, the other half to be paid out of the revenues of the District of Columbia. The sum so appropriated shall be paid upon presentation of a certificate by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia that the said viaduct has been completed as required by this act.

The act provides that they shall deed this property back to the Government of the United States and the District of Columbia to in part compensate us for the \$1,500,000 we give them. It is estimated, in the report made on that bill, that that property is worth \$1,300,000. Consequently, if that be true, we only lost, by the act of 1901, \$200,000; but this bill that continues to give them \$1,500,000 does not require the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to give to the Government of the United States or the District any property whatever.

Now, Mr. President, we would be in much better condition to stand by the act of 1901, for we would get back to some extent the property to compensate us for the \$1,500,000 which we give the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This bill requires nothing of this kind from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

Again, I was talking to a citizen of the District of Columbia, of splendid business qualities, a man who has succeeded in managing his own finances, a man who is thoroughly acquainted with the streets where this new line is to be located, and he says that in his opinion if these streets belonged to private citizens and



these roads had to buy the franchises they would cost eight or ten million dollars.

Mr. President, I am willing, if it becomes necessary, to allow them to go through the streets, provided they do not injure the streets. But what do we do by this legislation? As business Senators let us look at it and see what we do. We give to them in perpetuity the streets on which they are to locate their lines, without a dollar's expense to them. We give to one corporation \$1,500,000 to help it build this depot. We give to another corporation \$1,500,000, an absolute gratuity, and then we give \$1,670,000 additional to help them do this work.

When this bill is thoroughly analyzed it can not stand the test of analysis, and I tell you, Mr. President, when we say that we will give these railroads the right of way, when we give them the streets which a business man in this city says are worth \$10,000,000, when we give them \$3,000,000 in cash, when we give them \$1,670,000 more to help them do this work, it can not, in my opinion, be justified under any circumstances.

I exceedingly regret that I have felt it to be my duty to oppose the measure. Mr. President, it looks to me as if those Senators who are always so faithful and efficient in the discharge of their duties in all probability have been pressed with other matters, as we frequently are pressed, and have not gone to the bottom of this legislation. It strikes me the best course to pursue is to refer it back to the Committee on the District of Columbia, in order that a more thorough investigation may be had, and let us see, Mr. President, if we can not avoid part of the expenses that are to be incurred and locate this tunnel, if we are going to locate it, somewhere else.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President—

Mr. BAILEY. Will the Senator from New Hampshire permit me to ask him a question right there?

Mr. GALLINGER. Certainly.

Mr. BAILEY. I wish to know why it has been deemed necessary to ask for new legislation on this subject when, it seems to me, the whole matter was gone over and disposed of in the last Congress?

Mr. GALLINGER. I will answer that. The last Congress gave the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad the privilege of building a station at the junction of Delaware avenue and C street, moving their station east two blocks. It gave the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad the privilege of building a new station on the site they now occupy. The chairman of the Committee on the District of Columbia and the gentlemen who have in charge the park system of the District—three of the most distinguished architects in the country—thought it would be a good plan to have a union station in the city of Washington instead of having these two stations separately as they are now. They put their wits to work, and after numerous interviews with the railroad officials they succeeded in reaching an agreement whereby one station should be built instead of two. That, of course, necessitates new legislation.

I trust I have answered the Senator's question.

Now, Mr. President, it is not very flattering to the Committee on the District of Columbia, which has had this matter in charge for a good many years, to be told by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. CLAY] that he took a stroll down over the part of Washington known as "Swampoodle," probably last Sunday, and that he knows more about this matter than the Committee on the District of Columbia and the engineers of the District and the Board of Commissioners of the District. It may be he does, but my judgment is that he knows very much less about it. The Senator from Georgia says it will cost \$10,000,000, in his judgment, as damages to property.

Mr. CLAY. Mr. President, I did not say any such thing. I do not want to contradict the Senator, but—

Mr. GALLINGER. I should be very glad to have the Senator state what he did say.

Mr. CLAY. I said a prominent business man of the city of Washington, who is thoroughly familiar with the streets, said to me that, in his opinion, if the streets that are to be occupied by the new line belonged to private citizens and the railroads had to buy them, the franchises would cost \$10,000,000.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, the absurdity of that is contained in the statement. That entire section of the District is not worth \$10,000,000, and it is idle to say that the streets that are given up to these railroad corporations to put a building on them is a gift of \$10,000,000. Every man who has given this matter a moment's thought or investigation knows that that statement is so wide of the mark that there is no reason why it should be discussed for a single moment.

The Senator from Georgia says he understands—I do not know who told him; perhaps this intelligent citizen—that the pending bill was considered only thirty minutes in the Committee on the District of Columbia. Why, Mr. President, this question of the

elimination of grade crossings and the construction of terminals in the District of Columbia has been under consideration for ten years, not thirty minutes. This matter has been gone over and over again in that committee, especially by the chairman of the committee, and it has had the most careful and conscientious consideration.

In the Fifty-sixth Congress, when the laws were passed that are now on the statute book giving these railroad companies the right to construct new stations, which they say they prefer to the proposed legislation, it was considered for weeks and, I think, for months in that committee. The bill which is now before the Senate was introduced two months ago or more, and has been advertised to every citizen of the District, to every member of both branches of Congress. It has had the most careful consideration of the subcommittee of the Committee on the District of Columbia. It was presented at several meetings of the full committee, whether Senators were present or not, and was gone over section by section, and line by line, and word by word. If Senators who are on the committee or off the committee do not understand or did not then understand the provisions of the bill, it certainly is not the fault of the chairman of the committee or of the committee itself.

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. President, I should like to ask, in the line of the other question, if it will not interrupt the Senator from New Hampshire—

Mr. GALLINGER. I yield with pleasure.

Mr. BAILEY. Is it not true that since the other law was passed the railroads interested have come into a closer community of interest and that there is no necessity for the same railroad having two depots?

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, I will answer the Senator very promptly and tell him all I know about it. It has been said over and over again that the Pennsylvania Railroad controls the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

Mr. BAILEY. I do not go that far; but that it is largely interested in the directory I take it to be a matter of public knowledge.

Mr. GALLINGER. Four out of 12 members of the board are Pennsylvania Railroad men.

Mr. BAILEY. Four out of 12 are Pennsylvania Railroad men, but the ownership of the stock very largely controls the directory, although the directory might have been originally selected in another interest.

Mr. GALLINGER. Certainly.

Mr. BAILEY. I will state what my suggestion is simply intended to cover. We agree to give each road a million and a half to build its own depot. Now, I think the union depot is desirable myself. I hardly believe in bringing it in under the ground. I incline to the light myself, and would prefer to take the less attractive appearance of an elevated road. Leaving that as it may be, it is perfectly plain that these two railroads are now if not identical in interest, yet so largely so that they ought to have only one depot, and I think they might be permitted to take one of the two sites Congress provided for, with the \$3,000,000 that were appropriated to both and execute the improvement under the old law with a slight amendment authorizing that, and save us these new and perplexing questions.

Mr. GALLINGER. First, as to the community of interest as between these two roads, I will say to the Senator that all I know is what Mr. Green, vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and Mr. Loree, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, stated before the committee. Both those gentlemen stated that the Pennsylvania Railroad, neither in the matter of ownership of stock nor in the matter of directors, controlled the Baltimore and Ohio road. That is all I know about it. That there is a closer interest than existed two years ago I think is beyond question, but how far that goes I am unable to say, and I am bound to believe what these gentlemen stated to the committee.

Mr. WELLINGTON. May I interrupt the Senator?

Mr. GALLINGER. Certainly.

Mr. WELLINGTON. I think one thing is evident, however, that they may have forgotten to state. Mr. Loree is one of the vice-presidents of the Pennsylvania Railroad and has been made the president of the Baltimore and Ohio road. Is not that true?

Mr. GALLINGER. I did not know it, but I presume it is. If the Senator states it, it is true.

Mr. WELLINGTON. That is the case.

Mr. GALLINGER. That, of course, simply shows that a gentleman connected with the Pennsylvania road is a director in the Baltimore and Ohio, or vice versa.

Mr. TELLER. Mr. President, I would like to ask the Senator from New Hampshire, the object being to get rid of the grade crossings, as I understand it, how many street crossings do we get rid of by this proposition?

Mr. GALLINGER. We get rid of every grade crossing there

is in the District that these roads traverse. The number I can not state.

Mr. TELLER. How do we get rid of them?

Mr. GALLINGER. By elevating the tracks.

Mr. TELLER. By elevating the railroad tracks?

Mr. GALLINGER. Certainly.

Mr. TELLER. Or by elevating the streets?

Mr. GALLINGER. The railroad tracks.

Mr. TELLER. It is a part of the plan certainly to elevate the streets, according to my information.

Mr. GALLINGER. On the Baltimore and Ohio road there are a few instances of that kind, but we get rid of every grade crossing in the District of Columbia under the provisions of this bill.

Mr. TELLER. Under one or the other?

Mr. GALLINGER. Under one plan or the other.

Now, Mr. President, the Senator from Texas suggests we might have taken one of these sites. We certainly would not take the site on the Mall, because that is one of the chief things we have in view in this legislation—to get rid of a railroad station on the Mall. As I understand the matter, the location at the junction of Delaware avenue and C street was not as desirable a location as the one that has been selected. I will not go into particulars about that, but that was the judgment of the District Commissioners and of the railroad companies themselves.

I am bound to believe after the very careful investigation that has been made of this matter both by the District Commissioners, who are very wise men, by engineers representing the Government, and by engineers representing the railroad corporations, the proposed location is, all things considered, the best location that could have been found in the District.

Mr. President, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. CLAY] has made a very strong appeal—and we all know the kindness of his heart—in behalf of the poor people located in the vicinity of this proposed railroad station. Their interests are going to be wiped out and the property confiscated according to the statement of the Senator from Georgia. A very distinguished gentleman, formerly a member of this body, appeared before our committee, representing those people, and said they were perfectly satisfied with the matter as it was arranged. He was their attorney. I will not mention his name unless I am asked to do so, but he is a very distinguished gentleman who occupied at one time a seat on the other side of this Chamber. As a representative of those people he stated to the committee that the matter was satisfactory so far as they were concerned.

The Northeast Washington Citizens' Association, a business association having interests in that section of the city, only the other evening voted in favor of this bill, as they had done once or twice before.

I can not believe under those circumstances that this outrage, if Senators wish to call it such, is going to be perpetrated upon the people of that section of the city or that any substantial harm is going to come to them. There will be some inconveniences, of course. There never was a grade changed in a city that did not inconvenience somebody. There never was a great structure placed where human habitation is that did not inconvenience somebody and, very likely, damage somebody. I take it there will be some inconvenience and damage connected with this matter; but it is a well-known axiom that the individual interests to some extent must give way when a great public improvement is projected.

The committee certainly have sought to minimize that in every conceivable way and protect those people as far as they can be protected; and I feel sure that the measure is guarded as well as it will be guarded if this bill should be sent back to the committee and the committee is compelled to consider it again and report it, probably in substantially the same form.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. Will the Senator allow me to interrupt him?

Mr. GALLINGER. Certainly.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. I desire to call the attention of the Senator to the fact that the Georgetown Citizens' Association met recently and voted almost unanimously, as I understand, against this measure, and that the East Washington Citizens' Association meeting, to which the Senator has referred, was attended by seven members of that association.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, I recall another bit of history. A few years ago the Georgetown people wanted a railroad to come into Georgetown and have a station there. I voted for it and the Senator from North Dakota voted against it, for some reason or other; I do not know what it was. It is a further fact, Mr. President, that the people of Georgetown are against this proposition because they now say that they ought to have a station in Georgetown.

Mr. BEVERIDGE. Will the Senator permit me—

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator yield to the Senator from Indiana?

Mr. GALLINGER. Certainly.

Mr. BEVERIDGE. I wish to ask the Senator a question suggested by the honorable Senator from Georgia [Mr. CLAY] who made the statement that perhaps the committee was going somewhat blindly in the rush of other affairs. How long has the committee been at work upon this general proposition?

Mr. GALLINGER. Upon the general proposition of eliminating grade crossings, I will say ever since I have been a member of the Senate; certainly seven or eight years, and certainly two or three years in reference to the construction of new terminals, new stations in the city.

Now, Mr. President, one other point was made—that these damages and expenses, etc., have not been presented here to the Senate. We might have had blue prints here or we might have had pictures here, or we might have had figures that we could have stretched over the place occupied by the Presiding Officer. It was not thought necessary. It has all been figured out by the District Commissioners. It is a matter of record and it is perfectly well understood that this measure has been calculated as closely and as accurately as it is possible for men to do it. Of course with a margin on one side or the other.

Mr. BERRY. Will the Senator permit me to interrupt him?

Mr. GALLINGER. Certainly.

Mr. BERRY. Will the Senator tell the Senate what is the estimate of the cost of removing the grade crossings?

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, I am not going into a statement as to the exact cost of every item entering into a project that is to cost \$14,000,000.

Mr. BERRY. That is a very important feature, Mr. President. The Senator said there had been accurate estimates made, and I would like to have him state, because I really do not know, what is the estimate of cost to eliminate the grade crossings.

Mr. GALLINGER. It was considered by the committee a year and a half ago that a proper proportion on the part of the District and of the Government for the elimination of grade crossings would be \$3,000,000.

Mr. BERRY. That is not the question I asked the Senator. Of course, he can decline to answer if he desires. I want him to state what the estimate was of the cost of removing grade crossings.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, I will answer it by saying I do not know.

Mr. BERRY. Very well.

Mr. GALLINGER. That answers it.

Mr. President, so far as the streets about the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad are concerned, the Government and the District will come in possession of certain property there and the new structure will occupy certain other property. I have every reason to believe that it is to be a fair exchange, and that no harm will come to either the Government or the District.

The Senator from Georgia is very much troubled about the tunnel. The Senator from Montana [Mr. CLARK], who is perhaps not a skilled engineer, but a gentleman who has had great experience in making tunnels, I take it, was very much troubled on that point. We all sympathize with his views, but as I recall the matter when the hearing was had before the Committee on the District of Columbia—I had not the pleasure of being present—the engineers gave it as their opinion that there was no trouble whatever to be apprehended in that regard. But to make assurance doubly sure they have moved the tunnel some considerable distance farther from the Library building than it was at first contemplated. I believe I am right. I will ask the Senator from Montana if that is correct.

Mr. CLARK of Montana. That is correct.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, I think we can rely upon the engineers of the Government and the District of Columbia and the skilled engineers of these railroad corporations when they say that there is no danger to be apprehended from this tunnel so far as the Library building is concerned. I presumed that we can. It is a fact that we can do very little in this world that we are absolutely sure of; there is always an element of uncertainty and doubt and of danger, and there may be a small element of uncertainty as regards this matter; but it certainly is minimized from the circumstance that these distinguished engineers say that it is absolutely safe, in their opinion. So I have no fears on that point.

It was stated here yesterday by the Senator from North Dakota, with his usual accuracy, that this tunnel would be 50 feet from the Library building, when, as a matter of fact, it will be 175 feet.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. I remember distinctly—whether the Senator was present or not I do not know—when Bernard Green, the Superintendent of the Library building, was before the committee—I think the Senator was not present that day—

Mr. GALLINGER. I was not.



Mr. HANSBROUGH. I asked him distinctly the question as to where the tunnel would go with respect to the Library building, and his answer was that it would be about 50 feet from the front steps or the west steps of that building. Now, if the committee have discovered their mistake, and the engineers also, and have made a change, I am very glad of it.

Mr. GALLINGER. The trouble is that the Senator does not keep up with the procession.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. I think the Senator did not begin with the procession. That is the trouble with the Senator from New Hampshire. I was stating the matter positively here, and the Senator brought into question my reputation for integrity or truth.

Mr. GALLINGER. Oh, not at all; it was a mistake. It was an inaccuracy.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. He charged that it was an inaccuracy of statement.

Mr. GALLINGER. It was simply an inaccuracy; that was all.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. I wish simply to repeat—if the Senator knows to the contrary of course he should state it. Mr. Bernard Green made that statement before the committee. It was quite a full meeting. Other members who are here were at that meeting and will bear me out, I think, that that is the statement he made. That is my usual accuracy.

Mr. GALLINGER. The simple fact is, the Senator stated without qualification that it was to be 50 feet from the Library building.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. It has been changed since then. I was not aware of that fact until the Senator stated here that it had been changed. I say again if the engineers and the Senator have discovered their mistake and have changed the route of the tunnel I am very glad of it.

Mr. GALLINGER. Before any change was made it was 150 feet from the Library building.

Now, Mr. President, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. CLAY] has stated that we are granting these roads in perpetuity great privileges. They have those privileges now. I believe I have said that once or twice before. The only difference that we propose to make is to take them from public ground and put them on ground that will be owned by themselves. That is all. They have these rights.

Senators say that we can repeal the law and oust them; but we are not going to do it. Everybody knows that. We have not granted them any additional right nor have we taken from them any rights which they now have. They have trackage rights into two stations at the present time. They will have trackage rights into one station if this bill becomes a law. We will clear the Mall from the disagreeable condition of things which exists there, and it is very desirable that that should be done, and we will get rid of the old ramshackle Baltimore and Ohio Railroad station in the immediate vicinity of the Capitol.

Mr. President, it may be that some mistakes have been made; it may be that the best place has not been selected for this railroad station; but I submit that this matter has had the most careful and conscientious consideration by a committee of this Congress, aided by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, and aided by the distinguished architects who have in charge the park system of the District of Columbia, who have given their time gratuitously to help us solve this problem. I submit that that being the fact, it is hardly competent for a Senator who is not on the committee and who has not given the matter any consideration to say that we have made such egregious blunders that the bill ought to be rejected or sent back to the committee for further consideration.

The fill that the Senator from Montana speaks of is, perhaps, an unfortunate condition, but it is to be lessened one-half, as I am credibly informed, and it will be so managed by skilled engineers that no substantial harm will come to anybody as a result of it.

Now, Mr. President, I know that Senators who are opposed to this bill are more anxious to talk about it than I am, because I certainly have said all that I care to say about it, and I yield the floor.

Mr. CLAY. Mr. President, the Senator from New Hampshire I think somewhat unjustly criticises me in regard to the position I took. I made no reflection whatever upon the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Mr. GALLINGER. If the Senator will permit me, he said the committee had consideration of the bill thirty minutes. Is not that a reflection? Can it be possible that the committee—

Mr. CLAY. I meant by that the information I had when the bill was voted on. The day it was voted on it was taken up at 2 o'clock, and voted on at 2 o'clock and 30 minutes.

Mr. GALLINGER. Undoubtedly that may be true.

Mr. CLAY. That was the day it was discussed in the committee room. I made no reflection whatever upon the committee. I simply said in all probability the committee, being busy, as we are frequently busy during this part of the session, did not have that time to consider it maturely.

Now, the Senator criticised me because I saw fit and proper to go over the ground where this line is to be located. Mr. President, if I deserve censure and criticism simply because I went and examined the ground that I might understand the true situation, then I am willing to accept the criticism. I believe, that in all probability, if my friend from New Hampshire will go and examine the ground critically from beginning to the end, and he has probably done it, I am sure he will get much valuable information in regard to the location of this line. He will find where these fills are to be located, and he will find instead of there being \$600,000 damages that will accrue to property in all probability six or seven times that amount will accrue.

Mr. GALLINGER. Will the Senator permit me?

Mr. CLAY. With pleasure.

Mr. GALLINGER. I will say to the Senator I have been over this ground more than once, and, furthermore, these fills that are complained of are to be made at the request and almost at the dictation of the Engineer Commissioner of the District of Columbia and his associates for the purpose of accommodating the grade of certain streets.

Mr. CLAY. Then, Mr. President, I am in all probability relieved of the criticism that I went there to examine this ground, since I find that my friend the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire has done likewise. I hardly thought that I ought to be censured because I endeavored to obtain the necessary information to properly guide me in casting my vote on this bill.

In the remarks that I made I was governed simply by a desire to discharge my duty. I had no desire to make any reflection upon any member of that committee. I have nothing but the kindest feelings toward the chairman and the distinguished Senator who has just spoken.

But, Mr. President, it struck me that a measure involving so much money and involving so many streets and damaging so much property ought to be considered even for weeks. I believe that this bill ought to be debated here for ten or fifteen days. Of course we can not do it unless it is recommended to the committee. I believe Senators ought to go and examine these grounds and see where this new line is to be located.

I understand it is said the railroad companies do not want this location. I do not know how true that is. I have no criticisms to make upon the railroads; I make none now; but it is strange to me, Mr. President, that these two roads will not accept at the hands of Congress five or six or seven or eight streets through the very heart of the city without paying a single dollar and accept at the same time \$3,000,000 from Congress and \$1,670,000 more to aid them in doing this work. Then the officers and stockholders of these roads have ceased to consider the interest of these corporations.

Mr. TELLER. Mr. President, the purpose of this bill seems to be twofold: First, to get rid of the crossings of the railroads across the streets; secondly, to build a very fine station beyond the necessities of the railroads for some particular purpose, I suppose to beautify the city.

The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. GALLINGER] tells us he does not know, as a member of the committee, what it will cost to get rid of these street crossings, and yet he very promptly tells us that the people who are making these estimates consider \$3,000,000 the proper part for the United States to pay. We do not know whether that is a half, a quarter, or two-thirds. It seems to me we ought to know something about that. It is one of the items that is of sufficient importance, I think, to have attracted the attention of the committee, so that we might have at least a statement of it here.

We do not know very much about this matter here. Of course nobody can tell about it by the reading of the bill. In some of these streets the railroad is to go over the street, and some of the streets are to go over the railroads. I find that quite a number of streets are to be bridged. When the street is continued the railroad company is to put up bridges.

No streets or avenues, except Ninth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth streets and New York avenue, shall be opened across the railroads constructed under authority of this act between Florida and Montana avenues and said Ninth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth streets when and as opened, shall be carried above the railroads by suitable viaduct bridges, the cost whereof with their approaches within the limits of the right of way shall be paid by the terminal company—

That is a company, I understand, within a company, representing the railroads—

but shall be maintained as in the case of other public highways in the District of Columbia.

Now, I should like to have somebody tell me what kind of bridges they are going to put up. It seems to me that we ought to know whether they are to put up wooden bridges or iron bridges or stone bridges. It may be that the Senator from New Hampshire knows what the plan is; I do not, and I can not find it out from this bill.

Mr. GALLINGER. I should like to ask the Senator in all seriousness what kind of bridges he thinks these great railroad corporations would build.

Mr. TELLER. I do not know anything about it. I know what they put out here as they come in on the Mall. It is a little, unsightly, disgraceful sort of a bridge that has been there now for a number of years, obstructing what was supposed to be one of the most beautiful parks in the city. I have not the slightest reason to suppose they will do any better than that with these street crossings.

Mr. GALLINGER. I have traveled a good deal over the great railroads of the country and I find that the construction of their bridges is usually of the best quality. I do not think there is any danger that there will be any disgraceful bridges built here. I will say, furthermore, that all this construction is to be satisfactory to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia.

Mr. TELLER. It ought to be satisfactory to Congress. We ought to know something about it as well as the Commissioners.

Mr. GALLINGER. If we waited until it was satisfactory to every member of this body we certainly would never have any construction.

Mr. TELLER. Of course, I am not going to criticize the committee, because I do not understand that to be exactly in order; but a reasonable bill would have contained some things, it seems to me, that would be positive as to what the character of these bridges is to be. I do not know whether the committee expended in time over it thirty minutes or thirty days. I do not know anything about it. I know it is not in the bill. I do not know where to find it. If I go down and ask the Commissioners what kind of a bridge it is proposed to build I suppose they would tell me they did not know, and they would have to consult the railroad company about it. Under the provision of the bill they will build such a bridge as they choose, and if we do not like it we can build another.

A large number of these streets are to go over the railroads and necessarily will have to be elevated. Here is a large fill. I do not remember, but I think the Senator said last night that there was about \$1,700,000 to be paid by the District. I have seen the estimate made very much larger, but nobody now knows what the damage is going to be, of which the city is to pay one-half. That may amount to several million dollars. At every grade crossing where there is a bridge over the road the abutting lot owners will have a case of damage against the city. All along this fill, which I am told is to be a couple of thousand of feet long, or something like that, and whether it is 18 or 30 feet it will not make any difference, there will be a demand for damages against the District, and rightfully, too.

The District is to pay one-half of this expense. Now, suppose I should say that expense would be \$10,000,000. I do not know whether it will be that amount or not. The Senator says the whole district over there is not worth \$10,000,000. I think he will find out if he appraises it that it is worth a good deal, especially when you come to take men's homes and practically destroy them, for nobody wants to live under an embankment. Even if it is not more than 18 feet high, which the Senator seems to think is a very small affair, you will certainly find that \$1,670,000 will not pay the damages.

Mr. GALLINGER. Will the Senator permit me?

Mr. TELLER. I understand the damages are not included in the \$1,670,000.

Mr. GALLINGER. Yes; the damages are included in the \$1,670,000. I will say to the Senator that Mr. Richards, who is connected with the Engineer Department, who has had charge of the opening of the streets of the District of Columbia, who is a very accomplished gentleman and whose estimates heretofore have come out as accurately as could possibly be expected of any human agency, has estimated these damages, and they are based upon his estimate.

Mr. TELLER. The whole amount the Senator thinks will be \$1,670,000. Nobody knows what it will be. I will venture to predict now that, if this bill passes and becomes a law, you will find that it will be a great deal more than \$1,670,000.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. Will the Senator from Colorado yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DUBOIS in the chair). Does the Senator from Colorado yield to the Senator from North Dakota?

Mr. TELLER. I yield to the Senator.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. I hold in my hand a statement published in a local paper giving a report from the District Commis-

sioners on House bill 14148, which was a bill providing "for the appointment of a railroad commission in and for Washington, and for other purposes." The report of the District Commissioners is as follows:

The bill specifies—

Says the report—

the route which the proposed railroad terminals shall follow and fixes the location of a proposed union railroad depot. As the selection of routes within the city is a matter which demands great study and careful consideration, the Commissioners do not consider it desirable that the routes be specified until time is had to make a study of the situation and estimates of cost.

That would indicate that the Commissioners of the District of Columbia were somewhat in the dark in regard to this matter. I do not want to criticize these gentlemen, because I might incur the displeasure of the Senator from New Hampshire if I did. I will simply offer this for what it is worth.

Mr. GALLINGER. Will the Senator from Colorado permit me?

Mr. TELLER. I yield to the Senator.

Mr. GALLINGER. This is a report on the Senator's municipal-ownership bill.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. No, not at all. It is a report on a House bill. I do not know the provision of that bill beyond the fact that it provided for a railroad commission, and I think there ought to be some railroad commission to understand these questions.

Mr. GALLINGER. That may be. The Commissioners, in other words, did not select that site. In this case a site has been selected at the suggestion largely of the Commissioners, and a site which the Star, the newspaper from which the Senator has read, has been for twenty years saying was the best site for a railroad station in the District of Columbia.

Mr. TELLER. I do not know anything about the site of the station.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. I read from the Times.

Mr. TELLER. I agree with the Senator from New Hampshire that it is desirable to have one station if you can, and I am not averse to having a very handsome station, with a fine plaza in front of it. I have in my Senatorial experience here voted for everything that I thought would beautify this city. But, Mr. President, if we are going into the beautification of the city, which I am not objecting to, I do object to one thing. I object that the District of Columbia is to pay one-half of it. Whenever we go a step beyond what is proper and necessary for ordinary business and a decent observance of the architectural taste of the country, that minute the United States should pay the whole of it.

I object, also, Mr. President, to calling upon these railroad companies for a single dollar of contribution more than is justly their part. The Senator told us last night that these railroad companies are to put in several million dollars that would not benefit them at all. If that is so, it is simply legislative robbery upon our part to take it out of them. They yield simply because they are compelled to yield. The railroad companies do not pay it; it is paid by the stockholders, citizens of the United States. If there is to be a beautiful depot here, let all the people of the United States pay it out of the general taxes that we collect, and not the owners of stock in a railroad and not the people who live in the vicinity of it.

I am quite willing that the United States should pay all that is necessary to get a fine depot. As I said before, if we require these railroad companies to put up anything more than a respectable depot, then that minute it is our duty to pay the extra expense, and not theirs. If we are giving to the railroads anything more than is necessary, then we are doing what we have not any right to do with the public funds. No one knows right now, not even the Senator from New Hampshire, what an equitable thing would be with reference to our share of this money, because he does not know what it will cost to give us the street crossings as we want to have them.

Until he knows that we can not know what we ought to pay. Practically nobody knows about it here except that we are putting into the bill what apparently on the face of it looks as if we were making a great donation to the railroad companies, and the public will believe that we do make a donation. We ought not to do it, and if we are not doing it it is unjust to the railroad companies not only to make them put in money when they ought not to pay it, but to give them a reputation that they are making a demand here which they ought not to make and which the public will think they have made.

Mr. President, I do not want to reflect on the committee, as I said, but I believe this bill would put us in a good deal better shape if it went back to the committee, and if they would take it up and determine a few things. I do not think it is any disrespect to the committee to recommit a bill. It is done frequently. I am not willing myself to support the bill in the shape it is in,



yet I should like to accomplish the very purpose of this bill—that is, to get a union depot here and to get rid of these crossings; not to ask the railroad companies to do anything more than their part, but to require that they shall do just what their part is.

If there is to be any generosity at all I want to take it out of the funds of the United States Treasury and not out of the District of Columbia. We have got a lot of citizens here who have no voice whatever in this matter who are not consulted about it and have nothing to say. Of course, while it may beautify the city, it will add nothing to the small holding of some man who has a little home here. Possibly to the business men it may be of some advantage, but I do not see very well how that can be the case. I think the bill ought to be recommitted.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. I simply desire to make a suggestion to the Senator from Colorado, and that is, I am not so sure that the railroad company will be obliged to construct a union station even if we pass this bill.

Mr. GALLINGER. Then no harm will come.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. And we should then be left in the same situation we are now.

Mr. TELLER. Neither am I certain that they would erect a union station; but I presume they would. They would not like to stand out against an act of Congress, and probably they would do it, even if they did not wish to do it. As some seem to think they are to have a large bonus, I suppose they would not like to lose that.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. If the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. GALLINGER] was correct in his statement yesterday the railroad company is to spend \$10,000,000. They might conclude not to spend it. I want to read right here the first section of this bill, and I shall take the time of the Senator no further. This bill does not reenact the law of 1901. It is a bill "to provide for a union railroad station in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes." The first section provides:

That the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company, or the terminal company provided for in section 10 of the act of Congress approved February 12, 1901, entitled "An act to provide for eliminating certain grade crossings of railroads in the District of Columbia, to require and authorize the construction of new terminals and tracks for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company in the city of Washington, and for other purposes," be, and each of them is hereby, empowered and authorized to locate, construct, etc.

It does not direct them to build, but it empowers and authorizes them. So they may not do it. They may not conclude to do it even after we pass the bill.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, yesterday the Senator from North Dakota was troubled lest this thing should be done, and now he is troubled lest it shall not be done. "Consistency, thou art a jewel."

Mr. HANSBROUGH. Oh, no; that is not the point at all. The Senator is very restive when anyone undertakes to disagree with him. I regret exceedingly that the Senator in the last few days has insisted upon lecturing me because I have had the temerity to come in here and oppose this proposition. It is not in very good temper and not in very good taste.

Mr. GALLINGER. That may be, and I accept the rebuke with due humility, but I will say that a Senator who, after months and years of negotiation and an agreement on all hands between the District of Columbia and the railroad corporations that a union station shall be built, comes in at the last hour of the debate and says he is not sure it will be built is exploiting an avenue into which I do not wish to follow him.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. I will ask the Senator if he is sure that this railroad company will build this station?

Mr. GALLINGER. As sure as I am that the Senator is quibbling upon the subject.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. But there is nothing in the bill which compels them to do it.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President, I can only repeat what I have said—yes; I am sure.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, I had not intended to say anything on this bill, and am not as well informed about the details of the bill as I ought to be in undertaking to address the Senate. The laboring oar has largely been taken in the preparation of this bill by the chairman of the Committee on the District of Columbia [Mr. McMILLAN], who is unavoidably absent, for reasons understood by all of us.

The problem which has confronted the committee, and which has confronted Congress for some time, has been to get the railroads from the Mall. Its presence there has been objectionable from many standpoints in the improvement and beautification of the city.

Another problem has been to get rid of grade crossings in the city of Washington. These problems were taken up at the last session of Congress, and two bills were passed for the purpose of getting rid of the grade crossings. But the problem of getting the Pennsylvania depot removed from the Mall proved insur-

mountable at that time. If there has been any mistake made in this matter, it was made at the last session of Congress, when very large obligations were incurred for the purpose of getting rid of the grade crossings.

As I understand—and I confess that I gave the subject attention as it was in progress before the committee, and I gave much more than thirty minutes to it, and I think every member of the committee gave much more than thirty minutes to it, notwithstanding the statement made by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. CLAY].

Mr. HEITFELD. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Virginia yield to the Senator from Idaho?

Mr. MARTIN. I do.

Mr. HEITFELD. In justice to the Senator from Georgia [Mr. CLAY], I desire to say that there was but one meeting called upon the bill, and that was called after an effort had been made to report it without a meeting of the committee, and when I objected a meeting was called in the afternoon, during the session of the Senate, and within thirty minutes the bill was reported. I at the time reserved the right to oppose it if I should see fit to do so, and two or three other Senators, as I understand, did the same. Thirty minutes is all the time the committee ever gave to the bill.

Mr. CLAY. Mr. President, with the permission of the Senator from Virginia, the information I had came from such a source that I could not question it, and I am sure that all the members of the committee did not give more than thirty minutes to the consideration of the bill. Some of them may have given more than thirty minutes to its consideration, but surely I do not think all of them did.

Mr. MARTIN. Those members of the committee who did not give more than thirty minutes to the consideration of the bill neglected their duties.

Mr. HEITFELD. I desire to say that I attended every meeting of the committee of which I received notice, and if there were any meetings held of which I had no notice it was not my fault that I was not present.

Mr. MARTIN. It is impossible that my memory can be at fault when I say that this bill was considered at many meetings of the committee—not at one meeting, but at many meetings.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Virginia yield to the Senator from Nevada?

Mr. MARTIN. I yield.

Mr. STEWART. I am certain that I have attended many meetings of the committee when this bill was discussed. The chairman of the committee, the Senator from Michigan [Mr. McMILLAN] reported to the committee from time to time the progress he was making with the negotiations, and I suppose at least a half dozen times we had this up in committee, when he reported progress and called upon the committee to look into the subject. Every member of the committee has had an opportunity to do so, and the Senator from Michigan, who has charge of the matter, was very anxious that every member of the committee should have a full understanding of the case.

As a general proposition, I repeat, that if this is to be one of the great capitals of the world, we ought to have a respectable depot that strangers first see on coming to the city, a depot in harmony with the surroundings of the Capitol. These considerations weigh heavily with me.

I believe the best arrangements have been made by the chairman of the committee that could be made. I do not believe that anybody is a better business man than he or could have accomplished more. I regret that he is not here. This has been his especial work. At all times, when called upon as to how the negotiations were proceeding, he has been frank to tell what proceedings had been taken, and he has been carefully consulting from time to time the District Commissioners. Every question that arises is sent to the Commissioners, reported upon by them, and especially by the Engineer Commissioner, and we have had the surveyors' reports coming in from time to time and considered at different times during the whole of this session. So I do not think it is just to the chairman of the committee to suggest that this bill has not had ample consideration.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, I have been present at a number of the meetings, and I am sure I do not exaggerate when I say this bill has been considered at a half dozen meetings of the committee at which I have been present.

Mr. HEITFELD. I suggest that the Senator is probably thinking of the subcommittee. I will say that it is possible, and I believe it is true, that the subcommittee did meet time and again. I do not know who are the members of this subcommittee, but I heard there was a subcommittee in charge of the subject. So far, however, as a meeting of the full committee was concerned, there was

one afternoon a meeting of the committee to listen to a discussion of one of the engineers in regard to the tunnel. This was done because the Senator from Montana [Mr. CLARK] had some apprehension regarding the location of the tunnel, but no discussion of the bill was had that afternoon. The only discussion of the bill was in the afternoon to which I refer, when it was reported.

I am not making this statement because I desire to criticize anybody. If we who are members of the committee had not wanted the bill reported, we could have opposed it in the committee; but I am only saying what I do in justice to the Senator from Georgia and others who have made statements to that effect.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, I am not mistaken, I am sure, in the statement that I have been present at many meetings of this committee—not of the subcommittee, but of the full committee—at which this bill has been considered.

I will say furthermore, Mr. President, that it was unfortunate that members of the committee who felt that this bill was so unwise and so objectionable should not have given the committee the benefit of their views before we reported the bill here. With the exception of the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. HANSBROUGH], I do not recall any antagonism in the committee against a favorable report of this bill.

Mr. HEITFELD. If the Senator will allow me, I should like to know how there could be much antagonism in a short session of thirty minutes?

Mr. HANSBROUGH. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Virginia yield to the Senator from North Dakota?

Mr. MARTIN. I will yield for a question.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. I did not quite catch the remark of the Senator from Virginia. I was at the time engaged in a conversation with the Senator from Montana [Mr. CLARK]. Will he be kind enough to repeat the statement he made regarding me?

Mr. MARTIN. I said that the Senator from North Dakota vigorously opposed the bill, but that I did not recall that any other member of the committee had done so. That is what I said.

Mr. GALLINGER. And no member of the committee asked that the bill should be laid over.

Mr. MARTIN. No delay was asked and no time was asked for the further consideration of the bill, but the bill was reported with the understanding, of course, not that any Senator was bound to support it or obliged to support it who did not wish to do so. Members of the committee, as well as other members of the Senate, are in duty bound to oppose a bill if they do not approve of it and do not believe it is a wise and just measure.

I am not complaining of the opposition of any Senator to the bill, but I do say that I think it is unfortunate that those Senators who believed the bill to be unwise and unjust did not give their fellow-members of the committee the benefit of their views on that line, in order that we might give due consideration to those views and act upon them so far as they appeared to be meritorious.

Mr. President, I undertake to say that the bill has had every opportunity for consideration and has had the careful consideration of such members of the committee as saw fit to give attention to a matter which had been pending before the committee for months, and the District Commissioners—

Mr. WELLINGTON. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Virginia yield to the Senator from Maryland?

Mr. MARTIN. Certainly.

Mr. WELLINGTON. I think the Senator is possibly stating the case too strongly. He is getting two committees mixed. There was a subcommittee that had this matter in charge, and it gave it very careful attention, but the whole committee was not even consulted as to the bill itself or any of its provisions.

Mr. MARTIN. I have not said that the bill was elaborately discussed in the committee; but if it was not, it was because the members of the committee did not see fit to do so, but the bill was before the committee for consideration.

Mr. CLAY. With the Senator's permission, I desire to ask him a question.

Mr. MARTIN. I yield to the Senator.

Mr. CLAY. I understood the Senator to say a while ago that this bill was considered in the Committee on the District of Columbia for months and months. I understand this bill was introduced in the Senate on March 31, 1902.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, perhaps "months and months" may have been stating it a little too strongly, but the bill had been under consideration for a long time.

Mr. STEWART. The subject had been under consideration.

Mr. MARTIN. I will come to that. I know this matter has been before the committee in a number of shapes, that there have been a number of bills there, and from the very commencement

of this Congress it has been more or less attracting the attention of the District Committee.

Mr. CLAY. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Virginia yield to the Senator from Georgia?

Mr. MARTIN. I do.

Mr. CLAY. With the Senator's permission, I will state that this bill was introduced March 31, 1902, I believe, was reported to the Senate April 3, 1902, and on April 18, 1902, was ordered to be reprinted with additional reported amendments.

Mr. GALLINGER. Now, Mr. President, if the Senator from Virginia will permit me—

Mr. MARTIN. I will.

Mr. GALLINGER. The Senator from Virginia perhaps has forgotten that a bill was introduced long before March 31. The Commissioners of the District of Columbia recommended certain amendments, which were incorporated by the committee, and a new bill was then introduced, which is the bill to which the Senator from Georgia has reference; but the subject was before the committee in the shape of a bill long before the time he has stated.

Mr. MARTIN. I am familiar with the fact stated by the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. GALLINGER], and I repeat that this subject has been having the attention of the District Committee almost from the very commencement of this session of Congress. The measure as reported may be an unwise one, it may be that it ought to be defeated. If Senators think that way, they have only to register their votes that way and defeat it; but the bill has had ample consideration in the District Committee by those members of the committee who saw fit to give attention to the subject committed to it by the Senate. The members of the committee who have not given it consideration have no right to complain of their fellow-members, but the Senate has a right to complain of them. If the bill has not been considered by the committee, let the accusation come from Senators who are not on the committee, let it not come from Senators who belong to the committee and who have had an opportunity to consider it. If they have not considered it, it is their own fault and not the fault of their fellow-members.

Mr. CLARK of Montana. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Virginia yield to the Senator from Montana?

Mr. MARTIN. I do.

Mr. CLARK of Montana. Mr. President, in view of what has been stated as to the consideration of this question before the committee, I desire to say that I think I attended all the meetings of the committee except two during this session of Congress. This question came up before the committee one day, when I raised the point about the proximity of the tunnel to the Library building, when the chairman said he would have the engineers present at the next meeting, or probably it may have been a day or two after, when we were to meet and consider with the engineers the questions regarding the tunnel.

I also raised the question one day with the chairman of the committee about the rights of the property holders down there, and inquired whether or not they had any objection to the bill. The chairman stated that they had had that matter before the subcommittee for weeks, and that he knew of no objection to it.

After that the question was considered, as stated by the Senator from Idaho [Mr. HEITFELD], just before the bill was reported, for about half an hour, or something like that. I then stated that I was willing to allow the bill to be reported to the Senate, but I reserved the right to raise these points against it on the floor of the Senate. The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. FOSTER] also made the same reservation. I am quite confident that this matter was never considered at any other meeting of the committee when I was present, and I am sure I was absent but twice.

Mr. MARTIN. It seems, Mr. President, that the Senator was present at three meetings, or two—I could not clearly understand which from his statement—but he was at least present at two meetings, and perhaps his remarks will show that he was present at three of the meetings of the committee. If he desired to have other meetings to further consider the bill I take it he would have asked for them. I remember very well the Senator from Montana did raise a question of the too close proximity of the tunnel to the Congressional Library building and that difficulty was amply met. If the best experts in the land are to be credited, it was shown conclusively, and not a shadow of doubt was left, that the tunnel as proposed would not endanger the Library building. Mr. Green and quite a number of other experts appeared before the committee in relation to that matter.

The hour is so late that I will not delay the Senate to quote their testimony; but I invite the attention of the Senate to a report which has appended to it the testimony of the engineers. If



human testimony can establish anything; if we are to rely upon the best skill in the United States to determine a technical question, it has been established that the Library building would not be in danger by reason of the proximity of the proposed tunnel. If, on the other hand, laymen are to determine this question—

Mr. TELLER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Virginia yield to the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. MARTIN. I do.

Mr. TELLER. I should like to suggest to the Senator that I have not heard anybody suggest in this debate that the line as now fixed is not perfectly safe.

Mr. MARTIN. I understood the Senator from Georgia to intimate a contrary opinion.

Mr. TELLER. Perhaps he did.

Mr. MARTIN. I understood the Senator to distinctly express a contrary opinion.

Mr. HOAR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Virginia yield to the Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. MARTIN. I yield.

Mr. HOAR. Will the Senator state what is the distance from the Library building of the proposed tunnel on the surface, and how far below the surface is the tunnel to run?

Mr. MARTIN. The distance is about 150 feet. I can not undertake to give it exactly.

Mr. HOAR. Perhaps the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. GALLINGER] can do so.

Mr. MARTIN. I ask the Senator from New Hampshire to give the figures. My own impression is that it is about 150 feet.

Mr. GALLINGER. The distance of the tunnel from the Library building is 175 feet, and it is 64 feet below grade.

Mr. MARTIN. And at that depth the experts in the engineering profession say there is not the slightest possibility of injuring that building.

Mr. President, verifying my recollection about this matter, I will say that the first bill on the subject has been handed to me, and it appears to have been introduced on the 8th day of January, 1902. After a number of modifications were made to it, it became necessary to frame a new bill, which was introduced. Instead of amending the old bill, a new bill meeting these difficulties was introduced in the Senate, which is the bill now under consideration, but the subject was brought to the attention of the Senate by a bill as early as the 8th day of January.

Mr. President, these problems with which the committee was confronted, the removal of the railroad from the Mall and the discontinuance of grade crossings, the committee undertook to meet. They deemed the problem a very important one. The people of the city of Washington and the people of the United States have been deeply interested in having the grade crossings discontinued and the railroad removed from the Mall, where it had been put by act of Congress as far back as 1872, and since that time the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, I believe, have paid taxes on the property. In the limited time remaining at this hour of the evening I am not going to discuss the question whether the Pennsylvania Railroad Company acquired a fee-simple title to that land, but they acquired the right to hold that property under an act of Congress, and they have been holding it since 1872.

At the last session of Congress the committee was unable in a satisfactory way to get that company from the Mall and to get its structures removed. They did find a way to get rid of grade crossings, the removal of which, as I understand, was estimated to cost \$6,000,000. A good deal of comment has been made on that subject. I have not the most implicit confidence in my figures; as I say, my recollection is a general one, and I have not taken the laboring oar in the conduct of this bill, but the chairman of the committee has done that.

There was, however, enough shown to me to satisfy my mind, but I have not carried the figures with that accuracy and fullness that I would if I had intended to present this matter to the Senate, though I am sure I am not far amiss when I say that the cost of getting rid of the grade crossing will be \$6,000,000. The whole expense will be much larger, of course—\$14,000,000 it is estimated—but to get rid of the grade crossings it was estimated that \$6,000,000 would be required.

As to the justice or the injustice of the Government contributing to that expenditure, each Senator may have his own opinion; but it has been considered just and equitable in different cities where the removal of grade crossing has been proposed that the cities should contribute a share of the expense equally. I will say, with the railroads. That has been the general rule on that subject.

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company was to receive under the legislation of the last Congress \$1,500,000, and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company is to receive under this bill \$1,500,000

to leave the Mall. It was considered they had property rights there equivalent to a million and a half dollars. So that the railroad company was paying \$3,000,000 and the Government paying \$3,000,000, the Government paying all of the amount to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, as it has regained possession of the Mall, and the District paying only one-half of the million and a half dollars.

At the last session of Congress it was found impossible, as I say, to get up any plan which would relieve the Mall of the objectionable structures there. That became possible only when there was a chance of merger of the Baltimore and Ohio and the Pennsylvania railroads. Those roads may not be under the same ownership. Of course I do not undertake to give the information with absolute accuracy.

One of the leading officers of the road, Mr. Green, one of the vice-presidents, stated that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company did not own a majority of the stock of the Baltimore and Ohio, but I think it is a well-recognized fact—the public, at least, accepts it as true—that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company owns so largely of the Baltimore and Ohio stock that it dominates its policy and is likely to continue to do so, so that the roads are substantially under one management, and may be viewed from the standpoint of being one stock company, and it was only when that condition was brought about that it appeared to be possible to get up any arrangement by which there could be a union depot. I say this object, which the last Congress could not accomplish, became possible at this session of Congress by the merger of these two railroads.

Now we are confronted with this condition: Unless this bill is passed the railroads will proceed, under the legislation of the last Congress, to dispense with grade crossings and to establish two depots, one on the Mall and the other near the present location of the Baltimore and Ohio depot—not exactly on that location, but very near it.

Mr. MALLORY. Will the Senator from Virginia permit me to ask him a question?

Mr. MARTIN. Certainly.

Mr. MALLORY. What is the Senator's understanding as to the provision of the act of 1901, which requires the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to cede to the Government certain property of which it now has possession? In view of the enactment of this pending measure, if it be enacted, what becomes of that provision in the act of 1901 requiring the cession to the United States Government of that property?

Mr. MARTIN. As I stated at the outset, I have not at my command the information that I ought to have in undertaking to present this matter to the Senate, not having expected until within the last few minutes to say a word on the subject. My information is general, just such, perhaps, as the Senator from Florida [Mr. MALLORY] himself now has as a member of the same committee. I suppose that remains unchanged. That is my understanding of it.

Mr. MALLORY. The Senator from Georgia [Mr. CLAY], in the remarks made by him some time ago this afternoon, seemed to indicate that in his judgment that requirement would lapse, and that the Government would lose the benefit of the cession of that particular property, which he estimates at about \$1,200,000 in value. If that be so, it is a matter of great importance for us, I think, to consider.

Mr. MARTIN. I am very sure that is not the case, and I think that is in keeping with many other statements of my friend the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. CLAY. I do not understand the Senator.

Mr. MARTIN. I think the Senator from Georgia made a good many statements that he had not well considered. One was on the question of damages, when he put his judgment up here against that of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, one of them an engineer of distinction, and all of them living here in the District, men who have made a special study of this subject, who have been over the ground and calculated to a cent the cost in this matter. They have reported that \$600,000 would pay all the damages resulting from this construction, and yet the Senator from Georgia estimates it at \$3,600,000.

Mr. BERRY. Will the Senator permit me a moment on that point?

Mr. MARTIN. I will.

Mr. BERRY. Does not this bill, in effect, do away with the provisions of the bill which was passed in 1901?

Mr. MARTIN. It does not; because where it is in conflict this bill is a modification of the law as contained in those two acts passed at the last session of Congress.

Mr. BERRY. One other question. As I understand, this bill is to be enacted to take the place of that legislation and to do away with the rights that were given to the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company to extend the depot on the ground where it

now is, and to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company to rebuild where their station now is. I understand that is clear, is it not?

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, it is not clear, because it is not a fact. This is intended as a modification of that legislation where it is in conflict. The provisions of that legislation that are not in conflict with this legislation are not repealed, are not interfered with in any way, but only where that legislation is modified in terms by this legislation is any change made in that law.

Mr. BERRY. Why, Mr. President, it was admitted by the Senator from New Hampshire that the purpose was to get rid of that legislation which was passed a year and a half ago, and to provide for a union station instead of having two stations, and that all the provisions of those acts that are not included in this bill, I clearly understood from the bill, are eliminated. By that bill the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company was to convey certain property to the Government or to the District—to the Government, I think—and now there is nothing in this bill requiring that conveyance to be made, although all the conditions contained in that law are done away with by the present bill.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. President, I venture to say that the Senator from New Hampshire stated what I have stated—that this bill does away with the legislation of the last session of Congress in certain respects. It does not repeal it in toto. That law is repealed or modified only to the extent that it is inconsistent with this bill. This bill contains the provision—

That Congress reserves the right to alter, amend, or repeal this act; and all acts or parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.

Not a single provision of the legislation of the last session of Congress is repealed unless it is in conflict with this act.

I shall be as brief as possible. I am very sorry to detain the Senate at all at this late hour. This bill undertakes to do what the legislation of the last Congress failed to do, to the extent of having a union depot instead of two depots, removing all railroad depots from the Mall, and establishing one grand union depot. The additional cost, outside of the cost incurred by the railroad companies, is that the United States Government pays a million and a half dollars to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. The other costs amount to \$1,670,000, of which the District of Columbia pays half and the United States Government the other half.

As I say, if any mistake is made, it was made in the previous Congress. What we are endeavoring to do now is to get the railroad from the Mall and to have a grand union depot here, to cost over \$4,000,000; and the expense incurred, as I say, outside of the expense which the railroads bear, is one and a half million dollars paid by the United States Government alone, the District of Columbia contributing no part thereof, and an additional \$1,670,000 to be paid one-half by the United States Government and one-half by the District government.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. Will the Senator yield to me a moment?

Mr. MARTIN. I will.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. As I understand it, we are to pay the Baltimore and Potomac road one million and a half of money to remove from the Mall, and the United States Government then takes the Mall; it becomes the property of the Government of the United States. Of course, it is the property of the United States now, but the railroad abandons it and it remains the property of the United States. Then one-half of that million and a half is charged to the District of Columbia.

Mr. MARTIN. Not at all. The Senator is mistaken.

Mr. GALLINGER. The Senator from North Dakota is mistaken about that.

Mr. HANSBROUGH. I am asking simply for information.

Mr. MARTIN. I will answer the Senator. He is mistaken about that. The million and a half that the Government pays in connection with the removal of the structures from the Mall is paid out of the United States Treasury, and the District government pays no part of it.

Mr. BERRY. I will ask the Senator if they do not also pay the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company a million and a half?

Mr. MARTIN. That was done by the legislation of the last session of Congress, and is not under consideration now.

Mr. BERRY. It is directed to be paid by this bill, though.

Mr. MARTIN. It is not directed to be paid by this bill. It is directed by the legislation of the last session of Congress. This bill has nothing whatever to do with it.

Mr. BERRY. Will the Senator permit me a moment further?

Mr. MARTIN. I will.

Mr. BERRY. Under this new arrangement, unless the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company complies with the conditions of the last act, it is not entitled to the \$1,500,000. Under this bill it is relieved from complying, but still gets the \$1,500,000, does it not, which was included in the other act? That is a direct question. Is not the Government to pay \$1,500,000, either

under this bill or the previous act, to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company?

Mr. MARTIN. It is. It pays it under the legislation of the last session of Congress. All these expenses were taken into consideration by the District Commissioners and the engineers. Plans and specifications have been drawn, to the minutest details, and they have been verified by the Engineer Commissioner of the District of Columbia. There is nothing haphazard; there is nothing by guess; there is nothing reckless in this bill. Every item of cost has been gone over carefully. It has not been estimated in a crude and rough way; it has been calculated to the minutest degree, to the last farthing, by the Engineer Commissioner, who is a sworn officer of the District of Columbia, and whose services were at the disposal of the Committee on the District of Columbia.

The only element that is uncertain in the matter, an element which must of necessity, in every improvement of this sort, remain uncertain to some extent, is the element of damages to abutting property. The Engineer Commissioner of the District of Columbia has examined that question with the utmost care; he has reported to the committee, and has staked his reputation upon it—we act by virtue of his statement and by virtue of our confidence in his skill as an engineer—that \$600,000 will pay those damages. Of course, he could not determine that with mathematical accuracy, because it is something that the event only can reduce to absolute mathematical certainty; but so far as engineering skill can determine it he has estimated it, and has fixed it at \$600,000.

Mr. President, I do not feel justified in detaining the Senate, but I will say the defeat of this bill means to relegate the city and the country to the legislation of the last session of Congress. It means to dispense with a grand union depot here, which will, in its monumental character, be fully equal in every respect to the Capitol building itself—a larger building, in many respects—and that would be, in my judgment, a most unfortunate result. I believe it would be disastrous. It would be a disappointment to the whole country to see this bill fail and see the old law executed, giving us two depots without the monumental character that this grand union depot will have.

I believe the bill has been carefully considered; that the conclusions arrived at are just and reasonable, and that it ought to pass.

Mr. BEVERIDGE. I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

Mr. MALLORY. Will the Senator withdraw that motion for a moment?

Mr. BEVERIDGE. I withdraw the motion for one moment.

Mr. MALLORY. Mr. President, I wish to make an inquiry of the Chair in regard to the unanimous-consent agreement as to the pending bill, the measure that has just been discussed. I have an amendment that I desire to offer, and I wish to understand whether the Chair holds that it can be offered in the morning.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The opinion of the Chair would be, while nothing was said in relation to it in the giving of unanimous consent, that it was not the intention, when the request was granted, that amendments should be cut off, and the Chair would feel compelled to recognize the Senator to offer his amendment to-morrow morning.

Mr. GALLINGER. If the Senator from Indiana will yield just one moment, I wish to say I made the request for unanimous consent, and I want to say to Senators that I certainly will not contest their right to offer amendments. I think they ought to have that right under the unanimous-consent agreement, although it is not specified in the agreement.

#### EXECUTIVE SESSION.

Mr. BEVERIDGE. I renew my motion that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business. After ten minutes spent in executive session the doors were reopened, and (at 5 o'clock and 55 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, May 15, 1902, at 12 o'clock meridian.

#### NOMINATIONS.

*Executive nominations received by the Senate May 14, 1902.*

#### PROMOTIONS IN THE ARMY.

##### *Infantry Arm.*

Lieut. Col. Edmund Rice, Second Infantry, to be colonel, May 5, 1902, vice Snyder, Nineteenth Infantry, appointed brigadier-general, United States Army.

Lieut. Col. Charles G. Penney, Twenty-third Infantry, to be colonel, May 9, 1902, vice Anman, Twenty-ninth Infantry, appointed brigadier-general, United States Army.



Maj. Willis Wittich, Twenty-first Infantry, to be lieutenant-colonel, May 5, 1902, vice Rice, Second Infantry, promoted.

Maj. William H. W. James, Twenty-third Infantry, to be lieutenant-colonel, May 9, 1902, vice Penney, Twenty-third Infantry, promoted.

#### COINER OF THE MINT.

Rhine Russell Freed, of Pennsylvania, to be coiner of the mint of the United States at Philadelphia, Pa., in place of Albert A. Norris, confirmed April 14, 1902, and declined.

#### ASSISTANT PAYMASTER IN THE NAVY.

Gustavus R. Madden, a citizen of California, to be an assistant paymaster in the Navy, to fill a vacancy existing in that grade.

#### CONFIRMATIONS.

*Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate May 14, 1902.*

#### GOVERNOR OF ARIZONA.

Alexander O. Brodie, of Arizona, to be governor of Arizona, to take effect July 1, 1902.

#### COINER OF THE MINT.

Rhine Russell Freed, of Pennsylvania, to be coiner of the mint at Philadelphia, Pa.

#### SECRETARIES OF EMBASSIES.

Montgomery Schuyler, jr., of New York, to be second secretary of the embassy of the United States at St. Petersburg, Russia.

Craig W. Wadsworth, of New York, to be third secretary of the embassy of the United States at London, to take effect July 1, 1902.

#### INDIAN AGENT.

S. G. Reynolds, of Billings, Mont., to be agent for the Indians of the Crow Agency in Montana.

#### REGISTERS OF THE LAND OFFICE.

Francis M. Rathbun, of Nebraska, to be register of the land office at McCook, Nebr., to take effect May 29, 1902.

James Whitehead, of Nebraska, to be register of the land office at Broken Bow, Nebr., to take effect May 25, 1902.

#### RECEIVERS OF PUBLIC MONEYS.

John Nelson, of Wahpeton, N. Dak., to be receiver of public moneys at Grand Forks, N. Dak.

C. W. Barnes, of Nebraska, to be receiver of public moneys at McCook, Nebr., to take effect May 29, 1902.

Frank H. Young, of Nebraska, to be receiver of public moneys at Broken Bow, Nebr., to take effect May 25, 1902.

#### POSTMASTERS.

Burt Graves, to be postmaster at Middleport, in the county of Niagara and State of New York.

William H. Bartlett, to be postmaster at Amenia, in the county of Dutchess and State of New York.

William B. R. Mason, to be postmaster at Boundbrook, in the county of Somerset and State of New Jersey.

Frank N. Webster, to be postmaster at Spencerport, in the county of Monroe and State of New York.

George T. Reeve, jr., to be postmaster at Riverhead, in the county of Suffolk and State of New York.

Thomas Dye, to be postmaster at Millerton, in the county of Dutchess and State of New York.

George H. Richmond, to be postmaster at Northfield, in the county of Washington and State of Vermont.

Reuben F. Hoff, to be postmaster at Union Springs, in the county of Cayuga and State of New York.

Edwin P. Bouton, to be postmaster at Trumansburg, in the county of Tompkins and State of New York.

George H. Tice, to be postmaster at Perth Amboy, in the county of Middlesex and State of New Jersey.

Peter F. Wanser, to be postmaster at Jersey City, in the county of Hudson and State of New Jersey.

Edward S. Hance, to be postmaster at Wharton, late Port Oram, in the county of Morris and State of New Jersey.

Joseph F. Naugle, to be postmaster at Meyersdale, in the county of Somerset and State of Pennsylvania.

Walter C. Dolson, to be postmaster at Kingston, in the county of Ulster and State of New York.

Luther M. Whitaker, to be postmaster at Westfield, in the county of Union and State of New Jersey.

George L. Fish, to be postmaster at Woonsocket, in the county of Sanborn and State of South Dakota.

James H. Happy, to be postmaster at Mayfield, in the county of Graves and State of Kentucky.

B. J. Bowman, to be postmaster at Berlin, in the county of Somerset and State of Pennsylvania.

#### HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

WEDNESDAY, May 14, 1902.

The House met at 12 o'clock m. Prayer by the Chaplain, Rev. HENRY N. COUDEN, D. D.

The Journal of yesterday's proceedings was read and approved.

#### CHANGE OF REFERENCE.

By unanimous consent, the Committee on Ways and Means was discharged from the consideration of House Document 293, relating to authority to cover into the Treasury so-called retained bounty fund, and it was referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

#### LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to Mr. TALBERT, indefinitely, on account of important business.

#### NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House now resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the naval appropriation bill; and pending that motion, I will ask my colleague from Louisiana if we can not agree on some limit as to general debate?

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, I would suggest that we allow the debate to continue during the day without any limitation, and that on to-morrow we may agree upon a limit.

Mr. FOSS. I will say to the gentleman that I would like to fix a limitation to-day if we can. Would it not be agreeable to him to close general debate at the close of to-day's session? Will not that give sufficient time to the other side?

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. There are a number of gentlemen on this side who desire to speak, and to close debate to-day would scarcely afford adequate time to meet their desires. I think if we were to continue general debate until to-morrow at 3 o'clock, it would perhaps afford sufficient time and be satisfactory to all upon this side.

Mr. FOSS. How much time is desired on that side?

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. About five hours.

Mr. FOSS. Would it not be agreeable to the gentleman to close debate to-morrow at 2 o'clock?

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. I have suggested 3 o'clock. We want about five hours on this side.

Mr. FOSS. We shall not use five hours on this side.

Mr. VANDIVER. Will the gentleman permit me a suggestion? I suggest to the chairman of the committee that we proceed as we did yesterday with general debate, and if there is a little time wanted on the other side, perhaps we may be able to get through to-day. Let us proceed to-day as we did yesterday and see if we can not get through; and if not, an agreement can be made to-morrow. The chairman of the committee had two hours and a half yesterday, and perhaps others may want some time to-day or to-morrow.

Mr. FOSS. Then I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that we close general debate at 3 o'clock to-morrow afternoon. I make this upon the suggestion of my colleague, Mr. MEYER.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois asks unanimous consent that general debate be closed to-morrow afternoon at 3 o'clock.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Speaker, I do not want to object, but I would like to ask the chairman of the committee, in view of the statement of the gentleman from Louisiana, that five hours will be desired on the other side, if the chairman of the committee has reserved time enough so that we on this side can have the time we desire. I should like an hour myself, and it seems to me if the agreement suggested is carried out, there may not be time enough. I think there are one or two other members on this side who may not get the time they desire.

Mr. FOSS. I think there will be plenty of time for the gentlemen.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Pending that, Mr. Speaker, I will ask the chairman of the committee if he will allow me an hour?

Mr. FOSS. Oh, yes; there will be plenty of time for the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. VANDIVER. Mr. Speaker, I want to ask the gentleman whether he understands or intends to agree that we shall have five hours of that time upon this side?

Mr. FOSS. There has been no such agreement that that side of the House should have five hours.

Mr. VANDIVER. I understood that each member of the committee was to have an hour of time, if he desired, and I understand it is desired by nearly all the members of the committee; and therefore, unless it is so understood that we can have five hours on this side, I shall be obliged to object.

The SPEAKER. The Chair will admonish the gentleman that

the agreement yesterday was that the time should be controlled by the gentleman from Illinois and the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. FOSS. Do I understand that the gentleman from Missouri objects to the arrangement which has been agreed upon between the gentleman from Louisiana and myself?

Mr. VANDIVER. Not if it is understood in that agreement that each of the members of the committee is to have his hour.

Mr. FOSS. The gentleman from Louisiana will control the time on that side of the House, which is provided for by this arrangement. He can parcel it out as he sees fit.

Mr. VANDIVER. Well, if he is to have the five hours I will not object.

Mr. FOSS. Why can you not leave the matter with him?

Mr. VANDIVER. I will if he is to have the five hours.

Mr. FOSS. If the matter is arranged agreeably to him, why not leave it in that way?

Mr. VANDIVER. I am willing, if it is understood in advance that he shall have the five hours.

Mr. FOSS. I think we can make an arrangement all right to close the debate at 3 o'clock to-morrow afternoon.

Mr. VANDIVER. I shall have to object, Mr. Speaker, unless it is understood that five hours will be allowed on this side.

The SPEAKER. Objection is made. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Foss] that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union to resume the consideration of the naval appropriation bill.

#### QUESTION OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, after the omnibus bill had been disposed of yesterday by sending it back to the conference committee my attention was called to a circular which had been distributed yesterday morning to members of this House—a circular signed by a man whom I do not know—whom I never met in my life—Henry H. Smith—an entire stranger to me. Now, with the greater part of this circular I have nothing to do, but I want to call the attention of the House to one part of it:

Nathaniel McKay has stated to me that he paid Representative MAHON, chairman of the Committee on War Claims, hundreds of dollars for campaign expenses and hundreds more for "good will" and services rendered. He has made similar statements as to a few other members, some of whom are not now in Congress.

That is the part to which I wish to call to the attention of the House; as to the balance, I have nothing to do with it.

Now, Mr. Speaker, you will observe the statement of this writer that Mr. McKay told him this. I immediately called Mr. McKay up on the telephone and called his attention to that declaration. After reading the circular this morning, he sent to me this affidavit, which I will read:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

Personally appeared before me Nathaniel McKay, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says: In a certain circular signed by one Henry H. Smith, on page 8, the statement is made by said Smith that "Nathaniel McKay has stated to me that he paid Representative MAHON, chairman of the Committee on War Claims, hundreds of dollars for campaign expenses. He has made similar statements as to a few other members, some of whom are not now in Congress."

I have had no communication with said Henry H. Smith since the year 1898, and have not spoken to him since that time. The last communication I received from him was dated August 30, 1898.

In the year 1898 I was not acquainted with Representative MAHON, and have never paid him a cent for campaign purposes in my life, and have never spoken to him in regard to his election.

In June, 1898, the said Smith wrote me a letter demanding \$200, stating that he would give me full acquittance for clerical services, etc., when, as a matter of fact, he has never rendered me any clerical services of any kind whatever.

On August 29, 1898, said Henry H. Smith wrote me that he withdrew his former request for money, and that he would get a thousand dollars' more satisfaction in another way.

I will read the whole of this, although it does not refer to me:

On one occasion the said Henry H. Smith gave me a worthless check drawn on a bank where he had no account—and that brought up the controversy, and he has been hounding me ever since by misrepresentations.

The circular above referred to is not the only one put in circulation by the said Smith, but he has written books in which he has made false statements with reference to me and to which I paid no attention. He again wrote a communication to the editor of Town Topics, New York, for which I obtained an indictment against him in the supreme court of the District of Columbia.

I could have stopped the whole controversy for \$200. The statements of the said Smith are made for the purpose of injuring individuals having claims before Congress. His statement to the effect that I have paid members of Congress to vote for me is false in every particular, and he has been publishing scurrilous articles against me all over the United States. I have never acceded to his demands.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of May, A. D. 1902.

NATHANIEL MCKAY.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 14th day of May, A. D. 1902.

[SEAL.]

SAMUEL E. TATEM,  
Notary Public, D. C.

This same Henry H. Smith sent out the circular which I hold in my hand, headed:

The old musty "iron-clad" claims of 1862-1863.

The "fetich" of the Selfridge board "findings" exposed.

The Treasury to be looted out of \$800,000 in order to give Lobbyist McKay a fee of nearly \$400,000, or 50 per cent.

In regard to this circular I read the following affidavit:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:

Personally appeared before me, Nathaniel McKay, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have no interest, directly or indirectly, in any claim contained in the omnibus claims bill (H. R. 5537) now pending before Congress, notwithstanding the assertions contained in a certain circular issued by one H. H. Smith this morning to members of Congress setting forth that I am to receive \$400,000 in fees.

That the said circular has been sent out because said Smith has been placed under indictment in the supreme court of this District for libel by me, the said McKay.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of May, A. D. 1902.

NATHANIEL MCKAY.

In witness whereof I hereunto set my hand and affix my seal this 13th day of May, 1902.

SAMUEL E. TATEN,

Notary Public, District of Columbia.

Now, Mr. Speaker, this man says that Mr. McKay told him this story; but Mr. McKay denies it in toto. I do not know this man Smith; he is an entire stranger to me; but I want to say to members of this House that the statement he makes is absolutely false in every particular. Neither Nathaniel McKay nor any living man since I have been chairman of the War Claims Committee has ever approached me in reference to any bills—not even Mr. McKay—excepting as attorneys before the committee. I want to state further that no committee—Congressional, State, or district—has ever contributed a dollar to my election. I pay my own election expenses. I am able to pay them, and I do so.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I have been in this House ten years. This is the first time I have risen to a question of personal privilege. I, like all other men who have been engaged in politics, have been attacked by papers of the opposite side, and attacked by some of my own side; but I take such attacks and make no more ado about them. But a man who will deliberately make a charge of this kind without any foundation—a man who is a stranger to me—and circulate it among members of this House—a man who will do that has a heart as black as the soot in the flues of hell; and I do not care who he is.

Now, as I said, I do not know this man, but I have investigated him. I have been making inquiries of some of the members of this House as to who he is, and I am told that he is a lobbyist, a drunken lobbyist, that he has been hanging around this Congress since he lost his position as an officer of this House; that his life is utterly worthless, and that he is a man who makes it his business to carry his point against anyone against whom he has a grievance, by issuing these circulars.

Like other members of the House, I propose to fight my own battles. As I say, I am a stranger to this man, and I denounce this as an absolute falsehood, and I propose to consult an attorney in the city of Washington before the sun goes down, and this Henry H. Smith will either retract that statement or I shall put him behind the bars. [Prolonged applause.]

#### NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Speaker, pending that motion, upon the request of my colleague from Louisiana [Mr. MEYER], I ask that general debate be closed to-morrow at 3 o'clock upon the naval appropriation bill. Is that agreeable to my friend?

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. That is agreeable, Mr. Speaker, inasmuch as I have been assured by my colleague that this side of the House will certainly have five hours' time.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois asks unanimous consent that general debate be closed on this bill at 3 o'clock to-morrow.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Speaker, pending that I would like to ask the chairman of the committee if I may be accorded an hour of the time controlled by him.

Mr. FOSS. Yes; and, Mr. Speaker, I ask further that the time be controlled by the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. MEYER] and the chairman of the committee.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois couples with the request the further request that the time be controlled by himself as chairman and by the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. MEYER].

Mr. VANDIVER. Mr. Speaker, on the statement of the gentleman that we are to have five hours on this side I will not object.

Mr. TATE. We already having had two.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The question now is on the motion of the gentleman from Illinois.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H. R. 14046) making appropriation for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903, and for other purposes, with Mr. SHERMAN in the chair.



Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that any member of this committee who may speak on the bill be also extended that privilege.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Louisiana asks unanimous consent that any member who speaks on this bill may extend his remarks in the RECORD.

Mr. ROBERTS. For how long is that?

Mr. PAYNE. I object to it, indefinitely.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair was about to say that that was an order that ought to be made in the House, while individual leaves can be granted in the committee.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield an hour to my colleague from West Virginia [Mr. DAYTON].

Mr. DAYTON. Mr. Chairman, in approaching my part of this discussion of the bill providing for the naval establishment this year I do so with a sense of sadness that I can not help referring to. When I came to Congress seven years ago and became a member of the Naval Committee, it had for its chairman Charles A. Boutelle, of Maine. The ranking member on the Democratic side was Amos J. Cummings, of New York. It is a matter of intense regret that during the last year both of these gentlemen have crossed to the great beyond. The past associations with both on the part of the older members of the committee will be cherished for many years to come.

These men, in some particulars alike, in many different, were able, patriotic, and generous, and their loss to the country is a distinct one. In addition to this, within the last ten days the Navy establishment has lost one of its great admirals—William T. Sampson—who has been closely identified with the practical work of building up the Navy. His character, I undertake to say, has not been thoroughly understood by the citizens of his country, but that that character will be understood in the years to come, and that all will recognize that he was a brave man, a true man, a patriotic man, and that he did his duty well, I feel, is assured. Besides all this, in the last year the Navy Department, and this committee in its close relationship with it, has seen its Secretary, John D. Long, sever his connection with it as its chief and pass again into private life.

It will certainly be the pleasure of us all to bear testimony to the fact that there never was a more genial, kindly, or able man in public station than he. Every one of us will recognize his uniform courtesy, his calm serenity, and the ability and patriotic motives that constantly were the mainspring of his conduct. While we regret that this Secretary, one of the greatest that this country has ever known, during whose administration more than half of the naval establishment, so far as its material is concerned, was built up, is no longer at the head of the Department, all of us will rejoice that his mantle has fallen upon the shoulders of one of our colleagues in this House, and we all know from our associations with him that the Department has passed into able hands that will maintain the usefulness and greatness of the American Navy.

Now, Mr. Chairman, in the opening of this discussion I desire to say a few words in regard to the naval establishment and the necessity for it. Ever since the fall of Adam man has been compelled to spend a vast amount of his individual resources and energies in his own self-protection. It seems to me that we do not appreciate how much of our energies are directed in this channel. We build fences around our farms; we build walls around our cities; we build houses for ourselves, we establish law and all the machinery of the courts for the simple purpose of the protection of the citizen.

The man who presumes that the Navy is built up simply for the purpose of giving vent to the savage instinct that demands war and bloodshed makes the greatest mistake possible. We do not build navies for war. We build navies to procure and maintain peace, and the Navy is just as much necessary for the defense and maintenance of the peace of the nation as houses are necessary for the protection of the individual; just as much necessary as police are necessary for the protection of cities.

It seems to me that the saddest spectacle in American history was that one when, under one of its most enlightened intellects, and one of its greatest statesmen, Thomas Jefferson, this country deemed that all the navy it required was a few gunboats to defend our coasts. We soon found the error of that, because in a little while we were paying tribute to the pirates of Tripoli, and it was not long until the cry came forth from the American people that they had millions for defense, but not a cent for tribute. From that moment I undertake to say that the generous sentiment of the great masses of the common people of this country

has been that the dignity, the honor, and the defense of this country demands a strong navy, that will command respect for us as a nation among the nations of the earth.

Mr. Chairman, I listened with close attention and with a great deal of interest to the remarks of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY] yesterday evening. The latter part of those remarks was to the effect that this Navy is a costly institution and that it requires large sums from the American Treasury to maintain it—thousands of dollars a day to man and run the ships when in commission. I grant that.

Liberty is always costly. Peace comes at a high price. But when we look back into our own national history and recall the fact, which every earnest, thoughtful man must admit, that the great civil war would not have occurred had we had a strong navy that could have silenced rebellion, and that we would have been saved the \$8,000,000,000 and the countless lives that that struggle cost us, it seems to me all of us will recognize that in time of peace we must make those preparations that will find us strong in time of war.

Men may defend themselves upon the principle that—

He who fights and runs away  
May live to fight another day.

But that man may be sure that the day will come when he must fight again, because his adversary, seeing his cowardice and weakness, will corner him some time with the absolute confidence that he can whip him, and he will do it; but the strong man who stands up armed and meets his adversary, and makes him realize that he is ready for that conflict, will prevent the conflict in more instances than one. That is the principle upon which we build the American Navy. It is for the purpose of maintaining peace and not for the purpose of carrying on war. That is the primary object. The secondary object is that if war does come to us we shall be prepared to meet it as a great nation ought to meet it.

Another thing in this connection, Mr. Chairman. When we build up the American Navy it must be with a sense of satisfaction that conditions have changed in this country so that the reasons given by Mr. Jefferson for the building of the gunboats for the protection of this country have passed away. We no longer are under the conditions that then surrounded us. The excuse for no Navy in those days was the fact of the limited revenues of this country and the burden of taxation upon the people.

In this day and generation it is not a question of how we shall raise revenue, but the question is, How shall we decrease the revenues that are so remarkable as to command the attention of the nations of the earth? The man who stands up on the floor of this House to proclaim that the money expended in the erection of a naval defense for this country and for its commerce is a burden upon the pocketbooks of the people of this great land of ours simply makes a statement that is laughed at by a people who are the most prosperous, and who have the most money to expend in the necessities, luxuries, and extravagances, if you please, of life of any nation in the world.

Then, too, Mr. Chairman, I want to call your attention to another thing in relation to this work of building up the American Navy, and it, too, brings gratitude to every American heart. When we started this work under Thomas Jefferson we did not have a single shipyard in this country, and the work had to be done in foreign shipyards. At this time there is not a bolt that enters into our great battle ships, or any of our ships, if you please, the material for which does not come from American soil. It is forged in American furnaces and nailed home by the hand of American laboring men.

Every dollar, therefore, that we expend in this work is not lost, but it is simply an investment of the revenues of this country for the beneficial purpose of establishing its peace, maintaining its dignity, protecting its commerce, and giving it a proper standing among the nations of the world. [Applause.] Under these circumstances, gentlemen, I ask you if there can be any excuse for the carping, criticising cry that it is going to cost dollars and cents to do this.

When we entered on the Spanish war the Navy of the United States was scarcely known among many of the nations of the world. We were called by the Spaniards "a nation of shopkeepers;" and it was supposed that they could send their fleet of torpedo boats over to this country, rake our coasts, and bring us absolutely to our knees. Spain found out the mistake of that. Over in the Philippine Islands, at Manila, the old atlases that were used in the schools pictured the American Republic as the size of your hand, while the Spanish dominions were made to appear as big as the side of a wall.

We do not bear in mind frequently, gentlemen, that in the history of this country there are two triumphs that have come to us. For years the agricultural growth of this country was phenomenal. Cotton was king. We triumphed in agriculture. We raised more

products from the soil than any other nation in the world. Then we advanced in the manufacturing industries. Iron became king. And in the last few years we have turned the balance of trade in our favor, and we are recognized as the greatest manufacturing country on earth.

Every thoughtful man will realize that there is yet another victory that must come to the American Republic, and that victory must be when our commerce shall be, not supreme, but dominant upon the seas, and when our Navy must go to protect it, and when the United States must be first in agriculture, first in manufacturing, and first in commerce. [Applause.] We can no more expect to defend that or build it up without the strong arm of the law in its representative by the naval power than we can expect to prepare our cotton without the cotton gin, cut the wheat of the Northwest without the reaper, or raise corn without the hoe. Another thing, gentlemen, I want to call your attention to.

The world's history shows that in wars, contests—I think there is no great exception—the victories have followed the banner of that nation which controlled the sea power. Hannibal would have conquered Rome had he controlled the narrow neck of water that separated his country from that of his adversary, so that he could have made his transportation of provisions and men without that long trip across the mountains that so weakened his forces.

Napoleon would have accomplished his gigantic ambitions and rearranged the map of Europe, he would have achieved success instead of sinking all at Waterloo, if it had not been for Nelson's victory at Trafalgar; and the great civil war of this country might have had a different issue had it not been for the *Monitor* and the sea power of the North that closed up the South Atlantic and finally the Mississippi River, shutting off all supplies. So it is with all historic incidents.

So my appeal to-day, gentlemen, in behalf of this bill is for us not to consider, not to spend our time upon the mere criticising, carping idea that we are to cut down the naval establishment to save dollars and cents. Let us look at it from the broader and more patriotic standpoint that it is our duty to keep step with the progress of this nation; that it is our duty in this particular bill to build up this Navy, not as a means of war, but as a means of defense.

I want to say in behalf of this naval appropriation bill that I have never seen the care and attention given to any one of these measures that has been given to this one. It has been gone over in the subcommittee and in the full committee four different times. Every item in it has been carefully and earnestly scrutinized and considered. So far as I know, so far as I can see and understand, not a single thing that has been absolutely necessary has been omitted. On the other hand, not a single item has been included in it that is extravagant or that should be left out in the general items for the maintenance of this establishment.

I want to call the attention of the members of the House to another thing: There has never been in the world's history—and I challenge any man to deny this statement—there has never been in the world's history as remarkable an example of bravery, honesty, character, integrity as the Navy personnel of the United States from the beginning to this day presents to the world. No navy has such a record.

The spirit of the naval corps stands without a parallel; it stands alone in the world's history. That very thing has kept out of it any corruption. Its organization from the Secretary down has been efficient. Any of you who may have had occasion to communicate with it during the time of war could not but be impressed with how promptly information sought was given to you, and what a contrast there was between the Navy Department and some others in this particular. There is not one of you but what was impressed with the fact of the readiness of this branch of our service for that war and with its promptness when action became necessary.

My friend from Virginia criticises the organization of the Navy Department—the bureau organization. Gentlemen, I want to say to you that men will differ. I have no doubt that he is absolutely sincere in the position he takes. But to show you how far men may differ, I want to make the statement here that I have, after fair and careful consideration of this matter, reached the conclusion that that bureau organization is the very best that could possibly be obtained.

Let us look at it a moment. The Secretary of the Navy comes from civil life. There are eight bureaus, three of them alone coming from the Navy proper; three of them are filled alone by naval officers. They only fill it for a term of four years. Their appointment has to be scrutinized by the Senate of the United States and has to be confirmed by that body. The other five come from the staff division, the Engineer Corps, the construction corps, the Pay Corps, the Medical Corps. These men from these corps are selected from the very strongest and the best men. As I say, their appointments are, like other civil appointments, for

a period of four years and must be confirmed by the Senate. This gives the Secretary of the Navy full control and power over these bureau chiefs.

It is not so in the Army. The Adjutant-General holds his position for life, the other heads of the Army Corps here in Washington hold their positions for life. To a certain extent they are independent of the Secretary of War and therefore he has not his hand on that organization as does the Secretary of the Navy. It is a matter of great interest—it seems to me it is a matter of great importance—that this organization should continue.

Oh, but they say it leads to additional expense, and it brings about conflicts and disagreements. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY] refers to Secretary Long's recommendation in regard to the consolidation of three of these bureaus. No man will yield to Secretary Long a higher or more cordial respect or esteem than I do. But I want to say to you gentlemen I disagree entirely with him on this matter, and I have so stated to him. He abandoned any idea of this consolidation of bureaus in his last report, and substantially told us so, and since he has left the Navy, at his home, he has paid the highest compliment that could be paid to any set of men by saying that the success of his administration depended almost entirely upon the efficiency of the bureau chiefs that served under him.

Gentlemen, I would not give a snap for great, strong, earnest, brilliant American citizens in high Government places who did not disagree with each other. Disagreements as to what is best to be done are healthy. These men form a body to whom are referred the great problems of building up the Navy. They meet, they disagree, they talk, they discuss, and out of the whole sum total of their discussion comes the final result, and one of the results has been the finest battle ship that rides on any sea. It has also brought about the closest and most economical administration of naval affairs found among the nations.

It is true the duties of bureau chiefs will run once in a while close together, but ordinarily they are very wide apart. Do you not think that a man who has given his attention to steam engineering all his life is better able to tell and be held responsible, if you please, for the engines and machinery that enter into these great battle ships? Do you not think a man like George W. Melville, who made it his life study, is better able to determine upon the engineering subjects than a line officer who has had no experience of any kind or character?

Do not you think a man like Royal B. Bradford, who has made a life study of the questions of electricity, of questions of equipping naval vessels, would be better able to equip these vessels than a constructor whose whole life has been devoted simply to the study of the manufacture of hulls of vessels? And when you bring three experts together side by side, would you not rather trust their combined judgment than that of any single one of them? I say that, on this question of bureau organization, it is the three experts in their separate lines whose joint judgment is to be preferred rather than that of one man.

Then I insist on another thing. I insist that never do we want to put \$30,000,000 or \$40,000,000 of the Government money into the hands or under the administration of one man. One man would not be able to even answer the letters that would come to him in a single day in connection with the management of affairs so vast.

So much for this statement of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY] as to the great extravagance and other great evils which, as he maintains, grow out of the bureau organization. In closing my remarks on this subject I want to call attention to the fact that the system which the gentleman advocates was tried and found wanting. In 1842, under Secretary Upshur, the bureaus as then organized were fixed at five.

The works of construction, repair, and equipment were under one head. Constant complaints arose upon the ground that the man who was in charge was not qualified for these separate and distinct duties. So in 1863, under Secretary Welles, and upon his recommendation, the system was changed to the present one. The modern system has been universally favored until Secretary Long made the mistake of recommending a consolidation, a return to the old policy that the Navy followed from 1842 to 1862. And the failure of the system, to which I have referred, came, mark you, when the naval appropriation bill amounted to less than three or four million dollars, while now it aggregates \$78,000,000.

I quote from our hearings of last year the statement of Admiral Bradford in regard to this matter, which is so full, clear, and convincing as to set at rest all future consideration, it would seem to me.

MR. DAYTON. I do not know that I asked the question, and I do not know what your views are in regard to it, but there is one other matter which has come before the committee, and about which I asked Admiral O'Neil, and I want to ask you—What is your view concerning the consolidation of the bureaus?

Admiral BRADFORD. I presume you refer to the proposition to consolidate the Bureaus of Equipment, Steam Engineering, and Construction and Repair.



If a careful study of the history of the organization of the Navy Department is made, it will be clearly seen that the present system is founded entirely on the principle of a necessary division of duties, which, in the main, are widely separated, but which must, in the nature of things, approach and possibly at times overlap, and for which specific appropriations are made by Congress.

The present organization has been urged in the past by various Secretaries of the Navy for the reason that it has been found impossible for the duties of the Department to be performed by a less number of bureaus than now exist. Congress in the past has also recognized the necessity for the present system in order that specific sums for specific purposes may be appropriated, with individual responsibility for their expenditure. If the three bureaus referred to were consolidated into one, there would be during the present fiscal year more than \$25,000,000 to be expended by one chief. It is submitted that this is too great a sum to be placed at the disposal of any single individual.

Mr. DAYTON. In your judgment better work can be obtained by having the conference of a number of the bureau heads than could be obtained by following the leadership of one man?

Admiral BRADFORD. Undoubtedly. Of the eight bureaus there are only three now with a military head who are conversant with the duties of commanders of ships and fleets. They are at present much overworked, have immense responsibilities, and probably would soon break down in time of war under the present organization of the Department. In the latter respect I speak from experience.

Mr. DAYTON. Is there any practical ground for the complaint that there is any disagreement between these bureaus involved which has caused friction, trouble, and delay in the work?

Admiral BRADFORD. There are disagreements at times between chiefs of bureaus, it is true, and there always will be disagreements among men who are conscientious, earnest, and ambitious in their efforts to advance the interests of their profession and make an honorable record for themselves. I regard such manifestations as a healthy sign. It is simple enough for a chief of bureau to have no disagreements; he has only to float with the current, as a chip passes to the sea, never to originate anything, and to allow other ambitious men to encroach upon his duties if they wish.

In the meantime his salary remains the same. In this connection I may say that I have always believed it would be wise to have a board of five officers for the purpose of harmonizing difficulties between bureaus, settle upon a shipbuilding policy, and other matters that embarrass the head of the Department on account of a lack of professional knowledge. As for delays in Government work, they are incident to Government methods of accountability in accordance with law. I believe they would be greater if the duties of the three bureaus were concentrated in the hands of one man, not subject to the criticism of others.

Mr. DAYTON. Do not these differences bring out more strongly and more forcibly the ideas?

Admiral BRADFORD. It is a proverb that "Two heads are better than one." It is the custom for the head of the Department to refer subjects pertaining to two or more bureaus to each bureau for an expression of opinion and recommendation. The result is beneficial as, on account of the rivalry between bureaus, the subject-matter is, as a rule, presented from every point of view and fully discussed. This would probably not be the result if considered by one bureau only. I have not discussed the proposed consolidation of bureaus, nor mentioned the subject in my annual reports, for the reason that I did not wish to appear as opposing a measure recommended by the head of the Department. I have, however, positive ideas on the subject, and have considered the matter a great deal in order that I might be prepared to give an opinion as to the wisdom of the proposed change in the organization of the Navy Department, should it be called for.

Mr. DAYTON. I know that, and we have the very highest respect for his views, or at least some of them, about the matter, but we want to get at what would be good for the naval service, and we thought it right and proper to call on you for your judgment; and I suppose you recognize that Congress, after all, is the supreme authority?

Admiral BRADFORD. I do.

Mr. DAYTON. I do not want you to fail to express your opinion—

Mr. LOUDENSLAGER. He may feel better not to have his opinion recorded, perhaps.

Mr. DAYTON. No; we want this. One of the objections made on the floor of the House last time was to "the iniquitous bureau system," as it was called, and if any such statement shall be made this year I want the statements of men whom I have not spoken to about it, but who have, by reason of their great experience, an ability to speak of that with more knowledge than those of us who have to learn such things from just such men.

Admiral BRADFORD. I believe it would be very detrimental to the interests of the Navy if the bureaus proposed were consolidated, and I will give in writing some reasons for this opinion.

During the Revolutionary war and until the year 1789 the Navy suffered many vicissitudes of direction, being at different times under the charge of a "marine committee," a "naval marine committee," a "continental navy board," a "board of admiralty," and "agent of marine," etc. It was universally admitted that these various authorities constituted by Congress to administer upon the Navy lacked sufficient professional knowledge to successfully perform the task allotted.

In 1789 a War Department was created, and both the land and naval forces placed under it. The War Department continued to administer upon naval affairs until 1798, when Congress established a Navy Department. It was stated in Congress, during a discussion of the act, that it was necessary "from a want of knowledge of naval affairs in the War Department."

The Navy Department first consisted of a Secretary of the Navy, a chief clerk, and such other clerks as were necessary. This organization continued until 1815, when, by act of Congress, a board of Navy commissioners, consisting of three captains, the highest grade then in the Navy, was authorized for the purpose of assisting the Secretary of the Navy in the discharge of his ministerial duties and for the express purpose of taking charge of all matters in reference to the construction, armament, and equipment of ships of war.

The Secretary, in asking for a change in the organization of the Navy Department, expressly stated that "the multifarious concerns of the naval establishment, the absence of wholesome regulations in its civil administration, and the imperfect execution of duties, owing to want of professional experience, lead to confusion, waste, and abuse."

The members of the board of Navy commissioners were appointed by the President and subject to confirmation by the Senate.

This organization continued for a period of twenty-seven years and was far more efficient than any previous organization. The mistake was made, however, of requiring the three Navy commissioners to act as a unit, thereby greatly limiting their capacity.

In 1842 the Department was again reorganized. After much discussion and debate a system of seven bureaus (practically the same as at present, with the exception of Steam Engineering) was recommended by the Board of Navy Commissioners to the Secretary and by him to Congress. A bill providing for such an organization passed the Senate and was recommended by the

Naval Committee of the House. The House, however, reduced the seven bureaus to five by combining the Bureaus of Ordnance and Hydrography and Equipment and Construction and Repair.

When the organization was complete, the Department was divided into the following five bureaus: Yards and Docks; Construction, Equipment, and Repairs; Provisions and Clothing; Ordnance and Hydrography; Medicine and Surgery. A captain was made the chief of each bureau, with the exception of Provisions and Clothing and Medicine and Surgery.

This organization was not satisfactory to the Secretary of the Navy, who continued to recommend the seven bureaus proposed in 1842. Secretary Upshur, in discussing it in his report, after it had been in operation about six months, made use of the following language:

"The law for the reorganization of this Department has been carried out as far as it has been found practicable. The advantages of this change in the increased facilities of transacting business and in the concentration of responsibilities are manifest and great. I regret to say, however, that the system is yet very imperfect."

"The bill as it passed the Senate (providing for seven bureaus) would, it is believed, have proved as complete and effective in its provisions as could reasonably be expected of any new measure running so much into details, but the changes made in it by the House of Representatives (combining Equipment with Construction and Repairs, and Ordnance with Hydrography) have produced difficulties and embarrassments in practice which were not foreseen at the time."

"The Bureau of Construction and Repairs, for instance, is charged with the duties of the Bureau of Equipment. It requires a ship carpenter to build or repair a vessel of war; it requires a naval officer to equip her."

"It would probably be impossible to find any one man properly equipped to perform all the duties of building, repairing, and equipping a vessel of war."

"In providing a Chief for the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repairs the alternative lay between a naval captain qualified to equip and a naval constructor qualified to build and repair. I did not hesitate to prefer the former, and the place is filled by a member of the late board of Navy commissioners."

Owing to the increasing importance of steam machinery, Charles H. Haswell, a navy engineer, was attached to the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repairs in 1846, and that Bureau continued to perform the duties of the Bureau of Steam Engineering until 1862. In 1853 John Lenthall, a naval constructor, was appointed Chief of Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repairs, a captain having previously been chief of that Bureau.

In accordance with the recommendation of Secretary Welles and preceding Secretaries, a bill for the reorganization of the Navy Department was introduced in Congress in 1862. Senator Grimes, then chairman of the Senate Naval Committee, in presenting the bill to the Senate had a statement printed to the effect that the granting of three additional bureaus would actually cause "a diminution of the expenses of the Government" and the naval service "be made much more efficient."

The bill passed both Houses and was approved July, 1862.

The new bureaus created were the Bureau of Navigation, Bureau of Equipment, and Bureau of Steam Engineering. This organization has continued to the present time.

It appears, therefore, that the proposition now made to consolidate the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Equipment is one that has been tried and found unsatisfactory. In fact, the lesson to be learned from the changes in the organization of the Navy Department at various times is that expansion and specialization, rather than contraction and generalization, are necessary as the Navy is enlarged.

Since 1815 three officers of command rank have been in the councils of the Navy Department. In this respect there has been no increase, there being the same number now, all captains, but holding the rank of rear-admiral while chiefs of bureaus.

Should the three bureaus be consolidated as proposed, the chief thereof could not even read his mail, and he would be in the hands of subordinates without responsibility.

Figures are often given to prove that a consolidation of bureaus will result in economy by decreasing the number of employees. It is not claimed that an unnecessary number of employees exists now, and it is difficult to understand how a consolidation will decrease the amount of work to be performed.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to say a few words in regard to the character of the Navy that we must build. Let no man deceive himself. As the chairman of our committee said yesterday, let us not get into our heads the idea that the American Navy is a finished product or that we can stand up to-day and boast of its size. No man can say but that the battle ship of the American Navy, side by side with the battle ship of any other country, will stand up equal, if not superior. But when it comes to quantity, we are sadly deficient. We have 10 battle ships, with 8 more building. England has three times that number. So it goes.

The Navy substantially must depend upon its battle line—the battle ships, the armored cruisers, and to a limited extent the protected cruisers, although those protected cruisers are not in the full sense of the term fighting machines; they are simply the messengers of the sea that go quickly from one part of the field of battle to another. I say to you, gentlemen, we are not able to stand up with our battle line against the navies of either France, Germany, or England. And when you take into consideration that Germany, according to her naval programme, will in the next fifteen years double her navy, and that England's navy is already three times as great as ours, and that she is adding to it yearly a great many more vessels than we are adding to ours, it seems to me that it is time for us to look to our battle line.

I deprecate greatly, gentlemen, an idea which has been circulated throughout this country and which we have followed to our sorrow, that there are other machines, mechanical inventions, that will do away with the battle ships. For instance, our attention is constantly being called to one type or another of what are known as submarine torpedo boats—boats that are calculated, according to human imagination, to dive under the water and come up, to send at will their torpedoes right into the bowels of a great battle ship and blow it out of the sea. And from this the deduction is made, "Oh, well, let us get a lot of

these submarine boats, with which we will blow up the battle ships, and therefore it is not necessary to build any battle ships."

Gentlemen, I want to call your attention to the fact that a human being is better able to protect himself on land than anywhere else. When he stands on terra firma he has his full powers and capacities. Put him on the sea and he must necessarily lose some part of his abilities. If, then, you put him into a little narrow space where he is covered up and locked in he is deprived of another part of his power. Now, put him under water, where he can not tell where he is going or what he is doing, or whether he is going to come to the surface or not, and you deprive him of another part of his power. These inventions are mere mechanical inventions, the outgrowth of the human disposition to get something or other that will do in the nature of supernatural or unnatural things.

The great strength of a navy is its battle ship, manned by its trained seamen and its trained officers, who can stand with every faculty alert, protected by the armor of that ship and strengthened by the confidence which comes from its stability. I say that the fighting machine armed in that way is the one that will always do the most effective service. If you could have a battle ship quiet and at rest, and have one of these torpedo boats or submarine boats come under it and get its bearings and inflict its blow, the ship making no defense, then it might be possible for such a contrivance to do damage—to blow up a battle ship. But when you remember that 600 men are aboard the battle ship, that it is moving, that the tides are moving, that the currents are moving, that the men in command are looking out for all these things that may happen, I undertake to say that a submarine boat is in effect of little or no consequence in modern warfare. Every single experiment that the American Navy has tried in regard to these mechanical inventions has practically proven to be a mistake and a failure.

The *Vesuvius* was to accomplish wonderful things. We were to throw dynamite for miles into the forts and blow things right and left. The battle ships, too, were to be destroyed by it. But the *Vesuvius* proved itself in the Spanish war to be substantially of no value whatever. Then we got the ram *Katahdin*, which was to run with a speed that would enable it to cut with its knife-blade front right into a battle ship and destroy it. To-day the *Katahdin* is another illustration of the fact that it was so much money thrown away to gratify the mechanical imagination of inventors who thought they had got something that would accomplish, in a measure, superhuman things.

Now, there is another thing in this bill to which I wish to call attention and consideration of which I ask of the members of the House. We have been constantly building up the matériel of the Navy. As I stated in the beginning, half of the Navy vessels, when you take tonnage into consideration more than half, have been built during the five years of the administration of John D. Long. At the same time we have not been preparing ourselves to man those vessels, and it is an absolute fact that you may take the vessels of the United States Navy to-day and you could not officer them if they were all ordered into commission.

Every single officer taken from every single bureau, taken from every yard, and placed on these vessels would not be sufficient to man them. Why? Simply because no provision has been made for a relative increase of the officers in proportion to the increase of the vessels. This increase must necessarily be made. Some people charge the Navy of the United States with being exclusive, aristocratic, if you please. I want to say to you that the preparation of a naval officer must necessarily be different from that of an Army officer. He must not only be trained in military discipline, but he must be trained in a number of things that are necessary to make up the education of a naval officer.

Under and since the personnel bill he must know all about mechanics and machinery; he must be an engineer; he must be not only a mechanical engineer, but he must be an electrical engineer. Upon these great vessels of war we have the most complex machinery, mechanical and electrical in character, and therefore the officer must be thoroughly conversant in these things. In addition to that he must be an educated man; he must be a lawyer to a certain extent. He must be thoroughly acquainted with the principles of international law, because he does not stay here at home, but he goes to the foreign nations; and when in the foreign ports he is a representative of the Government and must be the arbiter of those questions which arise, not only of courtesy, but also of business and commerce and of the disagreements between his nation and the foreign nation.

Away back yonder, one hundred and twenty-five years ago, Paul Jones, the father of the American Navy, defined what an American naval officer must be. I quote it in my remarks, because while that article was written a century and a quarter ago by the hero that fought the greatest and most romantic battle that was ever fought in the history of the world, a battle that took to the bottom of the sea his flag in triumph flying, upon the vessel that

won it, yet those remarks are absolutely true and define what the character of a naval officer should be to-day.

Mr. TAYLER of Ohio. Will the gentleman just permit an interruption? Did not John Paul Jones exhibit in his diplomatic knowledge and achievements quite as great ability as he did as a naval officer?

Mr. DAYTON. I thank the gentleman for his suggestion. Why, Mr. Chairman, I undertake to say that until right recently no man in American history was worse misjudged or as little understood as Paul Jones. He was a statesman that stood side by side with Washington and Jefferson and Adams, and he made fewer mistakes than John Adams did. He was a diplomat, he was a gentleman, he was a scholar, and, above all things, he was as noble a patriot and as devoted to the flag of this country as any man who ever drew breath in it. [Applause.]

But let me read his letter to a committee of Congress under date of September 14, 1775, referred to:

As this is to be the foundation, or I may say the first keel timber, of a new navy, which all patriots must hope shall become among the foremost in the world, it should be well begun in the selection of the first list of officers. You will pardon me, I know, if I say that I have enjoyed much opportunity during my sea life to observe the duties and responsibilities that are put upon naval officers.

It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that of course, but also a great deal more. He should be as well a gentleman of liberal education, refined manners, punctilious courtesy, and the nicest sense of personal honor.

He should not only be able to express himself clearly and with force in his own language, both with tongue and pen, but he should also be versed in French and Spanish—for an American officer, particularly the former—for our relations with France must necessarily become exceedingly close in view of the mutual hostility of the two countries toward Great Britain.

The naval officer should be familiar with the principles of international law and the general practice of admiralty jurisprudence, because such knowledge may often, when cruising at a distance from home, be necessary to protect his flag from insult, or his crew from imposition or injury in foreign ports.

He should be conversant with the usages of diplomacy and capable of maintaining, if called upon, a dignified and judicious diplomatic correspondence, because it often happens that sudden emergencies in foreign waters make him the diplomatic as well as military representative of his country, and in such cases he may have to act without opportunity of consulting his civic or ministerial superiors at home, and such action may easily involve the portentous issue of peace or war between great powers. These are general qualifications, and the nearer the officer approaches the full possession of them the more likely he will be to serve his country well and win fame and honors for himself.

Coming now to view the naval officer aboard ship and in relation to those under his command, he should be the soul of tact, patience, justice, firmness, and charity. No meritorious act of a subordinate should escape his attention or be left to pass without its reward, if even the reward be only one word of approval. Conversely, he should not be blind to a single fault in any subordinate, though at the same time he should be quick and unfailing to distinguish error from malice, thoughtlessness from incompetency, and well-meant shortcoming from heedless or stupid blunder; as he should be universal and impartial in his reward and approval of merit, so should he be judicial and unbending in his punishment or reproof of misconduct.

In his intercourse with subordinates he should ever maintain the attitude of a commander, but that need by no means prevent him from the amenities of cordiality or the cultivation of good cheer within proper limits. Every commanding officer should hold with his subordinates such relations as will make them constantly anxious to receive invitation to sit at his mess table, and his bearing toward them should be such as to encourage them to express their opinions to him with freedom and to ask his views without reserve.

It is always for the best interests of the service that a cordial interchange of sentiments and civility should subsist between superior and subordinate officers aboard ship. Therefore, it is the worst of policy in superiors to behave toward their subordinates with indiscriminate hauteur, as if the latter were of a lower species. Men of liberal minds, themselves accustomed to command can ill brook being thus set at naught by others who from temporary authority may claim a monopoly of power and sense for the time being.

If such men experience rude, ungentle treatment from their superiors, it will create such heartburnings and resentments as are nowise consonant with that cheerful ardor and ambitious spirit that ought ever to be characteristic of officers of all grades. In one word, every commander should keep constantly before him the great truth, that to be well obeyed he must be perfectly esteemed.

But it is not alone with subordinate officers that a commander has to deal. Behind them, and the foundation of all, is the crew. To his men the commanding officer should be prophet, priest, and king! His authority when on shore being necessarily absolute, the crew should be, as one man, impressed that the captain, like the sovereign, "can do no wrong."

This is the most delicate of all the commanding officer's obligations. No rule can be set for meeting it. It must ever be a question of tact and perception of human nature on the spot and to suit the occasion. If an officer fails in this he can not make up for such failure by severity, austerity, or cruelty. Use force and apply restraint or punishment as he may, he will always have a sullen crew and an unhappy ship.

But force must be used sometimes for the ends of discipline. On such occasions the quality of the commander will be most sorely tried. You and the other members of the honorable committee will, I am sure, pardon me for speaking with some feeling on this point. It is known to you and, I presume, to the other gentlemen, your colleagues, that only a few years ago I was called upon in a desperate emergency and as a last resort to preserve the discipline requisite for the salvation of my ship and my fever-stricken crew to put to death with my own hands a refractory and wholly incorrigible sailor.

I stood jury trial for it and was honorably acquitted. My acquittal was due wholly to the impression made upon the minds of the jury by the testimony of my crew. \* \* \* I do not reproach myself, but it is a case to illustrate the truth of what I have already said, namely, that the commander should always impress his crew with the belief that whatever he does or may have to do is right, and that, like the sovereign, he "can do no wrong."

When a commander has by tact, patience, justice, and firmness, each exercised in its proper turn, produced such an impression upon those under his orders in a ship of war, he has only to await the appearance of his enemy's topsails upon the horizon.

He can never tell when that moment may come. But when it does come



he may be sure of victory over an equal or somewhat superior force, or honorable defeat by one greatly superior. Or, in rare cases, sometimes justifiable, he may challenge the devotion of his followers to sink with him alongside the more powerful foe, and all go down together with the unstricken flag of their country still waving defiantly over them in their ocean sepulcher!

No such achievements are possible to an unhappy ship with a sullen crew. All these considerations pertain to the naval officer afloat. But part, and often an important part, of his career must be in port or on duty ashore. Here he must be of affable temper and a master of civilities.

He must meet and mix with his inferiors of rank in society ashore, and on such occasions he must have tact, to be easy and gracious with them, particularly when ladies are present; at the same time without the least air of patronage or affected condescension, though constantly preserving the distinction of rank.

It may not be possible to always realize these ideas to the full, but they should form the standard, and selections ought to be made with a view to their closest approximation.

In old-established navies, like, for example, those of Britain and France, generations are bred and specially educated to the duties and responsibilities. In land forces generals may and sometimes do rise from the ranks. But I have not yet heard of an admiral coming aft from a fore-castle. Even in the merchant service master mariners almost invariably start as cabin apprentices. In all my wide acquaintance with the merchant service I can now think of but three competent master mariners who made their first appearance on board ship "through the hawse hole," as the saying is.

A navy is essentially and necessarily aristocratic. True as may be the political principles for which we are now contending, they can never be practically applied or even admitted on board ship, out of port or off soundings. This may seem a hardship, but it is nevertheless the simplest of truths. Whilst the ships sent forth by the Congress may and must fight for the principles of human rights and republican freedom, the ships themselves must be ruled and commanded at sea under a system of absolute despotism.

I trust that I have now made fairly clear to you the tremendous responsibilities that devolve upon the honorable committee of which you are a member. You are called upon to found a new navy, to lay the foundations of a new power afloat that must some time, in the course of human events, become formidable enough to dispute even with England the mastery of the ocean. Neither you nor I may live to see such growth.

But we are here at the planting of the tree, and maybe some of us must, in the course of destiny, water its feeble and struggling roots with our blood. If so, let it be so. We can not help it. We must do the best we can with what we have at hand.

I hope the members of this House will take occasion, if they have not already done so, to study this statement, the definition, if you please, of what a naval officer should be, made by Paul Jones.

For the reasons given by him it is necessary for us to educate these naval officers. It is necessary that this education be not only a liberal literary education, but an education in all these other things that enter into and make a part of the naval officer's life.

We have a great school at Annapolis, where this education goes on. Necessarily you can not pick up men in civil life and enlist them as officers in the naval establishment and expect them to come up to these high requirements. They must be educated, not alone like the man in one of our ordinary colleges who takes a special course, it may be in law, it may be in literary matters, it may be in engineering; but he must have an education in all of these branches, and, in addition to that, he must have an education in seamanship.

This is the sole reason why the naval organization up to this time has drawn its officers from its naval school. To meet this requirement, because of the insufficiency of officers, we have provided in this bill for 500 additional cadets to be appointed to the Naval Academy. A number of our vessels will be completed in four years. It is confidently believed that this provision will give us from 300 to 360 additional officers.

Mr. HEPBURN. Will it interrupt the gentleman if I should ask him a question here?

Mr. DAYTON. Certainly not.

Mr. HEPBURN. I should like to know how many officers of the Navy are now detailed in the Navy Department here in this city.

Mr. DAYTON. I really am unable to tell you accurately.

Mr. HEPBURN. I have heard the statement that there are 151.

Mr. DAYTON. That is an impossibility.

Mr. HEPBURN. It is?

Mr. DAYTON. Yes; absolutely. My judgment is that there are not actual naval officers detailed in the Department here at Washington to exceed 40 or 50. If the chairman of the committee has an accurate statement, I hope he will correct me if I am wrong. There are a number detailed at Annapolis, who are engaged in instructing the cadets there.

Mr. HEPBURN. How many are there?

Mr. DAYTON. Of course there are not as many there now as there were during the session of the school. I think 51, if I counted rightly, were at Annapolis the first of this year in charge of the school there. A number of those have been detached. In fact, the class was graduated in this month, rather than in June, in order that the officers might be detached and sent to the Philippine Islands, and a number of them have already been sent there.

Mr. HEPBURN. Does the gentleman remember how many cadets there were at the Naval Academy, say, about the 1st of May, at the time of the graduating exercises, whenever they were?

Mr. DAYTON. About 400, according to my recollection.

Mr. HEPBURN. So many as that?

Mr. DAYTON. I think so.

Mr. BUTLER. Is not the gentleman mistaken about that?

Mr. DAYTON. I may be. What is your recollection?

Mr. BUTLER. Between 350 and 375.

Mr. DAYTON. I may be wrong in my statement. There ought to be about 400, but there may have been some vacancies, growing out of the fact that the members of Congress had not their districts represented. I was speaking as to the number that ought to be there, but I could not speak as to the number of vacancies.

Mr. HEPBURN. How many were there in the graduating class?

Mr. DAYTON. My recollection is there were 58.

Mr. BUTLER. Fifty-eight.

Mr. HEPBURN. And 51 officers acting as professors?

Mr. DAYTON. There were 58 in the graduating class.

Mr. HEPBURN. How many professors were there in addition to the naval officers?

Mr. DAYTON. Not very many; I would not undertake to say how many, but not very many. The teaching force is almost entirely made up of officers, and this must necessarily be so, because of the fact that they have to train and discipline these cadets in seamanship and in military discipline, and in the things that make up an officer. I do not undertake to say that my statements are absolutely accurate as to numbers.

Mr. BUTLER of Pennsylvania. Do I understand from the gentleman that any of the recent graduates will be assigned to the construction corps?

Mr. DAYTON. I really do not know.

Mr. HEPBURN. I should like to ask the gentleman another question or two.

Mr. DAYTON. I am very glad to yield to the gentleman, but my time is limited.

Mr. HEPBURN. Very well.

Mr. DAYTON. But I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HEPBURN. The question I wanted to ask is whether the course of instruction there is uniform to all the cadets.

Mr. DAYTON. It is now. It was not so formerly.

Mr. HEPBURN. All cadets have that primary information to put them in the department of constructors?

Mr. DAYTON. Yes.

Mr. HEPBURN. To put them in the department of steam engineering?

Mr. DAYTON. Yes; in steam engineering since the personnel bill.

Mr. HEPBURN. To put them in the department of naval engineer?

Mr. DAYTON. Yes.

Mr. HEPBURN. They are all so instructed?

Mr. DAYTON. They are all instructed alike, I think.

Mr. HEPBURN. Yet only a few can serve in these various departments?

Mr. DAYTON. Simply because the number in the corps is limited by law. For example, the constructor corps so many.

Mr. HEPBURN. Yes.

Mr. DAYTON. The Engineer Corps is a part of the line, you know.

Mr. HEPBURN. Is it wise to educate all in that class, or would it be wiser to educate a certain number?

Mr. DAYTON. I think it is wise to educate them all, for the reason that you can not tell at all until after years of experience has demonstrated what a boy's capabilities will be. That is one reason why I advocated the amalgamation of the Engineer Corps and the line. Some men are in line whose natural predilections would have been for the Engineer Corps. So I think it better for them to be educated for both.

Mr. SNODGRASS. Will the gentleman yield to me for a question?

Mr. DAYTON. Certainly.

Mr. SNODGRASS. I understand the gentleman to say that this bill provides for the appointment of 500 additional cadets?

Mr. DAYTON. Yes; in addition to the present law, which goes right straight on.

Mr. SNODGRASS. Will that necessitate any additional buildings or facilities for instruction?

Mr. DAYTON. No; this provision is to be extended over a period of four years. Each Senator is to have the appointment of one cadet, each Member of Congress and each Delegate under the new apportionment of next year is to have one cadet, and the President is to have 24. Under the provision of the bill 125 are to be appointed each year for four years, and the Secretary of the Navy is to determine by lot which ones shall be appointed.

Mr. SNODGRASS. They have ample facilities there now for this additional number of cadets.

Mr. DAYTON. They have ample facilities. We are already expending \$8,000,000 on the Naval Academy in rebuilding.

Mr. KLUTTZ. I want to ask the gentleman if he does not think the provision in the bill for the selection of these cadets to be made by lot should be made absolute? I do not wish to accuse the Secretary of the Navy of partiality or anything of the kind.

Mr. DAYTON. I want to say this to the gentleman: I think I do not abuse any confidence of the committee room when I say that I have given personally a great deal of attention to this matter. To make any such provision as the gentleman suggests would increase the verbiage, and there was some objection made—not here, but elsewhere—to the provision being extended into minute details. The matter, however, was thoroughly discussed with the Navy Department, and that was the understanding, that it would be done by lot, and I supposed that would be satisfactory.

Mr. KLUTTZ. I have perfect confidence in the present Secretary of the Navy, and am satisfied with the gentleman's explanation.

Mr. DAYTON. However, the first year, because the Senate never had any cadets, theirs shall first be taken. Gentlemen will understand that the President's 24 will be divided over the four years, 6 each year, just like the rest of us.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I do not desire to occupy but a moment longer. I earnestly hope, from what I have already said, that we may pass this bill without any material objection on either side. This, it seems to me, when it comes to building up the American Navy, is common ground for both sides of the Chamber to stand upon, and that politics should not enter into the consideration of these great questions. My plea is for the upbuilding of the Navy and for investing American resources in this necessary arm of defense. It is a work that we can all go hand in hand in; and for my part, I would favor a larger increase, a larger building programme this year than provided for in this bill.

But certainly there can be no objection to this programme when it is remembered that we have, with two small exceptions, two gunboats provided only for the vessels that the last Congress directed the Department to prepare and report plans and specifications for. We built none last year, and we certainly ought to have no objections to the building of these four this year. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, if I have any time remaining, I yield it back to the chairman of the committee.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE.

The committee informally rose; and Mr. BUTLER having taken the chair as Speaker pro tempore, a message from the Senate, by Mr. PARKINSON, its reading clerk, announced that the Senate had passed joint resolution of the following title; in which the concurrence of the House was requested:

Joint resolution (S. R. 99) fixing the time when certain provisions of the Indian appropriation act for the year ending June 30, 1903, shall take effect.

The message also announced that the Senate had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 13996) making appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service in the Republic of Cuba.

The message also announced that the Senate had further insisted upon the amendments to the bill (H. R. 8587) for the allowance of certain claims for stores and supplies reported by the Court of Claims under the provisions of the act approved March 3, 1883, and commonly known as the "Bowman Act," disagreed to by the House of Representatives, had agreed to the further conference asked by the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and had appointed Mr. WARREN, Mr. TELLER, and Mr. MASON as the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed without amendment the following resolution:

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring).* That there be 6,000 additional copies of the report of the Director of the Mint on the production of the precious metals for the calendar year 1900, bound in cloth and wrapped; 2,000 copies for the use of the House of Representatives, 1,000 for the use of the Senate, and 3,000 copies for the use of the Director of the Mint.

*Resolved.* That there also be printed 8,000 additional copies of the report of the Director of the Mint covering the operations of the mints and assay offices of the United States for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1901, to be bound in cloth and wrapped; 3,000 copies for the use of the House of Representatives, 2,000 for the use of the Senate, and 3,000 for the use of the Director of the Mint.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed, with amendments, bill of the following title; in which the concurrence of the House of Representatives was requested:

H. R. 13895. An act making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903.

#### NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

The committee resumed its session.

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I now yield one hour to the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, this bill will pass, but not until after there have been some efforts made to amend it, because a bill of this magnitude, dealing with so many different items, carrying so much money, can hardly be presumed to meet the ideas of all the members of the House or even of the Committee on Naval Affairs itself. There are many items in this bill that I do not indorse. I have not the time to refer to all the items on which I differ with the majority of the committee.

But, Mr. Chairman, upon an important one I desire to be heard. There is no disposition upon the part of those members of the committee whose views I share to cut down or in any way hamper the Navy Department or the development and healthy growth of the Navy itself. I indorse those patriotic utterances of the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. DAYTON] that he delighted in giving to the House a few moments ago in eulogy of our great Navy. I do not think that he intended to say that anybody on this side wanted to cut down the Navy. I take it that there is not a man in this body who does not want to see the American Navy go on in strength and power, but there is some difference of opinion as to how rapid the strides shall be with which we advance to the final point of perfection.

I do not believe that there is anything in our environment that requires us to undertake to compete with the navy of England in the number of ships or in tonnage. While I believe to-day that we have a better Navy, a stronger Navy, a more effective Navy than Germany, I do not believe the conditions require us to measure our Navy and its strength and its glory by the navy of Germany. Under Germany's programme, which I believe was originally intended to be completed by 1916, but which I understand the chairman of the Naval Committee thinks will be completed by 1908, Germany will then have 56 battle ships. We will have more than that number of first-class machines of warfare by that time, even at a more moderate rate of increase than is indicated in this bill. We to-day have, built and building, 47 first-class machines of war, including 18 battle ships, 21 protected cruisers, and 8 armored cruisers. For all practical purposes a protected cruiser and an armored cruiser is a battle ship, whether you call it so or not. In actual war the protected and armored cruiser is as powerful as the battle ship, in my judgment, and I think naval experts bear me out. These cruisers are about as expensive as first-class battle ships.

I deny that it is necessary to take these immense strides year by year, entailing annually on the people \$30,000,000 expense to increase this Navy, to say nothing of the vast sums for maintenance. The new Navy we already have has cost us about \$250,000,000, and we ought to be and are proud of it.

The 6 new ships, which include 2 battle ships, 2 armored cruisers, and 2 gunboats, provided in this bill, will cost about \$30,000,000. As far as I am concerned I believe we could well do with 1 battle ship and 1 cruiser, and if we should adopt the plan of building annually 1 battle ship and 1 cruiser for the next several years I think that would be fast enough to increase our Navy. European nations living right at each other's doors need to have larger standing armies than the United States; they need to be more readily prepared for war at all times than the United States, and they need greater and larger navies to defend themselves than the United States. An ocean divides us from any powerful possible enemy. Another thing: I believe some of the bureaus of the Navy Department ought to be consolidated. For instance, we have a Bureau of Construction and Repair, a Bureau of Equipment, and a Bureau of Steam Engineering, every one of which pertains directly to the building and completion of ships.

Why should they not be united? Secretary Long, who gave protracted study to this matter, earnestly recommended it. Why, Mr. Chairman, the great reason, in my judgment, why such consolidation is opposed is that the heads of these bureaus and the clerks under them do not want to lose their places, and men aspiring some day to fill these positions want the offices retained. I believe this lies at the bottom of the opposition, because if we were to conduct our business as any man of ordinary prudence would, we would consolidate these bureaus pertaining to the construction of ships, and thus save many salaries. So, Mr. Chairman, I differ with the gentleman from West Virginia on that point.

Another thing: I believe we ought to have more submarine boats, and that we ought to make provision for some in this bill. Ever since the submarine boat has been before the public I have shared the opinion that these boats are the best instrument of defense for our harbors, and I was strengthened in this opinion two years ago by the testimony of Admiral Dewey, who showed the highest respect not only for the effectiveness of these submarine boats, but for the protection which the moral force of their very presence would afford in a harbor.

I do not pretend to quote exactly, but according to my recollection Admiral Dewey testified before our committee that if he and his men had known that there were two submarine boats in



the harbor of Manila, had such boats been there, the men in his fleet could never have carried their vessels into that harbor. The moral and mental strain would have been too much for human nerve. Why, sir, the reason is apparent. Is there a commander anywhere who would take a fleet into a position that meant almost certain destruction to a battle ship or to several battle ships? If a commander under such circumstances should lose a battle ship and with it hundreds of lives, historians to the remotest times would criticize him and he would be denounced throughout the civilized world for doing so reckless an act. I am reminded by my friend from North Carolina [Mr. KLUTTZ] that a late distinguished member of this committee, Mr. Cummings, was an earnest, hearty advocate of the submarine boats. Seacoast cities throughout the land want these submarine boats in their harbors. I have received many communications from Wilmington, N. C., desiring submarine boats for the protection of that city. They can not be procured until more of those boats are in our Navy.

But, Mr. Chairman, the main thing that I wish to advocate for a few minutes is the proposition to build more of our ships in the navy-yards—whether we are to build all of them there or not, certainly to build more than one in our navy-yards.

Mr. Chairman, there are members in this body who kept up with the great fight that was made against the Government paying to private factories exorbitant prices for its armor plate. There were gentlemen then in this House—and, if I recollect correctly, the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. DAYTON] was one of them—who argued strongly against the position we took and in favor of allowing the conditions that then existed to continue, under which our Government would have paid the armor-plate factories \$545 per ton for every ton of armor plate used by our Navy. But some of us on the Naval Committee saw fit to protest against the then existing policy and to advocate a change in the method of acquiring our armor plate.

What has been the result? Instead of paying \$545 per ton—which was the lowest price at which armor plate was then offered to us—owing to the fight that we made for lower prices, although we did not succeed in having an armor-plate factory erected by the Government, yet the Government succeeded in getting armor plate at \$420 per ton, plus the royalty. And by that one struggle made on this bill two years ago the Government has saved something like three million and a half of dollars upon armor plate alone.

As I understand, under the law that was then passed, there have been 37,000 tons of armor plate purchased—purchased at a cost of about \$100 a ton less than these plate factories had demanded theretofore; and that reduced price means a saving to the people of this country of \$3,700,000. We shall hereafter need other armor plate, and we should take steps to get it cheaper, for I believe that \$420 a ton is still too much to pay for it. In the committee I unsuccessfully tried to have a provision incorporated in this bill giving the Secretary of the Navy the power to erect an armor-plate factory.

And now, Mr. Chairman, we contend for the building of more ships in the navy-yards of the Government. We believe it will save to the people of the country more money than the fight that we made for armor plate saved to the people in that direction. We believe that if this Congress will authorize the building of one of these ships to be authorized by this bill at Mare Island, another at Brooklyn, another at Boston, and another at Norfolk, we shall save a large sum of money on these ships, and that the building of these ships in this way will demonstrate to the country that the private contractors have been charging us exorbitant prices for ships; that we shall thus get data which will inform us of the actual cost of ships, and that hereafter, having this information which will be absolutely reliable, we shall be prepared to make contracts intelligently, and if we are going to continue to build up the Navy it will mean a saving of many millions of dollars in the years to come.

The question is whether we are willing to branch out in this line and try to save this money to the taxpayers of the country. We believe that it will be an economical method of building ships; that it will improve the mechanical force and the general efficiency of our navy-yards and enable us to do the repair work for the navy in a more economical manner. We believe, as Admiral Bowles believed before he became connected more intimately with the Administration as head of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, that there are nine reasons which ought to induce Congress to require the building of some of our ships in the Government navy-yards. The nine reasons or advantages which Admiral Bowles gave two years ago when he was in charge as constructor of the greatest navy-yard in the country were these:

1. Maintains efficiency of force and plant.
2. Renders repair work economical and rapid.
3. Will reduce the amount of repair work by removing the necessity for maintenance of force.
4. Maintains a standard of workmanship and design on basis of practical experience.

5. Provides training for those who must inspect contractors' work.
6. No profit to be made.
7. The indirect charges in commercial practice which makes a large percentage of cost are not included, because they are already provided and are maintained for other purposes, viz: Interest on plant, taxes, insurance, depreciation and care of property, large proportion of office and organization expense.
8. Cost of inspection is saved.
9. Cost of trial trip is saved.

These were the nine reasons that Admiral Bowles gave for building ships in the Government navy-yards. I will state also that he gave nine disadvantages in building these ships in Government navy-yards, but he summed it up by saying that in his judgment it was a wise thing to build ships in navy-yards. I quote from his testimony before our committee:

I will say a few words now about the general subject of building ships in navy-yards. I recommend the building of some vessels in the important navy-yards in the United States, because I believe it to be good business, and if I owned those yards and kept them for the purposes they are now kept, I should say it would be a sensible thing to do to build one ship in each important yard all the time simply to keep them in order and maintain a sufficient force ready for all emergencies.

Then he goes on to state what yards he thinks are prepared to build these ships. I will state that in Mr. Bowles's opinion, Mr. Stahl, then the constructor at Norfolk Navy-Yard, and Mr. Baxter, who was on the Pacific coast, as I recall, concurred, all favoring the construction of ships in our navy-yards. Admiral Hichborn also, in his report dated September 29, 1900, being then at the head of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, was strongly in favor of building ships in Government navy-yards. I have his report on this subject, which is as follows:

#### BUILDING VESSELS IN NAVY-YARDS.

Much has been said both in favor of and against the building of vessels in the navy-yards. The progress made in the improvement of yard plants and the ever-increasing need for a permanent skilled force ready for and capable of at all times taking up repairs of any character which the growth in "matériel" of the Navy entails makes it desirable that the question should be given careful consideration. There is at the present time, in view of the prosperous condition of the shipbuilding industry and the number of naval vessels building and appropriated for, sufficient work to permit the assignment of a portion of the building work to the Government yards without there being a question of the withdrawal or withholding of necessary support and assistance, through work given out, to a private industry, the maintenance of which in a high state of efficiency is unquestionably of national importance.

These conditions make it possible to eliminate from the discussion any questions of policy except such as affect economy and efficiency. It has been the history of all the iron and steel navies in existence to-day that the building of the vessels was at first entirely confided to private industry, and that the existence of the nucleus of a steel fleet made it necessary that the governments who were their owners should themselves provide for repairing these vessels; and that, having provided the necessary plant for this purpose, the provision for the maintenance of the equally necessary though vastly more difficult thing to attain, viz, efficient working organization and adequate efficient personnel, forced them to undertake in their navy-yards a portion of the new building work. The extent to which this is being done by the principal naval powers may be seen by the table below:

Nation.	Number of Government navy-yards in which building is carried on.	Number of battle ships building in Government yards.	Number of armored cruisers building in Government yards.	Number of other cruising vessels.
England .....	5	8	5	3
France .....	5	3	10	4
Germany .....	3	3	1	4
Russia .....	2	3	1	2
Italy .....	2	1	-----	2

In the case of many of the European nations—for example, Denmark and Holland, maintaining smaller navies—so strongly is this necessity for a permanent efficient navy-yard personnel felt that practically all the naval building work undertaken by them is carried out at their navy-yards. What they have done and are doing is mentioned here solely to emphasize the fact that the unanimous testimony of experience has been and is that the execution of a certain amount of building work at the chief Government yards is necessary to the maintenance of such navy-yard staffs as a complete and efficient naval organization requires; and that, whatever disadvantages such a course entails, they are more than compensated for in the end. It is believed that we have reached that stage in a naval development—still considerably behind our national development—which forces upon us serious consideration of this step which other naval powers have found necessary and expedient.

At the outset the disadvantages to be labored under will be considerable. Time and experience will do much toward the alleviation or possibly the entire removal of many of these. While, under existing conditions, in the case of the first vessels built in our navy-yards it may be expected that the cost will not be greatly different from—may even be somewhat greater than for—the same work executed by contract in the private shipyards, the Bureau believes that such a course once entered upon would demonstrate its desirability and practicability in an increased efficiency and economy in naval administration, regarded as a whole, without interference with a judicious policy of such Government encouragement of the shipbuilding industry as will keep the greatest number of establishments in a position to undertake and execute promptly any naval work which may be required.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am aware that Constructor Bowles, since his promotion to the head of this Bureau, has modified his opinion. It is not for me to undertake to explain that. I know not how strong the influences, or how clearer the light, or how fuller the information may be that cause a man to modify views that

he entertained before becoming intimate with the Administration. Frequently we have evidences of such modifications. I do not know whether it is simply a change of judgment on the part of Constructor Bowles or a change of desires also.

I suppose I will do him no injustice to allude to a statement that has been published in one of the most reputable Republican papers on the Pacific coast, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, for I have not seen it denied, to the effect that the chief constructor of the Navy has contemplated some day becoming connected with private shipbuilding plants. I know not whether that is true, but if he should have the ambition some day to become the head of some great private shipbuilding concern, then I could see some reason for a change of his heart upon these matters. I could then see why he should want the Government to stay out of the shipbuilding business; I could then see why he should want the Government to continue to buy all of its ships from private contractors. That would account for a change of his wishes upon it. But I do not see that that would necessarily account for a change of judgment on his part.

As I understand, he has stated lately that building ships in public yards will cost 25 per cent more than building ships in the private yards. Now, let us consider that. What are the advantages that a private yard has as to the cost of construction over the Government yard? First, they say in a Government yard we give the mechanics fifteen days' leave of absence. Well, that is true. Fifteen days is what percentage of a year's work? Fifteen days is, I believe, about one-twentieth, which would be 5 per cent. Say that is 5 per cent added to the cost of labor. They say that in the Government yards the mechanics work only eight hours a day, while in private yards they work ten. In other words, the private yard has an advantage of 25 per cent over the public yard. Well, that added to the 5 per cent on the leave would make 30 per cent. Then, there is 30 per cent in the labor.

Now, the labor in the yards that goes into the construction of a battle ship is one-half of its cost, as I am informed; it is so estimated. Then 30 per cent of the labor is 15 per cent of the total cost of the ship. So upon that hypothesis you would find they would contend that the private yard has an advantage of 15 per cent. Now, let us see what they have to offset that 15 per cent. In the first place, by building your ships in the public yards you will have a better product, in my judgment. In the second place, the mechanics in the shipyards will be the best class of mechanics in this country working only eight hours a day, and they will do more work in eight hours than the ten-hour men will do in eight hours.

So that will diminish that per cent in some respects. Then, as Constructor Bowles says, the cost of inspection is saved, and, if my recollection is right, the cost of inspecting one of these big battle ships is from \$50,000 to \$75,000. So that will come off of the 15 per cent. The cost of the trial trip, which is always large, will be saved. That will come off of this 15 per cent. Then, again, no profit is to be made. I take it that certainly a reasonable man, under the evidence, will believe that as a matter of calculation in the cost these private yards can not build their ships for more than 10 per cent less than the public yards can build them. Is there anybody who believes that a private yard has ever yet taken a contract for Government work at a profit of 10 per cent? It has been asserted that private yards have made as much as 40 per cent, and even more; but suppose we assume that the private yards have been making only 25 per cent.

Then, Mr. Chairman, we ought to save at least 15 per cent in cash by building these ships in the Government yards, which will be a saving of nearly a million dollars on each great warship. Let me say that it has been demonstrated in these cards sent to the members of Congress by the Vallejo Chamber of Commerce, which cards, I believe, are in the main correct and just, that the public yards can build these ships just as cheaply as the private yards. But even if we should have to pay the same amount of money for our battle ships, who will get the profits? Why, this great army of mechanics who work in the public navy-yards would get the profits. The profits would be divided among the thousands who labor from early morn till evening, instead of going into the pockets of a dozen owners of private shipyards.

Is it not better, is it not more patriotic, that these enormous profits should be divided among the many, or else retained in the people's Treasury, rather than be given to the private shipowners, when they are no longer beggars as infant industries at our hands? The private yards are running on full time. They have more work than they can turn out upon contract time now, as I understand. They do not come to us as suppliants. They stand erect in their wealth, demanding of this Congress that we do not go into the business of building our own ships, for fear that it may take from them their great profits upon Government work.

Mr. RIXEY. May I ask the gentleman a question?

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. Certainly.

Mr. RIXEY. In the interesting statement the gentleman has

given us he says that the private shipyards work their men ten hours. Is it not likely that a law will be passed providing that these shipbuilding plants shall only work their labor eight hours upon Government contracts? I understand that the Committee on Labor have drafted such a bill.

Mr. WILLIAM W. KITCHIN. I think the gentleman from Virginia is correct; but, Mr. Chairman, I was arguing it from the other standpoint. Our public yards are no longer in the unorganized state that they were when the *Texas*, the *Raleigh*, the *Cincinnati*, and the *Maine* were built. There is no longer a deficiency in men or in machinery, but they are to-day provided with the best machinery known to the trade. They are located on good water fronts. They have every advantage that the private yards have. This great Government of ours has invested in its public yards something like \$100,000,000, and we turn out four or five million dollars' worth of repairs, when it costs us annually to maintain these yards something like eight or ten million dollars.

As Admiral Bowles said before he became the head of the Bureau, it is good business and it is good common sense to use these great plants that we have, this improved machinery that we have, the vast sums that we are compelled to pay for maintenance, in the interest of the American mechanic, in the interest of the American Navy, in the interest of the American Treasury; and no longer be held off or intimidated from this proposition by the whims and the desires of the private shipbuilders of this country, who, of course, want to continue to make millions of dollars upon the battle ships that we put upon the sea.

The suggestion that all this contest for building ships in public yards came from the Pacific coast and from the Vallejo Chamber of Commerce is not correct. Long before I ever heard of the Vallejo Chamber of Commerce I was in favor of this proposition. Long before this chamber of commerce began to send these cards the minority of the Naval Committee—the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. TATE], whom I see before me; the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RIXEY], likewise before me; the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. VANDIVER], the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. WHEELER], and myself—filed minority views on the naval bill, two years ago, in which we set out at length our reasons for advocating the building of some of our ships in the Government navy-yards.

It was not a new proposition, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen on the other side can not escape from it by the cry of novelty in this matter. It is a disposition on the part of the people to relieve themselves from unjust extortion, as they believe, that is being committed upon the Government by the private shipbuilders. It is a disposition on the part of the people to use their navy-yards, not as toy establishments, but to do the great work that the Government requires. It is a disposition to maintain the navy-yards in a state of efficiency. It is a disposition to be just to the great labor organizations of this country and the mechanics who work in these yards and whose representatives have constantly favored it. This is not a new-born spirit.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that this spirit will grow, that it will increase until Congress will be compelled to adopt the proposition, in my judgment. You can not cry it down by this statement that it will increase the cost 25 per cent. What do we ask in this controversy? We ask for a fair trial of the proposition that we advocate. Give the navy-yards and the labor there employed an honest trial; and then, Mr. Chairman, if the prophecies that we have heard from the other side are true, if it turns out that it will cost 25 per cent more to build our ships in the navy-yards than it will by private contractors, then I for one will change my opinion upon it, and will say let us close the navy-yards against shipbuilding.

I would even go further than that, and would be willing that the private contractors should do our repair business as well as construction business. I do not believe it is good business to maintain this great army of mechanics in the navy-yards and expend vast sums in the maintenance of the plants, and keep vast amounts in plants, if we are only going to do four or five million dollars worth of repair work a year in them. We are asking a trial, and in order that we may have a fair trial we ask that the navy-yards at Mare Island, at Brooklyn, at Boston, and at Norfolk, that have the modern equipment, have a fair opportunity to demonstrate to the country and to the private shipyards that they can build a ship just as well and just as good a ship and build it at just as little cost as any private shipyard.

So, Mr. Chairman, it does seem that when the country has made a saving of over three millions in the matter of armor plate, against the earnest protest of many gentlemen on the other side, and when it is in the interest of the labor of the country, and patriotic members believe we can save more money by building our ships in the navy-yards than we did on the armor plate, Congress ought to yield to this demand and amend this bill so that it will



require not only one ship, but these four ships that are to be authorized in this bill to be built in the navy-yards.

Mr. Chairman, the bill as it now stands authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to build all these ships in the navy-yards, if he thinks it best. If the navy-yards are not ready and prepared, he is authorized to expend a sufficient sum of money to make them ready. The Secretary of the Navy is permitted to build four ships in the navy-yards, but he is required to build one of them in a navy-yard. We have that much in the bill over what we had last year and the year before. Never until this year, since I have been connected with this great committee, have we been able to get any proposition in the bill looking toward the construction of ships in the navy-yards.

Now, there will be a motion to amend, Mr. Chairman, to increase the number of ships to be built in the navy-yards. We want more than one built in the navy-yards. If there is only one to be built the work may be hampered—it may be allotted to the navy-yard which will prove to be not the best equipped for building economically. Now, if you have the four ships built in these four different yards, there will be very apt to be one or two of those yards which would build ships cheap the first time. We would be more apt to have sufficient correct information by building four than by building merely one.

We have now many ships being built in the private yards. We have eight battle ships and several protected cruisers and armored cruisers now on the docks of private yards. So we will know what they will cost ton for ton. Now, let us do the fair thing and have all these four ships built in the Government yards. Build these four ships, so that we will have these four different sources of information as to the actual cost in the navy-yards per ton.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the proposition that I intended to discuss. I believe it is understood that we will have some time under the five-minute rule to discuss this important proposition. I now return to the gentleman from Louisiana such portion of the time that he yielded to me as I have not consumed. [Loud applause on the Democratic side.]

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, I call for a quorum. We have not anyone to hear the discussion of this important matter. It is an important discussion, and there is no quorum present.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee raises the point of order that there is not a quorum present.

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count.

During the count.

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. I am willing that the debate shall go on, but I want the quorum to be present.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman withdraw the point?

Mr. GAINES of Tennessee. No; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will finish the count. [After the count.] One hundred and four gentlemen present, a quorum.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chairman, provision is made in the pending bill for two first-class battle ships, two first-class armored cruisers, and two gunboats. It has been customary to provide that new vessels authorized for the Navy should be built by contract. A departure from the established custom is made in the pending measure. By the terms of this bill the Secretary of the Navy is directed to build at least one of the battle ships or one of the armored cruisers in a navy-yard; and, further, it is made discretionary with him to build in the same way some or all of the other authorized vessels.

In its report the Committee on Naval Affairs states that—

In view of the fact that there is some public sentiment favorable to building ships in Government navy-yards, it has been deemed advisable by the committee to insert a provision in the appropriation bill of this year leaving it in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy to build any or all ships in Government yards, but making it mandatory on him to construct at least one battle ship or one armored cruiser in such navy-yard as he may designate, as an experiment.

It is true that there is not only some public sentiment, but there is a widespread conviction that the navy-yards of this country should be utilized for building purposes. In both sessions of the Fifty-sixth Congress vigorous efforts were made to have some provision similar to that contained in the pending bill inserted in the naval appropriation act. The movement for such legislation was not the result of hasty and ill-considered action. For some years naval architects had discussed the question; other great maritime powers had long since adopted the policy. Conditions that existed in respect to the contracts that had been made for the construction of war vessels for this Government were such that it seemed advisable that the Government should undertake building operations in its own yards, so that a comparison might be instituted as to the character of the work done in private yards, as well as the prices charged therefor.

I may be pardoned if I express at this time my personal gratifi-

cation at the committee's action in placing a mandatory provision in the bill for the building of at least one vessel in a Government yard. For more than three years I have devoted much time to the study of the question. Early in the first session of the Fifty-sixth Congress I became convinced that the wise and proper policy for this Government was that followed by Great Britain and the continental powers. To secure the adoption of such a policy I offered amendments to the naval appropriation bills in both the first and second sessions of the Fifty-sixth Congress which, if adopted, would have distributed the shipbuilding operations of the Government among the private and the Government shipyards. Continued investigation of the question has only strengthened my convictions, and naturally I am pleased to find the Committee on Naval Affairs incorporating such a provision in this bill.

Perhaps it would have been more nearly correct had the committee justified its action not upon the existence of some favorable public sentiment, but upon the widespread and almost universal expression of the existing public sentiment that was brought to the attention of the committee. Exhaustive hearings were held during the first session of the last Congress, to determine the advisability of building at navy-yards. Since then very little additional information has been contributed, and such that has been so contributed is the fruit of individual research and investigation. The diffusion throughout the country of the facts ascertained at those hearings, however, has awakened public interest to such an extent that the question can no longer be ignored nor evaded.

Upon two other occasions in this House I have discussed at some length the advantages and disadvantages of building at navy-yards. Briefly summarized, the advantages are that the mechanical force, the plant, and the shops of the navy-yards are maintained in an efficient condition; that it is possible to conduct the repair work more economically and rapidly; that the Government is enabled to maintain a high standard of workmanship and design, to which contractors can be made to conform; that the men detailed to inspect the work placed in private yards are trained in the most practical and thorough manner to render effective and satisfactory service to the Government; that there is no profit to be made, and the total cost is thereby so much lessened; that the indirect charges which exist in commercial practice and which make a large percentage of the cost—for instance, interest on plant, taxes, insurance, depreciation, care of property, and a large percentage of office and organization expenses—are not included in the Government charges; and that the cost of inspection, which when vessels are built by contract is very large, is saved to the Government.

The experience of the past has demonstrated that if no actual combination of the different shipbuilding plants in the country has existed in fact, that in nearly every instance when bids were invited for vessels authorized by the different appropriation acts an understanding, or, perhaps, a "gentlemen's agreement," had been made regarding the amounts of the bids to be submitted by those estimating and submitting bids. This I will undertake to show a little farther on in my remarks. So that an additional advantage resulting to the Government from the building in the navy-yards of some of the vessels authorized from time to time is that after the policy is once inaugurated it will be impossible for contractors to obtain excessive prices for the building of naval vessels.

It is not my purpose at this time to enlarge upon the advantages to be derived by the Government by the building of some vessels in navy-yards; my object, rather, will be to refute some additional arguments advanced against this policy.

Lately it has been urged with some flourish that the Government yards are not sufficiently equipped for building purposes; that they lack facilities possessed by all private plants doing Government work; that the lack of sufficient water by reason of the narrowness of the streams and other bodies of water upon which navy-yards are located would prevent, or, rather, make impossible, the launching of a battle ship or armored cruiser; that the Government would be unable to adopt the practice followed in all private establishments of purchasing large quantities of materials in the open market whenever the prices were favorable and retain such materials until required in the prosecution of some particular work; that the eight-hour law, under which mechanics in the navy-yards work only eight hours a day, as against a ten-hour day in the private yards, would result to the very great disadvantage of the Government, and that the fifteen days' annual leave which mechanics in Government yards now receive would increase the cost of work in Government yards to an enormous extent.

Careful investigation has convinced me that the only two of the above-mentioned objections that have any merit whatever is that urged because of the difference in the hours that a mechanic works in a Government yard and in a private yard and the increased expense resulting from the annual leaves. In a Government yard

a day's work consists of eight hours; in most of the private yards, ten hours; in some few, for some branches of trade, especially the metal-working trades, nine hours. In my opinion the extra cost of labor in the Government yards is largely offset, if not more than offset, by the profit that goes to the contractor. If a choice must be made between these two, then my choice is already made. I prefer that Government expenditures be distributed among a great number of mechanics for a reasonable day's work than to two or three or a selected few engaged in the shipbuilding industry at the expense of the mechanics employed by them.

While on this point I wish to make one further observation. In estimating the increased cost by reason of this difference in the number of hours that constitutes a day's work, it has always been claimed that the navy-yards are at a disadvantage which amounts to a difference of 25 per cent of the amount paid for labor. This computation undoubtedly would be correct if a man would do 25 per cent more work in a day of ten hours than he does in a day of eight hours.

I have been credibly informed, however, that representatives of some of the concerns which within a recent time have shortened the workday of mechanics engaged in the metal-working trade from ten to nine hours a day have expressed the opinion that the results are so much more satisfactory under the new conditions that they would under no circumstances return to the ten-hour day, so that it is fair to insist that whatever disadvantages the Government yards may be under from the shorter day it can not with certainty be said that it equals 25 per cent of the cost of the labor.

Mr. BELL. May I suggest to the gentleman that the Industrial Commission took evidence in Salt Lake as to the eight-hour workday, and the managers of every coal mine and practically of every metalliferous mine in the State, including the smelters, all swore that they got as much work now from the men in eight hours as they formerly got in ten or twelve.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think that fact is generally recognized.

Mr. BELL. Only one man could be found among the employers of labor who disputed that proposition.

Mr. FITZGERALD. I think it is generally recognized that during a fair day's work covering a fair length of time the mechanic or laborer accomplishes better results than in a day the duration of which overtaxes his capacity for work.

Mr. BELL. The manager of the P. V. coal mine, a very large institution, stated that the machines broke as much coal now in eight hours as they formerly did in ten, and the mule drivers took as much out now under the eight-hour system as they formerly did under the other system.

Mr. FITZGERALD. There is another thing that should be considered. There has been pending before Congress for some years a bill to compel contractors doing Government work to limit the day of labor to eight hours. I am firmly convinced that it will not be long before the pressure of an enlightened public opinion will result in the passage of that bill, and as soon as that proposition becomes a law this objection will be completely obviated.

Opponents of the policy of building at navy-yards have placed much stress upon the fact that under the law passed during the last Congress employees in Government yards get fifteen days' annual leave with pay. It is true that under the operations of that law the cost of work done in Government yards is somewhat increased. Under no circumstances, however, can it exceed 5 per cent of the total cost. Besides the fifty-two Sundays in each year there are seven holidays upon which no work is done in the navy-yards. This leaves three hundred and five working days, 5 per cent of which are used for vacations, so that the fifteen days' leave with pay can not increase the cost more than 5 per cent.

This increase, however, is only on the cost of labor, and considering the increase in its relation to the entire cost of the ship, in all probability it does not amount to more than 3 per cent. During the hearings had in the Fifty-sixth Congress, the then Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Long, stated that it cost twice as much and took twice as long to build in the navy-yards as it did in private plants. No figures have ever been adduced to support this statement. During the present session, Secretary Long produced a memorandum signed by Chief Constructor Bowles, in which he said:

In my judgment, a vessel built in the navy-yard under existing conditions as to administration, wages, hours of labor, leaves of absence, etc., would cost by the least estimate 25 per cent more than if built by contract.

Until the Chief Constructor gives detailed figures to justify this statement it serves no useful purpose to challenge it. With this statement of Admiral Bowles, however, I wish to place another made by him in November, 1897. In that month Naval Constructor William J. Baxter, United States Navy, read a paper on navy-yard expenses at the fifth general meeting of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers. After the paper had

been read it was discussed by members of the society present, among others by Admiral Bowles, who said:

When Mr. Baxter wrote this paper, he wrote a very moderate and plain statement of the facts as they are to-day. Now, the facts ought not to be as they are to-day. The navy-yards ought to be properly organized, and they can be organized without much difficulty; and, further, I would guarantee that if I had three months to start it I could do in the New York Navy-Yard what can not be done in any organization in this country—I could build ships cheaper than anyone can, and I know it.

Since that time the condition of the navy-yard at Brooklyn, as well as of all the navy-yards in the United States, has been vastly improved. Every year since then large sums have been spent for the purpose of improving the plant and facilities at the yards. If, five years ago, Admiral Bowles could build war ships at the Brooklyn navy-yard more cheaply than they could have been built anywhere else in this country, with the superior facilities that exist at that yard at the present time, including the finest machine shop in the United States, completed since that statement was made, there should be less difficulty in doing the same thing to-day.

In the hearing in March, 1900, the Admiral made the following statement to the Committee on Naval Affairs, which it may be advisable to quote at this time:

I will say a few words now about the general subject of building ships in the navy-yards. I recommend the building of some vessels in the important navy-yards of the United States because I believe it to be good business; and if I owned those yards and kept them for the purposes they are now kept I should say that it would be a sensible thing to do to build one ship in each of the important yards all the time simply to keep them in order and maintain a sufficient force ready for all emergencies.

If the ships are built in that way and under the present system of management, I believe that they will exceed in cost those built outside; but I believe you can fully afford to pay that additional expense for the advantages obtained, and those advantages are fully worth the money that will be paid. That is my general view of the attitude that ought to be taken toward the navy-yards of the United States, but I want it clearly understood that I do not believe in building ships in every out-of-the-way navy-yard that we may have.

Whatever may have caused the chief constructor to shift on this question, or apparently to shift, I have only to say that the statement of no man in this country will be accepted as conclusive upon the relative cost of building in private and Government plants unless substantial reasons are given upon which such opinions can be based.

For the convenience of this discussion I shall consider together the objections that the Government yards are not sufficiently equipped for building purposes; that they lack facilities possessed by all private plants doing Government work; and that the Government would be unable to adopt the practice followed in all private establishments of purchasing large quantities of material in open market whenever the prices are favorable, to be utilized in the prosecution of work then under way or thereafter to be obtained.

Let me call attention first to two letters from Admiral Bowles, dated April 11, 1902, submitted by Mr. DAYTON to the Committee on Naval Affairs. In these communications the Admiral states that with an appropriation of \$175,000 for the preparation of a building slip with overhead traveling cranes and power communications the New York Navy-Yard would be in proper condition to build a battle ship or cruiser. An appropriation of \$225,000 for the Norfolk yard and the Mare Island yard would place those yards in condition to build. In these communications he also points out the condition of the Boston, the League Island, and the Portsmouth navy-yards.

The most effective way to determine whether these yards have the requisite equipment for building purposes is to compare their condition with some of the private yards wherein Government work is under contract. I have in mind a yard which has contracts for five naval vessels. I undertake to say that the facts when stated will excite at least some astonishment. At the outset I desire to emphasize that I have no prejudice against the concern about which I intend to speak at some length. I raise no issue as to its ability to perform satisfactory work. My purpose is merely to show the absolute worthlessness of some of the arguments that have been made against the utilization of the Government yards for building purposes.

The Fore River Ship and Engine Company, of Quincy, Mass., is located on the Weymouth or Fore River, which is tributary to Hingham Bay, Boston Harbor. This company has been awarded contracts to build two battle ships, a cruiser, and two torpedo-boat destroyers. The total of these contracts aggregates \$8,437,000. The vessels that are under contract to this company have all been authorized since March, 1899. If the contentions of those who oppose war-ship building at navy-yards be correct, then the Fore River Ship and Engine Company with contracts aggregating almost eight and a half millions of dollars should be one of the best and most completely equipped shipbuilding plants in the country. It should also be in a position to go into the open market and purchase great quantities of materials whenever the prices are



favorable and retain those materials until work is secured on which they can be used.

It should also be located at a place where there is ample water. I have in my hand a copy of the Saturday Evening Post issued on the 19th of April, 1902. This is an illustrated weekly magazine founded in 1728 by Benjamin Franklin and published in Philadelphia. It has an advertisement inserted by the Fore River Ship and Engine Company, in which the public is invited to subscribe for stock in the company. Let me read from this advertisement:

If you would behold the American spirit in its purest, strongest, and most buoyant phase, catch it on the wing, so to speak, learn the rate at which things under its inspiring influence can be made to happen, and see how truly robust and promising an infant is a shipbuilding plant reared under its guidance at the tender age of 22 months, go to Fore River.

At Fore River two things have been going on—the building of ships and the installing of a plant to build them. Logically, the plant should come first, of course, but as a matter of fact the two enterprises have been carried on so side by side and intermingled that the ships, during the confusion, have managed somehow to come out ahead. This is most distinctly an American way of doing things—to start at nothing, to keep moving at all hazard, and decide upon conveniences and methods afterwards.

No even-minded European could ever proceed in such a manner, yet the scheme is a good one, economical, and not without foresight.

This distinctly American spur-of-the-moment way of getting a great plant together is one of the principal reasons for our being so many years ahead of the rest of the mechanical world.

It seems to me that this statement completely refutes the argument heretofore urged against the navy-yards, that they are not as well equipped as private plants.

This advertisement, however, contains much more instructive information. Let me read again from it:

Work in progress in Fore River Yard April 1, 1902.—Battle ship *New Jersey*, 15,000 tons; battle ship *Rhode Island*, 15,000 tons; cruiser *Des Moines*, to be launched May, 1902; torpedo-boat destroyer *Lawrence*; torpedo-boat destroyer *Macdonough*; seven-masted steel schooner (11,000 tons displacement), the largest sailing vessel in the world, to be launched May, 1902; forgings for steamships now being built in other yards; steel bridge, 800 feet long, over Weymouth Fore River; 75 sets forgings for rapid-fire guns; miscellaneous structural work. The above, with other work in hand, will bring the total amount of contracts up to \$8,907,000.

The company states that its total contracts amount to \$8,907,000. Just a moment's consideration of this statement. The contract price of the *New Jersey*, one of the battle ships building at this plant, is \$3,405,000. The contract price of the *Rhode Island*, another battle ship, is \$3,405,000. The contract price of the *Des Moines*, the cruiser building at this yard, is \$1,065,000; of torpedo-boat destroyers *Lawrence* and *Macdonough*, \$281,000 each, or for both, \$562,000. The total of the Government contracts aggregates \$8,437,000, not including the prices of the 75 sets of forgings for rapid-fire guns.

The report of the Commissioner of Navigation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, shows that by its own statement the Fore River Ship and Engine Company on June 15, 1901, was building no vessels except under Government contract. It further appears from the report that on the 25th of June the company signed a contract to build a seven-masted steel schooner of 6,000 tons, to be completed in February, 1902, and to cost ready for sea about \$250,000.

Outside of the Government contracts, not including the 75 sets of forgings, and the contract for building this vessel, this company, according to its own statement, has not more than \$270,000 worth of contracts. This advertisement goes on to point out that this Ship and Engine Company offers for public subscription 10,000 shares of preferred stock with a bonus of one share of common with every two shares of preferred purchased. The capitalization of the company is \$4,000,000, equally divided into preferred and common stock, of which only \$2,000,000 (\$1,000,000 of each) have been issued.

It further appears that the preferred stock is a 7 per cent stock, and that the earnings of the company have been such that in the five months prior to January, 1902, they have been at a rate of over \$100,000 in excess of the amount required to pay the dividend on the entire \$2,000,000 preferred stock, and this without the advantage of having in the business the \$1,000,000 which will result from the sale of the stock offered in this advertisement and while at the disadvantage of constructing and continuing to complete the plant and works. I hope that no one will think that I am trying to promote or boom this company. Nothing is further from my purpose. I am trying only to point out what "an awfully good thing" this class of Government work must be when this company is able to do all it says with practically no work except Government contracts.

Mr. ROBERTS. This is a Massachusetts company. That is a good thing, too.

Mr. FITZGERALD. It is not surprising that there has been such strenuous opposition to the movement to have war ships built in Government yards. Here is a company able to earn 7 per cent on \$2,000,000 preferred stock and 5 per cent on \$2,000,000 common stock, of which at least \$1,000,000 is water, and at the same time accumulate enough to build its works. It would seem to reasonable men that with plants as well equipped as the navy-yards, the profit on such work, which many have believed

to be quite enormous, will more than offset the disadvantages under which the Government is alleged to labor.

A question naturally arises at this time, which I prefer should be answered by some one opposed to the policy about to be initiated. Until explained, I feel justified in ignoring the arguments that private plants take advantage of the market to purchase large quantities of materials to be utilized at some future time, when other work has been secured.

How does such a company as the Fore River Ship and Engine Company, which is seeking so assiduously for capital with which to complete its plant, find the necessary means with which to make purchases of materials for which they have no immediate and really no prospective use? And this in the face of the fact that it offers a bonus of common stock to subscribers to its preferred stock. It has been my belief that, except in trifling instances, no such practice is followed; and this belief has been strengthened by reason of my inability to obtain any convincing proof of the existence of the practice.

Another objection recently urged with much force is the impossibility of launching armored cruisers or battle ships at the different navy-yards of the country. Of the several navy-yards at which it has been believed there was adequate equipment to undertake building operations that at Norfolk was the one against which this objection was urged most persistently. It was based upon the fact that the width of the body of water on which the Norfolk yard is located was not sufficient to permit the launching of a large cruiser or battle ship. It might be sufficient to dispose of this objection merely by a reference to the statement contained in one of the letters of Admiral Bowles, heretofore referred to, in which he says, "at the Norfolk Navy-Yard it is possible to launch a battle ship or armored cruiser."

This objection, however, may just as well be disposed of now, completely and effectually. Permit me again to refer to the location of the Fore River Ship and Engine Company. Until within about two years the plant of this company was located on the Fore River just below the Braintree bridge. About two years ago the company removed its plant, or rather changed its location, to Quincy Point, at the junction of Weymouth Fore River and Town River.

The annual report of the Chief Engineer of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, states that—

Before improvement Weymouth Fore River was navigable at low water 4 miles for vessels drawing 18 feet, and the least low-water depth 3 miles farther was 3 feet. The existing project, approved by the act of September 19, 1890, and extended by the act of August 18, 1894, is to attain in Weymouth Fore River a navigable channel 6 feet at mean low water for a distance of 7,000 feet, 100 feet wide to near Weymouth Landing—

which carried the improvement beyond the present location of the Fore River Ship and Engine Company plant.

Town River, which sweeps past Quincy Point into Weymouth (Fore) River, is described in the same report as—

a small tidal tributary to Weymouth River, flowing into Boston Harbor. Before improvement it had a narrow, crooked channel with a least depth of 1½ feet at mean low water. The existing project is to dredge a channel 4 feet deep at mean low water, 100 feet wide, and 4,500 feet long to the head of navigation.

Everything connected with this engine and shipbuilding plant, it seems to me, must be most disheartening to those who have relied upon the objections enumerated by me for their opposition to building operations in navy-yards. Of course it is apparent, even to the most casual observer, that this Fore River Ship and Engine Company is not situated at a place where either the depth or the breadth of the waterways upon which it is located can be pointed to with exultation by the opponents of navy-yard shipbuilding. It seems peculiar that so much weight has been attached to this objection. It is a well-known fact that on the Clyde, where some of the greatest shipbuilding plants in the world are located, the river is so narrow that it has been necessary to build a number of turning basins.

If it were necessary to launch a vessel from five to six or seven hundred feet in length endwise into a stream only 100 feet wide, many shipbuilding plants would never be able to place even a moderate-sized vessel into the water. Some of these plants have built their slips obliquely instead of at right angles to the rivers, but the more progressive American genius has not been content with such an arrangement. The *Scientific American* for April 12, 1902, contains an article by Waldon Fawcett on broadside launchings. Let me quote from that article:

The launching sidewise of steel vessels of large dimensions is distinctively an American practice. The development of the idea in its application to vessels of considerable size has occurred on this side of the Atlantic, and, indeed, this is the only country where the plan is followed to any considerable extent. Broadside launchings have always been the rule at the shipyards on the Great Lakes, and of late years have been introduced to some extent in shipbuilding plants on the Atlantic coast.

The side launching is not claimed to have any advantage over the more common mode of getting a new hull into the water, but the adoption of the method has been dictated by limitations in the depths and areas of the waterways which have been available for launching at shipyards where this scheme has been employed. In other words, a vessel may by means of the broadside method be launched into a slip or river so shallow and narrow that the reception of the hull would be practically impossible were it sought to slide the

vessel into the water endwise, as is the custom at yards possessed of a generous extent and depth of water.

Further on in the article it is stated that—

There appears to be almost no limit to the size of vessels which may be successfully launched broadside, as several vessels, each approximately 500 feet in length, have been placed in the water in this manner.

It is further pointed out that at the plant of the William R. Trigg Company, at Richmond, Va., it was necessary to launch into a canal 100 feet in width and not exceeding 18 feet in depth.

It has never been claimed that the constructors in the Navy are lacking in genius, ability, or capacity. They have planned and designed and superintended the construction of the most effective fighting machines afloat, and I, for one, am firmly of the belief that the same genius, the same ability, and the same capacity displayed so highly in those fields in which they have been given opportunities will make just as brilliant a showing in every other field in which they may properly be exercised.

So much for the objection that it is impossible to launch battle ships or cruisers at navy-yards.

Early in the course of my remarks I stated that I believed that I could show that heretofore there has existed an understanding or a "gentlemen's agreement" as to the bids that should be submitted for naval vessels authorized by Congress. Without some such understanding it would be an utter impossibility for such similarity as is found to exist in the bids submitted from different firms. In 1893 the Newport News Company, never having bid upon naval work prior to this time, apparently was not deemed of sufficient importance to be considered. Upon gunboats Nos. 7, 8, and 9, now known as the *Nashville*, *Helena*, and *Wilmington*, the following bids were received:

Bidders.	Gunboat No. 7.	Gunboats Nos. 8 or 9.	Total for 7, 8, and 9.
Maryland Steel Co.....	\$370,000	\$370,000	\$1,110,000
Union Iron Works.....	400,000	350,000	1,100,000
Newport News Co.....	280,000	280,000	840,000
J. H. Dialogue & Co.....	395,333	395,333	1,186,000

Secretary of the Navy Hon. H. A. Herbert, in his report for 1893, speaking of these bids, said:

These bids are very much lower than ever heretofore received by the Government, but before accepting any of them the Department is having all the plans examined by a second board.

The contract was given to the Newport News Company.

In 1895 the following bids were received for the battle ships *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky*:

	One vessel.	Two vessels.
Cramps.....	\$2,820,000	\$5,500,000
Union.....	2,740,000	5,380,000
Newport News Co.....	2,350,000	4,500,000

On their first effort the Newport News Company bid \$270,000 less on three gunboats than the theretofore successful bidders; two years later on two battle ships their bid was \$1,000,000 less—20 per cent of the entire cost of the two vessels—than that of the Cramps and the Union Iron Works. That bid was effective. Competition proved too expensive. A different state of affairs prevailed thenceforth.

I do not care to encumber this speech with too many statistics, so I shall insert for the purposes of comparison only the amounts for which contracts were made for 6 vessels during the year 1901. And, in doing so, I wish to call attention to the fact that whereas in 1895 the difference in the bid of the Newport News Company and the Cramps on one battle ship was about \$500,000, in 1901 the difference is only \$5,000. More than that, the same difference of \$5,000 is found in the bids which they submitted on six armored cruisers during the same year, each receiving two of the vessels and the Union Iron Works receiving the other two.

And for the construction of three protected cruisers the bids of the Newport News Company and Neale & Levy Company and the Cramps were exactly identical, to wit, \$2,740,000, the Union Iron Works receiving a contract for one of the vessels for \$2,825,000. Under the provisions of the naval appropriation act, which authorized these vessels, one of them was to be built on the Pacific coast, providing that the cost did not exceed 4 per cent more than the amount of the lowest bidder. The bid of the Union Iron Works was well within the 4 per cent provision, and the contract had to be given to it. These figures, in my judgment, are conclusive of the existence of an understanding among the different shipbuilding concerns of the country regarding naval contracts.

Mr. RIXEY. Does the gentleman know any reason why the provision giving a differential preference to shipbuilding establishments on the Pacific coast should be continued in the bill?

Mr. FITZGERALD. I understand that it is claimed it has been necessary to get material for these vessels from the Far East; and

in order to encourage and build up the shipbuilding plants on the Pacific coast this differential in favor of the Pacific coast concerns has been inserted. It is in the nature of a subsidy or a bounty or a gratuity from the Government.

Mr. RIXEY. Does not the gentleman think that the shipbuilding plants on the Pacific coast are now old enough to stand upon their merits without any differential in their favor?

Mr. FITZGERALD. After what I have pointed out about the Fore River Engine Company, I think these shipbuilding plants can make a reasonable profit at any place without any such provision of law. It is difficult to imagine what would have happened had the Newport News Company been taken into the arrangement in 1893 and thus avoided cutting the price on three gunboats and two battle ships to the amount of \$1,270,000, which was nothing else than additional profit.

Statement of proposals for the construction of three protected cruisers, Nos. 20, 21, and 22, authorized by the act of June 7, 1900, received under the Department's advertisements of December 1, 1900, and March 6, 1901.

[Class 1—Department's plans. Class 2—Bidders' plans.]

	One vessel.	Two vessels.	One vessel.
Newport News Co.....	\$2,740,000	-----	\$2,741,000
Bath Iron Works.....	-----	-----	2,750,000
W. R. Trigg & Co.....	2,780,000	\$2,740,000	-----
Neale & Levy Co.....	\$2,740,000	-----	-----
Union Iron Works.....	\$2,825,000	-----	-----
Cramp Co.....	2,740,000	-----	2,740,000

\* Contract awarded.

Statement of proposals for the construction of 6 armored cruisers, Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, received under the Department's advertisement of October 1, 1900.

[Under act of June 7, 1900.]

Class 1—Department's plans.

Union Iron Works.....	\$3,750,000
Cramp's.....	\$3,780,000
Newport News Company.....	\$3,775,000

\* Contract awarded.

I have now exhausted the objections which I stated at the outset it was my intention to answer or to explain away. Two other great objections constantly urged against navy-yard construction is the excessive cost and the greater time for completion of navy-yard built ships. The comparisons heretofore made were between vessels built in private establishments and those built in Government yards at a time when the yards were absolutely barren of equipment. There are some additional considerations, however, which should not be overlooked at this time.

The Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair in his annual report for the year 1901 states that the Department's attention—has been specifically called to the probability of two years' delay in the completion of the 5 battle ships of the *Virginia* class and the 6 armored cruisers of the *Pennsylvania* class.

These vessels had just been begun when the report was compiled, and under the contracts for their construction were to be completed within thirty-six months from the date of the contract.

The reason given for the probable delay is the inability of the armor-plate manufacturers to provide the armor required for the vessels mentioned within the time required for their completion under the contracts.

The chief constructor further points out that the responsibility for such delay rests with the Government and renders it liable to suits for damages by the ship contractors. Members of this House who were in the Fifty-sixth Congress recall that a bill passed this House sending to the Court of Claims for adjustment claims of this character of the Cramps alone which aggregated more than a million dollars. This is an item of expense of very great proportions which would be entirely eliminated from the cost of vessels under construction at navy-yards.

The report of the chief constructor for 1901 further shows that the following vessels were the following number of months behind contract time of completion on July 1, 1901:

Battle ships.—*Illinois*, 3 months; *Missouri*, 17.2 months; *Maine*, 15.5 months; *Ohio*, 19 months.

Protected cruisers.—*Denver*, 3.8 months; *Chattanooga*, 6 months; *Tacoma*, 9 months; *St. Louis*, 6 months; *Des Moines*, 5 months; *Galveston*, 9.5 months; *Cleveland*, 1.5 months; *Milwaukee*, 2 months.

Monitors.—*Arkansas*, 15.1 months; *Florida*, 12 months; *Nevada*, 11.4 months; *Wyoming*, 9 months.

Torpedo-boat destroyers.—*Bainbridge*, 18.5 months; *Chauncey*, 31 months; *Decatur*, 19.3 months; *Hull*, 20.4 months; *McDonough*, 16.9 months; *Perry*, 19.8 months; *Stewart*, 26.7 months; *Whipple*, 19 months; *Barry*, 20 months; *Dale*, 20 months; *Hopkins*, 18.4 months; *Lawrence*, 16.9 months; *Paul Jones*, 19.1 months; *Preble*, 20.5 months; *Truxtun*, 19 months; *Warden*, 19 months.

Torpedo boats.—*Stringham*, 30.4 months; *Blakely*, 22.4 months; *Nicholson*, 23.6 months; *Thornton*, 23.5 months; *Wilkes*, 25.5 months; *Goldsboro*, 33 months; *DeLong*, 22.4 months; *O'Brien*, 23.1 months; *Tingey*, 27 months.

Submarine torpedo boats.—*Plunger*, 5.1 months; *Grampus*, 5.7 months; *Pike*, 5.2 months; *Shark*, 4.4 months; *Adder*, 5.9 months; *Moccasin*, 4.9 months; *Porpoise*, 4.4 months.

This statement shows that 48 vessels have been delayed beyond the time for completion, as required by the contracts, from one to thirty-three months. Under such circumstances the time required for the completion of such vessels under the terms of the contract can not be considered when estimating how long it takes



to build a ship by contract. Reference was made during the debate yesterday to the fact that representations have recently been made to the Navy Department by a number of contractors having contracts for the construction of torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers, to the effect that the contractors will lose more than \$2,000,000 on these various contracts, and that they desire the Government to share these losses with them by paying more than a million dollars in addition to the prices for which the contracts were awarded.

I have seen it stated that at the time these contracts were made naval constructors warned these contractors that it would be impossible to complete these boats for the prices submitted. This has some bearing upon the subject urged yesterday that there is no guaranty of performance from navy-yard-built ships. It seems to have been overlooked that the naval constructors design the vessels in their minutest details, including speed requirements, displacement, etc. They place a limit upon the cost, and not within ten or twelve years have contractors refused to take contracts at prices within the estimates of the naval constructors.

It will not be out of place to call attention at this time to a report made by Rear-Admiral Melville, Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, in 1892. It was in reference to the machinery and boilers of the cruisers *Raleigh* and *Cincinnati*. Admiral Melville pointed out in that report that the cost of building the machinery and erecting it on board the vessels would be considerably less than the original estimates on which the contractors had refused to bid as being too low for the amount of work required.

He calls attention, too, to the fact that bids were requested for the furnishing of certain flange plates. The only bid received was for \$81,200. The Department directed that the work be done at the New York Navy-Yard, the result being that the total cost of the flange plates completed was \$51,081.50. Admiral Melville's own words in reference to this matter are worth quoting:

Expressing the above figures in words the Government has obtained these flange plates ready for assembling in the boilers for \$18,418.48 less than was bid for the same work, and has a hydraulic flanging machine to boot.

The flanging machine and the cost of erecting it amounted altogether to \$11,700. This is but one instance of many that might be cited where the Government yards have demonstrated their capacity to compete favorably under any conditions with private establishments.

The chairman of the committee yesterday stated that one of the cards issued by the Chamber of Commerce of Vallejo regarding the value of the navy-yard plants was misleading. No one who examined the card with any care whatever could have been misled by it.

From his own report it appears that the value of the navy-yard plants is about \$80,000,000, and it can not be disputed that the expenditures for maintenance and for improvements at the various navy-yards for the year ending June 30, 1901, aggregate some \$10,000,000, while the repair work done did not exceed \$5,000,000 or, at the outside, \$6,000,000.

These yards can easily be utilized in a manner that will be more beneficial to the Government. With very little, if any, additional expense of maintenance the amount of work done at the navy-yards of the United States can be more than trebled. It is a well-known fact that the machinery of such plants deteriorates very quickly when not used constantly. Unless the yards are to be utilized to their fullest capacity, it is the greatest legislative folly conceivable to continue to appropriate vast sums for their improvement and maintenance.

Great Britain and the continental powers do not build war vessels in the government yards out of any desire to "stifle genius." The policy of every maritime power worthy of the name, excepting the United States, has been to build new vessels in government yards. I have here a statement furnished by the office of Naval Intelligence, which gives the number and kinds of naval vessels building for England, France, and Germany, with tonnage and estimated cost, and showing whether building in government or private yards.

Number and kinds of naval vessels building for the principal foreign powers, giving tonnage and estimated cost and showing whether building in Government or private yards.

## ENGLAND.

Class.	Number.	Total displacement.	Average cost.*
<i>Ships building in Government yards.</i>			
Battle ships	9	Tons. 134,350	£1,048,878
Cruisers	10	77,400	662,662
<i>Ships building in private yards.</i>			
Battle ships	7	101,650	976,986
Cruisers	14	143,020	779,141

\* As it was impossible to give the total cost of ships building for England, owing to the fact that the estimations for a number of them have not yet been given out, the average cost per ship for those obtainable is given.

## Number and kinds of naval vessels building, etc.—Continued.

## FRANCE.

Class.	Number.	Total displacement.	Average cost.
<i>Ships building in Government yards.</i>			
Battle ship	1	Tons. 14,865	Francs. 35,236,042
Cruisers	4	47,664	112,132,966
<i>Ships building in private yards.</i>			
Battle ship	1	14,865	36,196,042
Cruisers	4	37,245	91,248,008

## GERMANY.

Class.	Number.	Total displacement.	Average cost.
<i>Ships building in Government yards.</i>			
Battle ships	4	45,760	Marks. 83,910,000
Cruisers	6	42,000	73,870,000
<i>Ships building in private yards.</i>			
Battle ships	5	58,840	107,470,000
Cruisers	9	32,700	56,960,000

From this it appears that Great Britain, France, and Germany distribute their building operations very evenly between government and private establishments.

I have never urged that all Government constructions be done in navy-yards. I do not favor that policy now. In my opinion sufficient of the vessels authorized from time to time should be placed in the navy-yards for construction for the purpose of enabling the plants to be maintained in an efficient and economical manner, and as a check upon private concerns. This is not a blow at private enterprise. It will in no way cripple or injure any industry.

Two years ago I called attention to the fact that the Commissioner of Navigation in his report for 1899, after stating that our greatest annual production of ocean steam vessels was for the year then just closed, when it amounted to 43,871 gross tons, asserted that the construction "of 100,000 tons of ocean steel steamships (including those of the coasting trade) in addition to the naval contracts and contracts in other Government vessels on which they are engaged would overtax the present capacity of our shipyards."

His report for the year ending June 30, 1901, shows that the gross tonnage of ocean-going vessels built during that year in the United States aggregated 82,799 tons. The shipbuilding plants of the country are within easy reach of sufficient work to overtax—if not already overtaxed—their plants. The placing of some of the naval work in the Government yards can do no harm to them. It is beyond dispute that three of the Government yards are equipped for building operations, and I hope that all three of them will be given an opportunity to demonstrate their capacity and efficiency in the construction of three of the vessels authorized in this bill. [Applause.]

Mr. METCALF. Mr. Chairman, the bill now under consideration provides for the building, by contract, of 2 first-class battle ships, 2 first-class armored cruisers, and 2 gunboats. The Secretary of the Navy is directed to build at least one of the battle ships or armored cruisers in one of the Government navy-yards, and, in addition thereto, discretion is vested in the Secretary of the Navy to build any or all of the ships authorized by the bill in such Government navy-yards as he may designate. The provision making it mandatory that at least one ship be built in one of the Government navy-yards is a move in the right direction, but, in my judgment, it does not go far enough.

The committee in its report says that there is some public sentiment in favor of the building of ships in the navy-yards, and for the purpose of making the experiment it was deemed advisable to authorize the construction of at least one ship in one of the Government navy-yards. There is not only a strong public sentiment throughout the entire country in favor of building ships in the Government navy-yards, but there is a deep-rooted belief also that the time has now arrived for the Government to utilize its expensive navy-yards for the purpose of building as well as repairing its ships.

The value of the real estate and chattels of the 33 navy-yards and naval stations, according to the report accompanying the bill, is \$71,409,162.21, and of the machinery \$7,559,451.72. The value of the real estate and chattels, as also the machinery in eight of the largest Government navy-yards, is as follows:

Navy-yard.	Real estate and chattels.	Machinery.
Portsmouth	\$3,070,842.05	\$473,896.69
Boston	12,712,149.23	844,925.85
New York	21,306,010.37	1,488,374.99
League Island	3,562,722.56	325,802.68
Norfolk	6,313,919.67	863,164.57
Pensacola	1,781,450.39	134,580.94
Mare Island	5,387,301.86	660,146.49
Puget Sound	941,963.80	255,122.21
Total	55,076,389.93	5,046,014.42

making a total of \$60,122,404.35, practically a larger sum of money than is invested in all of the private shipbuilding plants in the United States. Appropriations are being made from year to year by Congress for the improvement of these plants, and most of the yards are now in a condition to compete, and compete successfully, with any of the great private shipbuilding plants of the United States. If it costs, as it is claimed, 40 per cent more to build a ship in the Government navy-yards than in the private yards, it will cost at least 40 per cent more to do the repair work upon the ships in the Navy; but there is no foundation in fact for this statement.

The *Texas*, built at the Norfolk Navy-Yard, is always singled out as an illustration of the great cost of building ships at the navy-yards, but at the time the *Texas* was built the Government navy-yards were run under a system radically different from that of to-day. The change was just being made from wooden to iron ships. The yard was not properly equipped. Most of the men employed were not skilled mechanics, and many of the men working at the yard were placed there through political influence.

Many of the tools that were furnished to the yard were charged to the construction of this ship. But notwithstanding the lack of experience and of modern tools and appliances, and notwithstanding the great delay, the *Texas* was successfully built, and to-day is one of the best ships in the United States Navy. She cost complete \$4,202,121.49. There is no ship in the United States Navy of the same class as the *Texas* with which we can make a comparison except the *Maine*, her sister ship. The *Maine* was built in the New York Navy-Yard and cost \$275,667.26 more than the *Texas*, but she was a heavier ship, and her displacement was 367 tons more than that of the *Texas*.

There is one ship, however, built in one of the private yards of the country with which we can make a comparison, and that is the *Columbia*. The contract price for hull and machinery of the *Columbia* was \$2,725,000; she cost complete \$3,909,011.26. She was built by the Cramps, and went into commission April 23, 1894. She received a speed premium of \$350,000 and has cost for repairs since completion \$147,449.18. She is now practically in the scrap heap, being used as a receiving ship in the New York Navy-Yard.

The *Texas* went into commission August 15, 1895, and has cost for repairs since the date of completion \$124,682.81. The *Texas*, built at the Norfolk Navy-Yard, is to-day one of the best fighting machines in the United States Navy, while the *Columbia*, built at one of the private shipbuilding yards at a cost to the Government of nearly \$4,000,000, is to-day used as a receiving ship at the New York Navy-Yard. The displacement of the *Columbia* is 7,375 tons and her gross tonnage 5,552.48 tons. The displacement of the *Texas* is 6,315 tons and her gross tonnage 4,050.31 tons.

To make a further comparison we will take the case of the two-turret coast-defense monitor *Monadnock*, built at the Mare Island Navy-Yard, and to which the chairman of the committee referred in such strong terms in the course of his remarks yesterday, and the two-turret coast-defense monitor *Monterey*, built at the Union Iron Works, San Francisco. The *Monadnock* was authorized under the act of August 3, 1886, and the *Monterey* under the act of March 3, 1887. The *Monadnock*, according to Senate Document No. 175, cost for hull, machinery, etc., \$1,526,268.65, and for armor to hull, equipment, etc., \$607,785.83, making a total cost of \$2,134,054.48.

Originally the contract for the construction of the *Monadnock* was awarded to the Continental Iron Works, but for some reason the work was not completed by this company, and the Government subsequently took the uncompleted hull and finished the work at Mare Island Navy-Yard. There was paid on account of the hull under the Robeson administration \$574,490.

When the hull was delivered to the Mare Island Navy-Yard a great portion of the work had to be done over, and it would have been cheaper for the Government to have begun anew. Adding this amount to the figures given in Senate Document No. 175, and we have as the entire cost \$2,708,544.48. From this should be deducted for a set of boilers never installed, \$112,000, making the total cost \$2,596,544.48.

And right here I want to say, in answer to the gentleman from Illinois, that no criticism can justly be made of the Vallejo Chamber of Commerce. It has simply exercised the right that every citizen in the United States has, and that is the right of petition. All the members of that chamber are well-known, reputable citizens. I know them all, and I know that under no circumstances would they knowingly make a misstatement or try to mislead the House or any member thereof.

The figures as to the cost of the *Monadnock* are taken from the report of the Secretary of the Navy as contained in Senate Document No. 175, less the sum of \$112,000 for a set of boilers never installed. Deducting this amount, and it leaves a difference of only \$2.65 between the figures given out by the Vallejo Chamber of Commerce and those of the Secretary of the Navy.

The people of Vallejo are deeply interested in the building of ships in the Government navy-yards. Most of the mechanics employed at the yard reside in Vallejo, and if Mare Island ever gets an opportunity to build a battle ship or cruiser, and I believe that she will, you will find that the mechanics at that yard, even though they work but eight hours a day, will turn out one of the best fighting ships and one of the speediest in the American Navy, and it will be built just as cheap if not cheaper than it could be built in any of the private ship-building yards.

The *Monterey* was built under contract by the Union Iron Works, and according to Senate Document No. 175 the hull and machinery cost \$1,861,232.69. To this should be added inspectors' charges of \$20,000 and the penalty remitted by Congress in 1901 of \$32,823, making a total of \$1,914,055.69. To this should be added the amount paid for armor to hull, gun protection, equipment, trial-trip expenses, etc., \$900,138.37, making the total cost of the *Monterey* \$2,814,194.06.

The *Monadnock* was commissioned February 20, 1896, and the *Monterey* was commissioned February 13, 1893. The gross tonnage of the *Monadnock* is 1,608.26 tons, and the gross tonnage of the *Monterey* is 1,589.74 tons, a difference in favor of the *Monadnock* of 18.52 tons. Up to August, 1898, the time of the arrival of these monitors at the Asiatic station, the *Monadnock* cost the Government for repairs the sum of \$48,658.30 and the *Monterey* \$70,902.34; and from August, 1898, to January 1, 1902, the *Monadnock* cost for repairs \$36,946.96 and the *Monterey* \$75,149.48—a pretty fair showing, especially when you consider that the yard was without modern tools, that many of the men were unskilled mechanics placed there by political influence and under political pressure, and that the appropriations at times were not sufficient to keep the men employed over two or three months during the year.

In a number of instances the navy-yards of the country have successfully competed with private yards for Government work, and in so competing have saved the Government large sums of money. As an illustration I cite the case of the Mare Island Navy-Yard. On October 30, 1885, bids were opened for the removal of the cofferdam in front of the dry dock at Mare Island. The bids ranged from \$39,750 to \$50,000. All of the bids, however, largely exceeded the amount allowed.

New bids were received on November 28 following, at which time 10 offers were made ranging from \$15,000 to \$49,975. The \$15,000 bid was from an irresponsible firm and was rejected. The other bids being excessive, the civil engineer of the yard undertook the work, and did it for \$20,492.19. About the same time a set of boilers was required for the dry-dock pump house. The lowest bid was \$26,200. This sum being regarded as excessive, the boilers were built in the shop of the engineering department at the yard at a cost of \$19,000, or \$7,200 less than the lowest bid.

One of the private shipbuilding yards in San Francisco offered to build a 100-ton pair of shear legs for \$80,200. This offer was declined and the work was done at the yard for \$44,375, including the foundation. And this is not all. The Government was charged, as is claimed, excessive prices for repair work on some of the transports in San Francisco. It was rumored that there was a combination on the part of the private shipbuilding yards, and the navy-yard was called on to furnish estimates.

It was generally known that the yard was to furnish estimates, and when the bids were put in for repairs on the transport *Sheridan* it was found that the Risdon Iron Works bid \$293,000, to do the work in 117 working days; the Union Iron Works, \$291,525; the Mare Island Navy-Yard's estimate was \$289,150, to do the work in 150 working days, and the Fulton Iron Works bid \$285,675, to do the work in 112 working days. The contract was awarded to the Fulton Iron Works, but it took 180 days to do the work, 30 days more than was estimated by the Mare Island Navy-Yard. The difference in price between the Fulton Iron Works and the Mare Island Navy-Yard was only \$3,475.

Subsequently bids were called for for repairs on the transport *Sherman*. W. A. Boole & Son bid \$399,045, to do the work in 90 working days; Fulton Iron Works bid \$390,000, to do the work in 110 working days; the Risdon Iron Works bid \$385,000, to do the work in 100 working days; the Mare Island Navy-Yard estimated \$387,771 if teak was used, and \$351,771 if Oregon pine was used, the work to be done in 75 working days; the Union Iron Works bid \$384,900, to do the work in 75 working days, or \$387,497.50, to do the work in 90 working days. The contract was awarded to the Union Iron Works, and the transport *Sherman* was, owing to a strike in that yard, on the ways for nearly a year before she was delivered to the Government.

Bids were also called for for repairs on the transport *Logan*. The Fulton Iron Works bid \$65,850, to do the work in 90 working days after the receipt of the material; the Risdon Iron Works bid \$69,100, to do the work in 100 days after the receipt of the material; The Union Iron Works bid \$70,337.50, to do the work in 100 working days after the receipt of the material, and the Mare Island Navy-Yard estimated \$33,072, to do the work in 40



working days after the receipt of the material—\$32,728 less than the bid of the lowest bidder. The ship was sent to the Mare Island Navy-Yard for repairs and she did the work within the estimate and within the time specified.

If it is a fact that it costs the Government 40 per cent more to build its ships in the navy-yards of the country than in the private yards, it naturally follows that it must cost the Government 40 per cent more to do the repair work. If this is the case, the sooner the Government closes its navy-yards and allows the work to be done by private contract the better it will be for the taxpayers of the country; but this is not the case, as the figures just given demonstrate.

The mechanics and foremen employed at the Government navy-yards are just as skilled and just as intelligent as those employed in any of the private shipyards, and I bar none. Political influence will not at the present time avail a man in securing work in any of the Government navy-yards. Under the rules and regulations of the Department preference is given to the veterans of the civil and Spanish-American wars and to former employees of the yard in good standing. All persons desiring work at the navy-yards must register, and they are employed in the order of registration.

If upon trial they are found to be incompetent, they are at once discharged, and the result is that we now have in the Government navy-yards an efficient and skilled class of mechanics. The foremen are all under civil service and are some of the best men in the United States. As an illustration: At Mare Island Navy-Yard eight of the foremen were foremen at the Union Iron Works when the *Oregon* was constructed. Many of the mechanics employed at the yard worked on the *Olympia* and *Oregon*, admittedly two of the finest ships of their class in the American Navy. There is no inducement to slur work in the Government yards, and all the work turned out by these yards is of the highest order.

I do not advocate the building by the Government of all of its ships in its navy-yards, but I do believe that the time has now arrived for the Government to build at least some of its ships in its own yards for the purpose of demonstrating that it can build just as cheaply if not cheaper than the private yards, and above all, for the purpose of preventing a combination and consolidation of the private shipbuilding yards.

The bid of the Newport News Shipbuilding Company on the *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky* was nearly a million dollars less than the bids of the Cramps and the Union Iron Works. This was before the Newport News Company entered the combination and is another illustration of what competition will do. The Government exacts but eight hours a day from its employees in its yards; the private yards from nine to ten hours a day; and if I had my way I would insist upon the Government inserting in every contract made by it with private shipbuilding concerns a clause that none of the men employed in the building of Government ships shall work to exceed eight hours a day.

All the guns used by the Navy are manufactured in the Government navy-yard at Washington, and the same is true of the guns used by the Army. Until recently the Navy Department paid for smokeless powder 90 cents a pound. The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance recommended the establishment of a gunpowder factory, and an appropriation was made therefor.

The factory was built and experiments were made in the manufacture of smokeless powder. The two powder factories supplying smokeless powder to the Government were informed that unless they reduced their price to 75 cents per pound the Government would manufacture its own powder. The result was that the price was immediately reduced. Numerous other instances could be cited, but to my mind these are sufficient. None but American citizens are employed in the navy-yards of the United States—no foreigner is permitted to work in these yards—and it is a wise regulation.

At the last session of the Fifty-sixth Congress a bill was passed giving to the mechanics and laborers employed in the navy-yards of the Government fifteen days' leave of absence with pay. The private shipbuilding concerns who have been fighting the bill providing for an eight-hour law on all Government work were in favor, so I am informed, of the bill giving fifteen days' leave of absence with pay to the employees of the navy-yards, and are favorable to the bill recently introduced, giving to the same employees thirty days' leave of absence with pay.

The employees of the yards have not asked for the passage of such a measure. All they ask for is steady, permanent employment, and many of them have protested against the bill allowing them fifteen days' additional leave of absence with pay. They would prefer to have Congress authorize the building of some of the ships by the Government in the Government yards rather than to have fifteen or thirty days' leave of absence with pay. England, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia build ships in the Government navy-yards, and there is no reason why such a course should not be pursued by this Government.

Many of the private shipbuilding yards of the country are congested with work, and one yard alone at the present time has 1 first-class battle ship, 2 armored cruisers, 1 monitor, 2 unarmed protected cruisers, 3 torpedo boats, and 2 submarine boats under construction, and on most of these ships a hammer has not been struck for eight or ten months. And you can not point out an instance when any of the ships built in the private shipbuilding yards have been finished within the contract time.

The *Maine* was to be finished June 1, 1901; now 67 per cent finished. The *Missouri* was to be finished August 30, 1901; now 60 per cent finished. The *Ohio* was to be finished June 5, 1901; now about 50 per cent finished. The *Illinois* was twenty-four months over the contract time; the *Indiana*, twenty-four; the *Iowa*, sixteen; the *Kearsarge*, thirteen; the *Kentucky*, sixteen; the *Massachusetts*, twenty-nine; the *Oregon*, thirty-two; the *Wisconsin*, seventeen; the *Baltimore*, fifteen; the *Newark*, sixteen; the *Olympia*, twenty-two; the *Detroit*, fourteen; the *Minneapolis*, sixteen; the *Marblehead*, twenty-four; the *Montgomery*, twenty-two; the *Bennington*, twenty-four; the *Castine*, thirty; the *Concord*, twenty-two; the *Machias*, fifteen; the *Petrel*, twenty-four; the *Yorktown*, fifteen; the *Helena*, eighteen; the *Nashville*, nineteen; the *Wilmington*, sixteen; the *Princeton*, fifteen; the *Davis*, nineteen, and the *Rowan*, twenty-six.

In most every case where penalties have been imposed the penalties have been remitted. Over three millions and a half have been paid by the Government as premiums for excess of speed, but this was done away with some time ago. The building of ships by the Government in the Government navy-yards will give permanent employment, will increase the efficiency of the force, and will greatly reduce the cost of construction as also the cost of repair work. It will give employment to a greater number of men, and the Government will secure better results.

Most of the Government navy-yards are now equipped for construction work; the men employed at the yards are skilled and competent mechanics; the yards are all under the control and management of naval officers.

All work done at the yards is done under the direction and supervision of skilled and eminent naval constructors, and those naval constructors favor the building of ships in Government yards.

The veterans of the civil war, the veterans of the Spanish-American war, the employees of the yards, as well as organized labor throughout the United States, are asking Congress to utilize the Government navy-yards. The arguments, to my mind, are all in favor of the proposition, and I sincerely trust that the bill will be amended so as to make it mandatory on the Secretary of the Navy to have at least three of the ships authorized under this bill built in the Government navy-yards. [Applause.]

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest to my friend from Louisiana [Mr. MEYER] that he use some of the time belonging to that side.

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield thirty minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. GRIFFITH].

Mr. GRIFFITH. Mr. Chairman, I desire to demonstrate that some part of this appropriation should be applied toward enforcing our rights upon the shores of Alaska. As a member of the Committee on Public Lands, I desire to call attention to the fact that Canada has encroached upon our lines and is to-day in possession of a strip of country half as large as the State of Indiana, and that whereas our flag from 1867 to 1898 waved over this section of our domain the flag has now been hauled down by the last and present Administration. Canada has moved upon our territory until she has an outlet through the arms of the sea down to the coast.

This contraction of our domain is in strange contrast to the policy of expansion as now advocated by the Republican party.

Whenever our country has been involved with any other power England has always seized the opportunity to assert some claim against us or to encroach upon some of our territory.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that, while we are measuring our "new possessions" and counting the spoils of conquest, it would be prudent in us to measure our undisputed territory and find out the boundaries of our domain. No farmer would try to fence in his neighbor's land until he had secured to himself the title of his own acres. Is not the United States forgetting the fable of the dog that jumped into the water to catch the shadow of the meat in his mouth and lost hold of the substance in the vain pursuit?

Do we own Alaska, the Alaska which we purchased from Russia at a cost of \$7,200,000 in 1867? This is a grave question. Mr. Chairman, for the answer to it depends on whether we shall be still fighting the Filipinos after England shall have conquered the Boers. If England shall succeed in her nefarious purpose of exterminating the intrepid burghers of South Africa, or, what is more probable, of cheating them by lying pretenses into a hollow peace, while we are still engaged in the business of making a

"howling wilderness" of the Philippine Islands, we may well doubt our dominion over the gold fields of the North, bought and paid for with our good money.

Our miners upon the Yukon and the shores of Bering Sea are crying to us for protection. They are remonstrating against having the British flag unfurled over their homes upon American soil; they are remonstrating against British dragoons destroying ancient landmarks and monuments erected by Russia a century ago; they are remonstrating against British surveyors setting up their theodolites and drawing their sinister angles upon territory which we have held for thirty-five years under a title that has never been challenged, and which Russia had held for forty-two years before ceding the same to us; they are remonstrating against British soldiers, with rifles on their shoulders and caps cocked impudently upon one side, enforcing the laws of England in American camps, far within the American borders; they are remonstrating against the exactions of the British taxgatherer on American soil, an outrage which is aggravated by the tax being four times as great as that levied by the Transvaal Government on the mining Uitlanders, one of the alleged grievances that caused Great Britain to begin the war.

These remonstrances from our fellow-citizens of the Northwest fall upon dull ears. How could it be otherwise? We are busy in the Tropics—too busy to resent insults or aggressions under the Arctic Circle. Will the impudent claims of Great Britain in Alaska be relaxed while the islands in the Asiatic sea demand our attention?

Does the history of England justify the expectation that she will voluntarily abandon any place on earth where her soldiers have once put their feet? The fact that the land belongs to somebody else is of not the slightest consequence to England, except that it increases her avidity in seizing it and her enjoyment in possessing it.

There is no such word as "justice" in her vocabulary; no such sensation as shame in her repertory of emotions. There is no land on earth that conceals wealth or possesses value that is not the object of her covetous desire. If the owner is poor and weak, or if he is otherwise engaged, so that her encroachments will not be resented, or if there be with him "an understanding, an agreement, an alliance, if you wish," England is sure to put in an appearance as the original owner of the property.

As I have said, however, it is not only the poor and weak who are the prey of Great Britain. She also robs strong nations when they are so preoccupied and hampered that they can not successfully resist the plunderer. Not once only or twice, but half a dozen times since the treaty of peace was signed with us in September, 1783, Great Britain has invaded our territory, scorned our pretensions, boldly violated that treaty, and on several occasions successfully deprived us of our own.

Before that treaty the people of all the colonies enjoyed unmolested the right to take fish of every kind off the banks of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and this right was in that treaty guaranteed and confirmed anew; but it has been denied ever since pugnaciously and almost to the point of war.

By the treaty of 1783 it was supposed that we had settled with Great Britain and obtained release from her exactions. But before a score of years had passed she required to be conciliated, held up her platter again and made new demands, and in 1802 we were compelled to pay her \$3,000,000 to satisfy alleged claims of alleged individuals who asserted that they were "loyal subjects" and had lost property during the Revolution.

By the treaty of 1783 the northeastern boundary of the United States was drawn from the headwaters of the St. Croix River to the Highlands and along the said Highlands, which became the watershed between the St. Lawrence River and the Atlantic, to the source of the Connecticut River. For more than a generation this was construed literally and the maps made in both England and America ran the boundary line up nearly to the St. Lawrence River, and included much of what is now Canada and New Brunswick.

Presently John Bull cast a greedy eye upon this region and formally insisted that our boundary should be contracted. The demand was resisted. The contention went on for many years till finally, in 1842, when the quarrel had become chronic and was verging upon hostilities, the British minister, Lord Ashburton, and our Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, came to an agreement. The incidents which led up to this agreement are obscure. They both lived on Lafayette square, and were near neighbors. They dined together often. They were generous livers, sometimes too generous.

The net result was that Great Britain was conciliated again. America surrendered 7,500 square miles of land—a territory nearly as large as the State of New Jersey. There was never any justice in this transaction. There was never any claim that it was not within the "Highlands." For sixty years the children of Eng-

land and the United States had studied geography on maps which included this territory within the United States, and after the surrender was made one of these old maps was found in the British Museum by Lord Brougham, bearing in the handwriting of George III the words, "This belongs to the United States." But England was "conciliated."

By this time our northwestern boundary had become involved. The United States claimed to own Oregon Territory, and this territory was held to extend for 500 miles above Puget Sound, joining the Russian province of Alaska. In the "treaty of amity and limits" concluded and ratified in 1821, Spain had formally quitclaimed to the United States all her rights to this territory. We had sent Lewis and Clarke thither, had established the town of Astoria, and had built forts upon the Columbia. Our vessels had traded upon its coasts as far north as Sitka.

But England, which had never acquired any right to the territory, except such as a few wandering half-breed hunters and fishers could bestow, now demanded again to be "conciliated." It was an auspicious moment. Texas had been admitted into the Union, and General Taylor was sent to the Rio Grande. Just then Packenham appeared upon the scene, bristling with demands. The United States Army was across the Mexican border; this was Great Britain's hour.

The American people raised the wild cry of "Fifty-four forty or fight," 54° 40' being the southern line of Russian Alaska. But the cry was untimely. We could not fight two nations at once, and Great Britain knew it. She therefore made a peremptory demand and our Secretary of State was compelled to concede it in the name of peace.

For two generations American maps and school atlases had marked as our own this vast territory north of Puget Sound, as large as the present States of Oregon and Washington together; but Packenham persisted in his peremptory requirement that the American flag should be hauled down wherever it was floating over this great empire of the Northwest, accompanied by the implied alternative threat that a brigade of British troops would be landed in Portland.

The American Government made peace. It hauled down its flag wherever it was unfurled north of Vancouver, between the ocean and the Rocky Mountains. This treaty, ratified under the menace of war, transferred to Great Britain the most of that region now known as British Columbia—not less than 160,000 square miles, capable of making 20 states like Massachusetts or 5 as large as the great State of Indiana. Again Great Britain was "conciliated."

Now, at the beginning of the twentieth century, as frequently through the nineteenth, Great Britain again asks to be conciliated—nay, she imperatively and arrogantly demands to be pacified. The party in control of this Government has affirmed that the American flag shall never come down where once it has floated. But as it has already been pulled down where it waved over 7,000 square miles of New Brunswick and 160,000 square miles of British Columbia, we can only interpret the Republican declaration to mean that the Star-Spangled Banner shall never be pulled down excepting where it floats justly and by right.

Is it to be pulled down permanently where it has been set by solemn treaty upon the summits of the Cascade Range in Alaska? Is it to be chased down the slopes of the mountains and driven into the sea by the Canadian mounted police at the behest of Joseph Chamberlain, whose hands are red with the blood of the Boers and who is diverting himself in the attempted destruction of the flags of two brave young Republics in South Africa? It has been said, if not in the Canadian Parliament, openly in the Canadian press, that Great Britain would have to pay for the services of the Canadian regiments in the Transvaal by transferring to them the mining camps of American Alaska. Is this indemnity about to be exacted? Are 10,000 square miles of American territory to be seized by England to compensate for the blunders of Kitchener and the bravery of De Wet, Botha, and Delarey?

"Oh, no," says Great Britain; "we do not at present propose to go to extremities, and drive Americans into the sea in Alaska; we only propose to submit the question to arbitration." It may as well be understood at once, if the fact has escaped the attention of Great Britain till this time, that there are some questions that are not subject to arbitration. If the United States was to claim Ireland as its own would England consent to arbitrate the claim?

If we were to seize Nova Scotia, would England and Canada submit it to arbitration, although more than half the population of Nova Scotia consists of the descendants of Tories who fled from this country during the Revolution? Would England consent to arbitrate a claim of France to the island of Jersey, although that island is within 12 miles of the French coast and more than 100 miles from England? No; possession which has been for generations undisputed is not subject to arbitration.

Let me pass the history of Alaska in quick review, and show



that the British claim is equally new and preposterous. The United States and Russia signed a treaty in 1824 in which they agreed on the parallel of 54° 40' as the division between their respective territories, and in February of the next year Russia and Great Britain signed a treaty which drew the following boundary line between their respective possessions in North America:

ARTICLE III. The line of demarcation between the possessions of the high contracting parties upon the coast of the continent and the islands of America to the northwest shall be drawn in the manner following: Commencing from the southernmost point of the island called Prince of Wales Island, which point lies in the parallel of 54° 40' north latitude, and between the one hundred and thirty-first and the one hundred and thirty-third degree of west longitude (Meridian of Greenwich), the said line shall ascend to the north along the channel called Portland Channel as far as the point of the continent where it strikes the fifty-sixth degree of north latitude; from this last-mentioned point the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast as far as the point of intersection of the one hundred and forty-first degree of west longitude (of the same meridian); and, finally, from the said point of intersection the said meridian line of the one hundred and forty-first degree, in its prolongation as far as the frozen ocean, shall form the limit between the Russian and British possessions on the continent of America to the northwest.

ARTICLE IV. With reference to the line of demarcation laid down in the preceding article, it is understood:

First. That the island called Prince of Wales Island shall belong wholly to Russia.

Second. That wherever the summit of the mountains which extend in a direction parallel to the coast from the fifty-sixth degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the one hundred and forty-first degree of west longitude shall prove to be at the distance of more than 10 marine leagues from the ocean, the limit between the British possessions and the line of coast which is to belong to Russia, as above mentioned, shall be formed by a line parallel to the windings (sinuosities) of the coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of 10 marine leagues therefrom.

In defining the boundaries of Russian America the Russian Government never failed to insist that it was entitled to a strip of seacoast (lisière, in the language of diplomacy) on the main land from the Portland Channel on the south to Mount St. Elias in the north, so as absolutely to cut off the British possessions from all access to the sea above the point of 54° 40'.

For more than half a century the British Empire never contested this interpretation, and after the cession of Russian America (afterwards called Alaska) to the United States, in 1867, England still quietly accepted the reading of the treaty, which declared that the boundary "shall follow the summit of the mountains parallel with the coast." Map after map was published by Russians, English, Canadians, and Americans, unanimously agreeing in placing the boundary upon the mountain tops, at least 30 miles from shore. They all agreed in shutting off England from all access to the sea at every point north of Portland Canal, even from Lynn Canal, an immense bayou, stretching inland.

When the Russo-British treaty was negotiated in 1825, Sir Charles Bagot, on behalf of England, contended urgently for a free access to the sea as far north as possible. He first proposed that the boundary line should run "through Chatham Strait to the head of Lynn Canal, thence northwest to the one hundred and fortieth degree of longitude west of Greenwich, and thence along that degree of longitude to the Polar Sea." To this proposition Count Nesselrode replied by insisting upon the frontier line defined in the treaty.

Sir Charles Bagot thereupon modified his plea and marked out a boundary wandering among the islands and giving the Hudson Bay Company access to the fiords and estuaries. The Russian plenipotentiaries insisted upon the boundary laid down in the treaty. Russia thus simply defended her territory, while England sought to obtain territory which she had never possessed. It was, as Count Nesselrode said in contrasting the policies of the two nations, "Thus we wish to retain and the English wish to acquire." England, after much discussion and a long and stubborn resistance, finally yielded at every point.

The mutual understanding of both the British and the Russians as to the boundary which they definitely arranged between their respective Empires in the treaty of 1825 is proved, first, by the overwhelming multitude of maps of the best cartographers of the leading nations of the world, including England and Canada, in recognizing the boundary always claimed in the beginning by Russia and afterwards by the United States; second, by the accordant acts of the British and Canadian authorities.

Not only had Great Britain recognized and confirmed in the official maps which she had published the boundary as defined in the treaty, but she had still further confirmed the mutual understanding by renting from Russia for a long term of years the very territory which she contended was her own. Great Britain agreed to pay and did pay from the year 1839 to the year 1857 \$7,500 a year for this very margin of coast which she now claims is British territory.

Probably the most important English map, indicating what the best geographers of the British Government thought was the true boundary until very recently, is the British Admiralty Chart, No. 787, giving the northwest corner of America, prepared in 1876 and corrected up to April, 1898.

On this chart of the British Admiralty the frontier of the

United States descends the one hundred and forty-first degree of longitude west from Greenwich, and then advancing follows the sinuosities of the coast, so as to give a continuous strip of territory completely cutting off the Dominion of Canada from all contact with the fiords or even estuaries which make their way into the continent. This boundary between British and American territory is drawn more than 50 miles from the coast. Thus the British Admiralty itself upholds and indorses the territorial claims maintained by both the Russian and the United States Governments.

This significant chart, it will be noted, was corrected up to April, 1898. On the 1st of August, 1898, the British Government for the first time presented to the Government of the United States a statement revealing the fact that it repudiated the provisions of the treaty of 1825 concerning the meaning of the Alaskan frontier as defined in the Anglo-Russian treaty, and on August 23, 1898, it claimed that the eastern boundary of Alaska should run across the estuaries and fiords, so as to give Great Britain access to the sea.

It is in exact accordance with British character that this demand was made during the very year that we got into trouble with Spain. As soon as it was obvious that we had a war upon our hands, England hastened to formulate and present demands which had not before occurred to her. As, during the rebellion, she took instant advantage of our plight by launching a privateer to prey upon our commerce, so now, when we were involved in trouble with another nation, she presented a demand for a new boundary that would give her a thousand or more square miles of territory.

It is to be further observed that her cupidity was tempted in still another way. Not only was an accession of territory desired, but the very year before, it had been discovered that that territory hid untold wealth. As poverty proved an ample protection to the South African Republics for scores of years, and as England made no assault upon their integrity until diamonds had been found at Kimberley and abundant gold in the Witwatersrand, so the greedy plunderer made no motion to climb over the mountains and invade Alaska till it had become an Eldorado.

Our Secretary of State is a most amiable and obliging person. His sensibilities were deeply wounded when he heard that the Alaskan miners had held a meeting and resolved to pay their taxes to Great Britain in lead, but not in any more valuable metal. He was also profoundly touched by the complaint of Mr. Chamberlain that the people of British America could not get down to the salt water, and the expression of his hope that the United States would consent to the abrogation of the treaty without insisting on any equivalent.

The Secretary of State is tender hearted. He sympathizes with distress wherever he beholds it, especially in great and powerful empires, and after residing several years in Great Britain he developed a fervent attachment for its style of government, which has broken out in a magnanimous concession almost without parallel in the history of nations.

It is less than three years since his susceptible heart was touched by an appeal from Great Britain for a temporary modification of the Alaskan boundary. The United States was at war, and England requested, in accents suggestive of a demand, that the boundary between her British possessions and the North Pacific should be rubbed out temporarily. She did not offer any reciprocal consideration. She did not take the trouble to define the word "temporarily."

Everybody knows that when Great Britain uses the word "temporarily" in this connection it always means "permanently." Whenever she takes transient possession of any land on the face of the earth, she remains there forever and a day. In the light of these facts must be read the official document printed by the State Department entitled "Modus vivendi between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, fixing a provisional boundary line between the Territory of Alaska and the Dominion of Canada about the head of Lynn Canal."

Concluded by exchange of notes October 20, 1890, by John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States, and Reginald Tower, chargé d'affaires of Her Britannic Majesty at Washington.

This remarkable document gave to Great Britain, without any equivalent and without any effort to define the word "temporary," the right to occupy thousands of square miles of our territory with her soldiers and surveyors and to harass its American inhabitants, and I give it in full, as follows:

It is hereby agreed between the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain that the boundary line between Canada and the Territory of Alaska in the region about the head of Lynn Canal shall be provisionally fixed as follows without prejudice to the claims of either party in the permanent adjustment of the international boundary:

In the region of the Dalton Trail, a line beginning at the peak west of Porcupine Creek, marked on the map No. 10 of the United States Commission, December 31, 1895, and on sheet No. 18 of the British commission, December 31, 1895, with the number 6500; thence running to the Klehini or

Klaheela) River in the direction of the peak north of that river, marked 5020 on the aforesaid United States map and 5025 on the aforesaid British map; thence following the high or right bank of the said Klehini River to the junction thereof with the Chilkat River, a mile and a half, more or less, north of Klukwan; provided that persons proceeding to or from Porcupine Creek shall be freely permitted to follow the trail between the said creek and the said junction of the rivers into and across the territory on the Canadian side of the temporary line wherever the trail crosses to such side, and, subject to such reasonable regulations for the protection of the revenue as the Canadian government may prescribe, to carry with them over such part or parts of the trail between the said points as may lie on the Canadian side of the temporary line such goods and articles as they desire, without being required to pay any customs duties on such goods and articles; and from said junction to the summit of the peak east of the Chilkat River, marked on the aforesaid map No. 10 of the United States Commission with the number 5410 and on the map No. 17 of the aforesaid British commission with the number 5490.

On the Dyea and Skagway trails, the summits of the Chilcoot and White passes.

"It is understood, as formerly set forth in communications of the Department of State of the United States, that the citizens or subjects of either power found by this arrangement within the temporary jurisdiction of the other shall suffer no diminution of the rights and privileges which they now enjoy.

"The Government of the United States will at once appoint an officer or officers, in conjunction with an officer or officers to be named by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, to mark the temporary line agreed upon by the erection of posts, stakes, or other appropriate temporary marks."

This is, indeed, a curious example of a *modus vivendi*. In the Century Dictionary we read that the *modus vivendi* is "a manner or way of living; a temporary arrangement pending a settlement of matters in debate, as between two nations." Hitherto when nations have established a *modus vivendi* it has been established by the nation actually in possession, and if it be a question of boundary, and if the boundary has been defined by a treaty, the *modus vivendi* operates in accordance with the terms of the treaty.

In this case of Alaska, however, the generous and susceptible Secretary of State establishes a *modus vivendi* in accordance with the claims of the party not in possession and conceding to him territory which he has never had the right to enter.

This is a new kind of *modus vivendi*, so absolutely novel that it ought to be secured to America by an international patent. Possession has hitherto been said to be nine points of the law; and if a man's right to his house is contested in the courts, he does not usually move out of it until some kind of a verdict has been found against him.

Much less does he invite the contestant to occupy the house jointly with him until some indefinite future year. The impudence of Mr. Reginald Tower in making the proposition finds its counterpart in the unsophisticated simple-mindedness of John Hay in conceding it. Or is it something else than simple-mindedness—perhaps the same lack of patriotism which induces him to permit and protect the establishment of British camps of supply at New Orleans in violation of our neutrality laws as defined by treaty?

I call your attention to the statement of Hon. J. W. Ivey, late collector of customs in Alaska, as published in the Washington Post:

Turning to the dispute over the boundary line, Mr. Ivey continued:

#### THE BOUNDARY-LINE DISPUTE.

"The United States made a most stupendous blunder when it submitted the boundary question to arbitration. The treaty of 1825 between England and Russia so clearly defines the line that it is not debatable. The Canadians are to-day occupying millions of acres of American territory at Forty Mile, the Porcupine, and other stations in that vicinity. Their surveyors and engineers have been actively at work for years, and I am satisfied that it will be soon proven to the satisfaction of our people that their zeal for their government has led them to destroy boundary monuments erected by the Russian Government more than half a century ago.

"Three years ago, when gold was discovered by American miners on American soil in the Porcupine district, the Canadians aggressively moved forward 21 miles, taking in most of the mines, subjecting the American miner to Canadian laws, executed by armed officers under the British flag while on American soil. Under these conditions Secretary Hay consented to a '*modus vivendi*' with the British Government, agreeing to postpone the settlement of the question, leaving the Canadians in possession of the territory. If this was done by our Government through ignorance it was inexcusable; if intentional, it was a crime.

"The Canadians should have been put back to their own line by persuasion, if possible, but by force, if necessary, and action should have been taken before the sun went down.

#### NO CAUSE FOR ARBITRATION.

"The United States should withdraw this question from arbitration, after which it should make the survey on the lines defined by treaty, erect its boundary monuments, and if that does not settle it, let it be settled the way George Washington settled with them."

The cuckoo warbles its curious note as far north as Alaska, and we must not forget its sinister habit of depositing its eggs in the nests of other birds to be hatched and the unpleasant habit which the usurping strangers have of killing the young of their entertainer and kicking them out of their own mother's nest.

Æsop lived a great while ago, but he has bequeathed to us a prophetic fable: A porcupine, looking for shelter, asked a nest of ground squirrels to admit him into their cave. Being good-natured, they granted him hospitality, and in he came accordingly; but he made such aggressive and ugly use of his sharp

quills that they soon repented of their easy compliance and entreated the porcupine to withdraw and leave them their home to themselves. "No," said he, "let them quit the place that don't like it; for my part, I am well enough satisfied as I am, and shall make it my home."

And the porcupine made it his home—"temporarily."

The full meaning of the *modus vivendi*, as I have given it, can scarcely be understood without reference to a map. Its very worst feature, except the surrender to England of territory to which she has no shadow of right, is its fragmentary and indefinite character. It represents the territory included in a circle of 200 miles around the head of Lynn Canal, the central highway to the Klondike.

Of this 200 miles less than 50 miles are covered by the provisional boundary in any way whatever. The Katschin River trail, the Taklin River trail, the Ferebee River Valley, and the great Chilkoot River route northward are all completely unprotected and are left with the open door. Indeed, the business centers of Skagway and Dyea are left with Canadians to share equally with ourselves if they approach by flanking the White Pass and the summit of the Cascade Range.

By the *modus vivendi* we concede to English soldiers and English surveyors the right to penetrate to the very heart of Alaska, giving them all advantages and acquiring nothing for ourselves. Acquiring nothing, do I say? O, yes; we have acquired something. We have acquired the permission of England to conquer and desolate the Philippine Archipelago, to turn Samar into a "howling wilderness" and to "kill everything over 10 years of age." If this was a duty which we needed to perform, perhaps the acquiescence of the Empire of Edward VII has not been dearly purchased.

Possibly, however, we might have continued to walk in the pathway of honor without seeking the approval of Great Britain. If England demanded to be bribed, or sought to blackmail us, we might have triumphantly quoted one of John Hay's admirable apothegms, published in his works: "Be not too anxious to gain your next-door neighbor's approval; live your own life, and let him strive to gain yours." And if the crime against the Boers and our course against the Filipinos should be mentioned in one breath, it would be cruel to embarrass Mr. Hay by quoting from his own poems this beautiful apostrophe to Liberty:

For all in vain will timorous ones essay  
To set the metes and bounds of liberty,  
For freedom is its own eternal law.  
It makes its own conditions, and in storm  
Or calm, alike, fulfills the unerring will.  
For always in thine eyes, O Liberty!  
Shines that high light by which the world is saved;  
And, though thou slay us, we will trust in thee.

The honorable gentleman has now discarded, as maudlin, this sentiment which he no doubt acquired from association with Abraham Lincoln. In fact, he has repudiated many of the principles of his callow youth. "Jim Bludso" was once his ideal hero—Jim Bludso, the brave and unselfish pilot of the Prairie Belle, who nobly did his duty and "held the nozzle agin the bank" till the passengers were saved.

Now, his ideal Jim Bludso trains a machine gun against an unprotected village or holds a burning torch under the thatch of a Tagal home. John Hay's opinion of little boys seems also to have undergone a change. He shed rhetorical tears when "Little Breeches" got lost, and when the child was found herded with the sheep the poet insisted that angels had protected him. The Tagal infants, "everything over 10," seem to have lost their angel guardians, and "loafing around the throne" in satin knee breeches has risen to a delightful profession.

We have not much to hope for from this Administration. It has discarded and repudiated the Declaration of Independence for the greed of conquest, and it has formed an unholy alliance in giving the British Empire permission and assistance in exterminating the gallant farmers of South Africa. The last Democratic President knew well how to defend the nation's honor, and if for nothing else, he should be honored.

When the British lion, roaming up and down the earth, laid its heavy paw upon little Venezuela and insolently growled, "This is mine," Uncle Sam, in the person of Grover Cleveland, took that voracious animal by the tail and gave it such a mighty twist that its roar of anguish echoed across the Atlantic Ocean. And straightway it took its wounded appendage between its legs and hastened home. When some other man of patriotism and unflinching courage shall stand at the head of our affairs, Alaska will be defended against the robber nation of the world, and our bright flag will be drawn again to the masthead wherever it has a right to fly. [Applause.]

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield forty-five minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. ELLIOTT].

Mr. ELLIOTT. Mr. Chairman, there is no measure now before Congress which is of more importance to the people of my State



and to the neighboring States of the South than the creation of the National Appalachian Forest Reserve.

In 1899 a movement was inaugurated by the Appalachian Park Association at Asheville, N. C., for the purpose of preserving the Southern Appalachian forests. The necessity that these forests should be preserved in order to prevent the washing of the mountain lands has long been advocated by geologists familiar with the country; but what has commended the subject to the favor of the country is "the increasing violence and destructiveness of the floods during the past few years, and the general recognition of the fact that the continued clearing of these mountain slopes would soon result in the absolute ruin of all the interests of this region and of the adjacent lowlands in the several States."

The agitation of the subject resulted in an appropriation by Congress of \$5,000 in the Agricultural appropriation bill for 1901 for the investigation, by the Secretary of Agriculture, of "the Southern Appalachian Mountain region of western North Carolina and adjacent States." This very prompt recognition by Congress of the importance of the project was due chiefly to its strong support by the press of the country, which has done more than all other agencies to awaken the American people to the importance of preserving the remnants of our forests before it is too late, and of educating them to a knowledge of the fact that these forests are for this generation to legitimately use but not to destroy.

In 1901 the Secretary of Agriculture made a short preliminary report on the subject, which was submitted to Congress by President McKinley with his approval, and in December last the Secretary of Agriculture made a most exhaustive and valuable report to President Roosevelt, who commended the subject to Congress in a message in which he said:

Its conclusions point unmistakably, in the judgment of the Secretary and in my own, to the creation of a national forest reserve in certain parts of the Southern States. The facts ascertained and here presented deserve the careful consideration of the Congress; they have already received the full attention of the scientist and the lumberman. They set forth an economic need of prime importance to the welfare of the South, and hence to that of the nation as a whole, and they point to the necessity of protecting, through wise use, a mountain region whose influence flows far beyond its borders with the waters of the rivers to which it gives rise.

#### PURPOSE OF THE BILL.

The purpose of the bill, stated in the report of the House Committee on Agriculture just filed, is—

To set aside in the Southern Appalachian Mountain region a national reserve for the preservation of the forests of that district, the perpetuation of the timber supply, the development of its farming resources, and the regulation of the water flow in its streams. It authorizes the purchase for the people, by the Secretary of Agriculture, under certain reasonable restrictions, of not more than 4,000,000 acres of land, to be selected in the mountain forest region of Virginia, West Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee. It also authorizes the Secretary to accept and administer donations of land in the same vicinity for the same purposes.

While the purpose of the original advocates of this measure was chiefly to establish a park from considerations of pleasure rather than utility, the movement has been changed to the making of a forest reserve as distinguished from a park. Secretary Wilson says: "The idea of a national park is conservation, not use; that of the forest reserve conservation by use. I have therefore to recommend a forest reserve instead of a park."

#### PROVISIONS OF THE BILL.

The bill provides that the Secretary of Agriculture may purchase land suitable for a forest reserve in the Appalachian Mountains in the States of West Virginia, Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, not to exceed in all 4,000,000 acres; to care for, protect, use, and make accessible the same; that he shall advertise in said States for land to be purchased and, as between lands of equal value for the purposes of this act, he shall accept the lowest bids; he may also contract for the purchase of lands exclusive of the timber thereon of specified kinds and sizes, the same to be cut under regulations to be established; also, he may contract for the purchase of lands exclusive of mineral rights therein, and the mineral deposits may be mined under prescribed regulations, which regulations, as well as those for cutting timber, shall be embodied in the contract of purchase.

In purchasing lands the Secretary shall in each State conform to the conditions prescribed in the present or future acts of such States, but no lands shall be condemned against the will of the owner so long as the owner shall protect and perpetuate the forests on such lands, under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary for the other forest lands purchased under this act, as far as applicable. The Secretary may also accept gifts of lands for such purposes. He shall take proper steps to protect the United States as to the title to lands, and no payment shall be made therefor except after approval of the Attorney-General.

He shall also make provision for replanting of trees on cleaned lands when necessary for the protection of the soil or the water supply. He shall also make such rules and regulations and establish such service as he may deem necessary for the care, protection, control, and use of such forest, and may sell such wood, timber, and other products as may be removed without injury to

the forest, but no sale shall be made except under prescribed regulations, nor at less than the appraised value thereof, the proceeds to be covered into the Treasury of the United States.

Two million dollars are appropriated for the purposes of the act, to be available until June 30, 1906, but no part of the money shall be expended for land until a valid title to the same shall be vested in the United States and until the State in which the land lies shall have ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction of the same during the time the United States shall be or remain the owner thereof for all purposes except the administration of the criminal laws of said State and the service of any civil process therein. The Secretary shall annually make to Congress a detailed statement of his doings under the act.

#### DAMAGES BY FLOODS ON THE CATAWBA.

It is a matter beyond dispute and of common observation that in recent years disastrous floods and freshets have visited the above States with alarming frequency. The report of the Secretary shows that the damage to the farmers on the Catawba River alone, caused by the May, 1901, storm, on the Blue Ridge, about the sources of that river, amounted to a million and a half dollars, and that an August storm in the same year added a further loss of a half million more on the low lands of the same river.

I find the following in the March, 1902, number of Forestry and Irrigation:

The characteristics of the Catawba River floods have undergone a sudden and alarming change. In previous years all floods along the river rose slowly. The water stagnated like a mill pond over the bottom lands and, gently receding, left a deep, rich deposit on the already fertile bottoms.

The floods have changed, therefore, from an agency of good to the farmers to one of absolute destruction—a quick, tumultuous rise of waters and a swiftly rushing current that tears up the soil down to the rocks and hard clay and leaves barren wastes. This extraordinary and deplorable change in the characteristics of the flood has followed the laying waste in recent years of thousands of acres of woodland in the western part of the State.

There have been two notable floods in the Catawba River in the past. The first was in 1848 and the second was in 1876. In neither instance was there any damage to farm lands. The water rose slowly and receded gently, leaving the river bottoms richer by a deposit of fertile sediment. There is no Government record of the rainfall during those periods, but Catawba River land owners say that there was as much water in the bottoms during the freshet of 1876 as there was last May.

To show the protection against floods furnished by forests the same publication gives the results of a valuable experiment on 400 acres of land, made in the South Mountains, owned by the State hospital at Morganton, N. C., and from which it gets its water supply by a creek having its source in the above tract. For twenty years no timber has been cut on this tract, there have been no forest fires, and the ground is thickly covered with leaves, mold, and undergrowth.

Near by is another similar stream, but the trees have been cut from about its source and there have been frequent fires. Accurate measurements of the flow of water in May and August, 1901, show that while the first stream had lost only 10 per cent of its volume of water between those months the other had lost 88 per cent in the same time.

#### DAMAGE ON THE YADKIN AND OTHER RIVERS.

During 1901 the May floods caused destruction along the valleys of the Yadkin, the Kanawha, and the upper tributaries of the Tennessee estimated at the enormous sum of \$5,000,000, which, added to the damage during the summer and spring on other streams rising in this section, approximates the appalling total of \$10,000,000. These figures are enough to stagger belief, and yet they do not include the damage done in the region about the mountains nor to the rice fields on the seacoast.

While 1901 was a most disastrous year, yet similar losses to a less extent have been occurring for years past, and, as I will hereafter show, it is inevitable that if some such measure as this be not adopted, with each recurring year the damage will be greater and greater, just as in past years there has been a perceptible increase in the number and the destruction of these floods.

#### DAMAGE ON THE SAVANNAH RIVER RICE FIELDS.

This fact is clearly demonstrated by the conditions existing on the rice fields on the seacoast of South Carolina. Take, for example, the rice plantations on the South Carolina side of the Savannah River, which has its source in these mountains. Formerly they were most productive. The lands were exceedingly valuable. They were all cultivated in the most careful manner and yielded splendid returns. Whoever was so lucky as to own one of them was considered a rich man. What is their condition now? Many of them, including their elaborate and expensive systems of irrigation, have been substantially abandoned, and the remainder generally show a loss at the end of the year instead of a profit.

In the course of less than twenty years there has been a complete revolution from a state of great prosperity to one of utter prostration. What is the cause of all this? None other than freshets, all the time increasing in number and destructive power. In about the year 1887 I visited these plantations after one of these

overflows specially for the purpose of seeing their condition and ascertaining whether some remedy could not be applied, and I found that on eight of the most valuable plantations on the river the entire rice crop, just ready for harvesting, had been swept away, not one bushel of rice having been gathered and the fields being as bare as a well-traveled highway.

#### DAMAGE ON THE SOUTH SANTEE.

Take another river, the south branch of the Santee, into which flow the waters of the Broad, the Saluda, and the Catawba, all of which have their sources in these mountains. The South Santee, like the Savannah, was noted for its splendid rice plantations, cultivated in the most expensive and scientific manner, and yielding annually the most bountiful harvests.

For years past the same process has been going on as on the Savannah, and all from the same cause, until there is now not one plantation under cultivation. During a recent visit there I was told by a planter that during the last season the small area planted by him had been covered by no less than 13 distinct freshets of greater or less force, making it absolutely impossible for him to make a crop.

#### RICE FIELDS AS SEEN BY WASHINGTON.

More than a century ago these rice plantations, now in ruin, attracted the wonder and admiration of the foremost man of his times, and, withal, a great farmer. In Mrs. Ravenel's *Life and Times of William Lowndes* is found the following:

When General Washington visited the State in 1791 he crossed in his journey all the large rice rivers from the Waccamaw to the Savannah, and he expressed to Mr. Charles Pinckney, then governor, his admiration of what he saw. "He had no idea that the United States possessed such agricultural improvement as the tide lands showed."

But all the rice fields that charmed the eye of Washington are not in a state of ruin to-day—by no means. It is only those lying on rivers that have their sources in the mountains. On the other rivers, those not reaching to the mountains, the cultivation of rice is as profitable as ever, a freshet never destroying a crop except when combined with an equinoctial gale which forces the salt water in from the ocean. The rule is that, as to rivers having their sources in the mountains, rice planting is substantially abandoned, while, as to the others, it is carried on as successfully as ever.

The conclusion is irresistible that the source of the trouble is the mountains, which are also the source of the waters. And how can one doubt this when we find that the destruction from these floods commences in the very mountains themselves, then invades the valleys lying at their feet, then overflows the rich bottom lands of the Broad, Saluda, Catawba, Wateree, and the Congaree, and lastly, overwhelms the rice fields on the coast, the waters all the time loaded with the best soil of the State, which blocks up our harbors or stains for many miles the ocean, into which it is emptied and wasted? Not only is it plain whence comes the trouble, but it is equally plain that it is of recent origin, because these things did not happen in the days when Washington visited the State, nor for many years afterwards. What has brought about the change?

#### FOREST DESTRUCTION THE CAUSE.

All the evidence goes to show that the cause is the destruction of our mountain forests, which commenced some twenty years ago, just before the time when destructive freshets became so frequent. The lumberman first cut only the more valuable trees, such as the walnut and cherry; then, as railroads improved the means of transportation, he cut other somewhat less valuable trees, until now everything merchantable is cut, tramroads opening up sections hitherto inaccessible. It is estimated by the Secretary of Agriculture that, at the rate the destruction by cutting and fires is now going on, these mountain forests will be destroyed within the next ten years.

#### HEAVY RAINFALL.

Two of the most striking features of these Appalachian Mountains are the enormous rainfall and the splendid forests. Careful investigation by the Secretary of Agriculture shows that for a period of ten years the average rainfall in these mountains at various places in South Carolina, western North Carolina, and Georgia was nearly 73 inches.

For the year 1898 it was at Highlands, N. C., 105.24 inches; at Horse Cove, 99.97 inches, and at Flat Rock, 78.39 inches. In May, 1901, in twenty-four hours it was 6.12 inches at Flat Rock, N. C.; 7.25 inches at Marion, N. C., and at 8.3 at Patterson, N. C. There was a rainfall of 8 inches in eleven hours near Roan Mountain. The total rainfall for August, 1901, at Highlands was 30.74 inches, while the annual rainfall in the basin of Broad River is approximately only 51 inches.

Moreover, the rainfall, as a rule, is exceedingly heavy at short periods, and, owing to the steep mountain sides and the absence of lakes and other reservoirs, heavy rainfalls are followed by a rapid rise in the streams, which, when the forests have been

cleared or fires have burned off the underbrush and fallen leaves, produce most destructive floods. The Secretary says:

The soil, once denuded of its forests and swept by torrential rains, rapidly loses first its humus, then its rich upper strata, and finally is washed in enormous volume into the streams, to bury such of the fertile lowlands as are not eroded by the floods, to obstruct the rivers, and to fill up the harbors on the coast. More good soil is now washed from these cleared mountain-side fields during a single heavy rain than during centuries under forest cover.

In New England and many of the Northern States the numerous lakes and glacial deposits of sand and gravel, spread out over the hills and valleys, serve as storehouses for the water and help materially to preserve uniformity in the flow of the streams. In this respect they cooperate largely with the forest cover in that region; and, indeed, they would accomplish much in that direction were the forest cover entirely removed.

But in the Southern Appalachian region there are no lakes and no glacial gravels and sands; the forests and the soil are the factors upon which the solution of water storage depends. And that the problem resolves itself largely into one of forest cover, with its undergrowth and humus, is seen by the fact that in the streams of the Piedmont Plain of the South Atlantic States the irregularity in flow, as observed for a number of years, has been almost directly proportional to the extent of forest clearings. Observations and measurements of the Southern Appalachian mountain streams made during the last few years show that the same is true in that region. Hence, here the water problem is a forest problem.

#### MOUNTAIN FORESTS.

As to the forests of these mountains the House report says:

The oldest, largest, and most varied primeval hard-wood forests of the continent are within its limits. One hundred and thirty-seven species of trees have been examined and described by the Government experts who have visited and surveyed the territory. The list of shrubs and smaller plants is still greater. Northern varieties mingle with Southern; those from the Gulf region with those from New England. It contains a unique natural collection of forest species selected and fostered by soil and climate which if once destroyed can never be replaced. Among these are cherry, walnut, yellow poplar, chestnut, ash, beech, and the magnolia and mulberry.

The Secretary says they—

are the heaviest and most beautiful forests of the continent. \* \* \* For economic reasons the preservation of these forests is imperative. Their existence in good condition is essential to the prosperity of the lowlands through which their waters run. Maintained in productive condition they will supply indispensable materials, which must fail without them. \* \* \*

The agricultural resources of the Southern Appalachian region must be protected and preserved. To that end the preservation of the forests is an indispensable condition, which will lead not to the reduction but to the increase of the yield of agricultural products.

#### PRESERVATION OF OUR WATER POWER.

Up to this point I have considered this measure with reference only to the farming interests—much the most important to us—and which are already feeling most seriously the damage which the bill is intended to stop. But the question of preserving the magnificent water power furnished by the many rivers rising in these mountains is hardly less important. To-day the larger water powers in the South Atlantic States are confined to the rivers which have their sources in the mountains. I give a table, compiled from the Secretary's report, of the estimated available horsepower and that actually in use on the following rivers:

Rivers.	Available.	Actually used.
James .....	28,290	8,700
Roanoke .....	41,000	3,500
Yadkin .....	56,400	1,500
Catawba .....	57,000	2,000
Broad and Saluda .....	43,000	18,000
Savannah .....	75,000	11,500
Chattahoochee .....	285,000	4,300
Coosa .....	141,000	3,700

A safe estimate of the available but undeveloped water power on all the rivers and streams, according to Secretary Wilson, is 1,000,000 horsepower. Everyone is familiar with the extraordinary increase in manufacturing that has taken place in the two Carolinas in very recent years, much of it owing to our abundant water power. It is, of course, the cheapest power to be procured, the water flowing without cost day and night, while every ton of coal purchased adds necessarily and materially to expenses.

Heretofore the advantage of water power over steam has not been demonstrated because steam could be generated wherever fuel could be got, and mills could be located at points having advantages in transportation and otherwise. Now, however, steam has lost its advantage because, through improvements in electricity, power can be brought many miles at less cost than coal can be furnished at most points.

The water powers, therefore, in the not far distant future—

Says the report—

may become as valuable as coal mines, and, as the local supply becomes more costly by reason of deeper mining, the water powers will increase in value. This wealth should not be wantonly wasted.

It has been ascertained that in sections comparatively level, but where the forests have been cleared from areas aggregating from 60 to 80 per cent of the land, floods are frequent and excessive, and that some of the smaller streams in seasons of drought almost



wholly disappear, and the use of their water power is substantially abandoned, whereas the flow of streams whose sources have not been cleared of forests shows striking uniformity. The important thing is uniformity of flow—in contrast to a rushing torrent after each heavy rain followed by a weak flow. The report proceeds:

This is just what one would expect who has been, during a rainy season, in the heart of a mountain region where the lands have not been cleared nor have forest fires destroyed the humus cover from their surface. The rain-drops are battered to pieces and their force broken by the leaves and twigs of the trees, and when their spray reaches the ferns, the grass, and the flowers below, instead of running away down the surface slope, it passes into the spongy humus and thence into the soil and the crevices among the rocks below. As much of this supply as is not subsequently used by the growing plants emerges from the storehouse weeks or months later in numberless springs. The rain must be extremely abundant or long protracted to produce any excessive increase in the flow of the adjacent brooks.

Of course, the damage is not all owing to the destruction of the forests in the mountains. Anyone passing through my State can see the same process in operation on every hillside that has been cleared for cultivation and now abandoned. There is nothing on the lands to hold the water, which, after each rain, rushes into numerous rivulets, then into the swollen creeks, then into the rivers, already overflowing with the torrents that have rushed down the mountains. And it may with much force be said that the preservation of the mountain forests will avail but little unless the cooperation of individual landowners can be procured.

One of the most beneficial results from passing this bill, Mr. Chairman, will be that it will give an object lesson to our people of the benefits of forestry. The late Mr. Morton, formerly Secretary of Agriculture, had printed at the head of every one of his letters the words: "Plant a tree." No better advice could be given. The Department of Agriculture has for years been doing all in its power to induce private owners both to preserve their forests and to renew them by forest tree planting.

"The private forest lands exceed in area those of the States and the United States combined, and their preservation in productive condition, as regards both the timber and water supply, is of vast importance to the nation." The object of the Department is to show that improved ways of handling timber are best for the owners from a pecuniary standpoint, as well as for the forest, and the Secretary, upon application to him, will, after examination of the land if it be from 5 acres up, prepare a plan for the purpose of promoting and increasing its present value and usefulness to its owner and to develop and perpetuate forests upon it; and all without cost to the owner.

I realize, Mr. Chairman, that this is a stupendous project, and to many persons a startling one, but I never was better satisfied that it was our duty to act and to act quickly. While great damage has already been done, yet it is as nothing compared to what will soon take place if some remedy be not applied. The experience of other countries teaches us that it must be done at some time, and that if longer delayed it will only entail enormous additional expense. The Senate report says:

As illustrating the necessity for such action as is now proposed, attention may be called to the fact that in every civilized country it has been found absolutely necessary to preserve the forests on mountain slopes, and especially is this true in more southern latitudes. Everywhere it has been found vastly cheaper to preserve existing forests on these mountains than to reforest such regions after the former forests have been once destroyed.

In Italy it was found that destroying the mountain forests had produced excessive floods, and the Government is now restoring them at an estimated cost of \$24 per acre. In France the same destruction occurred, and with the same inevitable result, and the restoration of the forests now in progress will, it is estimated, cost no less than \$50 per acre. Unfortunately for those countries the remedy was postponed too long, a postponement that will cost Italy \$12,000,000 and France no less than \$40,000,000.

In our own country the State of New York is now paying a similar penalty. That State years ago sold, or allowed to be sold, the Adirondack forests, and now, realizing that the water supply of her most important river is rapidly failing, she is buying back the same forests at great expense. Fortunate it is for us that we have realized the danger while we are in position to avert it at only the cost of cheap land.

It is estimated that because of the small amount of work necessary to be done by the Government beyond mere protection, the reserve will be self-supporting through a system of timber selling that will improve, instead of destroying, the forests. South Carolina alone can not afford to make this outlay, necessary as it is for the protection of her farmers, but she fully appreciates the necessity for it and has adopted the following resolution favoring this bill:

A resolution favoring the establishment of a national forest reserve in the Southern Appalachian Mountain region.

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring). The general assembly of South Carolina hereby expresses its approval of the movement looking to the establishment by the Federal Government of an extensive national forest reserve in the Southern Appalachian Mountain region as a wise and beneficent measure, such as many other nations have already adopted, and which this country should adopt before it is too late, looking to

the conservation of its forests and the protection of the sources of important streams; and

Whereas the proposal to establish this forest reserve has been approved and urged by the leading scientific societies and forestry associations of this country and by the general press; and

Whereas this general assembly has passed an act granting its consent to the acquisition of lands in northern South Carolina by the Federal Government for incorporation in such a forest reserve, believing the measure to be one of great importance to the people of this State; and

Whereas a bill is now before the Federal Congress providing for the purchase of lands for this purpose:

Resolved, That the Senators and Representatives in Congress from this State are hereby requested to urge upon Congress the importance of prompt and favorable action in behalf of this measure.

Neither can the other interested States undertake the work. The United States alone can do it, and I am here, in obedience to the action of the legislature of my State, asking that Congress shall pass this bill. All private rights are protected. What will be done will be done in subordination to the laws of the States interested, and even in the mountains themselves agriculture will not be hindered, but improved.

Through the beneficence of Providence these magnificent mountains, having 46 peaks and 41 miles of ridges exceeding 6,000 feet in height, and 288 other peaks and 300 miles of ridges of over 5,000 feet, "the greatest masses of mountains east of the Rockies," and "the highest mountains covered with hard wood in America," have been provided as an unfailing source for the rivers of six great States.

What a wonderful provision! First the bountiful, even wonderful rainfall; then these splendid forests to preserve and store it for the use of man! But the work of man is fast destroying the handiwork of God. Let us at once see to it that this shall stop and that what was intended for the benefit of toiling millions shall not be perverted to their ruin. [Loud applause.]

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Nevada [Mr. NEWLANDS].

[Mr. NEWLANDS addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSON].

[Mr. JOHNSON addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I yield thirty minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. RHEA].

Mr. RHEA of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I shall avail myself of this opportunity to submit a few remarks upon the past, present, and future policy of the Administration in the Philippine Islands. Since I have been a member of this House I have been content, for reasons satisfactory to myself and I trust to my constituents, to remain silent and to serve them in the most effective way I could by constant attendance upon the sessions of the House and by voting upon all propositions for what I believed to be for their best interests.

Not only have I endeavored to be constant in my efforts to represent them upon this floor, but wherever their interests were involved I have endeavored to serve them as efficiently as I could, and this without question of political affiliation or condition in life.

I do not know whether I should consider myself fortunate or unfortunate in being in the American Congress at a period when the whole theory of our Government seems to have undergone a sudden and violent change.

Four years ago when I announced my candidacy for Congress we were upon the threshold of a war with Spain for the purpose of freeing the people of Cuba from Spain's inhuman and despotic power.

Since that time strange events have crowded thick and fast upon each other, until the American mind stands appalled at the gravity of the situation.

The sound of Dewey's victorious guns in the harbor of Manila, as reechoed later by Schley's greater victory in the harbor of Santiago, is still fresh in the minds of the American people.

But who can realize the stupendous results and grave responsibilities inherited by the American people from those brilliant victories.

I venture the assertion, that if four years ago some member of this House had announced to the American Congress that the United States Government would occupy the attitude it does today with reference to those foreign islands he would have been laughed to scorn and ridicule by every lover of the institutions of his country.

At that time he would indeed have been considered a wild and reckless prophet who should have foretold that a war begun to free the struggling Cubans from the cruel and despotic power of Spain would to-day have been changed into a war of subjugation in the Philippine Islands—a war which for inhuman acts and atrocious conduct has shocked not only the sense of justice, but the moral sense of the civilized world.

Mr. Chairman, the story of what induced our war with Spain is known to every intelligent citizen in the country.

They know this unhappy people had been striving for generations to secure their liberty and independence. They know that Spain's wicked and inhuman policy had devastated the beautiful island of Cuba and made it a "howling wilderness."

They know that the bitter cries of its oppressed and starving people had so stirred the American conscience that there was a universal demand for intervention.

They know that the destruction of our ill-fated battle ship, with so many precious lives, was the crowning act in the long series of tragedies which hastened the declaration of war and the crushing of Spain's power in the island of Cuba.

They know, too, Mr. Chairman, that this great Republic most solemnly declared that it was not to be a war of conquest; that it was not to be a war for territorial aggrandizement; that it was not to be a war of "criminal aggression," but we protested to all the world that our only purpose was to free the Cuban people from the Spanish yoke and give them the blessing of liberty and independence.

The people applauded the action of Congress in voting \$50,000,000 for this purpose. It was a short, decisive, and victorious battle.

We had a right to be proud of our Army and proud of our Navy.

We had a right to be grateful to the Philippine people, who, at our request joined with our naval forces in crushing the power of Spain in the Philippine Islands.

We knew that the Filipinos had been fighting for ages to free their native land from the heel of the despot and to secure their independence.

We know now that they were led to believe through our representatives that an alliance with our forces meant their liberty and a government of their own.

They knew it was a war against oppression, for liberty, and the uplifting of humanity, for we ourselves had so declared, and they trusted in the honor and justice of the great American people. How that trust has been so wantonly and shamefully betrayed the whole world knows to-day.

I believe it was the intention of our Government in the beginning to give to the Philippine people their liberty and independence and a government of their own.

The correspondence between our representatives and the Administration can leave no serious doubt that this was the intention.

We defy any candid and truthful man to read this correspondence and then assert that such was not the inevitable conclusion.

The very fact that our own Government did not question or controvert the tenor of that correspondence is conclusive proof of the fact that the Philippine people had a right to expect that the United States would guarantee to them their independence.

We sought their aid and armed and supported them with the munitions of war.

We knew then that liberty and independence was their dearest hope, and that they would fight Americans as quick as Spaniards if subjugation was to be their eternal lot.

Is it possible that we armed these people knowing that later they would turn their arms upon the American flag?

No, Mr. Chairman, such would have been a suicidal policy and unworthy of the patriotism, if not the good sense, of the American people.

The proof is irresistible that we intended, and they believed, that the hour of their deliverance had come.

But in an evil hour the insane desire to become a world power took possession of some of the American people.

The taste of Spanish blood had whetted the appetite for more, and had so poisoned the American system that we started forth upon our inglorious career of greed, cruelty, and despotism.

We had demonstrated the superior skill of our soldiers and sailors, and our splendid battle ships had startled the world with their effective and destructive power.

Now, we should turn them, not against a great and powerful nation, but against a weak and feeble people, who had lately been our allies against Spain; whose burning desire was for independence; whose every act and declaration was a solemn warning that nothing short of liberty would ever be submitted to; that it was independence or extermination.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that for ingratitude, treachery, and cruelty our present war in the Philippines has been surpassed in modern times. What did Spain do in Cuba that we have not done in the Philippine Islands?

Ah, Mr. Chairman, what have we done in the Philippine Islands that Spain did not do in Cuba?

The American conscience revolted at Weyler's reconcentration camps in Cuba, but that same conscience is supposed to be dormant and numbed at our same policy in the Philippine Islands.

We are told that it is treason to criticize the conduct of this cruel and relentless war.

We are told to wait until the work of "benevolent assimilation" has been completed.

Shall we wait until thousands more of our brave American

boys shall go down in death and to the grave in trying to subjugate a people who have been taught by the noble example of our forefathers that liberty was the priceless jewel of the human race?

Shall we wait until the torch has finished its deadly work and blackened the earth with the smoke of its humble homes?

Shall we wait until another Smith shall issue his command to "kill and burn and make it a howling wilderness;" until its land is bleached with the bones of its men, women, and children?

Shall we wait until we have exterminated its population "above the age of 10," and left only its babes and sucklings as a reminder of the generosity of the great American people?

Mr. Chairman, those who have disagreed with the Administration in its policy in the Philippine Islands have been accused of encouraging resistance to our authority there.

Let us remember that nearly a century and a half ago, when our forefathers were struggling for liberty and independence against the despotism of Great Britain, the elder Pitt, one of England's greatest statesmen, came to our relief and declared upon the floor of the House of Commons:

Gentlemen, sir, have been charged with giving birth to the sedition in America. They have spoken their sentiments with freedom against this unhappy act, and freedom has become their crime. Sorry I am to hear the liberty of speech in this house imputed as a crime. But the imputation shall not discourage me. It is a liberty I mean to exercise.

No gentleman ought to be afraid to exercise it. It is a liberty by which the gentleman who calumniates it might have profited, by which he ought to have profited. He ought to have desisted from his project. The gentleman tells us America is obstinate; America is almost in open rebellion. I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people so dead to all feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves would have been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest.

The cry of treason and the encouragement to the American rebels had no terrors for Pitt. He went so far as to boldly declare that he rejoiced that America had resisted.

I am not aware, Mr. Chairman, that any American Senator or Representative has ever gone so far with reference to the Filipinos. It has only been a source of regret to us that this free Republic should have pursued a course of such manifest injustice and cruelty as to inevitably lead to resistance upon the part of a people whose burning desire was for liberty and to whom the thought of independence was as sweet as it was to the American colonists.

Mr. Chairman, in all the years of our national life, what loyal American has been found to denounce Pitt as a traitor and to condemn him for his courageous defense of our colonial ancestors?

They were resisting what they rightly conceived to be the unrighteous and unconstitutional acts of the British Parliament.

The Filipinos are resisting what they conceive to be an unrighteous military subjugation and the unconstitutional acts of the American Congress and the President of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, we were told in the beginning that our war in the Philippine Islands was in behalf of civilization and Christianity—that it would be of short duration, and with little loss in treasure and blood.

But nearly four years have passed and the bloody tragedy still goes on, and as the years have fled the Army has been enormously augmented; the expenditures are climbing rapidly to the half-billion mark; our military excesses have gone from bad to worse, until the country has been largely depopulated of its adult male citizenship, to say nothing of the women and children who have perished in the awful work of destruction.

Since we have Christianized them with the sword and civilized them with the torch we do not now hear so much about Christianity and civilization.

It is now commercial expansion! We are told that they have once again become pacified and the land is ready for the advent and possession of the carpetbagger and adventurer.

Mr. Chairman, we would hope and trust that they could not only be pacified, but satisfied; but we do not believe that the word "pacified" has any place in the argument of this question. We do not believe that a people high strung and intelligent as they are said to be—a people who love their homes and their country, and who for more than two hundred years have shown their willingness to die for the security of the one and the independence of the other, in their unequal warfare against Spain and other powers—will ever become "pacified" until they have been promised and assured their independence and a government of their own. They may be overpowered and subdued for a while, but will not the insults and wrongs and tortures and devastation which they have suffered at our hands live to rankle in the bosoms of their posterity and call for a continued military force to keep them in subjection?

Now, before proceeding to ascertain what is to be the future course of the Republican party with reference to the Philippine Islands, as revealed by the two bills pending in the Senate and House for the government of said islands, let us see how the account stands to date.

But first let me advert to the proposition so often advanced by our friends upon the other side that the American people had



indorsed at the polls the policy of the party in power in the Philippine Islands. I deny it.

I deny that the Republican party ever went before the people upon any fixed and certain policy as to the government of the islands. Their cry was, Stand by the flag; uphold the Army; the country is prosperous; "let well enough alone," and trust to us to deal honorably and justly with the great questions involved in our foreign possessions—and the people, whose blood was still feverish from the excitement of war, took them at their word.

But the people of this country are a just, intelligent, and discriminating people; they are a patient and forbearing people, but when their conscience is once aroused they can not be trifled with.

They know a great deal more about these questions than they did two years ago.

The facts have been slowly but surely coming to light.

The books have been partly opened and we see more clearly the fearful condition to which our country has been brought.

It is true the reserve (I will not say concealment) that has obtained in Administration circles, and the censorship which has been permitted, has kept the light from a great many things that the people would like to know in regard to what has transpired in the Philippines; but we know enough to know that our whole course there has been an expensive and horrible one.

The Secretary of War recently stated in a communication to the Senate that it would be difficult to give in detail all of our expenses in the Philippine Islands up to the present time.

But it is not denied, I believe, from any source that these expenses have exceeded \$300,000,000.

And this does not take into account the amount we have paid, are now paying, and the enormous amount we will have to pay for generations yet in pensions to the dependents of those who have or may die from wounds or disease and to those who have and will contract some of the innumerable diseases to which the human race is subject.

I have no doubt it would be a safe prediction to say that 75 per cent of the Americans who are in the service of their country in that tropical climate will finally be placed upon the pension roll.

No one can estimate the untold millions that the American people will yet have to pay for this purpose.

Mr. Chairman, if the millions we have already spent in trying to subjugate the Philippine people had been kept at home and wisely expended what manifold blessings it would have brought to the American people.

We have seen gentlemen upon this floor antagonize certain items in the agricultural appropriation bill, where the question of only a few thousand dollars was involved, and which was intended to aid the great agricultural interests of the country. This great Department of the Government which is doing such a magnificent work for the farmers of the country is to receive niggardly aid at the hands of the American Congress, while millions are leaving the Treasury of the United States in our mad prosecution of a cruel and unrighteous war. We are asked to give only a few thousand dollars to the Agricultural Department to be expended under the direction of its Bureau of Public Road Inquiries for the purpose of making experiments in road building and of giving information and arousing public sentiment as to the great importance of a better system of public roads, and yet we spend millions to establish our reputation as a world power and to oppress a weak and sorrow-stricken people 10,000 miles from our capital.

But we are told that the Government ought not to go into the business of assisting our great rural communities in securing a better system of public roads.

Mr. Chairman, this Government since its foundation has spent hundreds of millions of dollars in improving rivers and harbors to increase our commerce and build up the great cities of the country.

They have given away millions of acres of the public lands of the United States to aid in the construction of the great railroads that traverse our Western territory in order to develop that great section and give to its people better transportation facilities.

We contend that if the Government can engage in such enterprises as I have mentioned, and a number of others that might be enumerated, it is just as legitimate and proper for the Government to extend its aid in perfecting a better system of public roads, so as to furnish our rural communities better transportation for the products of their farms.

Then, again, Mr. Chairman, under the system so wisely begun and so auspiciously being carried on of establishing rural free delivery for the carrying of mail to the home of every farmer and wage-earner in the United States, the roads of this country will eventually become a great network of postal routes over which the United States will have its mail carried to within convenient reach of every citizen of the land.

Now, for the lack of sufficient appropriations, this great and

beneficent service of rural free delivery has not progressed with the rapidity we had hoped for or that the rural communities had a right to expect.

I believe it is the greatest institution ever put into operation for the direct benefit of the agricultural and wage-earning classes of the country.

They can feel its benefits quickly and immediately, for it brings them into closer touch with the educational, industrial, and commercial interests of the country.

With its complete establishment, the people of all the land will become in easy communication with each other. Newspapers, magazines, and other educational agencies will daily find their way into the homes of the country boys and girls, upon whom in the future, as in the past, must largely rest the perpetuity of our free institutions.

Mr. Chairman, we want to see this great system expanded more rapidly. I have urged its establishment and rapid extension for my constituents with as much persistency as I could. I do not complain that I have not been able to do more, for I realize that the appropriation has not been sufficient to enable the authorities to press the work more vigorously. If we could have kept but a part of the hundreds of millions this Government has so recklessly expended in our inglorious war of conquest and oppression in the far-away islands of the sea, we could not only have more quickly given to that great army of rural producers and taxpayers better roads and mail facilities, but we would have been better engaged in preserving the honor and traditions of our country.

The Congress appropriates about \$5,000,000 for the Agricultural Department of the United States. As I have said before, this Department, presided over as it is by a wise and distinguished Secretary, is doing, through its various branches and agencies, an inestimable service to the American people in general and to the American farmer in particular.

I would not detract from any of our citizenship engaged in any of the avocations of life, but I say the agricultural interests of the country deserve the most generous and liberal treatment at the hands of Congress.

They are a patient, patriotic, and persevering people, and have always constituted largely the foundation upon which the greatness and prosperity of our Republic rests.

For the American farmer the policy of the Republican party results in the burning of the candle at both ends.

They not only take from him an enormous sum in the way of taxes for the purpose of increasing the Army and Navy and of carrying out their imperial policy in the Orient, but by reason of its unjust system of tariff taxation as it regards what the farmer has to buy we have reached the point where he is completely at the mercy of the great monopolies and trusts who a few years ago were demanding protection for their infant industries, but which have now become so overgrown that they are actually selling agricultural implements and other domestic articles manufactured here in America for from 25 to 75 per cent less in foreign countries than they are selling the same article here at home.

In other words, by reason of the injustice of our tax laws they are enabled to pay the freight and other charges upon these goods to foreign countries and then sell them much cheaper there than they do to our own people here in America.

Mr. Chairman, as an illustration of the great injustice which the protected monopolies are enabled to practice upon our own people by reason of the tariff system now in force, I herewith give a list of some of the agricultural implements and other articles manufactured in this country and showing the price at which they are sold in this country and the lesser price at which they are sold in foreign countries:

Articles.	Domes- tic price.	Foreign price.
Barbed wire, per 100 pounds.....	\$3.00	\$2.00
Wire nails, per 100 pounds.....	2.25	1.35
Plows.....	14.00	12.60
Horse nails, per pound.....	.17	.14
Axes, per dozen.....	8.25	7.20
Cultivators.....	11.00	8.40
Kettles.....	1.40	.85
Table knives, per gross.....	15.00	12.00
Rivets, per 100 pounds.....	10.00	5.55
Typewriters.....	100.00	60.00
Sewing machines:		
Fine.....	27.50	20.75
Medium.....	22.00	17.50
Cheap.....	18.00	12.00

I do not believe that the American people will much longer submit to a policy which gives the foreign purchaser such a great advantage over our own people in the purchase of such goods of American manufacture.

Mr. Chairman, we are told that under domestic conditions, as well as the policy of conquest and empire upon the seas, the American wage-worker in shop and mine and factory is contented

and happy, and yet who has not felt in the recent past the unrest and dissatisfaction that was permeating the wage-working classes of the country? Notwithstanding the efforts that have recently been made to alleviate the situation and adjust the differences between capital and labor, we see inaugurated in Pennsylvania, almost under the shadow of this Capitol, one of the greatest, if not the greatest, strikes in the history of the world. Does this show that labor is satisfied with present conditions? Not at all. If such an unfortunate condition of affairs can exist now, at a time when it is alleged there is unexampled prosperity, what may we expect when periods of depression come?

I believe the conflict between capital and labor is one of the greatest dangers that threatens our Republic, and it is most earnestly to be hoped that some way can be found to adjust these differences upon a basis alike honorable and just to all.

We have discussed the policy of the Administration in the Philippines, its conduct of the war, and the effect of such a policy upon the future of this country.

In addition to the many millions taken from the Treasury and spent in our efforts to subdue those people, we are continuing to spend something like seventy-five millions per annum in the further prosecution of those efforts, and where it will end no human being can tell.

We all know that partly by reason of the prosecution of this war the very bill now under consideration carries many millions more than similar bills did prior to the Spanish-American war.

Now, Mr. Chairman, there is one other feature of this question that I want to present to this House and the American people.

It is believed that upon the passage of the majority bill now pending that millions of capital will go from this country to the Philippine Islands for exploitation and investment in its lands, forests, and mines. As a nation we are yet in the morning of the development of the natural resources of our own great country, and that great section from which I come is in the very infancy of its industrial development.

No place in the world offers greater inducement for legitimate investment than that great district which I have the honor to represent upon this floor.

I assert here, without the fear of successful denial, that no similar area upon the face of the earth can present a greater field of varied and natural resources than southwestern Virginia.

Its mountains of coal, embracing the surface of almost entire counties, has scarcely been touched by the hand of industry.

Its iron, lead, marble, barytes, salt, plaster, zinc, and other deposits are there in almost inexhaustible quantities, all of which is yet in the beginning of its development.

Its timber consists of numerous varieties of hard woods, and is of the finest quality; its water power is unexcelled; its agricultural lands are fertile and abundantly productive; its grazing lands are unsurpassed, and produce cattle for export and home consumption that commands the highest price.

Its people are honest, industrious, conservative, law-abiding, hospitable, and patriotic, and would welcome those who would come there with capital and an honest purpose to assist in the development of the vast resources I have described.

But now you propose to pursue a course which will divert millions of American capital from the development of our own resources and for the benefit of our own people, to the exploitation of the lands of a wronged and helpless people on the other side of the earth.

Mr. Chairman, the measures of the Republican party for the government of the Philippine Islands, now pending in the Senate and House, are but another step in the onward march of empire and colonial possessions. They do not provide for any government, except a government of force and a perpetuation and increase in the executive, administrative, and judicial power of the Philippine Commission.

They do not disclose or even intimate what the future policy of the Republican party is to be with reference to the islands. They are framed for present emergencies and are almost entirely devoted to provisions for exploitation, greed, and plunder.

There are about 76,000,000 acres of land in the Philippine Islands and only about 5,000,000 are held by private title.

What a magnificent field for the American adventurer! We have spent years in preparation for this, the next inglorious step in the crushing of a people's hopes and aspirations.

Under our "benevolent" rule its men, women, and children have been starved, its people have been tortured, and the torch has swept its towns and villages from the face of the earth.

And now, after all this reign of terror, our Army is to be kept there to hold in subjection its remaining population while the greedy speculator seeks what else he may devour.

No one to molest him or make him afraid.

The American Republic with its Army stands behind him and in front of him while he roams over its great public domain and takes from the forests and mines their richest treasures.

Mr. Chairman, what a spectacle is presented to the world to-day! England is crushing liberty and independence in the South African Republics, in order that she may possess its lands and rob it of its riches, and we denying liberty and independence to a helpless people in order that we too may become a world power, rob the land of its riches, and take our place beside the despotic empires of the earth.

The people of this country have never yet declared for such a policy, nor do I believe they ever will.

No gentleman upon the other side will confess to the American people that he is in favor of ever permitting these islands to be admitted as States into the Union upon equality among the sisterhood of States. That may be the hidden purpose of some, but they dare not proclaim it.

You do not propose now or hereafter to give them their liberty, but your purpose is to hold these people as subjects, and to rule them with the sword of a tyrant in one hand and the decrees of a dictator in the other.

You will keep on sacrificing the lives of American soldiers and spending millions upon millions of American treasure until the people shall demand that you stop your career of annihilation and spoliation, until they shall demand that you shall give to these people their own government with that protection necessary for its peaceful and successful inauguration.

Then, Mr. Chairman, our soldiers can turn their faces homeward and the drain upon our Treasury can cease.

In this course there is honor and glory for the Republic; in any other there is humiliation and shame.

We can then say to all the earth that we began as a Republic and that we shall continue as a Republic.

We can say that wherever we are forced to go it will be to carry the blessings of liberty, not tyranny; it will be to teach people to love us, not to hate us; it will be to establish republics, not empires, and that no black star representing a colonial despotism shall ever stain the red, white, and blue of the American flag. [Loud applause.]

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana. I yield thirty-seven minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MAYNARD].

Mr. MAYNARD. Mr. Chairman, in common with almost every member of this House, I am keenly interested in that phase of this bill which refers to the question of building battle ships and other war vessels in the Government navy-yards throughout the country. Representing, as I do, a district in which one of these yards is situated, it is but natural that the subject should have claimed a large share of my attention. Among the many important measures which have come before this Congress for consideration, none affect so vitally the majority of my constituents as does the measure now before us.

A country like the United States with unlimited seacoast to defend, with many of our largest and most prosperous cities to protect against the invading fleets of an enemy, with a growing commerce, and with ships that are carrying trade to every port, we must be in a position to defend them wherever attacked. All of these things demand that we shall be a great naval power. The burden and responsibility placed upon us by the late war but accentuates the necessity for an increase of our Navy, and the position which the United States occupies as a great naval power makes it absolutely incumbent upon us to be prepared to measure strength successfully on the seas with the strongest naval forces.

The reasons which appeal to us to increase the Navy must just as strongly appeal to our business judgment to convince us that we should keep the public yards of the country prepared not only to repair vessels but to construct in the shortest time and in the most economical manner the largest fighting craft for which a great naval power may have need in time of war. The policy of nearly all the naval powers of Europe is to increase the strength of their navy, and while they encourage and patronize the private dockyards, they at the same time demonstrate their belief that it is sound policy to keep in the highest efficiency the public dockyards by constructing a portion of the new ships in the Government yards.

I refer particularly to Great Britain, whose fighting machines plow the sea in every quarter of the globe, building, as she has, no less than 89 vessels in Government yards in the last twelve years, while Germany and France each built 60 per cent of their ships in government yards; and Russia proposes, when existing contracts are completed, to build all of her ships, and even little Japan is practically doing this to-day.

The reasons for building at least a portion of our ships in the navy-yards are many; but it seems to me that it will only be necessary to call the attention of this House to a few prominent facts to convince the most prejudiced mind of the fallacy of our present policy of fostering private yards at the expense of the public ones. Owning plants that represent capital invested to the extent of nearly a hundred million dollars, costing annually ten millions to



maintain, to do four millions of repair work, seems to me to be a business proposition so ridiculous as to need no other argument.

But, Mr. Chairman, the advocates of the private shipbuilding concerns tell this House that we should build our ships in private yards because we save money. Now, if this be true—but which I by no means admit, and, upon the contrary, most positively deny—it would be far better that we sell or even give away these naval stations to some private trust, with whom we may contract at their own price, getting back as much as possible of the money invested, pay the four millions annually for repair work, and save the ten millions that is required to maintain the public yards.

But let us examine some of the other reasons why it is good public policy to build all or a part of the vessels provided for in this bill in the public yards.

First. The Government owns its own plants, which represent an investment of a hundred million dollars. An equal investment in a private concern would have to pay interest, depreciation, taxes, insurance, and a large force of expert men, as well as a large office force; all of which the Government has without adding one cent to the cost of building the ship.

Second. To the actual cost of building a ship in the private yard is to be added whatever per cent of profit is satisfactory; I suppose not less than 10 per cent, and frequently very much more. While it may not have proved profitable in some instances, and the contracting parties may have sustained a loss, we all know that the business is conducted for a profit; all of which would be saved to the Government building in its own yards.

Third. As long as the yards are to be maintained and repair work done in them, we must have a trained force of men to properly and accurately make the repairs that may be necessary.

To keep this force of skilled men on hand, so that they may be available for such repair work as comes to the yard, the Department is trying to find employment for the men instead of hurrying the repairs and doing only such things as are necessary. The present tendency is to see what repairs can be done and what improvements can be made to the ships with the idea of providing work to keep a trained force together. With a ship building on the docks they can be used either on the ships or, when necessary, on repair work, thus always having on hand a large force that can be used for either purpose, and by doing away with the necessity of extending the work on the part of the Department, and the men will not be afraid of working themselves out of a job.

To keep the cost of repairs down to the lowest point the Government must have the most skilled men, but under the present policy we take the risk of driving those men away from employment in the Government yards because of the uncertainty of the length of their employment. With a certainty of a continuance of their employment the Government yards would command the most skilled and best trained men in the trades; and from this skill, in addition to the other strong reasons given, the cost of repair work in the yards would be very much reduced from what it is under present condition.

The chairman of the committee yesterday urged that one of the strongest reasons for building in private yards is that the Government works eight hours and the private yards nine and ten hours. That is not a good reason; the hours of work in Government employ was fixed by Congress, and now the gentlemen on the other side seek to use it as an argument to crack the head of labor. The mechanic working eight hours will do as much work as the man working ten hours, because the shorter hours better fits him for his work; he will certainly do better work for this and another reason; the best trained and most skillful men will seek employment where the hours are shorter and the pay is best.

It follows as a sure conclusion that the most skillful workman will produce the best job and in the shortest time. A better class of workmen means a better built ship, and a better built ship means a saving to the Government in maintenance and repair. The private yards do get ten hours' work a day out of the men, but the Government gets no advantage out of this fact. The extra two hours are the profit of the shipbuilding company, and it is this profit that is diverted by the present policy from the mechanic to the capitalist.

Admiral Bowles, Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair in submitting the advantages of building new work in the Government yards, says: "The fourth advantage in carrying on new work in the Government yards is that it enables the Government to maintain a high standard of workmanship and design, by which contractors can be made to conform to what is necessary under their contract," and the Admiral adds that he considers this a great advantage.

I take it for granted that if the members of this House can be convinced that the work can be done in Government yards as cheaply, as expeditiously, and as efficiently as it can be done by private corporations that there will be practically no opposition to those provisions of the bill now under consideration providing for such work to be undertaken by Government labor. And this

is undoubtedly true. No one, it is thought, will attempt to deny that private shipbuilders have made large, even enormous, profits out of Government contracts.

If this were not so, they would not be so anxious to secure them, nor would they be so interested in the attempt to defeat any legislation which has for its object the taking of this work out of their hands. Certainly it is true that the U. S. S. *Monadnock* was built by the Government for less than her sister ship, the *Monterey*, was built for by an outside corporation. That the Mare Island Navy-Yard repaired the transport *Logan* for 35 per cent less than the contractors bid to do the work for is a matter of official record, and if such an enormous saving can be made in one instance, there is no good and sufficient reason why it can not be done in all.

It has been repeatedly asserted that when the present stone dock at Mare Island Navy-Yard was completed the Government gave the contract to construct the caisson to a private firm for \$78,000. A few years later a new caisson was needed, and the work of building it was given to the Government mechanics, who built it for so low a price that the chairman of the Naval Committee admitted in his argument yesterday that the Government saved \$13,000—thirteen thousand as admitted by the gentleman from Illinois or forty-one thousand as claimed by the much-abused cards. The fact, which is the only important thing sought to be shown, is clearly established that the Government, under its own officers, with its own men, saved money over the same work done by contract. The gentleman from Illinois has proved the contention of the card. Further comment is unnecessary.

Many of those who are opposed to the employment of Government labor on this class of work have cited the cases of the *Texas*, *Cincinnati*, *Raleigh*, and *Maine*, the cost of construction of which vessels they assert exceeded the sum for which they could have been built by the contractors. But it is a well-known fact that no contractors would undertake the work for the estimates made by the Government. The building of these ships was at that time an experiment, and the navy-yards were not then in a condition to do the work as economically as at present; and many things that were charged to these vessels should have been charged to the betterment of the yards, such as tools, slips, etc., which were not consumed in their building and are still in use at the two yards in which these vessels were built—so Chief Constructor Bowles testified in his hearing before the Naval Committee two years ago.

Their organization was poor; they had no trained foreman to direct the work, no skilled force of mechanics to execute it. The men had to be trained to a new style of shipbuilding. We were changing from a navy of wooden ships to a navy of ironclads. Even the officers of the Navy in charge were themselves inexperienced in building iron ships. From that time on the progress has been steady, and the mechanics now employed, or ready to be employed, in the Government yards are not to be excelled by any in the country.

The men are thoroughly capable and efficient, the method of supervision can not be improved upon, and the yards can at slight cost be fitted with every device needed or desirable in order to place them in thorough condition to build any vessel the Government may construct, even to the largest and costliest battle ship. It may be confidently asserted that to-day our Government yards are in a position to build our ships at no additional cost to the country and to the taxpayers than it would be to have them built for if the work was intrusted to private corporations.

A prominent member of this House, and a deep student of the subject, stated some time ago in a communication which has since been published that "we owe it to the taxpayers to build where it can be done at the least possible expense;" and, in stating the case thus, I am persuaded that he expressed the sentiments and wishes of nine-tenths of the voters throughout the country. Rear-Admiral Melville, the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering of the Navy Department, in a report made in 1892 stated in regard to the construction of the machinery of the *Raleigh* and *Cincinnati* as follows:

It is gratifying to the Bureau to be able to report in regard to the building of the machinery of these two vessels that, judging from the expenditures thus far, its cost when fully completed and erected on board the vessels will be considerably less than the original estimates on which the contractors refused to bid as being too low for the amount of work required, and this after making due allowance for the cost of repairing the machinery of the *Cincinnati* damaged by fire.

Such testimony from such a source is significant, and should not be forgotten.

Then, too, it is important to remember the testimony of another expert on this subject. I refer to the evidence of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy, recently expressed before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, who gave it as his opinion that, owing to the marked improvement effected during the last ten years in the administration of navy-yard affairs, the Government could secure better ships for less money by patronizing its own plants.

It has been estimated that the United States has up to the present time spent nearly \$100,000,000 in the equipment of its navy-yards, and practically the only use to which they are now put is to keep its vessels in repair. What an enormous investment and what a pitifully small return! As already stated, statistics show that it costs over \$10,000,000 annually to run our navy-yards to enable them to do about \$4,000,000 worth of repair work.

What a state of affairs! What business man of ordinary intelligence could permit such conditions to continue? It is a wanton waste of public money for which there is no excuse. It is well to remember that the cost of maintaining our navy-yards would be practically no greater if \$10,000,000 worth of new construction work, in addition to the repair work, were done than it is to have only a small amount of repair work done there. During the last ten years 4 ships only have been built at the navy-yards at a cost of \$7,200,000, while during the same period 139 ships have been constructed in private yards at a cost of over one hundred and thirty-one millions.

With a view to obtaining precise and reliable information as to what amount of expenditure would be necessary to put the Government yards in fit and proper condition to successfully build even the largest battle ships, I requested advices on the subject from the Navy Department, and quote herewith from their official reply:

While improvements are now in progress which will bring the Boston, League Island, and Puget Sound navy-yards to a state of efficiency, there are necessary certain preparations in the way of building slips, slip traveling cranes, railroad tracks, and power communications which must be made before even the important yards could build a battle ship. To be precise: The New York Navy-Yard would be in proper condition to build a battle ship or cruiser provided a simultaneous appropriation is made amounting to \$175,000 for preparation of the building slip with overhead traveling crane and power communications. At the Norfolk Navy-Yard it is possible to launch a battle ship or armored cruiser, and the yard is in proper condition to undertake the building of such vessels provided a simultaneous appropriation is made of \$225,000 for the building of a new slip, with overhead cranes and power communications. The preceding answer applies to the Mare Island Navy-Yard. At the Boston Navy-Yard the improvements now proceeding in the plant at that yard will bring it into proper condition to undertake the building of a battle ship or cruiser within about two years.

A further communication from the Navy Department is here given:

Referring to the Bureau's letter No. 575-A, 105 and 92 of this date, with regard to the Government navy-yards which are in a condition to undertake the building of a battle ship or armored cruiser, it is noted that particular mention of the navy-yard, Portsmouth, N. H., was accidentally omitted, and it is desired to add that with an appropriation of \$175,000 for the preparation of the building slip, now available, with overhead traveling crane and power communications, the building of a battle ship or armored cruiser could be undertaken at that yard.

Thus it will be seen that the Government yards could, at comparatively slight expense, be put in position to undertake the building of war vessels; and it would only seem sound and reasonable business policy to do this, for reasons already stated, instead of having the country's ships constructed by outside parties, who are certainly in the business to make money. But, rather than utilize its own facilities, the governmental policy has heretofore been to keep her costly yards in comparative idleness and use them only for occasional repair work and pay exorbitant sums of money for the construction of new ships by those whose only desire in obtaining the contract is to make as much out of them as possible.

And right here, Mr. Chairman, let me say with the strongest emphasis that this is no attack upon the private shipyard. I for one believe that the private yard is an enterprise that should be fostered. I believe that they should have a share of the Government work. There is in the district which I have the honor to represent upon this floor one of the finest shipbuilding plants in the world; and I would not raise my voice to injure an enterprise in the success of which so many of my constituents are interested.

Foster the private yards, but not at the expense of the public ones. There should be work enough for all. The private yards of the country have now 60 vessels building; the Government yards are comparatively idle. In time of need we should be able to use either or both. Give these four provided for in this bill to the public yards.

Mr. Chairman, in the limited time allotted to me I can not enumerate a great many other reasons which I believe would appeal to this House, why the building of Government vessels in the public yards would be an advantage, both as to the construction of new work and at the same time facilitate and cheapen the cost of repair work which it is the present policy of the Government to have done in the public yards.

The necessity for the United States being a strong naval power and for the continued increase of the Navy is evident; and if this is to be done, we should certainly not any longer remain at the mercy of the private contractor, but should with the least possible delay equip the public yards of the country for doing new work under the most favorable conditions. We have shown that it is a sound policy pursued by all the naval powers of the world; that it cheapens construction and guarantees a better built ship; it provides a permanent force of trained and skilled men prepared at all times to quickly and cheaply do any class of work the navy-

yards may be called upon to perform; that it establishes a basis and a standard to which contractors can be made to conform in the execution of such work as may be undertaken by them.

And apart from the considerations already touched upon, which it is thought are amply sufficient in themselves to cause this desirable change to be made, apart from the enormous saving of public money which this policy would effect, it is submitted that even were the cost entailed by the Government constructing its own vessels the same or even greater than to have them built by private corporations still it would be undoubtedly advantageous to adopt the former method for the two-fold reason that this great country, with its continually expanding territory, should be in a position at any moment to turn out powerful fighting machines under its own auspices in case of war, and secondly, that the money spent in the Government yards goes directly into the pockets of the people and not to swell the dividends of the stockholders and capitalists.

Mr. Chairman, the building of battle ships in Government yards is good policy. The people demand it. Labor has petitioned for it. We represent the people, and are here to carry out their wishes. Let us give them what they want. [Loud applause.]

On motion of Mr. MEYER of Louisiana, the committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the Chair, Mr. SHERMAN, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill (H. R. 14046) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903, and for other purposes, and had come to no resolution thereon.

#### CUBAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICE.

Mr. HITT. Mr. Speaker, I desire to submit a conference report. I ask to have the statement read in lieu of the report.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HITT], chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, calls up a conference report, requesting that the statement be read and that the reading of the report be omitted. Is there objection?

Mr. RICHARDSON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I desire to ask the gentleman if this report is concurred in by the minority members of the committee?

Mr. HITT. This report is unanimous, and, more than that, it is that for which the House strove in conference.

Mr. RICHARDSON of Tennessee. Is it signed by the minority members?

Mr. HITT. All of them.

The SPEAKER. The Chair hears no objection to the request, and it is so ordered. The Clerk will read the statement.

The report of the conference committee is as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 13996) making appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service in the Republic of Cuba, having met, after full and free conference have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its amendments numbered 2 and 3.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 1, and agree to the same.

ROBERT R. HITT,  
HUGH A. DINSMORE,  
ROBERT ADAMS, JR.,

Managers on the part of the House.

S. M. CULLOM,  
JOHN T. MORGAN,  
H. C. LODGE,

Managers on the part of the Senate.

The statement of the managers on the part of the House was read, as follows:

The managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 13996) making appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service in the Republic of Cuba, submit the following written statement in explanation of the accompanying report, namely:

On amendment No. 1, increasing the salary of the minister to Cuba from \$10,000 to \$12,000, as proposed by the Senate, the House recedes.

On amendment No. 2, providing for rent of a proper legation residence and offices not to exceed \$2,000, as proposed by the Senate, the Senate recedes.

On amendment No. 3, providing for a consul at Matanzas at \$2,500, as proposed by the Senate, the Senate recedes; so that the bill remains unchanged except in the increase of the salary of the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Cuba, which is made \$12,000 instead of \$10,000.

ROBERT R. HITT,  
ROBT. ADAMS, JR.,

Managers on the part of the House.

The conference report was agreed to.

On motion of Mr. HITT, a motion to reconsider the last vote was laid on the table.

And then, on motion of Mr. DALZELL (at 4 o'clock and 50 minutes p. m.), the House adjourned.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, the following executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a copy of a communication from the Secretary of the Interior submitting an estimate of appropriation for survey of boundaries of



Colorado, New Mexico, and Oklahoma—to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a communication from the General Superintendent of the Life-Saving Service, relating to mileage of certain officers—to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, making recommendation as to settlement of a deficiency in the appropriation for the Sac and Fox Indian Agency in Iowa—to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions of the following titles were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several Calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. McCLEARY, from the Committee on the Library, to which was referred the bill of the Senate (S. R. 12) authorizing the selection of a site and the erection of a pedestal for a bronze statue in Washington, D. C., in honor of the late Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2042); which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. PARKER, from the Committee on Military Affairs, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 14351) to provide for a national military park commission, reported the same with amendments, accompanied by a report (No. 2043); which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, private bills and resolutions of the following titles were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the Committee of the Whole House, as follows:

Mr. HENRY C. SMITH, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 3423), reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 250) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of Louis Scofield, jr., accompanied by a report (No. 2021); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. OTJEN, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 8006, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 251) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of Mrs. Martha E. West, accompanied by a report (No. 2022); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. HENRY C. SMITH, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 5976, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 252) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of William E. Cummin, accompanied by a report (No. 2023); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. KEHOE, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 5489) for the relief of Howard Lodge, No. 13, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, of Gallatin, Tenn., reported the same with amendments, accompanied by a report (No. 2024); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. GIBSON, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 4866) for the relief of the estate of Dr. Thomas J. Coward, deceased, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2025); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. CALDWELL, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 1773, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 253) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of the heirs of James Goodloe, deceased, accompanied by a report (No. 2026); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 7438, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 254) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of R. H. Dunaway, accompanied by a report (No. 2027); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 11041, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 255) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of Amos L. Griffith, accompanied by a report (No. 2028); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. SIMS, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 14070) for the relief of John A. Meroney, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2029); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. KEHOE, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the Senate (S. 92) for the relief of Howard Lodge, No. 13, Independent Order of Odd Fellows, of Gallatin, Tenn., reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2030); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. SIMS, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the resolution of the House (H. Res. 223) referring bills of the House Nos. 13965, 2517, 5493, 5491, 5502, 5507, 5508, 5484, 11143, 12747, 12748, 13603, and 13903 to the Court of Claims, reported the same with amendments, accompanied by a report (No. 2031); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. CALDWELL, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 7421, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 256) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of August Heberlein, accompanied by a report (No. 2032); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. THOMPSON, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 12446, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 257) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of Mrs. A. E. Hardin, accompanied by a report (No. 2033); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. MAHON, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 14326) for the relief of Samuel B. Bootes, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2034); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 13518, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 258) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of Julia A. Pierce and John Pierce, heirs of John C. Pierce, deceased, accompanied by a report (No. 2035); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 13521, reported in lieu thereof a resolution (H. Res. 259) referring to the Court of Claims the papers in the case of the legal representatives of H. S. Thompson, deceased, accompanied by a report (No. 2036); which said resolution and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House H. R. 11937, reported in lieu thereof a bill (H. R. 14412) for the relief of Margaret Dalton, widow of George Dalton, deceased, accompanied by a report (No. 2037); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. SIMS, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 11208) for the relief of the heirs and legal representatives of John W. Hancock, deceased, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2038); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. KEHOE, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 11272) to pay J. B. McRae \$99 for services as hospital steward, etc., reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2039); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. THOMPSON, from the Committee on War Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 10654) for the relief of Mount Zion Society, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2040); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 7355) authorizing the payment of the claim of M. A. Gantt & Son for board and lodging to volunteers during the Spanish-American war, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2041); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

Mr. GRAFF, from the Committee on Claims, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 10961) for the relief of Judd O. Harzell, of Laharpe, Ill., reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 2044); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

#### CHANGE OF REFERENCE.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXII, the Committee on Elections No. 1 was discharged from the consideration of the bill (H. R. 6175) for the relief of the estate of Samuel Lee, and the same was referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

## PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials of the following titles were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. RAY of New York: A bill (H. R. 14410) to provide for the control and management of United States penitentiaries, and for other purposes—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14411) to regulate commutation for good conduct for United States prisoners—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CUSHMAN: A bill (H. R. 14413) to establish a Branch Soldiers' Home at Coeur d'Alene, Idaho—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. HENRY C. SMITH: A joint resolution (H. J. Res. 190) concerning consolidation and duplication of scientific work carried on by the Government—to the Committee on Agriculture.

## PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. MAHON, from the Committee on War Claims: A bill (H. R. 14412) for the relief of Margaret Dalton, widow of George Dalton, deceased, in lieu of the bill H. R. 11937—to the Private Calendar.

By Mr. ALLEN of Maine: A bill (H. R. 14414) granting an increase of pension to Frederick F. Willey, alias William F. Willey—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. BOWERSOCK: A bill (H. R. 14415) granting a pension to William McClure—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. CUSHMAN: A bill (H. R. 14416) granting an increase of pension to Albert H. Phillips—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. DOUGHERTY: A bill (H. R. 14417) granting a pension to Lewis D. David—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GRAFF: A bill (H. R. 14418) for the relief of Bernard Wagner—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. GRIFFITH: A bill (H. R. 14419) granting an increase of pension to Stephen A. Kennedy—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HASKINS: A bill (H. R. 14420) granting an increase of pension to Delia H. Honey—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. HENDERSON: A bill (H. R. 14421) granting an increase of pension to John Q. A. Rider—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HENRY of Connecticut: A bill (H. R. 14422) for the relief of Charles Uerkvitz—to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. LEWIS of Georgia: A bill (H. R. 14423) for the relief of the estate of Mrs. Tabitha W. Reese, deceased—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. MIERS of Indiana: A bill (H. R. 14424) granting an increase of pension to Edward Sherman—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14425) granting an increase of pension to Harvey Miller—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14426) granting a pension to Sarah J. Kinnaman—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SIMS: A bill (H. R. 14427) for the relief of the estate M. W. Savells, deceased—to the Committee on War Claims.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14428) for the relief of D. C. Savells—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. SMITH of Iowa: A bill (H. R. 14429) granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim of the widow, heirs, and personal representative of Thomas Page for Indian depredation—to the Committee on Claims.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14430) for the relief of the personal representative of Jacob Bogert—to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. TOMPKINS of Ohio: A bill (H. R. 14431) correcting military record of Harvey Williams—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14432) granting an increase of pension to Elizabeth W. Eldridge—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14433) granting an increase of pension to J. M. Rife—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14434) granting an increase of pension to Israel Gaymen—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14435) granting an increase of pension to James Coyle—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14436) granting an increase of pension to Samuel C. Heastan—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14437) granting a pension to Henry M. Bostwick—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14438) correcting the military record of Carlos H. Cady—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. NEVILLE: A bill (H. R. 14439) granting an increase of pension to Franklin Peale—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. WADSWORTH: A bill (H. R. 14440) granting a pension to William L. Buck—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HENRY C. SMITH, from the Committee on War Claims: A resolution (H. Res. 250) in lieu of H. R. 3423, referring the claim of Louis Scofield, jr., to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

By Mr. OTJEN, from the Committee on War Claims: A resolution (H. Res. 251) in lieu of H. R. 8006, referring the claim of Mrs. Martha E. West to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

By Mr. HENRY C. SMITH, from the Committee on War Claims: A resolution (H. Res. 252) in lieu of H. R. 5976, referring the claim of William E. Cummin to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

By Mr. CALDWELL, from the Committee on War Claims: A resolution (H. Res. 253) in lieu of H. R. 1773, referring the claim of the heirs of James Goodloe, deceased, to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

Also, from the Committee on War Claims, a resolution (H. Res. 254) in lieu of H. R. 7438, referring the claim of R. H. Dunaway to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

Also, from the Committee on War Claims, a resolution (H. Res. 255) in lieu of H. R. 11041, referring the claim of Amos L. Griffith to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

Also, from the Committee on War Claims, a resolution (H. Res. 256) in lieu of H. R. 7421, referring the claim of the estate of August Heberlein to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

By Mr. THOMPSON, from the Committee on War Claims: A resolution (H. Res. 257) in lieu of H. R. 12445, referring the claim of Mrs. A. E. Hardin to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

By Mr. MAHON, from the Committee on War Claims: A resolution (H. Res. 258) in lieu of H. R. 13518, referring the claim of Julia A. Pierce and John Pierce to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

Also, from the Committee on War Claims, a resolution (H. Res. 259) in lieu of H. R. 13521, referring the claim of the legal representatives of H. S. Thompson, deceased, to the Court of Claims—to the Private Calendar.

## PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, the following petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By Mr. ALEXANDER: Resolutions of the Merchants' Exchange of Buffalo, N. Y., in favor of the Lodge consular bill—to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. ALLEN of Maine: Petition of George B. Merrill and 47 other citizens of Yarmouthville, Me., for repeal of the duties on beef, veal, mutton, and pork—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CALDERHEAD: Petition of the Kelley Milling Company, Kansas City, Mo., for the removal of the duty on breadstuffs—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CASSINGHAM: Papers to accompany House bill for the relief of Fletcher Duling—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. DARRAGH: Papers to accompany House bill 11254, to amend the military record of Andrew Martin—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. DAYTON: Petition of John A. Teter, of Pendleton County, W. Va., for reference of war claim to the Court of Claims—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. DOUGHERTY: Petition of Lewis D. David for restoration on the pension roll—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GRAHAM: Resolutions of J. L. Buzzell Post, No. 24, of Amandale, Department of Minnesota, Grand Army of the Republic, favoring House bill 3067, relating to pensions—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GRIFFITH: Petition of National Association of Manufacturers, in favor of a system of national irrigation—to the Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands.

Also, petition of James T. McDonald, of Krebs, Ind. T., in support of House bill 12268, relating to Indian Territory—to the Committee on the Territories.

Also, paper to accompany House bill granting a pension to Stephen A. Kennedy—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, petition of the Samuel Wymond Cooperage Company, in favor of House bills 178 and 179—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HANBURY: Additional papers to accompany House bill 9874, to reimburse William A. Brown & Co. for one case of opium erroneously condemned and sold by the United States—to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. HILL: Resolutions of the Grand Division of the Sons of Temperance of Connecticut, concerning post exchanges at military posts—to the Committee on Military Affairs.



By Mr. HITT: Petition of the Personal Liberty League, of Rockford, Ill., in favor of House bills 178 and 179, reducing the tax on distilled spirits—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. JACK: Petition of Local Union No. 1384, of Punxsutawney, Pa., favoring an educational test for restriction of immigration—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. JONES of Washington: Petition of W. L. Jones, favoring the passage of a bill authorizing the Secretary of War to use only American-built vessels in the transportation of Government supplies to the Philippines—to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. LINDSAY: Resolution of the drug trade section of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation, allowing the payment of a drawback in cases where certain imported materials can not be positively identified, as shown in House bill 11308—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MANN: Petitions of the Board of Trade and citizens of Chicago, Ill., in support of House bill 3057, for the enactment of irrigation legislation—to the Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands.

Also, resolutions of National Encampment Service Men of the Spanish War, of Chicago, Ill., favoring the Bell bill, allowing travel pay to volunteers from Manila, P. I., to San Francisco, Cal.—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petitions of St. Adolbert's Society and the Polish Roman Catholic Clergy Society, of Chicago, Ill., favoring the erection of a statue to the late Brigadier-General Count Pulaski at Washington—to the Committee on the Library.

By Mr. McCLELLAN: Resolution of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation, in favor of House bill No. 11308—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MIERS of Indiana: Papers to accompany House bill granting an increase of pension to Harvey Miller—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. MOODY of Oregon: Resolutions of the Chamber of Commerce of Astoria, Oreg., urging the passage of House bill 163, to pension employees and dependents of Life-Saving Service—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HOLLIDAY: Resolutions of United Mine Workers' Union No. 198, of Seelyville, Ind., favoring the restriction of the immigration of cheap labor from the south and east of Europe—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. OTJEN: Resolution of common council of Milwaukee, Wis., against the beef trust—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RUPPERT: Resolutions of the drug trade section of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation, favoring the enactment of House bill 11308—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. RYAN: Resolutions of Buffalo (N. Y.) Merchants' Exchange, approving the reorganization of the consular service—to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. SIMS: Resolutions of Forked Deer Lodge, No. 72, Jackson, Tenn., for more rigid restriction of immigration—to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. STARK: Papers to accompany House bill 14377, granting a pension to Josephine Stewart—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SULZER: Resolution of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation, in favor of House bill 11308—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. WARNOCK: Petition of J. W. Hood, of Fayetteville, N. C., and others, favoring Senate bill 5002 and House bill 12940, designated as the inquiry commission bill—to the Committee on Labor.

## SENATE.

THURSDAY, May 15, 1902.

Prayer by the Chaplain, Rev. W. H. MILBURN, D. D.

The Secretary proceeded to read the Journal of yesterday's proceedings, when, on request of Mr. GALLINGER, and by unanimous consent, the further reading was dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Journal will stand approved.

SAC AND FOX AGENCY, IOWA.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a communication from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a letter from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs submitting an item to be incorporated in the general deficiency appropriation bill for the payment of indebtedness incurred by the Indian agent of the Sac and Fox Agency, Iowa, amounting to \$2,143.05; which, with the accompanying paper, was referred to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

## MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE.

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. W. J. BROWNING, its Chief Clerk, announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 13996) making appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service in the Republic of Cuba.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 13895) making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903, asks a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and had appointed Mr. WADSWORTH, Mr. HENRY of Connecticut, and Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi managers at the conference on the part of the House.

## PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS.

Mr. HANSBROUGH presented a petition of Lodge No. 125, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Jamestown, N. Dak., and a petition of Local Division No. 178, Order of Railway Conductors, of Grand Forks, N. Dak., praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. CLAPP presented a petition of Flour Packers and Millers' Protective Union No. 7548, of Minneapolis, Minn., praying for the enactment of legislation providing an educational test for immigrants to this country; which was referred to the Committee on Immigration.

Mr. ELKINS presented petitions of Local Division No. 448, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Bluefield; of Lodge No. 236, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, of Benwood Junction; of Lodge No. 236, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, of Hinton; of Local Division No. 284, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Grafton; of Local Division No. 190, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Huntington, and of Colonel A. Howard Fleming Lodge, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Fairmont, all in the State of West Virginia, praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. BURTON presented a petition of the American Federation of Labor, of Pittsburg, Kans., praying for the enactment of legislation providing an educational test for immigrants to this country; which was referred to the Committee on Immigration.

He also presented petitions of Tip Top Lodge, No. 396, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, of Goodland; of Osawatimie Lodge, No. 65, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Osawatimie; of Walnut Valley Lodge, No. 354, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Arkansas City; of Carver Division, No. 28, Order of Railway Conductors, of Atchison; of Local Division No. 161, Order of Railway Conductors, of Parsons; of Herington Division, No. 261, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Herington; of Local Division No. 368, Order of Railway Conductors, of Argentine; of Cherokee Lodge, No. 370, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Parsons; of Lodge No. 96, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Dodge City; of Local Division No. 179, Order of Railway Conductors, of Topeka; of Local Division No. 137, Order of Railway Conductors, of Osawatimie; of Lodge No. 564, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Hoisington; of Local Division No. 81, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, of Kansas City, and of Kaw Valley Lodge, No. 313, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, all in the State of Kansas, praying for the passage of the so-called Hoar anti-injunction bill, to limit the meaning of the word "conspiracy" and the use of "restraining orders and injunctions" in certain cases, and remonstrating against the passage of any substitute therefor; which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. LODGE. I present a resolution adopted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, relative to the building of war vessels in the navy-yards of the country. I ask that the resolution be printed in the RECORD, and referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

The resolution was referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In the year 1902. Resolutions relative to the building of war vessels in navy-yards of the United States.

Resolved, That the Senators and Representatives from Massachusetts in the Congress of the United States are requested to use all reasonable efforts to secure the passage of the naval appropriation bill now pending in such form as shall authorize the construction by the United States Government in its own navy-yards of some of the war vessels to be built under the provisions of that bill.